Q.C.

The appellant insurer appealed a jury verdict awarding the respondent insured disability benefits, aggravated damages, and punitive damages following the denial of a disability claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and directed a new trial, finding fatal defects in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

Specifically, the charge on aggravated and punitive damages was wholly inadequate, failing to explain the legal requirements or direct the jury to relevant evidence.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in law by instructing the jury that a six-year limitation period applied for breach of contract rather than the one-year limitation period mandated by the insurance policy, and failed to instruct the jury on the discoverability principle.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred during the jury selection process by failing to adequately instruct the triers on the challenge for cause process and by interfering with his peremptory challenge rights.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the triers were not instructed on the standard of proof or the need for unanimity.

Furthermore, the trial judge's failure to pre-screen prospective jurors for personal hardship forced counsel to waste peremptory challenges.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant developer appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim for specific performance of an alleged agreement to purchase development lands for over $45 million.

The appellant argued that the respondents' negotiators had actual or ostensible authority to conclude the agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of actual authority and no representations by the principals to support a finding of ostensible authority.

The plaintiffs, homeowners, sued Bertrand and Lafarge for damages resulting from defective concrete foundations caused by fly ash supplied by Lafarge.

The trial judge found Lafarge 80% liable and Bertrand 20% liable for approximately $20,000,000 in damages.

This appeal concerns the insurance coverage disputes between Bertrand, Lafarge, and their numerous primary and excess insurers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the defective foundations constituted property damage under the CGL policies, that the continuous trigger theory applied to trigger all policies from 1986 to 1992, and that certain excess insurers had a duty to contribute to defence and third-party costs.

The appeal by Guardian Insurance was allowed regarding its duty to defend, but all other appeals and cross-appeals were dismissed.

Two Indian bands, the Wewaykum (Campbell River) and Wewaikai (Cape Mudge), claimed each other's reserve lands, alleging the federal Crown breached its fiduciary duty during the reserve creation process in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Both bands sought declarations and equitable compensation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the Crown fulfilled its fiduciary obligations by acting with loyalty, good faith, and ordinary prudence.

The Court found that both bands had historically acknowledged the other's entitlement to their respective reserves, making equitable relief inappropriate due to laches and acquiescence.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that the bands' claims were statute-barred by the applicable limitation periods.

The appeal concerned whether a genetically altered non-human mammal created for cancer research fell within the definition of “invention” in s. 2 of the Patent Act.

The Court held, by majority, that the Commissioner’s refusal of the product claims was reviewable for correctness and that the Commissioner had no free-standing discretion under s. 40 to deny a patent on public policy grounds.

Applying modern statutory interpretation, the majority concluded that “manufacture” and “composition of matter” do not extend to higher life forms and that the existing patent regime is ill-suited to address the complex practical, ethical, and policy issues raised by patenting such subject matter.

The appeal was allowed, the Federal Court of Appeal judgment was set aside, and no costs were ordered.

The respondents sought substantial indemnity costs of over $66,000 for an appeal, relying on an offer to settle.

The Court of Appeal held that Rule 49 does not apply to appeals and that substantial indemnity costs are reserved for exceptional circumstances, which were not present.

The appellant argued the old costs regime should apply as the appeal was argued before the new costs grid took effect.

Following recent jurisprudence, the Court confirmed the new costs grid is procedural and applies retroactively to costs awarded after its implementation.

The respondents were awarded partial indemnity costs of $22,000 in fees plus disbursements.

The appellant taxpayer was audited by revenue officials who obtained documents and statements using their statutory requirement powers.

The file was subsequently transferred to special investigations, and the taxpayer was charged with tax evasion.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the principles from R. v. Jarvis to determine when the audit became an investigation engaging the taxpayer's Charter rights.

The Court concluded that the investigation commenced after a specific meeting, meaning evidence gathered prior to that point was admissible, while evidence gathered afterward using audit powers violated the Charter and was subject to exclusion under s. 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new trial was confirmed.

The appellant requested access to personal information held by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

CSIS refused to disclose the information, claiming exemptions under the Privacy Act for national security and foreign confidences.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 51 of the Privacy Act, which mandates in camera and ex parte hearings when these exemptions are claimed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory ex parte provision did not violate s. 7 of the Charter.

However, the mandatory in camera provision violated s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1 because it was overly broad.

The Court read down s. 51(2)(a) to apply only to the ex parte submissions.

On a cross-appeal, the Court held that the law enforcement exemption in s. 22(1)(b) is not limited to current investigations.

The appellant challenged the use in a tax evasion prosecution of information obtained through statutory audit powers under the Income Tax Act.

The Court held that the Act draws a distinction between audit functions aimed at verifying tax liability and investigative functions aimed at determining penal liability.

