Re: Laureano Bistoyong
ORB File No: 8919
Hearing held on: Friday, February 13, 2026
Place of hearing: St. Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton Via Zoom Videoconference
Pursuant to: Section 672.47(1) of the Criminal Code
Before:
Chairperson: The Honourable Michael R. Dambrot, K.C.
Members: The Honourable Bruce Durno Dr. Hy Bloom Dr. Wagdy Loza Mr. Andy Bouvier
Parties Appearing:
Laureano Bistoyong: Counsel: Mr. Andrew Confente
The person in charge of the Hospital: Counsel: Mr. Stephen O’Brien
Attorney General of Ontario: Counsel: Ms. Jill McKenzie
REASONS FOR DISPOSITION
(Dated March 12, 2026)
Introduction
- Laureano Bistoyong1 stabbed and killed his cousin, Mark Bisoyong on July 2, 2023. He was charged with second degree murder and tried by Goodman J. without a jury in the Superior Court of Justice in Hamilton, Ontario. On November 26, 2025, he was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (“NCR”). The court did not hold a disposition hearing and instead issued a warrant of committal requiring Mr. Bistoyong to be detained in custody in the Forensic Psychiatry Program of St. Joseph’s Healthcare Hamilton (“St. Joseph’s” or “the Hospital”) pending the holding of a hearing and the making of a disposition by the Ontario Review Board pursuant to s. 672.47(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada (“Code”). On February 13, 2026, this panel of the Board conducted Mr. Bistoyong’s initial disposition hearing.
Position of the Parties
The Hospital, Mr. Bistoyong and the Attorney General all agreed that Mr. Bistoyong is a significant threat to the safety of the public and jointly submitted that a detention order in the Forensic Psychiatry Program of St. Joseph’s subject to terms was the necessary and appropriate disposition. However, they took different positions with respect to the terms they considered to be appropriate.
All parties agreed that Mr. Bistoyong should be ordered to:
(a) abstain absolutely from the non-medical use of alcohol or drugs or any other intoxicant;
(b) submit samples of their urine and/or breath to the person in charge of St. Joseph’s or their designate for the purpose of analyzing whether the accused has ingested alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicant; and
(c) refrain from having in their possession any firearm, ammunition or other offensive weapon, or being in the company of any person possessing a firearm other than a peace officer.
- The Hospital, joined by counsel for Mr. Bistoyong, also submitted that the Board should order that as part of a program for the detention and rehabilitation of Mr. Bistoyong, the person in charge of the St. Joseph’s should be authorized, in their discretion, to permit Mr. Bistoyong:
(a) to attend within or outside of the hospital for necessary medical, dental, legal or compassionate purposes;
(b) hospital and grounds privileges, escorted by staff;
(c) hospital and grounds privileges, accompanied by staff or a person approved by the person in charge;
(d) hospital and grounds privileges, indirectly supervised;
(e) to enter the community of Southern Ontario, escorted by staff;
(f) to enter the community of Southern Ontario, accompanied by staff or a person approved by the person in charge; and
(g) to enter the community of Southern Ontario, indirectly supervised.
- Counsel for the Attorney General joined in recommending all but the last two of these terms and proposed broad “no contact or communication” and “non-attendance” terms. In response to the Attorney General’s proposal, the Hospital and Mr. Bistoyong supported narrower “no contact or communication” and “non-attendance” terms.
The Board’s Conclusions
For the reasons that follow, the panel agreed that Mr. Bistoyong is a significant threat to the safety of the public and accepted the joint submission of the parties that the necessary and appropriate disposition in the circumstances is an order pursuant to s. 672.54(c) of the Code directing that he be detained in custody at the Hospital. The panel further adopted the additional terms and conditions proposed by the Hospital, except that we narrowed the scope of any entry into the community to Hamilton, Niagara and the Greater Toronto Area, and ordered that the person in charge of the Hospital may not permit Mr. Bistoyong to enter the said communities accompanied only by an approved person or indirectly supervised without first obtaining the Board’s approval at a discretionary review pursuant to s. 672.82 of the Code.
The panel also imposed the “no contact or communication” and “non-attendance” terms requested by the Attorney General but narrowed the proposed reach of those terms.
The Index Offence
Larry Bistoyong and Victorino Bistoyong are brothers. Larry is the father of Laureano and Liam Bistoyong. Victorino is the father of Mark, Adam and Cain Bistoyong. In 2023, Larry lived in a home in Hamilton with his sons. Victorino also lived in a home in Hamilton, with his wife, Merl, and their sons. On July 2, 2023, members of the Bistoyong family celebrated Larry’s 60th birthday at Larry’s home. During the celebrations, some of the younger guests, including Mark and Laureano, went to a nearby park to play basketball. Mark was sixteen at the time, and Laureano was twenty-two. The basketball game was physical, and some pushing and shoving took place. After playing basketball, the players returned to Larry’s residence.
When the basketball players returned to Larry’s residence, the birthday celebration was still going on. Guests were sitting in the living room, the dining room, the kitchen and the backyard. After spending some time in the basement, the five cousins came upstairs and sat in the dining room. At some point, Laureano returned to the basement and was physically ill. Larry and Liam went downstairs to clean up his vomit. Laureano came back upstairs to the kitchen area, picked up a chef’s knife with a 22-centimetre-long blade, approached Mark, who was seated in the dining room between Adam and Cain, and stabbed him once in the chest. The stab wound was approximately 5.2 centimetres wide, 16 centimetres deep and inflicted from front to back and downward, and perforated Mark’s lung, causing his death.
