Ranalli v. Conti, 2023 CanLII 112685

Toronto Local Appeal Body

40 Orchard View Blvd, Suite 253 Toronto, Ontario M4R 1B9

Date: 2023-11-29

21 142990 S53 03 TLAB, 21 138301 S45 03 TLAB, 21 138305 S45 03 TLAB

Ranalli v. Conti, 2023 ONTLAB 159

REVIEW REQUEST ORDER

Issuance Date: November 29, 2023

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER Section 53, subsection 53(19), Section 45(12), subsection 45(1) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, as amended (the "Act")

Appellant(s): H. RANALLI

Applicant(s): I. EVANGELISTA

Property Address: 182 QUEENS AVE

COA File No.: 20 137252 WET 03 CO, 20 137257 WET 03 MV, 20 137259 WET 03 MV

TLAB Case File No.: 21 142990 S53 03 TLAB, 21 138301 S45 03 TLAB, 21 138305 S45 03 TLAB

Hearing Date(s): September 21, 2021

Decision Delivered By: TLAB Panel Member C. Kilby

REGISTERED PARTIES AND PARTICIPANTS:

People Type	First Initial. Last Name	Representative
Applicant	I. EVANGELISTA
Appellant	H.T. RANALLI
Party	A. CONTI	S. LAMPERT
Expert Witness	F. ROMANO

REVIEW REQUEST NATURE AND RULE COMPLIANCE TO INITIATE

1On December 23, 2021, Angelo Conti filed a Request to Review (Review Request) under Rule 31.1 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Toronto Local Appeal Body (TLAB). As Requestor, Mr. Conti seeks a Review of the Final Decision and Order issued November 23, 2021 (Decision) in the Appeal relating to 182 Queens Avenue (Property)

2The Review Request was accompanied by an affidavit of Franco Romano sworn December 23, 2021, and a Book of Authorities. No Response was filed under Rule 31.10.

3TLAB staff deemed the Review Request compliant under the TLAB’s Rules of Practice and Procedure and the TLAB Chair designated me to conduct the Review under TLAB Rule 31.2.

BACKGROUND

4On September 21, 2021, the TLAB heard the Appeal of Hugh Ranalli from the Committee of Adjustment’s decision granting consent to sever the Property and approving variances required for the construction of two new two-storey detached dwellings on the Property. Mr. Ranalli opposed the severance of the lot into what he characterized as undersized lots, as well as the variances required for the dwellings as they would affect Mr. Ranalli’s own property, particularly with respect to light.¹

5The TLAB panel chair presiding over the Hearing (Chair) allowed the Appeal and set aside the Committee of Adjustment decision.

6The Review Request seeks an Order setting aside the Decision and granting the applications for consent to sever and for the variances (collectively referred to herein as the Application), or an Order setting aside the Decision and ordering a new hearing of the Application before a different TLAB panel.

THE LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

7The applicable version of Rule 31 is the one constituted after December 2, 2020. The Requestor relies on Rules 31.25(b) and (c) as grounds for the Review Request:

Grounds for Review

31.17 In considering whether to grant any remedy the Chair shall consider whether the reasons and evidence provided by the Requesting Party are compelling and demonstrate the TLAB:

b) violated the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness

c) made an error of law or fact which would likely have resulted in a different Final Decision or final order

8Rule 31.6(d)(iv) makes it clear that a review request shall include “a clear demonstration of how in the case of grounds asserted under Rule 31.17 c), d) and e), each would likely have resulted in a different Final Decision or final order”. From this I conclude that mere disagreement with the reasons given by a presiding Member does not meet the standard for granting a review request.

9A review request is not an opportunity to relitigate an appeal. My task is to decide whether the reasons and evidence given by the Requestor are compelling and demonstrate that there was a violation of the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness, or clearly demonstrate how the absence of the alleged errors of law or fact would likely have resulted in a different Decision (my emphasis).

10The Requestor alleges that the Decision contains “numerous” errors of law and fact and violates the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness. He further asserts that the errors described were of such magnitude that had they not been committed the Decision “would have resulted in a different outcome.” Throughout the Review Request the Requestor indicates that but for the alleged errors, there “may” or “could” have been a different Decision. Little detail is supplied in support of these conclusions.

11After reviewing the Review Request, the case law submitted, the Decision, materials filed with TLAB for the Appeal, and the recording of the Hearing, I find that the Review Request does not meet the standard set by Rule 31 for granting the remedies requested. The Decision is confirmed.

