Toronto Local Appeal Body

40 Orchard View Blvd, Suite 211

Toronto, Ontario M4R 1B9

Date:

2023-06-08

21 227414 S45 12 TLAB

Advani v. Glen Edyth Property Holdings Ltd., 2023 ONTLAB 100

REVIEW REQUEST ORDER

Issuance Date:

June 8, 2023

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER Section 45(12), subsection 45(1) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, as amended (the "Act")

Appellant(s):

R. ADVANI

Applicant(s):

RICHARD WENGLE ARCHITECT INC.

Property Address:

91 Glen Edyth Dr.

COA File No.:

21 149774 STE 12 MV (A0578/21TEY)

TLAB Case File No.:

21 227414 S45 12 TLAB

Hearing Date(s):

February 16, 2022; April 5, 2022; July 5, 2022; September 22, 2022;

Decision Delivered By:

TLAB Member T. Yao

REGISTERED PARTIES AND PARTICIPANTS:

People Type

First Initial. Last Name

Representative

Applicant

Richard Wengle Architect Inc.

Appellant

R. Advani

M. Helfand

Party/Owner

Glen Edyth Property Holding Ltd

I. Andres

Expert Witness

C. Chan

Expert Witness

J. McFarlane

INTRODUCTION

1Glen Edyth Property Holdings Ltd. has filed a request to review the decision of TLAB Member Gopikrishna, dated January 30, 2023. The TLAB Chair has recently delegated this review to me.

Background

2TLAB Member Gopikrishna denied Glen Edyth Property Holdings Ltd.’s request for variances as set out in Table 1 below:

Table 1. Variances sought for 91 Glen Edyth D¹r.

Required

Proposed

Variances from Zoning By-law 569-2013

1

Encroachment into front yard setback for canopy

Can encroach 2.5 m

Encroaches 3.52 m

2

Driveway should be higher than street

See next box to right

Driveway is 0.58 m lower than street at one point²

3

Building Height

Variances 3, 4 5, and 12 are no longer needed due to legislative changes in the course of the hearing process

4

Front main wall height

5

Rear main wall height

6

Building length

17 m

25.52 m

7

Building depth

19 m

20.09 m.

8

Floor Space Index

0.35 times the area of the lot

0.78 times the area of the lot

9

Front yard setback

5.96 m

5.19 m

10

Setback from stable top-of-slope

10 m

5.51 m

11

Setback from stable top-of-slope where not on that lot (i.e., to the neighbour to the left)

10 m

7.24 m

Variances from Zoning By-law 438-86

12

Building Height

See line 3

3Glen Edyth Property Holdings Ltd has a double lot, that is, a house with a wide side yard, far larger than what is needed to comply with the zoning by-law. This wide side yard is on the side that is closest to Mr. Advani, the appellant. The key variances in the request appear to be setback to the stable top of slope and Floor Space Index (0.78 sought vs. 0.35 permitted). FSI can be considered alone and together with length, depth, massing and other neighbourhood character considerations. Glen Edyth Property Holdings Ltd was successful before the Committee of Adjustment and Mr. Advani appealed. At the hearing, Glen Edyth was represented by Mr. Andres and Ms. McFarlane as lawyer and planner; their counterparts were Mr. Helfand and Mr. Chan.

4Mr. Andres’ Review Request was filed on March 1, 2023; Mr. Helfand’s Response on March 20, 2023 and Mr. Andres’ Reply to Response on March 27, 2023. All documents were thus filed in timely fashion.