Laureano then retreated into the corner of the room and stood by as family members tended to Mark's injuries. The stab caused Mark to bleed profusely. Larry and Liam were still in the basement at the time of the stabbing but came upstairs upon hearing the commotion. Larry approached Laureano, grabbed him and asked what he had done. Laureano appeared to be in shock, did not respond, and instead walked into the kitchen. Larry attempted to hold on to Laureano, but Laureano fled the residence. The following morning, Laureano was found in a stranger’s vehicle and was arrested. He had been outside for about twelve hours.
The Court Proceedings
This matter proceeded in court in a somewhat unusual manner. A brief description of the proceedings will help explain certain subsequent events.
On July 3, 2023, Mr. Bistoyong was arrested and charged with the second degree murder of Mark Bistoyong. He elected to be tried by a Superior Court Judge without a jury and was ordered to stand trial on November 3, 2023.
Mr. Bistoyong’s trial commenced on September 16, 2024. His plea of not guilty to the offence as charged, but guilty of manslaughter was not accepted by the Crown, and the matter proceeded on the original charge. The sole issue at the trial was whether the Crown could establish that Mr. Bistoyong had the requisite intent for second degree murder.
On October 11, 2024, Mr. Bistoyong was found guilty of second degree murder. The trial Judge concluded that he had the requisite state of mind for murder. Specifically, he found that when Mr. Bistoyong stabbed Mark Bistoyong, he subjectively intended to cause him serious bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless whether death ensued or not. The trial Judge registered a conviction and adjourned the matter for sentence. However, during the sentence hearing, and after hearing from numerous victims whose Victim Impact Statements (we will use “VIS” as an acronym for the singular “Victim Impact Statement” and “VISs” for the plural) had been read and filed, counsel for the accused raised the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for the first time and asked for a hearing to determine the issue. The matter was adjourned, and two psychiatric assessments were conducted, one by Dr. Lee and Dr. Chaimowitz, and one by Dr. Quinn.
Mr. Bistoyong’s NCR hearing took place in October 2025. On November 26, 2025, the trial Judge rendered a verdict that Mr. Bistoyong caused the death of Mark Bistoyong but was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.
Mr. Bistoyong’s Background
Mr. Bistoyong was born in Hamilton, Ontario in October 2000, the oldest of the two sons of Larry and Imelda Bistoyong. Imelda passed away in 2020. Mr. Bistoyong grew up in a close and nurturing family. His social life revolved around family. He was a quiet, well-behaved and introverted child with a small circle of friends. Academic achievement was important to him from a young age. He excelled academically in elementary and secondary school.
At around the age of twelve, Mr. Bistoyong began to experience auditory hallucinations. A voice that he identified as God told him that he was Jesus and needed to die to save others. Mr. Bistoyong was not bothered by the voices and simply considered them to be part of his life. He did not discuss the voices with his parents or his friends, because mental health was a taboo topic with his parents, and he feared being ridiculed by his friends. He reports that these symptoms did not impact his daily life until he was 16 or 17.
In high school, Mr. Bistoyong embarked on a spiritual journey with a focus on self-improvement, and became obsessed with meditation, mindfulness and listening to “frequencies”. He began smoking cannabis at 16, and his belief that he was Jesus intensified under its influence.
In his early twenties, Mr. Bistoyong developed an interest in “no fap”, a movement that encourages members to abstain from pornography and masturbation. He believed that his participation in this movement improved his mental clarity and the strength of his spiritual faith and fostered a closer connection to God.
Mr. Bistoyong commenced post-secondary education at McMaster University in 2018, where he studied commerce and economics. He performed well academically in his first year, but his marks gradually declined in his next two years. He attributed the decline to moving to on-line learning during the COVID pandemic and to his mother’s declining health.
In 2020, Mr. Bistoyong and his father and brother took leave from employment and education, isolated at home and provided full time care to Imelda who was in the late stages of cancer. After his mother died, Mr. Bistoyong never spoke of her death or the emotional toll it took on him. He declined his father’s offer of counselling. However, he confided in friends that he was experiencing suicidal ideations and using substances in the wake of his mother’s death. He went so far as to research hotel rooms as locations for suicide.
Mr. Bistoyong did return to university after the death of his mother but had trouble focussing on the course material. His marks continued to decline, and he dropped out in 2021. Although he had worked part-time during high school, he did not return to employment. He became socially withdrawn, started acting bizarrely with friends, gradually stopped spending time with them, and stopped replying to their texts. He reportedly smoked as much as fourteen grams of marijuana daily and used Percocet and opiates without a prescription four to five times per month to help him relax and sleep.
Mr. Bistoyong did go on a trip to Vancouver with friends in September 2021. On the first night of the trip, after smoking marijuana, he began speaking very loudly and tried to awaken his sleeping friends to finish watching a movie. He then began acting bizarrely, spinning in circles and speaking incoherently, and tried to leave their Airbnb to go home to Hamilton. When his friends physically prevented him from leaving, he acted out aggressively and slapped one of them. The police were called, and Mr. Bistoyong was taken to the hospital. He was remorseful when his friends picked him up the next morning and returned to his usual self for the remainder of the trip.