Alleged Errors

12The Requestor presents the following grounds for the Review:

a) The Chair rejected the only professional planning opinion evidence and substituted the Chair’s own opinion;

b) The Chair read Official Plan (OP) policies in isolation;

c) The Chair refused to provide weight to an opinion on as-of-right designs;

d) The Chair incorrectly interpreted the professional planning opinion evidence offered by the Requestor, including with respect to the expert’s statistics table; and

e) The Chair violated the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness.

A. Rejected Planner Evidence and Substituted Own Opinion

Rejected Planner Evidence

13The Chair is alleged to have committed an error of law by rejecting the evidence of Franco Romano, who was the only witness qualified at the Hearing as an expert in land use planning. In so arguing, the Requestor discounts the fact that the Appellant testified at the Hearing, albeit as a neighbouring resident and not a planning expert.²

14The Requestor also argues that in the absence of any cross-examination on the severance, the Chair had no basis to reject Mr. Romano’s evidence on that issue. The absence of cross-examination on the severance does not invalidate the Chair’s decision. The Decision makes it clear that the Appellant opposed the severance on the basis that it would “create two undersized lots with tall narrow structures which do not integrate into the existing neighbourhood.”³ The Applicant had notice of the grounds for the Appeal and therefore the issues to be considered, not least because the Planning Act⁴ (Act) sets out the criteria against which the Application would be assessed. There is no element of surprise at work here.

15The absence of cross-examination also does not mean that evidence is to be taken at face value without further analysis, weighing or scrutiny. The Act creates a scheme in which the presence or absence of an opponent is irrelevant. Variances are not automatically granted in the absence of opposition. It is still an applicant’s responsibility to prove its case. Regardless of who presents the evidence, or whether contrary evidence is raised, the presiding member must be satisfied that the applications before them meet the statutory tests. Were this not so, then any unopposed application would be automatically approved, and the law would say as much. The Requestor has not provided authority for such a conclusion. In fact, there are cases where an applicant was the only party before the TLAB, yet their evidence failed to satisfy the presiding member.⁵

16Similarly, that Mr. Romano was the only expert witness at the Hearing does not imply that his evidence must be accepted wholesale. The Applicant has not directed my attention to any binding authority which stands for this proposition. In a previous TLAB decision, upheld on review, expert evidence was rejected in favour of evidence provided by a lay witness.⁶

17I find that the Decision sets out the justification for the Chair’s findings concerning Mr. Romano’s evidence. The Chair explains how she arrived at her ruling regarding the consent application based on subsections 51(24)(c) and (f) of the Act. These criteria were analysed as part of a seven-page discussion of OP Policy 4.1.5, which concluded with the statement that the Chair was “not satisfied that the proposal conforms to the OP as required by s. 51(24)(c) of the Act, which is a requirement for approval of the application for consent to sever.”⁷

18I have not heard the evidence and cannot step into the Chair’s shoes on review to second-guess her reasoning, particularly in the absence of a clear connection between the alleged errors and a different outcome, as required by Rule 31.6(d)(iv). The analysis and conclusion on the severance application were grounded in the Applicant’s evidence. From this I conclude that the Chair properly exercised the authority given to her by the Act and came to an opinion about all the evidence presented. The Requestor has not supplied any compelling authority to show why that exercise was erroneous or flawed.

Substituted own Opinion

19The Requestor asserts that the Chair’s analysis and rationale constitute opinion evidence which Mr. Romano was not permitted to rebut through questioning. I disagree. The Chair did not introduce new evidence; she assessed Mr. Romano’s opinion evidence and assigned it weight based on the totality of the information presented in the Appeal. The Chair is authorized to form an opinion about the evidence presented:

45 (1) The committee of adjustment, upon the application of the owner of any land, …may, despite any other Act, authorize such minor variance from the provisions of the by-law, in respect of the land, building or structure or the use thereof, as in its opinion is desirable for the appropriate development or use of the land, building or structure, if in the opinion of the committee the general intent and purpose of the by-law and of the official plan, if any, are maintained.⁸ (emphasis added)

20The Chair made findings having read, heard, and considered the Applicant’s and Appellant’s evidence, as she was bound to do under the Act.