Test to be applied

5The applicable TLAB Rule of Practice and Procedure 31.17 states:

Grounds for Review

31.17 In considering whether to grant any remedy the Chair shall consider whether the reasons and evidence provided by the Requesting Party are compelling and demonstrate the TLAB:

c) made an error of law or fact which would likely have resulted in a different Final Decision or final order;

6I interpret this as requiring three elements. First there must be an identified error for consideration under subclause (c), either of law or fact. Second the review information supplied by Mr. Andres in support must be “compelling”; that is, the supporting “reasons and evidence” must be such that any reasonable TLAB member would agree that the decision is incorrect, based on the evidence provided. It must be more than the kind of discretion a member exercises in balancing various interests or in favouring certain evidence as more convincing. A trier of fact has discretion to reject evidence that is not persuasive or prefer certain evidence, if for example, the two parties differ substantially on how a document is to be interpreted. A review is not a rehearing.

7Third, if the allegation is an error under branch (c), it must be likely to have led to a different result. In support of an alleged error, it must provide:

Rule 31.6.d.iv. a clear demonstration of how in the case of grounds asserted under Rule 31.17 c), . . . each would likely have resulted in a different Final Decision or final order.

8Rule 31.6.d.iv requires that Mr. Andres provide me on behalf his client a precise outline, supported by specific reference to the transcript and appropriate authority³, it cannot be simply a vague complaint as to some perceived injustice. In this case there was no transcript provided. As a result, some allegations, Mr. Helfand said, created unfairness which went to the heart of the review process. Noting 11 instances where there should have been a reference to a transcript, he said:

These statements are completely unreliable without the supporting transcript. The Chair has no basis to assess the accuracy of these statements, and the responding party has no ability to adequately respond to them. The Review Request should be read down to exclude these improper references. (Response par 50)

By not specifying Ms. McFarlane’s or Mr. Chan’s actual words, Mr. Helfand could not respond. This is not just a technical violation. As Mr. Helfand requests, the result is arrived at, in large part, by “reading down” Mr. Andres’ statements.

9The Requester has failed to tell me what kind of error he means. Rule 37.17 (c) says “error of law or fact” and in his overview Mr. Andres says, “errors of law and fact”. In par. 30 he adds “errors of law” implying he two are equivalent. Since “error of law” has a rich jurisprudence and Mr. Andres’ phrase does not, I am left to sort out what he means. I will assume that he means errors of mixed fact and law, such that they amount to an alleged error of law. In summary, I allow that all references to:

Errors of fact

Errors of law

Mixed errors of fact and law

may conceivably be an error of law.

The alleged errors

10The format of the Request is as follows:

I Overview

II Grounds for Review

III Relief Requested

IV Submissions in Support of Grounds for review

A Background Context

(i) The Subject Property and Minor Variance Application

(ii) The TLB Appeal Process

(iii) The Decision

B The Decision should be Cancelled

(i) The Decision Incorrectly Interprets and Applies Official Plan Policy 3.4.8

(ii) The Decision Incorrectly Interprets and Applies Official Plan Policy 4.1.5

(iii) The Alleged Privacy and Overlook Impacts are Unsubstantiated

(iv) The Alleged Impact of the Size of the Proposal is Unsubstantiated

V Summary

11Given the components of Rule 31.17 in the previous section, I would have expected more attention to whether the alleged error, if proved, was supported by “compelling” information and “would likely to have led to a different result”. Instead, Mr. Andres offers this conclusory paragraph:

The Decision contains fundamental errors of law and fact. If those errors of law were not made, the Decision would have resulted in a different order. It must therefore be cancelled. (Request, paragraph 30)

12In Response, Mr. Helfand remarks:

[Section II Grounds for Review] do not identify a factual error. They are extremely generic criticisms of the Decision. It is not clear at all what “facts” the Applicant refers to, and the issue(s) taken by the Applicant are far from obvious: were the “facts” ignored, or were they wildly overstated? These are polar opposites. (Response paragraph 15)

13I agree in large part and find that the allegations of error were not clearly demonstrated. Mr. Andres’ Review Request is largely an attempt to relitigate the topics he raised. I will discuss further the matters he identified as errors.