In the months following this trip, Mr. Bistoyong exhibited a gradual decline. He sent several cryptic and incoherent texts to friends and ultimately ceased all communication. Since 2021, he has spent most of his time alone in his room watching videos, playing video games and obsessively studying Kabbalah numerology and astral projection, and engaging only minimally with his father and brother. He has had no source of income during this period of time and has entered into no relationships.
Psychiatric History
As mentioned above, Mr. Bistoyong reports that he first experienced auditory hallucinations at the age of twelve. However, he had no psychiatric diagnosis until the incident in Vancouver in 2021, when he was transported to Vancouver Coastal Hospital by the police after his friends reported that he was acting bizarrely. He settled down on the way to hospital and was cooperative when he arrived. He reported that he had smoked marijuana and consumed mushrooms and had had similar bad reactions to mushrooms in the past. He reported having intrusive thoughts about harming himself or others and was kept overnight for psychiatric consultation. Upon discharge, he was diagnosed with Unspecific Depressive Disorder. Follow-up with care providers in Ontario was recommended but never undertaken.
On December 22, 2024, following his arrest for the index offence, Mr. Bistoyong was transferred from the Toronto South Detention Centre (“the South”) to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (“CAMH”) for assessment. Upon being returned to custody at the South, Mr. Bistoyong was diagnosed with Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychiatric Disorder and given medication. Upon his return to the South, he quickly decompensated and on January 7, 2025, he was returned to CAMH. On this occasion, he reported that people were trying to listen to his thoughts and that he believed that everyone was trying to kill him. He appeared to have a preoccupation with Jesus Christ. After trialing Olanzapine and Sertraline, his auditory hallucinations resolved, and his symptoms of thought broadcasting and persecutory delusions improved substantially. He remained religiously preoccupied and said that he had to spread the word of God. He was returned to the South on February 7, 2025.
On March 5, 2025, Mr. Bistoyong was admitted to the Forensic Psychiatry Assessment Unit at St. Joseph’s for a court-ordered assessment of his fitness to stand trial. At the end of his assessment, he was returned to the South with the opinion that he was fit. Then on May 12, 2025, Mr. Bistoyong was admitted to the Forensic Psychiatry Program at St. Joseph’s for an assessment of his criminal responsibility. A report was completed on June 27, 2025. He was diagnosed with Schizophrenia and Cannabis Use Disorder, in sustained remission in a controlled environment. In the opinion of Dr. Lee and Dr. Chaimowitz, he had a defence to the index offence of Not Criminally Responsible on account of mental disorder.
On July 28, 2025, Mr. Bistoyong was admitted to the Southwest Centre for Forensic Mental Health (“the Southwest”) for a second assessment of criminal responsibility. He was discharged with a diagnosis of Schizophrenia and Cannabis Use Disorder, in sustained remission in a controlled environment, and transferred back to St. Joseph’s, where he remains admitted to date. Dr. Quinn was also of the opinion that Mr. Bistoyong had a defence to the index offence of Not Criminally Responsible on account of mental disorder.
As I have noted, after finding Mr. Bistoyong NCR, the trial Judge issued a warrant of committal requiring Mr. Bistoyong to be detained in custody in the Forensic Psychiatry Program of St. Joseph’s pending the holding of a hearing and the making of a disposition by the Review Board.
The Assessment of Mr. Bistoyong’s Mental Condition Ordered by the Board
- On January 5, 2026, the Board ordered a 30-day inpatient assessment of Mr. Bistoyong’s mental condition, and the preparation of a report in writing to the Board. The purpose of the assessment was to assist the Board in determining whether Mr. Bistoyong presents a significant threat to the safety of the public, and if so, to assist in determining the disposition that should be made. That report was prepared by Dr. Tan and Dr. Chaimowitz and was filed as an exhibit on the initial hearing. I will proceed to summarize some of its findings.
1. Course Since the NCR Finding
Since the NCR finding, Mr. Bistoyong has remained on the Forensic Psychiatric Assessment Unit of St. Joseph’s, where he has had an unremarkable course. He has caused no management issues, has remained independent in attending to daily functioning, and has remained adherent to his prescription treatment, including the antipsychotic olanzapine and the antidepressant sertraline. There have been no overt signs of psychosis, and no reported symptomology. However, he has reported experiencing auditory hallucinations, specifically non-command voices commenting on what was going on around him. These voices neither distressed him nor influenced his behaviour.
Mr. Bistoyong has had limited engagement in recreational therapy activities and has spent most of his time watching television or playing video games, often alone. However, when he does socialize, he does so appropriately. He also has regular family visits.
2. Psychological Assessment
A psychological assessment of Mr. Bistoyong was completed by Ms. Erin Fuller, a PhD candidate, under the supervision of Dr. Mini Mamak, as part of the June 2025 NCR assessment conducted at St. Joseph’s. This was supplemented by a clinical interview on January 8, 2026.
In the assessment, it was noted that Mr. Bistoyong exhibited no overt indications of psychosis, but his affect presented as blunted and his speech was monotone. In terms of his risk status, Dr. Mamak said that Mr. Bistoyong falls in the low range with the supervision and support currently in place. His historical risk factors are balanced by strong protective factors. However, he is in the early stages of the recovery process and his “forensic journey”. Continued monitoring of his medication compliance, stress tolerance, commitment to abstinance, and goal follow-through will be important. She agreed with the treatment team that a detention order is necessary and appropriate at this time to ensure continued risk management and support.
