Patrick McCann

During pre-trial motions for a first-degree murder trial, the court addressed the accused's refusal to participate, the role of amicus curiae, and the admissibility of a police statement.

The court expanded the role of amicus curiae beyond making legal submissions to ensure a fair trial, given the accused's complete non-participation.

The court also ruled that the accused's statement to police was voluntary.

Although the court found a technical breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights due to a five-hour delay in facilitating access to counsel, the statement was not excluded under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith and the accused ultimately exercised his right to counsel before giving the statement.

The appellant, a former designated public office holder, appealed his convictions and $50,000 fine for three counts of illegal lobbying under the Lobbying Act.

The Superior Court of Justice overturned the conviction on count three, finding that his communications regarding an existing government grant did not constitute prohibited lobbying.

However, the court upheld the convictions on counts one and two, agreeing that his activities on behalf of an energy policy institute constituted prohibited consultant lobbying.

The global fine was reduced to $45,000 to reflect the overturned conviction, but the court found no error in principle in the sentencing judge's approach.

The accused, a former senior political advisor with connections to federal officials, was charged under s. 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code with fraud on the government for seeking a benefit for his partner in connection with promoting water treatment systems to First Nations communities.

The Crown argued that the accused used his government influence to advance a supplier in a three‑way business relationship involving the federal government and First Nations bands.

The court held that the evidence established the accused attempted to influence government officials but that any potential sales of point‑of‑use water treatment systems were decisions made autonomously by individual First Nations communities.

Because the government did not procure or approve those systems, there was no “transaction of business with or any matter of business relating to the government” within the meaning of s. 121(1)(d).

The court concluded the essential element of government business was absent.

Accused charged with bid‑rigging and conspiracy challenged the constitutionality of s. 69(2) of the Competition Act, which deemed certain documents and records found in possession of a “participant” to constitute prima facie proof of knowledge and related facts.

The applicants argued the provision created evidentiary and legal presumptions that effectively shifted the burden of proof onto the accused, contrary to the presumption of innocence under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court held that the section required the trier of fact to accept knowledge of documents as proven and could compel the accused to respond before the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The provision therefore infringed the presumption of innocence and fundamental justice and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

Section 69(2) was declared of no force or effect in criminal proceedings, though its use in Competition Tribunal proceedings was unaffected.