Q.C.

The appellant sued the respondents for libel arising from a newspaper article.

Prior to filing a statement of defence, one of the individual respondents successfully moved to strike the claim against him on the basis that he was not personally served with a libel notice under s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the alternative mode of service in s. 5(1)—delivery to a grown-up person at the defendant's chief office—applies to all defendants, including individuals.

Delivery of the notice to an assistant at the respondent's campaign headquarters constituted effective service.

The appellant appealed a judgment, arguing that the respondent's claim was barred by cause of action estoppel due to an earlier small claims court action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that cause of action estoppel did not apply because the earlier action was resolved by a settlement without a court determination or releases.

Furthermore, the respondent was not required to assert its complaint as a counterclaim in the small claims court, as it would have exceeded the monetary jurisdiction.

The parties appealed and cross-appealed a trial judgment arising from the dissolution of their horse business relationship.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in awarding unjust enrichment for foal expenses, dismissing the claim for purse monies, overcompensating for a horse's reduced value, and denying damages from an interlocutory injunction.

The court also awarded the appellant solicitor and client costs based on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The cross-appeal was allowed in part to grant the respondent pre-judgment interest.

The parents of a child born with Down syndrome sued the mother's doctor for failing to advise her of testing that would have revealed the condition.

The trial judge awarded damages for the child's care up to age 19, plus an $80,000 contingency for adult care, finding that the state would cover adult group home costs.

The Court of Appeal increased the award, holding that post-trial amendments to the Family Relations Act made the parents legally responsible for adult care.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the doctor's appeal and restored the trial judgment, concluding that the child would withdraw from the parents' charge upon entering a group home, meaning the statutory support obligation would not apply and the state would bear the costs.

The parents of a child born with Down syndrome sued the mother's doctor for failing to advise her of testing that would have revealed the condition.

The trial judge awarded damages for the child's care up to age 19, plus an $80,000 contingency for adult care, finding that the state would cover adult group home costs.

The Court of Appeal increased the award, holding that post-trial amendments to the Family Relations Act made the parents legally responsible for adult care.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the doctor's appeal and restored the trial judgment, concluding that the child would withdraw from the parents' charge upon entering a group home, meaning the statutory support obligation would not apply and the state would bear the costs.

During a lawful strike and lockout, the union engaged in secondary picketing at retail outlets and other locations.

The employer obtained an interlocutory injunction prohibiting picketing at secondary locations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that secondary picketing is generally lawful unless it involves tortious or criminal conduct.

The Court rejected the 'illegal per se' doctrine, finding that the wrongful action model best balances the interests of free expression under section 2(b) of the Charter with the protection of third parties from undue economic harm.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant Bank was a secured creditor of a bankrupt corporation.

The trustee in bankruptcy sought to sell the corporation's oil and gas properties.

The respondents held overriding royalties arising from the corporation's working interest and claimed priority over the Bank, arguing their royalties were interests in land.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the common law prohibition against creating an interest in land from an incorporeal hereditament is inapplicable to the oil and gas industry.

An overriding royalty can be an interest in land if that is the intention of the parties.

The parties entered into a sale agreement containing an arbitration clause that precluded appeals.

A dispute arose, and a subsequent tripartite arbitration agreement was signed to include a third party.

The appellant's claim was dismissed at arbitration, and it sought leave to appeal under section 45(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The application judge held that the original sale agreement governed and precluded an appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the subsequent arbitration agreement was a free-standing agreement that governed the arbitration, thereby permitting the appellant to seek leave to appeal.

The appellants filed a Notice of Appeal from an order dismissing their motion to declare an action against them a nullity in bankruptcy proceedings.

They then brought a motion in chambers before the Court of Appeal, arguing that the filing of the Notice of Appeal triggered an automatic stay of the impending trial under s. 195 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The chambers judge first determined she had jurisdiction to decide the applicability of the stay.

On the merits, the judge found that the appellants did not have an appeal as of right under s. 193(a) or (c) because the order appealed from did not involve future rights or property directly exceeding $10,000 in value.

Consequently, the automatic stay under s. 195 did not take effect, and the motion was dismissed.

The appellant was acquitted of second degree murder after the trial judge ruled his statements to police were involuntary and inadmissible.

The Crown appealed, and the New Brunswick Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the voluntariness test by considering all circumstances, including oppressive conditions and inducements, and that the Crown's appeal did not raise a question of law alone.

The appellant, who suffers from AIDS, uses marihuana for medicinal purposes and obtained a personal exemption under s. 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

He applied for a declaration that his s. 7 Charter rights were infringed because the exemption did not protect his caregivers from criminal liability and the government failed to provide a safe supply of marihuana.