21The Applicant also alleges that the Chair’s failure to give Mr. Romano the opportunity to respond to her views during the Hearing was a denial of natural justice. No authority was offered for the proposition that the principles of natural justice entail offering parties insight into a decision-maker’s assessment of the evidence. The Review Request also does not explain how Mr. Romano’s evidence might have been different or how the outcome of the Hearing would have changed had such an opportunity been offered.

22The Applicant states that the Chair committed errors of law by creating and applying tests that do not exist in the planning regime, such as the language in the Decision stating that the evidence “does not sufficiently come to terms with the OP standards of ‘prevailing’ and ‘most frequently occurring’, as discussed previously.”⁹ The Applicant asserts that the term “sufficiently come to terms” constitutes a novel test improperly applied by the Chair. The context of the Decision demonstrates that the Chair used this phrase to describe the Application’s failure to satisfy the statutory tests relating to the OP. I find that the impugned phrase simply communicated the Chair’s findings and did not amount to a new standard of proof or legal test.

23Similarly, the Applicant asserts that the Chair’s reference to “meaningful categories” of lot frontages is an improper importing of her own opinion and evidence about Mr. Romano’s analysis of lot sizes. I find that the term “meaningful categories” forms part of the Chair’s explanation for rejecting Mr. Romano’s opinion evidence about the existing physical character of the neighbourhood. In fact, it was Mr. Romano who originated a categorical analysis of the neighbourhood’s lot sizes, including the most frequently occurring lot frontages, in his evidence. The Decision simply engages with his evidence:

Lots with frontages greater than 10.5 have been categorized and coloured on the map in intervals of 1.52m, (for example 10.5 to 12.02m, and 12.03m to 13.55m). A similar categorization of the lots with frontages less than 10.5m would have been useful to understand how many lots have similar frontages to those that are being proposed. A lot coloured blue on the map could have a frontage anywhere between 4.57m and 10.5m.¹⁰

24This explanation is followed by the Chair’s conclusion that although a significant number of lots in the neighbourhood have lot frontages that are smaller than the required minimum for detached houses, this does not “sufficiently come to terms with the OP standard of ‘prevailing’ and ‘most frequently occurring’, as discussed previously.”¹¹ In this context the term “meaningful categories” is used:

Even if the notion of “prevailing” can accommodate ranges/ categories rather than only lots with the exact same dimensions, those categories must have relevance. In a statistical analysis, to understand what is “prevailing”, it is important to understand, in a general way, what the frequency of lot sizes (frontages and areas) are in meaningful categories. Further, it is important to understand where the proposed lot frontages actually fall within that distribution. In other words, are the greatest number of lots (most frequently occurring/ prevailing) within a range of 9 to 10.5m frontage, for example, or are there substantial numbers within a range of 6-7.5m that would reflect the frontages of the proposed lots? How many lots are smaller than the proposed lot sizes?¹² (emphasis added)

25The Decision then goes on to explain, with reference to the statistical analysis provided by Mr. Romano, how the Chair arrives at her conclusion that the Applicant’s evidence does not satisfy the relevant tests. I find the explanation in the Decision clear, reasoned, and grounded in Mr. Romano’s qualitative and quantitative evidence concerning lot frontage and lot area.

26The Requestor also takes issue with the Chair’s reference to the categories as being a “general label” which would apply to any undersized lot. The Requestor characterizes this as evidence and as an untested and incorrect interpretation of Mr. Romano’s logic. I do not agree that term “general label” is evidence. In reading the Decision, I find that the Chair clearly sets out the evidence supplied by Mr. Romano on which the phrase is based:

Mr. Romano’s witness statement says that there is no single prevailing lot size number and goes on to “qualitatively” describe the lot size physical character as “compact to modest sized, being smaller than 10.5m (61%) or 12m (77%) for lot frontage and 400m2 (58.4%) or 500m2 (78%) for lot area”. He acknowledged that the proposed lot frontage and lot area may not be the most frequently occurring lot size numerically, but concluded that the proposed lot sizes’ physical character will create “modest sized lots which will respect and reinforce the prevailing lot size within the immediate context”.

