Pasquale Peloso

This endorsement addresses the importance of the open court principle in the context of motions or applications for approval of settlements reached by, or on behalf of, minors or persons under a disability.

The plaintiffs sought an order dispensing with service of relevant materials on the opposing party, citing solicitor-client and litigation-settlement privilege.

The court reviewed the legal framework for dispensing with service and sealing orders, emphasizing the high bar set by the open court principle and the Sierra Club criteria.

The court found the evidence insufficient to justify dispensing with service, concluding that claims of privilege alone are generally not enough to override the public interest in transparency and the court's parens patriae jurisdiction in such matters.

The plaintiffs' request to dispense with service was dismissed, and they were ordered to serve the defendants with the complete motion record.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a motor vehicle accident case, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on negligence, proximate cause, and the onus on a driver who was on the wrong side of the road.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, read as a whole, properly instructed the jury that the onus was on the defendant to explain how the accident occurred without his negligence due to an emergency situation.

The jury's conclusion that the defendant acted as an ordinary, prudent person in an emergency was upheld.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's decision dismissing his claim for statutory accident benefits.

The appellant was found highly intoxicated and lying next to his van, having suffered a neck injury.

He claimed he fell out of the van while using it for camping and sleeping.

The arbitrator rejected his evidence, finding the injury likely resulted from prolonged extreme neck posturing while intoxicated.

On appeal, the Director of Arbitrations upheld the decision, finding no error of law.

The Director held that even if the appellant was using the van for camping, there was no direct connection between the use or operation of the vehicle and the impairment to satisfy the definition of an 'accident' under the SABS-1996.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitration decision finding that the respondent was involved in an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The respondent slipped and fell on icy pavement at a gas station while walking back to his car after filling a tire with air.

The Director of Arbitrations dismissed the appeal, upholding the arbitrator's finding that the use or operation of the automobile was the dominant feature of the incident and that the icy pavement did not break the chain of causation.