The Court of Appeal held that while the provincial superior court had jurisdiction to hear the constitutional challenge to the Act, the appellant failed to establish a s. 7 violation.

The Act itself did not preclude caregiver exemptions, and the appellant was not dependent on the government for his supply.

Following a fatal motor vehicle accident caused by an uninsured driver, a dispute arose between two insurers over the priority of their respective policies in funding the settlement.

The motions judge held that the driver's State Farm Fire umbrella policy, which included an uninsured motorist option, had to respond before the passenger's Royal Insurance O.E.F. 44 family protection endorsement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the umbrella policy was not a motor vehicle liability policy under the Insurance Act and was explicitly excess insurance.

Therefore, the passenger's O.E.F. 44 endorsement had to be exhausted before recourse could be made to the umbrella policy.

The respondents, operators of adult entertainment parlours, were charged with keeping a common bawdy-house contrary to s. 210 of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the charges were stayed on the basis that the terms 'acts of indecency' and 'prostitution' were unconstitutionally vague under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that it was bound by stare decisis, as previous Supreme Court of Canada and Court of Appeal decisions had already established that the community standard of tolerance test provides an intelligible standard and that the terms are not impermissibly vague.

The stays were set aside and the matters remitted for trial.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 43 of the Criminal Code, which provides a defence for parents and teachers who use reasonable force to correct a child.

The appellant argued that the provision violates sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while section 43 engages a child's security of the person, it does not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The court also held that section 43 does not constitute state-imposed cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, and any infringement of equality rights under section 15 is justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that quashed a direct indictment against the accused.

The accused had already been committed for trial after a preliminary inquiry.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Attorney General can prefer a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code against an accused who could have been indicted through the ordinary process under s. 574(1)(a), which permitted his inclusion in a direct indictment with his co-accused.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the indictment reinstated.

The Crown appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that quashed a direct indictment against the accused.

The accused had already been committed for trial after a preliminary inquiry.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Attorney General can prefer a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code against an accused who could have been indicted through the ordinary process under s. 574(1)(a), which permitted his inclusion in a direct indictment with his co-accused.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the indictment reinstated.

The insured municipality suffered a catastrophic bacterial infection of its water supply, leading to investigations and a class action lawsuit.

The municipality's insurer appointed counsel to defend the civil actions under a reservation of rights.

Dissatisfied with the appointed counsel's advice and the reservation of rights, the municipality retained independent counsel and sought reimbursement from the insurer.

The Court of Appeal held that an insurer is only required to surrender control of the defence and pay for independent counsel if there is a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest.

As the reservation of rights was based on policy limits and exclusions rather than the insured's conduct, no conflict existed.

The insurer was not obliged to pay for the independent counsel.

The appellant, a permanent resident, was ordered removed from Canada for misrepresenting his marital status on his application.

He appealed to the Immigration Appeal Division (I.A.D.) under s. 70(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, arguing that the I.A.D. should consider the potential foreign hardship he would face if removed to Cambodia.

The I.A.D. and lower courts held that foreign hardship could not be considered because the Minister had not yet determined the country of removal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the I.A.D. is entitled to consider potential foreign hardship under s. 70(1)(b) when deciding whether to quash or stay a removal order, provided that a likely country of removal has been established by the individual facing removal.

On an appeal from the dismissal of a rule 21.01(3) motion, the court considered whether a corporation incorporated after the vendor's repudiation of a real estate agreement could adopt a pre-incorporation contract under s. 21 of the Business Corporations Act and sue for damages.

The court held that s. 21 replaces the common law and must be interpreted as a self-contained statutory scheme.

A contract falling within s. 21(4) remains a nascent statutory contract before adoption, and after incorporation the corporation's adoption operates retroactively to the date of the agreement.

Accepted repudiation terminated only future performance, not accrued obligations, so there remained a contract capable of adoption.

The corporation adopted the contract by commencing the action and therefore had status to enforce it.

The appellant's gas station leaked gasoline, contaminating the respondent's adjacent commercial property.

The trial judge awarded damages for remediation to a pristine state, stigma damages, a barrier, and prejudgment interest.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the award for remediation to a pristine state but struck the $350,000 award for stigma damages, finding no evidence of residual value loss once a property is restored to a pristine condition.

The court also replaced a mandatory injunction with a monetary award for a barrier and set aside the prejudgment interest to avoid double recovery, as damages were assessed at the date of trial.