Dr. Mamak recommended that Mr. Bistoyong participate in cognitive behaviour therapy for psychosis, in treatment addressing the index offence, and in targeted substance abuse interventions to help consolidate his progress, strengthen his coping skills and address his key risk factors.
3. Mental Status Examination
- A mental status examination was conducted by Dr. Tan and Dr. Chaimowitz. Mr. Bistoyong’s mental status has remained stable throughout the assessment period. He has been calm and cooperative and engaged in assessment, his speech is normal, his thought form coherent and organized, and his mood good, albeit with blunted affect. He denies any current perceptual disturbance or violent ideation and does not appear to be responding to internal stimuli. His insight and judgment are reasonable.
4. Clinical Risk Assessment
In their clinical risk assessment, Dr. Tan and Dr. Chaimowitz observed that Mr. Bistoyong has several static and dynamic factors that inform his risk. These include his diagnosis of Schizophrenia, a severe and persistent mental disorder, and a history of cannabis Use Disorder, in sustained remission in a controlled environment. At present, his symptoms of Schizophrenia are controlled by antipsychotic medication. While Mr. Bistoyong has insight into his mental condition and expresses an intention to continue taking his medication as recommended, he has remained in a highly controlled environment since commencing the medication and has not had the opportunity to demonstrate an independent commitment to continuing his prescribed treatment.
Given the violent and serious nature of the index offence, committed at a time when Mr. Bistoyong’s mental disorder was causing him to experience intense visual and auditory hallucinations, including command hallucinations, and that the management of his symptoms is a very recent development, more time is needed to demonstrate stability in his mental state.
Similarly, Mr. Bistoyong’s abstinence from cannabis and alcohol has been imposed on him in the same controlled environment. Again, despite his expressed intention to continue to abstain from these substances, his commitment is untested. Notably, while he abstained from cannabis from 2021 to 2023, his first subsequent use immediately preceded the index offence, and was accompanied by alcohol use.
Mr. Bistoyong does benefit from a supportive immediate family and has exhibited no incidents of violence or aggression in the nine months that he has been in hospital. Of concern, however, was an occasion when he intentionally consumed peanut butter in order to trigger an anaphylactic reaction with suicidal intent. In addition, the intense and predominantly condemnatory community interest in Mr. Bistoyong’s trajectory is a significant stressor for him.
In the end, Dr. Tan and Dr. Chaimowitz concluded that Mr. Bistoyong poses a significant threat to the safety of the public as that term was explained in Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), 1999 CanLII 694 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 625, and that his risk can be managed on a detention order subject to certain enumerated terms and conditions.
Additional Information before the Board – Victim Impact Statements
None of the parties adduced any additional evidence, but, pursuant to s. 672.45 (1.1), the Superior Court sent to the Board, amongst other things, all the exhibits filed with it in Mr. Bistoyong’s proceedings. As is ordinarily the case, the Board staff included the paper exhibits received from the Court in the hearing documents provided to the parties and to the panel conducting the initial hearing. What is not ordinary in this case is that the Court included in what it sent to the Board, and accordingly the Board staff included in the hearing documents, the 211 VISs filed in the aborted sentencing proceeding. This is not ordinary because when an accused is found NCR, there is no sentence imposed and no sentence hearing, and, ordinarily, there are no VISs. A VIS is only admissible in a criminal prosecution, pursuant to s. 722(1) of the Criminal Code, when the Court is determining the sentence to be imposed on an offender, or in the very rare circumstance when a Court exercises its authority pursuant to s. 672.45 (1) of the Code to hold an initial disposition hearing. But this case was extraordinary, as explained earlier, because Mr. Bistoyong was convicted of second degree murder and a sentence hearing was commenced. Only in the course of the sentence hearing, at which VISs were made exhibits, did Mr. Bistoyong raise his plea of NCR, causing the sentence hearing to come to an abrupt end.
Since the sentence hearing was effectively a nullity, the panel would have thought that there was no reason for the Court to send the VISs to the Board, but the trial Judge thought otherwise. After rendering his verdict of NCR, he stated, at paras 158-160 of his reasons:
158 Pursuant to the provisions of ss. 672.45 and 672.47 of the Code, I decline to make a disposition order and I defer that to the medical experts at the Ontario Review Board (“ORB”). The in-patient team would be able to use evidence-based risk assessment tools to assist the ORB in crafting his initial disposition. His initial hearing would likely occur within 45 days.
159 Section 672.5(14) of the Code provides for victim input at the Review Board hearing. I direct that the entire book of 217 (sic) VIS be sent to the Review Board for their consideration.
160 Further, I urge the ORB to fully consider Mark’s family's evidence at the disposition hearing and throughout the process, pursuant to s. 672.5(15.1) and 672.5(15.2) of the Criminal Code. A copy of the transcript, my oral ruling, my written reasons, the indictment, and all other exhibits filed on this trial are to be sent to the ORB forthwith.
Section 672.5 (15.1) of the Code permits victims of an offence, at their request, to read VISs prepared pursuant to s. 672.5(14) at a Board hearing. The VISs filed in the Superior Court were not prepared pursuant to s. s. 672.5(14), but having regard to the trial Judge’s comments, the Board permitted the nineteen victims who asked to do so to read their VISs.
In hindsight, this was not wise. The VISs were all written from the perspective that Mr. Bistoyong was guilty of second degree murder and would be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment. Importantly, they were all written on the assumption that Mr. Bistoyong had the mens rea for murder and was not NCR, and their VISs reflected that assumption.