Official Plan S. 3.4.8

14Th Official Plan reads:

8. Development will be set back from the following locations by at least 10 metres, or more if warranted by the severity of existing or potential natural hazards: a) the top-of-bank of valleys, ravines and bluffs; b) toe-of-slope of valleys, ravines and bluffs; c) other locations where slope instability, erosion, flooding, or other physical conditions present a significant risk to life or property; and d) other locations near the shoreline which may be hazardous if developed because of flooding, erosion or dynamic beach processes. Minor additions to existing development, replacement structures and ancillary structures are exempt from this policy.

15It is common to both parties that this policy refers to the top of bank of a ravine at the rear of the Glen Edyth property and is the topic of variance requests 10 and 11.

Figure 1. Top left present survey; Top right proposed footprint; Bottom left blow-up showing the two top of slope setbacks.

16Par 8(a) of the Request states:

In delivering the Decision, the TLAB Member made the following errors of law and fact: . . .

(a) provided an interpretation and analysis of policy 3.4.8 which is incoherent, riddled with conjecture, and inconsistent with the evidence and the legal tests under 45(1); (Review Request)

17The Request goes on to say in paragraph 26, that the decision contains “faulty analysis”⁴, followed by a list of negative comments about Member Gopikrishna’s conduct in handling the hearing. A key comment centred around Mr. Helfand’s issuing a summons to Ms. Lim, a planner with the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority who had written a “No objection” letter to the Committee of Adjustment. The Decision notes that at the outset of the hearing, Mr. Helfand withdrew his summons, Ms. Lim was then excused, and she did not testify. In paragraph 25, Mr. Andres says that Mr. Chan (planner for Mr. Advani, the objecting neighbour) should not have been able to make “unfounded assertions” about TRCA’s (Ms. Lim’s) objection letter.⁵

18I do not find what has happened amounts to an error of law. It is not an error for Mr. Chan to make comments that go beyond his Witness Statement. The TLAB Rule simply requires that he state his opinion and the reasons for that opinion. ⁶ Mr. Andres had the opportunity to cross examine Mr. Chan and explore how and why his opinion had changed, if indeed that is what he thought had happened. If Mr. Andres felt there was a prior inconsistent statement, then this was a matter to place before Member Gopikrishna in submissions. Member Gopikrishna had the power to make evidentiary rulings during the hearing, some of which might displease one party or the other.

19A tribunal member may admit evidence not admissible in court under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.⁷

20I think the substantive “error” that Mr. Andres alleges is that the Member did not automatically accept the “No objection” letter as irrefutable proof that OP s.3.4.8 was complied with, particularly the last bolded sentence.

21In Paragraph 25 of his Response, Mr. Helfand states Ms. McFarlane admitted that she had not considered the Living City’s Policies in arriving at her opinion and indeed Member Gopikrishna’s reasons deal extensively with the Living Cities Policies (the policies the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority uses in managing ravines under its jurisdiction).⁸ These are referred to in a sidebar entitled “TRCA – Toronto’s Partner in Managing the Natural Environment”⁹. This sidebar was in the province of Member Gopikrishna to consider and he had the discretion to interpret it in the light of all the evidence, including Ms. Lim’s letter. I do not find an error in giving weight to the definitions of “replacement” and “reconstruction” and other policies such as the Living City Policies.

OP 4.1.5

22This ground is contained in 8(b) of the Review Request

provided an interpretation and analysis of policy 4.1.5 which is incoherent, riddled with conjecture, inconsistent with the evidence and the legal tests under 45(1);

23Mr. Andres further elaborates that it is the use of the word “types” in part of Member Gopikrishna’s reasoning that he objects to, saying:

the faulty analysis and finding that OP policy 4.1.5 is not satisfied by the Proposal, based on a misunderstanding of evidence relating to prevailing building types, which was not even an issue during the hearing (Review Request paragraph 26(b))

24OP 4.1.5 states:

5. Development in established Neighbourhoods will respect and reinforce the existing physical character of each geographic neighbourhood, including in particular:

a) patterns of streets, blocks and lanes, parks and public building sites;

b) prevailing size and configuration of lots;

c) prevailing heights, massing, scale, density and dwelling type of nearby residential properties;

d) prevailing building type(s);

e) prevailing location, design and elevations relative to the grade of driveways and garages;

f) prevailing setbacks of buildings from the street or streets;

g) prevailing patterns of rear and side yard setbacks and landscaped open space;

h) continuation of special landscape or built-form features that contribute to the unique physical character of the geographic neighbourhood; and

i) conservation of heritage buildings, structures and landscapes.

