Q.C.

The Haida Nation claimed title to Haida Gwaii and objected to the Province of British Columbia's replacement and transfer of a Tree Farm Licence to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a legal duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests prior to making decisions that might adversely affect their as yet unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims.

This duty is grounded in the honour of the Crown and applies to both federal and provincial governments.

However, the Court found that third parties, such as Weyerhaeuser, do not owe an independent duty to consult or accommodate.

The Haida Nation claimed title to Haida Gwaii and objected to the Province of British Columbia's replacement and transfer of a Tree Farm Licence to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a legal duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests prior to making decisions that might adversely affect their as yet unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims.

This duty is grounded in the honour of the Crown and applies to both federal and provincial governments.

However, the Court found that third parties, such as Weyerhaeuser, do not owe an independent duty to consult or accommodate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, driving while disqualified, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, holding that the frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence rendered the convictions unsafe.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that the trial judge misapprehended the DNA evidence by assuming the complainant's DNA was found on the inside of the appellant's trousers, a finding unsupported by the record.

As this misapprehension was central to the trial judge's finding of guilt, the appeal was allowed, the conviction vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The provincial government signed a Pay Equity Agreement in 1988 to address systemic gender discrimination in the health care sector.

In 1991, facing a severe financial crisis, the government enacted the Public Sector Restraint Act, which deferred the pay equity adjustments and extinguished arrears.

The appellant union grieved the legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the legislation infringed the equality rights of female hospital workers under s. 15(1) of the Charter, the infringement was justified under s. 1 due to the exceptional financial crisis.

The Court also rejected the Court of Appeal's suggestion to add an explicit separation of powers step to the Oakes test.

The appellant was convicted of offences arising from three separate gang home invasions.

The Crown alleged the appellant was involved in all three incidents, although membership in the gang rotated.

The trial judge instructed the jury that evidence admitted with respect to each incident was admissible in proving the guilt of the accused on the others.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge erred.

While similar fact evidence of group activities is admissible to identify a gang responsible for a crime, it cannot be used to identify a particular member without an additional link connecting the individual to each crime.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Police stopped and detained a person matching the description of a recent break-and-enter suspect, conducted a protective pat-down, and then reached into his pocket and found marijuana, leading to a trafficking prosecution.

The Supreme Court recognized a limited common law power of investigative detention where police have reasonable grounds to suspect a connection to a particular crime and detention is reasonably necessary, together with a limited protective pat-down search power grounded in officer safety.

The Court held, however, that the more intrusive pocket search was not justified on the facts and violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the s. 24(2) exclusion analysis, the Court excluded the non-conscriptive evidence because the unjustified search represented a serious breach and admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.

The appellants, owners of surface and non-petroleum mineral rights on 'Split Title Lands' originally granted by the Canadian Pacific Railway, appealed a decision regarding the ownership of hydrocarbons.

The CPR had reserved 'petroleum' rights when selling the lands.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the reservation of petroleum divided ownership based on the phase of the hydrocarbons under initial conditions at the time of the contract.

The petroleum owner is entitled to all hydrocarbons in liquid phase prior to human intervention, regardless of whether they evolve into gas phase upon recovery.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant purchased the assets of the Nova Scotia Power Corporation (NSPC) upon its privatization and sought to deduct capital cost allowances.

The Minister of National Revenue denied the deductions on the basis that NSPC, as a Crown agent, was immune from income tax legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that NSPC was an agent of the Crown acting within its purposes, as expressly provided by the provincial Power Corporation Act, and was therefore entitled to Crown immunity under the federal Interpretation Act.

The respondent collective society sought to impose copyright liability on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for music downloaded in Canada from foreign countries.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that ISPs acting merely as conduits for information communicated by others are protected from liability under s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act.

The Court also ruled that the creation of temporary 'cache' copies for technical reasons of economy and efficiency falls within this protection.

Furthermore, the Court determined that the Copyright Act applies to international Internet transmissions that have a real and substantial connection to Canada, rejecting the view that a communication only occurs in Canada if it originates from a server located within the country.

The respondent collective society sought to impose copyright liability on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for music downloaded in Canada from foreign countries.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that ISPs acting merely as conduits for information communicated by others are protected from liability under s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act.

The Court also ruled that the creation of temporary 'cache' copies for technical reasons of economy and efficiency falls within this protection.

Furthermore, the Court determined that the Copyright Act applies to international Internet transmissions that have a real and substantial connection to Canada, rejecting the view that a communication only occurs in Canada if it originates from a server located within the country.

The Crown sought an ex parte order under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code to compel a Named Person to attend a judicial investigative hearing and answer questions regarding the Air India bombings.