By Mr. Romano’s approach, most of the lots in the neighbourhood have lot frontages smaller than 10.5m and areas less than 400m2 and he therefore applied a general label of “compact to modest sized” to the character of lots in the neighbourhood. He concluded that the proposed lots, being “modest sized lots” respect the prevailing lot size. By this logic, any undersized lot, no matter how small, could fit his description of the character of the neighbourhood.¹³

27Taken in context, the term “general label” is a descriptive term for the output of Mr. Romano’s qualitative analysis of the physical character of the neighbourhood, described in detail in his Witness Statement.¹⁴

28The Applicant further attacks the use of the word “noticeably” as a new test in qualitative and quantitative terms. Once again, context assists the reader to comprehend. The Decision says that the proposed lot frontage is “noticeably smaller” than the minimums established by the relevant zoning bylaws, with reference to different zoning standards applicable to different building forms, against the backdrop of the 1.52m “intervals” discussed on page 10. The Decision goes on to state that the proposed lot frontage and area would not maintain the intent and purpose of the Zoning Bylaw. The Requestor argues that the Chair had in mind a certain numerical value of lot frontage as materially consistent with the existing physical character of the neighbourhood, which was not put to Mr. Romano. The record is clear that the numerical value of lot frontage provided by Mr. Romano as the most frequently occurring in the broader neighbourhood is the one referenced in the Decision.¹⁵

29Most of the Applicant’s complaints in this category attempt to characterize the Chair’s language as some kind of planning or analytical standard with an esoteric meaning. I find that the Chair reviewed Mr. Romano’s evidence against the applicable statutory tests. Her conclusions on whether Mr. Romano’s evidence satisfied those tests are communicated in the context of her analysis using regular English words. I find no error in the Chair’s Decision rejecting Mr. Romano’s opinion evidence, nor any indication of the Chair substituting her own opinion evidence for that of Mr. Romano.

Lot Area

30The Requestor states that the Chair did not give “any consideration to lot area” in her analysis of whether the Application maintained the general intent and purpose of the Zoning Bylaw, characterized as an error of law and fact. It is not clear if the Requestor is asserting that the Chair failed to consider lot area at all, or disagreeing with the weight assigned to lot area in the Chair’s analysis.

31A TLAB chair is not obligated to address in their decision every evidentiary point raised by an applicant.¹⁶ The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that while the central issues and concerns raised by a party must be meaningfully addressed in a decision- maker’s reasons, “[r]eviewing courts cannot expect administrative decision makers to ‘respond to every argument or line of possible analysis’”.¹⁷

32In any event, the Decision discusses lot area as well as lot frontage, particularly on page 11. The Requestor has not explained how the Decision would have been different had lot area been considered in a way deemed more appropriate by the Requestor. Without that detail, I decline to second-guess the totality of the Chair’s analysis of the evidence. I find no basis to support the assertion that the Chair committed an error regarding lot area.

Semidetached Building Types

33The Requestor asserts that the Chair inappropriately referenced semidetached building types in the Decision after telling the Requestor during the Hearing that the Applicant’s choice not to build semidetached houses on the Property would not impact the decision. The Requestor also argues that using semidetached homes as a comparator for the Application while disregarding any evidence on what would be permitted as of right is inconsistent reasoning and an error of law and fact.

34During the Hearing, the Chair asked Mr. Romano whether a semidetached building type was considered for the Property.¹⁸

35The Decision discusses semidetached building types in the context of different wall height zoning standards;¹⁹ as an illustrative example of balance between lot size and architectural scale and massing as part of the analysis of the Application against OP Policy 4.1.5(c);²⁰ and as part of obiter comments on the Application’s maintenance of the general intent and purpose of the zoning bylaw where the Chair indicated that semidetached houses “are generally expected to be a narrower form of dwelling.”²¹

36The context of these references makes it clear that there is no improper comparison to semidetached dwellings as a benchmark for the Application, nor unfairness against the Applicant. Rather, this ground for review seems more in the nature of a “treasure hunt for error.”²² I find that there is no error of law or fact, nor a denial of natural justice, in the Decision’s discussion of semidetached building types.

B. Read OP Policies in Isolation

37The Requestor asserts that the Chair did not read the OP as a whole, focusing only on select policies. He also asserts that the Chair failed to consider Mr. Romano’s qualitative analysis of the Application and thus erred in law. The Requestor does not highlight which other policies in the OP ought to have been expressly considered, nor demonstrate the ways in which the Decision would have been altered had the Chair conducted the required analysis.

38The reasons provided in the Decision focus on OP Policy 4.1.5(b) and (c) because, as the Decision explains, of all the criteria listed under s. 51(24) of the Act, only two require further discussion, and one of those criteria, dimensions and shapes of proposed lots, would be canvassed in the discussion of the OP.²³ The framework applied by the Chair demonstrates a holistic approach to the OP rather than a narrow application of only one element. Moreover, the Decision refers to the preamble to OP Policy 4.1.5, that changes must “fit” the existing character of the neighbourhood.²⁴ From these examples, I conclude that the Chair read the OP as a whole in arriving at her decision.

