Q.C.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal.

The appellants submitted costs submissions, while the respondent provided no response.

The court fixed costs in the amount of $20,000 plus disbursements and G.S.T.

The appellant bank and respondent trust company entered into agreements to finance a condominium project.

When the real estate market collapsed, the respondent breached its commitment to provide takeout financing, leaving the appellant with a significant shortfall.

The trial judge awarded the appellant damages including compound pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the rate specified in the loan agreement.

The Court of Appeal substituted simple interest.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that courts have jurisdiction at common law and in equity to award compound interest as expectation damages to fully compensate a plaintiff for the time-value of money.

The appellant bank and respondent trust company entered into agreements to finance a condominium project.

When the real estate market collapsed, the respondent breached its commitment to provide takeout financing, leaving the appellant with a significant shortfall.

The trial judge awarded the appellant damages including compound pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the rate specified in the loan agreement.

The Court of Appeal substituted simple interest.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that courts have jurisdiction at common law and in equity to award compound interest as expectation damages to fully compensate a plaintiff for the time-value of money.

The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, sought a confidentiality order for technical documents related to the environmental assessment of nuclear reactors being built in China.

The Federal Court Trial Division and Federal Court of Appeal denied the order.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada established the test for granting confidentiality orders in civil litigation, adapting the Dagenais/Mentuck framework.

The Court held that a confidentiality order should be granted when necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, such as a commercial interest, and when the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects on the open court principle and freedom of expression.

Applying this test, the Court allowed the appeal and granted the confidentiality order.

The appellant broadcaster sought injunctive relief against parties assisting Canadian residents to subscribe to and decode U.S. direct-to-home satellite programming.

The appeal turned on whether s. 9(1)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act imposed a blanket prohibition on decoding encrypted subscription programming signals unless authorized by a lawful distributor in Canada, or only prohibited decoding of signals from licensed Canadian distributors.

Applying the modern contextual approach to statutory interpretation, the Court held the provision unambiguously creates an absolute prohibition with a limited exception and aligns with the broader broadcasting and copyright regime.

The Court refused to answer the stated Charter questions because the record did not support constitutional adjudication.

The appellants, Air Ontario pilots, brought an action against the respondents, Air Canada pilots, for breach of contract based on the union constitution after the respondents refused to implement an arbitration award integrating their seniority lists.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the historical legal fiction of a web of contracts between individual union members is no longer necessary or practical.

Instead, the Court recognized that a trade union is a legal entity capable of entering into a contract of membership with each individual member, and therefore, union members cannot be held personally liable to one another for breaching the union constitution.

The appellants, acting as litigation guardians for a dependent adult with Alzheimer's disease, commenced actions against her deceased husband's estate under the Matrimonial Property Act and the Dependants' Relief Act.

The Court of Appeal removed the family members as litigation and property guardians due to conflicts of interest, appointed the Public Trustee, and prohibited the Public Trustee from pursuing the matrimonial property claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction under the Dependent Adults Act to restrict the Public Trustee's authority and properly exercised it, as the matrimonial property claim was not in the dependent adult's best interests.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to differ with the disposition arrived at by the majority of the Court of Appeal regarding the reasonableness of the verdict.

LeBel J. dissented and would have allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals for careless storage of a firearm and storing a firearm contrary to regulations.

The trial judge found the accused had temporarily hidden loaded handguns in a panicked state.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this temporary hiding constituted 'storage' within the meaning of s. 86(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were entered, and the matter was remitted for sentencing.

The parties owned adjoining cottage properties and shared a mutual driveway.

In 1955, their predecessors in title signed an unregistered agreement granting each other a right-of-way over an 8-foot strip of their respective properties.

The actual driveway used by the parties over the next 45 years expanded into a keyhole shape.

When the appellant purchased her property and attempted to fence the boundary, the respondent successfully applied for a declaration of a prescriptive easement over the expanded driveway.

The appellant appealed, arguing that section 31 of the Limitations Act precludes a prescriptive easement where the use originated in a written agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 1955 agreement created a use as of right, not a permissive use, and therefore the statutory bar did not apply.

The Court also upheld the applications judge's findings on the dimensions and necessity of the easement.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decisions to strike his statement of claim and declare a mortgage registered to his mother as not binding on a partnership.