25“Building types” is listed in (d) and as Mr. Andres correctly points out, this Toronto neighbourhood has only one building type —single detached. That is, there are no multiplexes here. However, having read the decision in its entirety, I am of the view that what Member Gopikrishna meant by “”types”, was “building traits” or “building characteristics”, such as are enumerated in 4.1.5. This is clear from his discussion on lot sizes (p 11), length, depth and height (p 12), “multiple prevailing types” (p 12), and the “interdependence of variances”, (p 15) and his reasons on p 27 where he clearly means “prevailing FSI” and not “prevailing building type”:

[Ms. McFarlane] also provided a different analysis to demonstrate how the proposal respected the prevailing type, where she relied on the FSI calculations of other properties, and demonstrated that if the data set were restricted to the properties backing onto the ravine, then an FSI of 0.72 X Lot Size was the prevailing type. . . (Decision, page 27)

26Mr. Andres goes on to criticize Member Gopikrishna’s handling of the qualitative versus quantitative handing of prevailing characteristics in the Official Plan clause 4.1.5:

As clarified by the TLAB in a recent review decision on 21 Valley View, the tests in subsection 45(1) do not require that particular OP policies must be satisfied or conformed with, and to apply the “prevailing” tests in such a prescriptive numerical manner is contrary to the Planning Act and therefore an error of law. (Request, par 49)

27In this case I do not see how there is an error because both Mr. Andres and Member Gopikrishna seem to agree that both quantitative and qualitative approaches should be used.¹⁰ After quoting the 251 Old Forest Hill decision (supplied to Member Gopikrishna by Mr. Andres), and noting use of that Member’s “holistic” approach with approval (i.e., both quantitative and qualitative), Member Gopikrishna concludes:

The uniqueness and the power of Policy 4.1.5 derives from its flexibility, and inclusion of both qualitative, and quantitative analysis- both types of analyses are indispensable to establish the “prevailing type”. (Decision, page 19)

28Using a “flexible” approach, he preferred Mr. Chan’s evidence on 4.1.5 over Ms. McFarlane’s, which he had the discretion to do.

Overstating the Facts on privacy

29This ground is contained in 8(b) of the Review Request

ignored and/or wildly overstated the facts relating to the alleged privacy and overlook impacts resulting from permitted building elements and the rear first floor deck in making findings on whether the legal tests are satisfied by the Proposal. (Review Request)

30Mr. Andres goes on to say that:

Page 23 of the Decision completely mischaracterizes the Applicant’s position in respect of overlook and privacy issues, and it is wrong to state that “the Applicants did not contest the overlook and privacy issues”. To the contrary, the Applicant consistently maintained that the Proposal does not generate any undue impacts, and Ms. McFarlane provided clear and unequivocal opinions that the Proposal does not create any significant shadow, privacy or overlook issues. (footnote omitted) (Request, par 50)

The evidence plainly demonstrates that the east side yard setback next to the Appellant’s property is fully compliant and significantly exceeds the required setback for the majority of the building length, which at less than 17 metres is itself fully compliant with the permitted building length above grade. Moreover, the second floor balcony at the rear of the proposed dwelling has an area of only 4 m² which is also permitted as-of-right. Finally, despite the zoning by-law not regulating the placement of windows, the east wall of the dwelling proposes only two side-facing second storey windows (see para. 58 below). (Review Request par 51)

31In the bolded language, Mr. Andres is clearly attempting to relitigate the privacy issue. This is not the purpose of Rule 31.