It adopted a contextual predominant-purpose analysis to identify when the relationship between tax officials and the taxpayer becomes adversarial and full Charter protections apply.

On the facts, the audit did not become a penal investigation until the file was referred to Special Investigations on May 4, 1994, so the April 11 materials and the search warrant were valid.

However, banking records later compelled under s. 231.2(1) after the criminal investigation had commenced violated s. 7 and remained excluded.

The appellant challenged the use in a tax evasion prosecution of information obtained through statutory audit powers under the Income Tax Act.

The Court held that the Act draws a distinction between audit functions aimed at verifying tax liability and investigative functions aimed at determining penal liability.

It adopted a contextual predominant-purpose analysis to identify when the relationship between tax officials and the taxpayer becomes adversarial and full Charter protections apply.

On the facts, the audit did not become a penal investigation until the file was referred to Special Investigations on May 4, 1994, so the April 11 materials and the search warrant were valid.

However, banking records later compelled under s. 231.2(1) after the criminal investigation had commenced violated s. 7 and remained excluded.

In an addendum to judgment regarding costs of an appeal, the respondents sought costs totaling $132,145.72.

The appellants opposed, seeking a stay of costs for one insolvent respondent, arguing for the application of the pre-2002 party and party costs regime, and challenging the hourly rates of junior counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the stay request, held that the new costs grid under O. Reg. 284/01 applies retrospectively to services rendered before January 1, 2002, and reduced the hourly rates for certain junior counsel.

Total costs of $122,998.02 were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

Following the release of the main judgment, the court received written submissions on costs.

The appellant achieved substantial success on the appeal and was entitled to costs.

However, the court reduced the appellant's bill of costs by $15,000 for widening the scope of the appeal with unsuccessful compensatory damages issues, by $15,000 for excessive factum preparation time, and by $4,364 for excessive counsel fees.

Costs were fixed at $56,770.77 on a partial indemnity scale.

Appeal concerning the constitutionality of the federal prisoner voting ban applicable to persons incarcerated in a correctional institution serving sentences of two years or more.

The majority held that the impugned provision infringed the s. 3 Charter right to vote and failed the Oakes proportionality analysis because the government did not establish a rational connection, minimal impairment, or overall proportionality between disenfranchisement and its stated objectives of promoting civic responsibility and enhancing punishment.

The Court emphasized the fundamental nature of voting rights in a constitutional democracy and rejected deference where legislation limits core democratic participation.

The provision was declared of no force or effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of driving 'over 80', but a summary conviction appeal court judge ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the police officer had no lawful authority to detain him in a private parking lot for an unlit taillight, rendering the detention arbitrary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the summary conviction appeal court judge that the Highway Traffic Act authorized the continuing investigation off the highway onto private property.

The successful respondents sought to have the costs of the motion and the appeal fixed by the Court of Appeal.

The Court held that the costs of the motion were a matter for the motions judge.

The Court fixed the costs of the appeal payable to the respondents on a partial-indemnity basis at $7,500 plus assessable disbursements and G.S.T.

The appellants appealed and the respondent cross-appealed a trial judgment regarding the equalization of net family properties.

The issues on appeal included the valuation of a property known as Block 108, the trial judge's finding of undisclosed assets, the deduction of notional income tax on the deemed disposition of shares, and the beneficial ownership of various properties.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact, assessments of credibility, or exercise of discretion.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The Law Society of Alberta sought to discipline a Crown prosecutor for failing to disclose exculpatory DNA evidence to the defence in a timely manner.

The prosecutor argued that his actions were protected by prosecutorial discretion and that the Law Society lacked jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while core elements of prosecutorial discretion are immune from review absent flagrant impropriety, the duty to disclose relevant evidence is a legal obligation, not a matter of discretion.

Therefore, the Law Society has the jurisdiction to review a prosecutor's conduct to determine if a failure to disclose was done dishonestly or in bad faith, as this constitutes a breach of professional ethics.

The Law Society of Alberta sought to discipline a Crown prosecutor for failing to disclose exculpatory DNA evidence to the defence in a timely manner.

The prosecutor argued that his actions were protected by prosecutorial discretion and that the Law Society lacked jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while core elements of prosecutorial discretion are immune from review absent flagrant impropriety, the duty to disclose relevant evidence is a legal obligation, not a matter of discretion.

Therefore, the Law Society has the jurisdiction to review a prosecutor's conduct to determine if a failure to disclose was done dishonestly or in bad faith, as this constitutes a breach of professional ethics.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that the deceased misappropriated $547,000 in trust monies and tracing those funds into the purchase of a house.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the house was fully purchased with the misappropriated funds and was therefore held in trust for the respondents.

The Court also rejected the appellants' arguments regarding laches, limitation periods, and adverse possession, dismissing the appeal.