Lot Configuration

39The Requestor states that the Chair failed to consider lot configuration. The evidence was that the proposed lot configuration was rectangular-shaped,²⁵ which corresponds to the most frequently occurring lot configuration in all three contexts examined in Mr. Romano’s evidence.²⁶ The Chair explained that her Decision would focus on those issues warranting further discussion. I take from the evidence and the context of the Decision that lot configuration did not require extensive analysis to explain the reasons for the Decision. In any case, lot configuration was discussed in the Decision at pages 6, 7 and 9. In the absence of a clear demonstration of the significance of lot configuration to the outcome of the Hearing, I find no error in the Chair’s treatment of lot configuration.

Qualitative Analysis

40The Requestor asserts that the Chair considered only the quantitative evidence concerning lot area and over-focused on lot frontage. Although I have canvassed the treatment of lot area earlier in this decision, I repeat that the Decision refers to lot area in several places.²⁷

41With respect to qualitative analysis, the Requestor does not elaborate on the particular qualitative evidence that the Chair is alleged to have ignored, nor the connection between that evidence and a potentially different outcome. As a result, this ground for review reads largely as disagreement with the Decision and an attempt to reargue the case, which do not satisfy Rules 31.17(c) or 31.6(d)(iv).²⁸

42In any case, I find that the Decision specifically engages with Mr. Romano’s qualitative evidence about lot size, in particular his characterization of “compact to modest” sized lots as representing the physical character of the neighbourhood, discussed and cited above.²⁹ The Chair considers Mr. Romano’s analysis of the physical character of the neighbourhood, both the statistical and qualitative, in depth. That she arrives at a different conclusion from Mr. Romano’s following this analysis, which is clearly reasoned and explained, does not amount to a compelling error.

43The Morad and Robinson cases do not apply here. If anything, the Chair conducted the type of analysis urged by Robinson, of standing back to apply common sense to the information presented. That the Requestor dislikes the result is not sufficient to overturn the Decision.

FSI

44Finally, the Requestor states that it is unclear how the Chair found the proposed FSI variances to meet the general intent and purpose of the zoning bylaw, but not of the OP. The Requestor alleges that this inconsistency demonstrates that the Chair failed to consider the OP as a whole. The Requestor did not provide authority for the principle that a variance found to meet the general intent and purpose of the zoning bylaw must automatically be deemed to meet the general intent and purpose of the OP. I am not convinced that these findings amount to an error.

C. As-of-Right Designs Given no Weight

45The Requestor asserts that the Chair failed to give weight to as-of-right designs, constituting an error of law and fact which “may have resulted in a different Decision.”³⁰ The Review Request states that “Mr. Romano continuously demonstrated that what is permitted as-of-right would create more adverse impact on the Appellant than the Proposal.”³¹ The Requestor cites cases for the proposition that as-of-right designs should be considered when assessing the compatibility of a proposal with a neighbourhood’s physical character (Levine, Rubinoff).

46A review of the Decision reveals that the Chair did consider the as-of-right design elements articulated by Mr. Romano. She simply did not assign them the weight endorsed by the Applicant. The Decision canvasses the evidence about as-of-right designs alongside the Chair’s rationale for assigning “little weight” to that evidence.³² On this basis I conclude that the Chair did not fail to assign as-of-right design evidence any weight, or to consider it, but rather, the Chair weighed that evidence differently than the Applicant did. This does not represent an error or a departure from the principles articulated in the Requestor’s authorities.

47In addition, there is no clear demonstration of how this element of the Decision, had it been different, would change the outcome of the Appeal. The Chair is clear that the Applicant’s burden is to establish that their design fits the character of the neighbourhood. This ground for review fails.

D. Incorrect Interpretation of Expert Evidence

48The Decision is alleged to erroneously reproduce a typo in Mr. Romano’s Witness Statement, which represents an error of fact. The typo, corrected by Mr. Romano during his testimony, is that “immediate context” in section 4.13 of his Witness Statement should read “neighbourhood context.”³³ The Requestor asserts that the Decision’s continuation of this error could be improperly repeated in future TLAB analyses.