32In par. 46, Mr. Andres says that the Member did not refer to extensive evidence on FSI.¹¹ . The applicable law is that a tribunal is not obliged to recite every piece of evidence or every step in its reasoning, however it is an error if there is a complete lack of analysis.¹² In reviewing Mr. Andres’ comments on this issue, Mr. Helfand states that it is more like a closing argument concluding with a general disagreement with the conclusions of Member Gopikrishna: Mr. Helfand concludes at par. 43

[Glen Edyth Property Holding Ltd} does not articulate or establish an error in law or fact contained in the Decision in respect of the findings on privacy impact. Member Gopikrishna did undertake a thoughtful review and assessment of the issues, and did not commit an error by simply finding against the [Glen Edyth Property Holding Ltd] on the issue of privacy impact. (Response, par 43)

33I find there was analysis in Member Gopikrishna’s decision on privacy and overall impact as required by the Planning Act.

Front yard setback and the overall building height

34Par 8(d) of the Request reads:

[The Decision] ignored and/or wildly overstated the facts relating to the magnitude of variances sought in respect of the front yard setback and the overall building height in making findings on whether the legal tests are satisfied by the Proposal; (Review Request)

And continues with an allegation that Member Gopikrishna’s decision relies on:

the exaggerated and erroneous findings that the impact of the large house is “doubly intensified” as a result of a negligible front yard setback variance and that the modest height increase for a portion of the roof (which is now permitted) results in a “triple whammy” because of an alleged lack of measures to mitigate the impact, despite no explanation as to how these variances actually cause any impact on the streetscape or adjacent properties (Review Request par-26d)

35The request notes that Mr. Advani has “has similar side-facing windows and a side yard setback that does not conform with the by-law.” (Request par 52) That may be the case, it does not stop the member from keeping an open mind to all the other factors he mentions.

36In Paragraphs 59 and 60, Mr. Andres depicts the small portions of the building that are impacted; however, there is no reference to exhibit numbers and it is not clear whether this evidence was before Member Gopikrishna or created after the hearing for the special purpose of this request. However, for the purposes of the review request, I assume that these drawings were properly submitted to Member Gopikrishna.

37Speaking of paragraphs 56 to 60 of the Review Request, Mr. Helfand states:

What the Applicant asserts to be, variously, “wrong”, “reckless”, defying “common sense”, “erroneous” and “irresponsible and offensive”, are simply findings of the TLAB based on the evidence. Far from being an error of fact or law, the TLAB was simply performing its statutory function of weighing the evidence and reaching a conclusion. (Response par. 46)

I agree that Member Gopikrishna was performing his statutory duty. This part of the request is an attempt to relitigate issues at the hearing. Member Gopikrishna had discretion to consider the drawings, Mr. Advani’s windows etc. in the light of all the evidence and make factual determinations and draw overall conclusions.

Mr. Andres’ intemperate language

38Mr. Helfand notes Mr. Andres’ “charged rhetoric” and his opposite party’s “disdain for the Decision”.¹³ I think it was appropriate for Mr. Helfand to note this, as a participant in the administration of justice who has the obligation to encourage respect for the legal system.

39I was also concerned by this language; it seemed to me at times he went beyond what was necessary to advocate on behalf of his client and point out possible errors. The words “preposterous” and “irresponsible and offensive” are allegations that imply that Member Gopikrishna was irrational or malicious as opposed to merely being wrong. Member Gopikrishna is unable to defend himself as noted below.