What is more, the trial Judge permitted the filing and reading of VISs that did not comply with s. 722 (1) of the Code, which limits the content of a VIS to a description of “the physical or emotional harm, property damage or economic loss suffered by the victim as the result of the commission of the offence and the impact of the offence on the victim.” Many of the statements instead reflect the opinion of the writers as to the guilt and moral culpability of the accused; impugn his character and the character of his father and his brother – often in intemperate language; offer gratuitous (but likely heartfelt) comments in favour of the very severe sentence that ought to be imposed; and worse. The VISs draw a vivid picture of the contempt in which Mr. Bistoyong is held by a large network of relatives and friends of the deceased in the community.
We do not for a second begrudge the writers of the VISs their intense pain for the catastrophic loss of a remarkable young man who was dear to so many, nor even their deep anger at the accused regardless of the verdict. As the trial Judge put it, “What a heartbreaking case. What started out as a large close-knit and joyful family gathering to celebrate a birthday, turned into a horrific and tragic event with the stabbing death of a young man.” But that said, these comments should not have been before us. What is permitted in a VIS at a Board hearing by s. 672.5(14) of the Code is identical to what is permitted by s. 722(1). What is more, s. 672.5(14) provides that Form 48.2 in Part XXVIII of the Code must be used for the purpose of providing a VIS. That Form specifies on its face:
Your statement must not include
any statement about the conduct of the accused that is not relevant to the harm or loss suffered by you;
any unproven allegations;
any comments about any conduct for which the accused was not found criminally responsible;
any complaint about any individual, other than the accused, who was involved in the investigation or prosecution of the offence; or
except with the court’s or Review Board’s approval, an opinion or recommendation about the disposition.
The kind of information that is permitted to be included in a VIS can be helpful to the Board in assessing whether an accused is a threat to the safety to the public, and if so, whether they should be detained in a hospital or conditionally discharged, and what terms and conditions are necessary and appropriate. But the kind of information that is forbidden provides the Board with no assistance, and runs the risk, if accepted, of misdirecting the Board away from its mandated foci.
This understanding of what may and what may not be included in a VIS is consistent with the guidance of the Ontario Court of Appeal. In Klem (Re), 2016 ONCA 119, at para. 45, Lauwers J.A. stated:
Under these provisions, the Board was only permitted to allow as a victim impact statement “a written statement describing the harm done to, or loss suffered by, the victim arising from the commission of the offence.” In an ideal world, victims would complete their impact statements in full compliance with the requirements of the Criminal Code.
But what should the Board do when a VIS is tendered that goes beyond what is permitted? Lauwers J.A. went on to consider this question in Klem. He stated, in para. 46, that a number of preliminary steps could be taken.
First, he stated, at para. 47, “Those taking the statements from the victims could advise on how the statements would need to be revised to comply with the Criminal Code.” Where the Ontario Victim/Witness Assistance Program provides assistance to victims in preparing VISs, it should take this responsibility to heart in the advice it provides. When VIS submitted to the Board are Code-compliant, hearings are fairer and more efficient.
Second, Lauwers J.A. stated, at para. 48, “Counsel for the accused and the Crown could discuss redacting offending comments from the statements before they are tendered to the Board.” In my view, this should be the norm. I note that some Crown counsel resist doing this, for reasons that are unclear to me. Indeed, in this case, when we asked counsel to discuss redacting some of the comments in the one fresh VIS tendered to the Court in this case, Crown counsel agreed to do so reluctantly. In my view, doing so falls within the duty of Crown counsel as ministers of justice. Certainly, that was the view of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. Labrash, 2006 BCCA 357 at para. 13, albeit in the sentencing context, where the Court stated:
It is the duty of Crown counsel to carefully consider the contents of victim impact statements to prevent the kind of inappropriate comments that appear in the statement in this case from getting into the record, particularly when the statement in large measure amounts to a sentencing submission.
By taking such a proactive approach, counsel for the Crown and the accused will promote both the fairness and the efficiency of Board hearings. I note that the Board stands ready to assist in such an endeavour through its Pre-Hearing Conference process. In addition, the Board makes best efforts to flag non-compliant VIS for the parties, so that they are aware of potential issues and, where possible, agree on redactions prior to the hearing.
Third, Lauwers J.A. stated, at para. 49, that it would be open to the parties to request the Board to rule on the admissibility of comments on which counsel could not agree. In such cases, he said, the Board would hear submissions from the parties and decide whether to admit the statements in whole, with offending portions excised, or at all.
Fourth, Lauwers J.A. stated, at para. 50, that the Board could, of its own initiative, direct counsel to meet and attempt to come to an agreement on which portions of the victim impact statements should be redacted during a break in the hearing. As I have noted, that is what the panel did here with respect to the new VIS. However, since most Board hearings are scheduled for 1.5 hours, this approach is very inefficient, particularly in a case, such as this one, where there are many VISs. It is preferable that the issue be dealt with proactively.
Finally, Lauwers J. A. acknowledged at para. 51 that it would be open to the Board to admit a victim impact statement in full, while taking into consideration only those parts of the statement that comply with the Criminal Code. The Board, he said, could identify its concerns with the statements and advise the parties that it will only consider the non-offending portions of the statement. This could be done on the Board's own motion, or in response to concerns or objections raised by counsel.