49The table of evidence set out in the Decision is accompanied by a discussion of all the statistical evidence presented, including the following sentence: “the proposed lot sizes’ physical character will create ‘modest sized lots which will respect and reinforce the prevailing lot size within the immediate context.’”³⁴ That language is identical in both paragraph 4.13 of Mr. Romano’s Witness Statement dealing with the broader context and paragraph 4.18 dealing with the immediate context. It is not clear to me that the Chair has in fact reproduced a typographical error by citing this evidence. Rather, when the rest of page 11 is taken into consideration, one can see that the Decision discusses the characteristics of both the immediate and the broader contexts when analysing Mr. Romano’s statistical data. The Requestor has not clearly explained how the Decision would be different had the typographical error not been made. The Requestor has not demonstrated that the Chair erred by quoting this evidence in her Decision.

E. Natural Justice/Procedural Fairness

50The Requestor asserts that the Chair violated the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness by substituting her own opinion for Mr. Romano’s, without providing him an opportunity to respond. I have addressed this alleged error above.

51In sum, the Decision is a clear, cogent, and comprehensible discussion of the Chair’s reasons for allowing the Appeal. It does not rely on new evidence collected outside the Hearing, as in Juno, nor does it cite standards or legal principles that were not raised during the Hearing, as in Weirfoulds. The Chair’s analysis is founded on the evidence presented by Mr. Romano as it responds to the relevant OP policies and zoning standards cited in his Witness Statement.

CONCLUSION

52I find the Decision internally coherent with a rational chain of analysis. The conclusions reached by the Chair follow clearly and logically from her evaluation of all the evidence.³⁵

53As has been stated in a number of previous TLAB decisions, a review request is not an opportunity to re-litigate or reargue a point made during a Hearing which was not favourably received by a decision-maker.

54I find that this Review Request has not provided compelling reasons which demonstrate that the Chair made errors of law or fact in this case. Even if I had found that the Chair made an error of law or fact, the Requestor has not provided clear explanations of how the absence of such errors would likely have resulted in a different Decision.

DECISION AND ORDER

55The Review Request is denied. The Decision as issued on November 23, 2021, is confirmed.

C. Kilby Panel Member

Footnotes

1. 1Decision and Order dated November 23, 2021 in re: 182 Queens Avenue (Decision), pp. 2, 4.
2. 2See, e.g., Decision p. 7.
3. 3Decision, p. 4.
4. 4R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13.
5. 5Re: 508 St. Germain, Issued July 26, 2022 (Kilby); Re: 195 Erskine Avenue, Issued March 17, 2022 (Talukder).
6. 665 Fortieth Street, Issued January 19, 2022 (Talukder), upheld on review October 14, 2022 (Gopikrishna).
7. 7Decision, p. 15.
8. 8Act, subsection 45(1).
9. 9Decision, pp. 9-10.
10. 10Decision, p. 10.
11. 11Ibid.
12. 12Decision, p. 12.
13. 13Decision, p. 11.
14. 14See Exhibit 1, paras. 4.12, 4.13.
15. 15Exhibit 1, para. 4.11; Decision, p. 11.
16. 16See, e.g., Simpson v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FCA 82 at para. 10: “First, a tribunal need not refer in its reasons to each and every piece of evidence before it, but is presumed to have considered all the evidence.” See also Carney v. Ontario Labour Relations Board, 2021 ONSC 7590 at para. 11: “The Board is not required to explicitly mention every piece of evidence.”
17. 17Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at para. 25, cited with approval in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para. 128 (Vavilov).
18. 18Recording of Hearing, 1h46m.
19. 19Decision, p. 7.
20. 20Decision, p. 14.
21. 21Decision, pp. 15, 16.
22. 22Carney, supra, at para. 11.
23. 23Decision, p. 8.
24. 24Decision, p. 12.
25. 25Exhibit 1, para. 4.18.
26. 26Exhibit 1, paras. 4.11, 4.16, 4.20.
27. 27Particularly at pp. 9-12.
28. 28The Divisional Court of Ontario recently rejected a similar argument in Marquis Manors Ltd. v. Kennedy, 2023 ONSC 1134.
29. 29See Decision, p. 11.
30. 30Review Request, para. 32.
31. 31Review Request, para. 27.
32. 32Decision, p. 13.
33. 33Affidavit of F. Romano dated December 23, 2021, para. 11.
34. 34Decision, p. 11.
35. 35Vavilov at para. 102.