40S. 5.6.1(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (a document of the Law Society of Ontario) states:

3Criticizing Tribunals - Although proceedings and decisions of tribunals are properly subject to scrutiny and criticism by all members of the public, including lawyers, judges and members of tribunals are often prohibited by law or custom from defending themselves. Their inability to do so imposes special responsibilities upon lawyers. First, a lawyer should avoid criticism that is petty, intemperate, or unsupported by a bona fide belief in its real merit, bearing in mind that in the eyes of the public, professional knowledge lends weight to the lawyer's judgments or criticism. Second, if a lawyer has been involved in the proceedings, there is the risk that any criticism may be, or may appear to be, partisan rather than objective. Third, where a tribunal is the object of unjust criticism, a lawyer, as a participant in the administration of justice, is uniquely able to and should support the tribunal, both because its members cannot defend themselves and because in doing so the lawyer is contributing to greater public understanding of and therefore respect for the legal system.

41I have ignored the Rules of Professional Conduct as they were not germane to my determination of whether any Review remedy should be granted. I looked at every ground of alleged error and did not find any. Moreover, I have pointed out that the reasoning and evidence of Mr. Andres falls short of being compelling as required by Rule 31. In coming to this conclusion, I have relied only on the documents submitted, the TLAB Rules of Practice and Procedure, cases referred to and the zoning notice used by Member Gopikrishna.

DECISION AND ORDER

The Decision of Member Gopikrishna is confirmed, and the Request for Review denied.

T. Yao

TLAB Panel Chair

What is admissible in evidence at a hearing 15. (1) . . . a tribunal may admit as evidence at a hearing, whether or not given or proven under oath or affirmation or admissible as evidence in a court, (a) any oral testimony; and (b) any document or other thing, relevant to the subject-matter of the proceeding and may act on such evidence, but the tribunal may exclude anything unduly repetitious.

the house was a “Replacement” dwelling, and the proposed dwelling was farther away from the slope than the demolished house. In response, Mr. Helfand asked Ms. McFarland if she had considered the “Living City Policies” while arriving at her opinion, to which she replied in the negative. Mr. Helfand then questioned the reasoning behind Ms. McFarland’s concluding that the dwelling to be developed, was a “Replacement” dwelling, to which she replied that the house was a Replacement building, because it was built in place of a house that had been demolished. Mr. Helfand pointed out that the OP had no definition for a Replacement, while the Living Policies included a definition. He then proceeded to read out two definitions, which are recited as follows:

1. Replacement – see reconstruction
2. Reconstruction - the restoration, repair, or replacement of a building or structure within its original footprint, not to exceed its original ground floor area, gross floor area or height, and without any change to its original use. On the basis of the above discussion, Mr. Helfand disagreed with Ms. McFarland’s opinion, and insisted that the dwelling was not exempt from the Policy which required a 10 metre separation between the dwelling and LTSOS. (Decision, page 9)

[4] The Applicant’s disdain for the Decision, and the Decision making process is obvious. Yet, the fact is that the Decision is a detailed, 29 page document which contains a thorough canvassing of all the evidence brought forward over the course of a 4 day hearing. The Decision contains a thorough and reasoned analysis of the relevant issues, and clearly explains why the proposed minor variances fail each and every one of the four tests of section 45(1) of the Planning Act.