We acknowledge that this happens frequently. It is undoubtedly efficient when problems with a VIS have not been dealt with proactively, and as is often the case, where the offending portions of the VIS are few or of limited significance.
We note that there are those who argue that the need to consider the first four possible steps in Klem has been overtaken by one of the 2015 amendments to s. 722 of the Code, namely the addition of s. 722(8), which provides statutory approval of the fifth possible Klem step, as follows:
In considering the statement, the court shall take into account the portions of the statement that it considers relevant to the determination referred to in subsection (1) and disregard any other portion.
The argument runs that by virtue of this amendment, admitting a VIS containing inadmissible comments and then ignoring those inadmissible comments should now be either the mandatory or the default position. We see nothing in this amendment that suggests that this is the preferable approach, far less the mandatory approach, in particular at a Board hearing. With respect to Board hearing, we note, first of all, that no provision equivalent to s. 722(8), which governs sentencing proceedings, was added to s. 672.5, which governs VISs in Board proceedings. We see no reason to doubt that this omission was deliberate. And second, the Court of Appeal has continued to treat Klem as good law subsequent to the amendment (see, for example, Cole (Re), 2025 ONCA 899). As the Alberta Court of Appeal put it in R. v. De Grood, 2023 ABCA 182 at para. 21, “Inappropriate content is to be discouraged, but can be disregarded.” Neither s. 722(8) nor the final alternative in Klem say anything different.
We have an additional concern about the Board permitting victims to read impermissible comments in their VIS at a Board hearing and then disabusing their minds of those comments that is not, to our knowledge, addressed in the caselaw. The circumstances of Klem exemplify our concern. In Klem, the victim impact statements admitted into evidence were replete with highly prejudicial material that fell outside of the permitted topics. The Court adopted as fair descriptions of the impermissible comments the following: unproven, prejudicial allegations regarding the index offences; descriptions of the accused’s present character and dangerousness; irrelevant commentary on unrelated events; entreaties to the Board to restrict the accused’s freedom; and assertions of the NCR accused’s moral blameworthiness. All of this can be found in the VISs here. In Klem, the appellant asserted that prejudice flowed from the inflammatory nature of these comments and feelings, which could unduly influence the Board. Our concern is different.
In Ramos (Re), 2025 ONCA 820, para. 19, the Chief Justice directed us that:
Every person who comes before the Board has inherent dignity and worth, regardless of the nature of the offence, and is entitled to be treated with respect. Upholding this dignity is not optional; it is central to the human rights and freedoms that guide the Board's work. Although the index offence may have been serious and may understandably raise concerns for community safety, the Board’s processes should continue to recognize the humanity of individuals found NCR, reflect the commitment to equality expressed in Part XX.1 and in the Convention [the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Can. T.S. 2010 No. 8, which Canada has pledged to uphold, respecting liberty and dignity, accounting for diverse needs, and advancing equality and inclusion], and help reduce the shame and stigma that often prevent people with mental illnesses from exercising their rights …
Our concern is that permitting an onslaught of untested allegations and hostile commentary to be heaped on an accused that is irrelevant to the decision that the Board must make appears to be inconsistent with this duty. Related to this, the impact of such an onslaught of hostile but irrelevant commentary on the mental health of any particular accused will generally not be known to the Board. However, what we do know, in this case, is that the intense and predominantly condemnatory community interest in Mr. Bistoyong’s trajectory is a significant stressor for him and that continued monitoring of his stress tolerance will be important to his recovery.
Having regard to these comments, we direct that VISs filed with the Superior Court will not be included in the record prepared for the Board at Mr. Bistoyong’s next hearing and will not be read at that hearing. Of course, any victim who wishes to prepare a new VIS in accordance with s. 672.5(14) and read it at the next hearing in accordance with s. 672.5(15.1) will be free to do so, subject to the discretion of the panel of the Board that hears the matter.
Analysis
Risk
As I have noted, The Hospital, the accused and the Attorney General all agree that Mr. Bistoyong is a significant threat to the safety of the public and jointly submit that a detention order in the Forensic Psychiatry Program of St. Joseph’s subject to terms is the necessary and appropriate disposition. Dr. Tan and Dr. Chaimowitz, who conducted the assessment of Mr. Bistoyong’s mental condition ordered by the Board, are of the same view, and so are we.
We reach our conclusion that Mr. Bistoyong represents a significant threat to the safety of the public taking into consideration, among other things: the violent and fatal nature of the index offence; the fact that it took place without warning or apparent cause; the severe and persistent nature of Mr. Bistoyong’s mental disorder; his history of Cannabis Use Disorder; the reality that the present management of his symptoms with antipsychotic medication is a very recent development and that more time is needed to demonstrate stability in his mental state; and that his medication adherence and substance abstinence is untested beyond the short period of time he has been detained in a highly controlled environment.
The same considerations also lead us to the conclusion that a detention order is necessary and appropriate. As positive as the present control of his symptoms of Schizophrenia by antipsychotic medication and his adherence to that medication and substance abstinence may be, they are very recent developments, and more time is needed to demonstrate stability in his mental state and his positive stance towards mental health treatment. Similarly, his expressed intention to continue taking his medication and to abstain from substances are essentially untested.
Risk Management
- As I have already noted, all parties agree that Mr. Bistoyong’s detention order should be subject to terms that require him to:
(a) abstain absolutely from the non-medical use of alcohol or drugs or any other intoxicant;
(b) submit samples of their urine and/or breath to the person in charge of St. Joseph’s or their designate for the purpose of analyzing whether the accused has ingested alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicant; and
(c) refrain from having in their possession any firearm, ammunition or other offensive weapon, or being in the company of any person possessing a firearm other than a peace officer.