The Named Person challenged the constitutionality of s. 83.28, arguing it violated the right against self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter and compromised judicial independence.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the provision, finding it procedural in nature, thus applicable retrospectively.

The Court held that s. 83.28 includes adequate safeguards, such as derivative use immunity, which must be extended to extradition and deportation hearings to comply with s. 7.

The Court also found that the provision does not compromise judicial independence, as judges retain their role in protecting the witness's constitutional rights.

The Crown sought an ex parte order under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code to compel a Named Person to attend a judicial investigative hearing and answer questions regarding the Air India bombings.

The Named Person challenged the constitutionality of s. 83.28, arguing it violated the right against self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter and compromised judicial independence.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the provision, finding it procedural in nature, thus applicable retrospectively.

The Court held that s. 83.28 includes adequate safeguards, such as derivative use immunity, which must be extended to extradition and deportation hearings to comply with s. 7.

The Court also found that the provision does not compromise judicial independence, as judges retain their role in protecting the witness's constitutional rights.

The respondent filed multiple complaints with the Barreau du Québec regarding the conduct of a lawyer who was harassing her through the courts.

Despite the lawyer's extensive disciplinary record and a finding of incompetence, the Barreau delayed taking action for over a year.

The respondent sued the Barreau for damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Barreau's gross carelessness and serious negligence in handling the complaints amounted to bad faith, precluding it from relying on the statutory immunity provided by s. 193 of the Professional Code.

The Barreau was found civilly liable and ordered to pay moral damages.

The respondents hold a patent for genetically modified genes and cells that confer resistance to glyphosate herbicides.

The appellants, commercial canola farmers, saved and planted seed that they knew or ought to have known contained the patented genes and cells, without obtaining a licence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the patent was valid, as it claimed the genes and cells rather than the unpatentable plant itself.

The Court further held that the appellants infringed the patent by 'using' the invention, as their cultivation of the crop deprived the respondents of the full enjoyment of their monopoly.

However, the Court set aside the award for an accounting of profits, finding that the appellants earned no profit causally attributable to the invention.

The respondent challenged federal third party election advertising provisions, including spending limits, anti-circumvention rules, disclosure requirements, and a polling day blackout, as violating ss. 2(b), 2(d), and 3 of the Charter.

The majority held that although several provisions infringed freedom of expression, they were justified under s. 1 because Parliament could adopt an egalitarian electoral model aimed at electoral fairness, informed voting, and confidence in the electoral process.

The Court rejected the argument that s. 3 guarantees unlimited electoral expression, holding instead that meaningful participation includes access to a balanced political discourse.

The appeal was allowed and the impugned provisions were upheld as constitutional, with a partial dissent that would have struck down the spending limits.

The respondent challenged federal third party election advertising provisions, including spending limits, anti-circumvention rules, disclosure requirements, and a polling day blackout, as violating ss. 2(b), 2(d), and 3 of the Charter.

The majority held that although several provisions infringed freedom of expression, they were justified under s. 1 because Parliament could adopt an egalitarian electoral model aimed at electoral fairness, informed voting, and confidence in the electoral process.

The Court rejected the argument that s. 3 guarantees unlimited electoral expression, holding instead that meaningful participation includes access to a balanced political discourse.

The appeal was allowed and the impugned provisions were upheld as constitutional, with a partial dissent that would have struck down the spending limits.

The Supreme Court of Canada delivered an oral judgment dismissing the appeal from the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding the interpretation of s. 76 of the Canadian Wheat Board Act and the division of powers concerning flour mills.

The Court adopted the reasons given by the Court of Appeal of Quebec and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant employer dismissed the respondent employee for unsatisfactory work performance (non-culpable incompetence).

The arbitration board found the dismissal was without just cause because the employer failed to follow the Re Edith Cavell criteria.

The board awarded damages in lieu of reinstatement under s. 142(2) of the Labour Relations Code, finding reinstatement inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal set aside the board's decision, holding that s. 142(2) did not apply to non-culpable dismissals and ordering reinstatement.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for both the board's interpretation of s. 142(2) and its remedial award was reasonableness.

The Court found the board's broad interpretation of s. 142(2) to include non-culpable dismissals was reasonable, and its decision to award damages in lieu of reinstatement due to exceptional circumstances (the breakdown of the employment relationship) was also reasonable.

The City of Calgary enacted a bylaw freezing the number of taxi plate licences.

The respondents challenged the bylaw, arguing it was ultra vires the City under the new Municipal Government Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard of review for a municipality delineating its jurisdiction is correctness.

Applying a broad and purposive approach to interpreting municipal legislation, the Court found that the Act granted the City the power to limit the number of taxi plate licences.

The appeal was allowed and the bylaw was upheld.