Footnotes

1. 1This chart is compiled from the file materials since neither Member Gopikrishna nor the lawyers gave this to me. However, I have to explain to a wider audience and this background is necessary for understanding the issues raised in this review.
2. 2Two numbers are given for the street elevation, one does not trigger a variance.
3. 3Rule 31.6 A Party’s request for Review shall be entitled “Review Request” and shall contain;. . ... . .d) a concise written argument contained in numbered paragraphs. The Review Request shall provide, avoiding repetition, the concise written arguments regarding each listed matter from Rule 31.17 in the same order and include the following: i. the applicable section of the Planning Act or other legislative basis, if any, for the argument advanced; ii. the wording of the applicable policy, By-law or authority, if any, in support of the argument advanced; iii. the applicable transcript or other evidence and exhibit attachments,[.
4. 4On January 30, 2023, the TLAB issued its Decision [by Member Gopikrishna] allowing the Appeal and setting aside the CofA Decision. Although portions of the Decision are very difficult to comprehend, it essentially sets out four general grounds for refusing the Variance Application: the faulty analysis and finding that OP policy 3.4.8 is not satisfied by the Proposal, based on a misguided analysis of how that policy is implemented and applied by the TRCA (pages 16-17, 20-22 and 24-25) (Review Request, par 26)
5. 5Despite the Appellant’s decision to withdraw its summons for Ms. Lim and numerous objections from the Applicant’s counsel, Mr. Chan was permitted during the course of the TLAB hearing to make several unfounded assertions about the TRCA’s review of the Variance Application and its application of the[Living City Policies], and to provide opinions regarding OP policy 3.4.8 that were not contained in his witness statements. (Review Request, par 25)
6. 6Contents of Expert Witness Statement 16.13 An Expert Witness Statement shall include: a) the expert’s name, address and area of expertise; b) the expert’s qualifications, employment and educational experiences in his or her area of expertise; c) the instructions provided to the expert in relation to the Proceeding; d) the nature of the opinion being sought and, where there is a range of opinions given, a summary of the range and the reasons for the expert’s opinion within that range; and e) the expert’s reasons for his or her opinion, including a description of the factual assumptions, research and any Documents relied upon by the expert in forming his or her opinion. (TLAB Rules of Practice and Procedure)
7. 7Evidence
8. 8Mr. Helfand pointed Ms. McFarlane to a 9.4 metre separation between the sloping part of the ravine, and the planned location of the dwelling to be built, before and asking Ms. McFarland if the house to be built was exempt from the Policy that required a 10 metre separation from the LTSOS. Ms. McFarlane said that the house was exempt because
9. 9The TRCA: The City’s Partner in Managing the Natural Environment The Toronto and Region Conservation Authority plays an important role in managing Toronto’s natural environment. The Authority: • safeguards, manages and restores watercourses, lakes, woodlands, wetlands and natural habitat; • protects life and property from flooding and erosion through watershed planning, monitoring and maintenance efforts and its regulation under the Conservation Authorities Act; and • provides educational and recreational opportunities for the public. The Authority’s "Living City" vision focuses on three objectives: healthy watercourses and shorelines; regional biodiversity; and sustainable communities. (Toronto Official Plan p 3-49)
10. 10I also read the cases cited in support: 63 Methuen and 21 Valley View. Each case turns on its facts and these were not of assistance.
11. 11Shockingly, the Decision does not reference any of this extensive opinion evidence or analysis, even though it comprised a large portion of the written evidence and hours of testimony and submissions. (Review Request, par 46)
12. 12Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002 v. Zabian, 2013 ONSC 6647, Park v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 2013 ONSC 6673, C.Y. Vehicle Enterprises Inc. v. Lin, 2021 ONSC 4828
13. 13[3] The Chair should take careful note of the charged rhetoric used by the Applicant in the Review Request, referring to the Decision, and Member Gopikrishna, at times, as “lacking in coherent analysis” (para 3); “deeply concerning” (para 3); “incoherent and riddled with conjecture” (paras 8a and 8b); “faulty analysis” (paras 26a and 26b); “ridiculous and incorrect” (para 26c); “exaggerated and erroneous” (para 26d); “improper and/or unfounded logic” (para 27); “confusing” (para 29); “very little effort” (para 29); “clumsily” (para 32); “wrong” (para 37); “poorly reasoned” and “hair-splitting” (para 38); “misguided” (para 38); “misguided and incomprehensible” (para 40); “circular and incoherent” (para 42); “demonstrating a lack of awareness” (para 47); “clearly missed the point” (para 52); “preposterous” (para 54); “reckless” (para 58); “defies common sense” (para 59); “gross exaggeration and erroneous finding” (para 60); “irresponsible and offensive” (para 61); “bald unsubstantiated assumptions and assertions” (para 62).