Paul S. Rouleau

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a habeas corpus application regarding the refusal to transfer him from a medium security institution to a minimum security institution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was treated fairly and that there were ample reasons for the medium security designation, including his membership in a criminal organization.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, gross indecency, and sexual exploitation of a young relative, as well as his three-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or reliance on corroborative evidence.

The court also upheld the sentence, noting the trial judge correctly identified the minimum three-year range for sexual offences against a child by an adult in a position of trust, and appropriately weighed mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for her involvement in a commercial drug operation involving a wide variety of controlled substances.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting the sentencing judge appropriately balanced the appellant's guilty plea against her failure to appreciate the potential harm of distributing the substances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for indemnification under a commercial agreement due to failure to provide timely notice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation that the 18-month notice requirement was a condition precedent to the right of indemnity.

The Court also rejected the argument that the notice provision was void under section 22 of the Limitations Act, 2002, holding that a contractual notice requirement does not vary or exclude a statutory limitation period, but rather acts as a condition precedent for a cause of action to accrue.

The appellant participated in a home-invasion robbery during which his gun discharged, killing an occupant.

He was convicted of second degree murder under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of s. 229(c), arguing it violated s. 7 of the Charter by not requiring an intent to cause serious bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that subjective foresight of death combined with an unlawful object is a constitutionally sufficient mens rea for murder.

The court also upheld the trial judge's jury instructions, Vetrovec warning, and the 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The appellant municipality appealed a declaration that it was responsible for maintaining two roads leading to a First Nation reserve and an education centre following a municipal restructuring order.

The application judge had found the roads became municipal highways through statutory dedication under the Municipal Act and common law dedication by conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Municipal Act provisions relied upon explicitly excluded provincial roads under Crown control.

Furthermore, the common law doctrine of dedication and acceptance could not apply because the public already enjoyed a statutory right of passage under the Public Lands Act, and the province had failed to use the available statutory mechanisms to transfer the roads.

The appellants sued an investment advisor and his company for bad investments.

The insurer defended the action for over a year before denying coverage because the advisor sold securities, not insurance.

The advisor went bankrupt, and the appellants obtained an assignment of his rights against the insurer.

The appellants argued the insurer was estopped from denying coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the insured suffered no prejudice from the insurer's conduct, as the insured was bankrupt and could not have defended the action anyway.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering an equalization payment, dismissing a constructive trust claim, and imposing restraining and vexatious litigant orders.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence of a hearing impairment, which the Court of Appeal rejected.

The Court upheld the trial judge's finding that certain shares had no value, but adjusted the equalization payment to account for uncollectable receivables.

The Court also struck the restraining and vexatious litigant orders as they were not raised as issues for trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats against his ex-wife.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based primarily on credibility findings, rejecting the appellant's testimony.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on inappropriate considerations to assess the appellant's credibility, including the conduct of defense counsel, evidence from a voir dire that was not part of the trial record, and the appellant's proficiency in French.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's orders regarding child support arrears, equalization, property division, and costs following a divorce.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding errors in the calculation of child support arrears and the equalization payment, which were adjusted accordingly.

The Court also set aside the trial judge's order to sell a commercial property registered to the appellant's father, as the father was not a party to the proceedings and no finding of fraudulent conveyance had been made.

Finally, the trial costs award was reduced to exclude costs incurred prior to a previous consent order and costs from unrelated proceedings.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge's interpretation of section 22(i) read in conjunction with section 23.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 on consent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care and control of a motor vehicle while over the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to put him to his election under s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that while the formal election was never put to the appellant, his counsel's statements and subsequent actions in proceeding to a provincial court trial constituted a clear and unequivocal waiver of the procedural safeguard.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding the Ontario Municipal Board's finding that an amendment to the City of London's Official Plan (OPA 403) was valid.

The appellants argued that OPA 403 impermissibly delegated authority by making a separate guideline determinative in designating woodlands as significant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the respondents that the Official Plan remains paramount and the City's discretion is not fettered by the guideline.

The respondents sought costs for two appeals following the release of the court's reasons.

For the first appeal, the court declined to award costs, agreeing with the appellants that their partial success on appeal warranted an offset against the significant unadjusted costs awarded in the court below.

For the second appeal, where the respondents were entirely successful, the court awarded costs fixed at $7,500, noting the appeal was straightforward and took little time.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred in handling bad character evidence from a Crown witness and improper closing submissions by a self-represented co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's mid-trial instructions and jury charge were appropriate.

The Crown appealed the 8-year sentence and the trial judge's refusal to make a DNA order or a delayed parole eligibility order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence and parole decision but allowed the Crown's appeal in part to impose a DNA order, noting that violence is not a pre-condition for such an order.

The appellant appealed her convictions on the basis that there was no evidence identifying her as the perpetrator of the alleged offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no evidence linking the appellant to the co-accused, the mortgage applications, or the bank accounts.

The Court rejected the Crown's argument that the date of birth on the indictment could be used as evidence of identity.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and acquittals entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and total sentence of 14.5 years for sexually assaulting his two daughters, obstructing justice, and breaching an undertaking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's jury instructions on credibility.

The sentence appeal was largely dismissed, as the severe sentence was justified by the appellant's persistent, degrading abuse and gross breach of trust.

However, the court varied a 9-year concurrent sentence for assault to one year concurrent, as the original sentence was illegal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to being masked with intent and failing to comply with an undertaking, receiving a 40-month sentence on a joint submission.

He appealed the sentence, seeking a 16-month reduction to avoid deportation consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that immigration consequences cannot justify what would otherwise be an unfit sentence, and the proposed reduction was well outside the agreed-upon range.

The appellant appealed a three-year equivalent sentence for two serious sexual assaults, seeking a reduction to avoid immigration consequences (deportation to Jamaica).

The appellant introduced fresh evidence of his schizophrenia diagnosis, good behavior, and lack of reoffending over six years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and a reduction for immigration purposes unwarranted, noting that immigration officials could consider his medical and rehabilitative circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing he was denied a fair trial because he was unrepresented and the trial judge failed to adequately assist him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had chosen to proceed without counsel rather than delay the trial further, and that the trial judge's assistance was adequate and did not result in an unfair trial.