The appellant also alleged bias on the part of the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the statement of claim and the bias allegations, finding no substantial wrong and that the trial judge's conduct did not amount to bias.

However, the Court varied the judgment regarding the mortgage, directing that its validity and priority be determined in future proceedings when the property is sold, as the mortgagee was not a party to the action.

The appellant Bank appealed a decision granting priority to the respondent Charter's purchase-money security interest.

The debtor company had amalgamated, and there was confusion over its correct corporate name.

Charter registered its interest against the pre-amalgamation name, while the Bank later registered against the new name.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pre-amalgamation name continued to have legal existence based on the amalgamation agreement, making Charter's registration valid.

Furthermore, the Bank suffered no material prejudice as a search would have revealed Charter's interest.

The appellant was rendered a quadriplegic in a motor vehicle accident when the impaired driver failed to negotiate a sharp curve on a rural road.

The trial judge apportioned 35% liability to the municipality for failing to post a warning sign.

The Court of Appeal overturned this finding.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, holding that the trial judge's finding of negligence was a question of mixed fact and law that should not be overturned absent a palpable and overriding error.

The Court clarified the standards of review for questions of law, fact, and mixed fact and law.

The appellant First Nation challenged the constitutionality of provisions in British Columbia's Heritage Conservation Act that allowed the Minister to issue permits authorizing the alteration or destruction of aboriginal heritage objects, specifically culturally modified trees.

The appellants argued the provisions were ultra vires the province as they intruded on the federal power over Indians and lands reserved for Indians.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the impugned provisions were valid provincial legislation falling within the province's jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The Court found the legislation did not single out aboriginal peoples or impair their status, but rather established a balanced scheme for heritage conservation that applied generally across the province.

The appellant was rendered a quadriplegic in a motor vehicle accident when the impaired driver failed to negotiate a sharp curve on a rural road.

The trial judge apportioned 35% liability to the municipality for failing to post a warning sign.

The Court of Appeal overturned this finding.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, holding that the trial judge's finding of negligence was a question of mixed fact and law that should not be overturned absent a palpable and overriding error.

The Court clarified the standards of review for questions of law, fact, and mixed fact and law.

The appellant father appealed an order requiring him to pay child support in accordance with the Ontario Child Support Guidelines.

A 1985 court order had previously required him to pay a $4,000 lump sum for child support and denied him access.

The mother later married and her new husband assumed financial responsibility for the child.

Following her separation from the new husband, the mother applied for child support from the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the enactment of the Guidelines created an automatic right to vary pre-existing child support orders without needing to prove a material change in circumstances.

The Court also found that while the prior arrangements could constitute 'special provisions' under s. 37(2.3) of the Family Law Act, it would not be inequitable to apply the Guidelines in this case.

The parties separated after eight years of marriage.

The husband's income doubled to over $4.1 million annually after separation.

The trial judge declined to award the Guidelines table amount of over $65,000 per month for four children, instead awarding $16,000 per month under s. 4 based on the family's modest pre-separation lifestyle.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the table amount was inappropriate but found the trial judge erred by failing to adequately consider the post-separation increase in the husband's income and the reasonableness of the wife's proposed budget.

The Court of Appeal increased the child support to $32,000 per month and increased the required life insurance coverage to $2 million.

The respondents were convicted of manslaughter and aggravated assault following a drive-by shooting, based primarily on eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions, finding the trial judge's reasons inadequate for failing to sufficiently analyze the frailties of the identification evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the trial judge's reasons met the functional test set out in Sheppard, as they clearly explained the basis for accepting the identification evidence and permitted meaningful appellate review.

The appellants, an engineer and his company, sued for defamation after the respondent lawyer wrote a letter on behalf of his client, a gas company, describing the engineer's allegations about a gas heater explosion as 'professionally irresponsible if not deceitful or at worst malicious'.

The trial judge dismissed the action on the basis of qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the lawyer's letter was written on an occasion of qualified privilege to protect his client's interests, was sent only to those who received the engineer's initial letter, was not motivated by malice, and used language that was reasonably appropriate to the occasion.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants sought costs.

The Court of Appeal fixed the appellants' costs at $10,000, inclusive of the costs of the stay motion, disbursements, and GST.