We also agree. These terms are necessary and appropriate in the circumstances. The basis for the third term is self-evident – the stability of Mr. Bistoyong’s present control of his symptoms of Schizophrenia by medication and his untested adherence to medication, coupled with the violent offence he committed with a weapon of convenience when his symptoms were not under control make it imperative that his possession of offensive weapons of any type be prohibited and his access to them limited.
With respect to the first two terms, we of course recognize that any disposition made by the Board must be the least onerous and least restrictive available. Within those parameters, by virtue of s. 672.54(b) and (c), an abstinence provision in a disposition in relation to alcohol, cannabis or other substances, like any other condition, must be “appropriate”. For an abstinence provision to be appropriate, there must be evidence before the Board that demonstrates that use of the substance named in the provision by the accused would pose a significant risk to public safety: Davis (Re), 2022 ONCA 716 at para. 14.
A tenuous link between the use of a particular substance and an increased risk to public safety is not enough. The Board must be cautious not to conflate a patent risk of psychosis with a threat to public safety (Davis, para 15) . But that does not mean that before imposing an abstinence provision in an order, it is necessary for the Board to have direct evidence the use of the named substance would pose a significant risk, nor is it necessary to wait for an adverse event to take place (Anderson (Re), 2020 ONCA 277). The evidence can be circumstantial. For example, in Anderson, the Court of Appeal held that the Board was entitled make an abstinence from cannabis order relying on expert evidence that use of cannabis generally exacerbates psychotic symptoms in people, together with evidence of a prior incident where the accused acting aggressively was tied to his excessive use of cannabis, and against the backdrop that the accused posed a significant risk to the safety of the public.
The test is easily met in this case with respect to cannabis. Mr. Bistoyong has a diagnosis of Schizophrenia and a history of Cannabis Use Disorder, it is not contested that he poses a threat to the safety of the public, and the only two known examples of his exhibiting mental illness-related aggression or violence (the first in Vancouver in 2021 and the second, the index offence) were preceded by the smoking of marijuana. With respect to the first incident, his cannabis use was accompanied by the consumption of magic mushrooms. With respect to the index offence, his cannabis use was accompanied by the consumption of alcohol, and, in addition, it was the very first time he had consumed cannabis after two years of abstinence. The constellation of circumstantial evidence amply demonstrates that use of cannabis by the accused would pose a significant risk to public safety.
However, we have not limited the abstinence provision to cannabis. We have instead prohibited the non-medical use of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicant. Certainly, the basis for a cannabis prohibition would be much stronger than the case for other drugs or alcohol standing alone. But they do not stand alone. The accused consumed mushrooms along with cannabis before the Vancouver event, had had similar bad reactions to mushrooms prior to the Vancouver event, and consumed alcohol along with cannabis before the index offence. It is very early days for a treatment team to have had an opportunity to explore the role of other drugs and alcohol in and the synergy among any consumed substances on the accused’s mental illness and the risk he presents to the public. In addition, at least for now, Mr. Bistoyong takes no objection to this prohibition, and is committed to long term abstinence. We also note that the possession of most other drugs caught by this provision would be unlawful. Finally, we take comfort from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Jakaj (Re), 2024 ONCA 490, where the Court upheld a restriction precluding Mr. Jakaj from the non-medical use of any alcohol or drugs, including cannabis.
In addition to the three terms we have discussed, all parties jointly submitted that the Board should authorize the person in charge of the Hospital, in their discretion, to permit Mr. Bistoyong the following privileges:
(a) to attend within or outside of the hospital for necessary medical, dental, legal or compassionate purposes;
(b) hospital and grounds privileges, escorted by staff;
(c) hospital and grounds privileges, accompanied by staff or a person approved by the person in charge; and
(d) hospital and grounds privileges, indirectly supervised.
We note that the terms “hospital and grounds”, “escorted by staff”, “accompanied by staff”, “accompanied by a person approved by the person in charge”, and “indirectly supervised” all have fixed definitions, which can be found in the Guide to the Interpretation of Ontario Review Board Disposition Orders, which is available to the public on the Board’s website2.
Orders of the Ontario Review Board directing that an accused be detained in custody in a designated hospital invariably require the person in charge of the hospital to create a program for the detention in custody and rehabilitation of the accused within that hospital. Such orders usually then provide that within that program, the person in charge, in their discretion, may permit the accused to exercise certain named privileges. It is important to understand that the accused is not permitted to exercise these privileges as of right. Their availability is at the discretion of the person in charge. Section 672.56 of the Code permits the Board to delegate to the person in charge of the hospital authority to direct that the restrictions on the liberty of the accused be increased or decreased within the outer envelope established by the Board’s order and subject to any conditions set out in the disposition.
The reason for the delegation of discretion to the person in charge is obvious. The Code does not contemplate that Review Boards would micromanage the day-to-day operations of hospitals. Within the parameters set by a Board, a hospital requires the flexibility to implement the disposition in accordance with the day-to-day needs of the detained person and the circumstances that may arise: Scott (Re), 2017 ONCA 94 at para. 20.
To be clear, the privileges we are discussing here, as well as the remaining recommended privileges, which we will discuss shortly, form what is often referred to as a hospital privilege ladder. An accused with such privileges would rarely be granted permission to exercise all of them at once. Rather, an accused may (or may not) be permitted to gradually progress up the hospital privilege ladder over time as the person in charge, in their discretion, considers appropriate (see Sim (Re), 2020 ONCA 563 at para. 13). The list is not a “one size fits all ladder of privileges”. The person in charge is expected to apply “a flexible and individualized plan” which will be “geared to each person’s circumstances” (see Groves (Re), 2020 ONCA 634 at para. 17).
This delegated authority, of course, must be exercised having due regard to the accused’s liberty interest in light of the twin goals of public safety and treatment, but it permits a degree of day-to-day fine tuning that, if properly exercised, will prevent the least onerous and least restrictive requirement from compromising achievement of treatment objectives: Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 20 at para. 69.
The four conditions under consideration here are found in most dispositions. The reason for the first, permitting Mr. Bistoyong to attend within or outside of the hospital for necessary medical, dental, legal or compassionate purposes needs no explanation. The remining three, hospital and grounds privileges escorted by staff, accompanied by staff or a person approved by the person in charge or indirectly supervised are the most modest degrees of liberty available to a detained accused and allow for incremental reductions in the degree of supervision in the discretion of the person in charge in order to avoid any risk to public safety.
In his evidence before the Board, Dr. Chaimowitz assured us that while the Hospital considers Mr. Bistoyong to be “potentially reintegratable”, they are acutely aware that his offence was violent and out of the blue and cannot be permitted to happen again. As a result, in accordance with the Hospital’s practice, his progress up the ladder of community access will be graduated and tested after each step. If all goes well, it will still take many months to climb the ladder. If there is any deviation from what is requested of him, he will go back one or more steps.
Dr. Chaimowitz also noted that while Mr. Bistoyong’s offence was reported to have occurred without warning after a sudden onset of symptoms of his mental illness, in fact there were symptoms over several years that went unnoticed and untreated. However, going forward, he has been diagnosed, he is being treated, and he will be closely monitored by an adept clinical team tasked with monitoring risk. As a result, the team will be able to pick up any symptoms well ahead of any need to curtail community access.
Because the disposition will make access to community privileges discretionary and having regard to the evidence of Dr. Chaimowitz about how cautiously and incrementally that discretion will be exercised and how closely Mr. Bistoyong will be monitored, we will include the four community access privileges jointly recommended by all parties, identified above as privileges (a)-(d), in Mr. Bistoyong’s disposition.
I turn next to the remaining privileges under discussion. The Hospital and the accused jointly recommended that the person in charge of the Hospital should be authorized, in their discretion, to permit Mr. Bistoyong:
(e) to enter the community of Southern Ontario, escorted by staff;
(f) to enter the community of Southern Ontario, accompanied by staff or a person approved by the person in charge; and
(g) to enter the community of Southern Ontario, indirectly supervised.
Counsel for the Attorney General did not resist the first of these but opposed the last two.
With respect to the privilege (e), we agree that authorizing the person in charge, in their discretion, to permit Mr. Bistoyong to enter the community, escorted by staff, is an appropriate condition to include in the disposition for the same reasons and with the same limitations as paragraphs (b), (c) and (d). Although public safety considerations preclude entry into the community at present, it is foreseeable that a time will come in the current year when they would not.
We find support for our approach to privilege (e) in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Kachkar (Re), 2014 ONCA 250. Kachkar was charged with the first degree murder of a police officer. At his initial hearing before the Board, counsel for the Attorney General and the accused jointly submitted that Mr. Kachkar should be detained in a hospital and, in the discretion of the person in charge, be given privileges to access the hospital and grounds escorted by hospital staff. After hearing the evidence, the Board accepted these conditions but added a condition giving the respondent privileges, in the discretion of the Hospital, to enter the community of Whitby, escorted or accompanied by staff. The Crown appeals from this decision. It argues that the Board's decision to grant the Hospital discretion to allow the respondent access to the community was made without supporting evidence and is therefore unreasonable. The appeal was dismissed.
In his reasons. Goudge J.A. began with the reminder of the importance of remembering, despite the accused’s actions and their tragic consequences, that he was not convicted, but found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder. He then stated, at para. 21:
The existence of a distinct NCR status in our law reflects the moral conviction that those suffering from mental disorders that render them incapable either of appreciating the nature and quality of their criminal act or of knowing that these acts were wrong are exempted from criminal responsibility. As McLachlin J. (as she then was) said in Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), 1999 CanLII 694 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, at para. 31: “Criminal responsibility is appropriate only where the actor is a discerning moral agent, capable of making choices between right and wrong.”
Goudge J.A. went on to explain that NCR accused must be dealt with under the Review Board regime in Part XX.1 of the Code, which mandates the Board to provide NCR accused with opportunities to receive appropriate treatment, while at the same time protecting public safety. In this process, they are to be accorded the maximum liberty compatible with Part XX.1’s goals of public protection and fairness to the NCR accused. It is in this context that the community access privileges must be considered.
After a reminder, at para. 26, that the “least onerous, least restrictive consistent with public safety” requirement extends to conditions that form part of the Board's disposition, he said that adding the escorted or accompanied community access condition to the Board’s disposition was clearly less onerous and less restrictive to the accused than limiting him to access to the Hospital grounds alone. But the community access condition must also be consistent with public safety, and the question before the Court was whether the conclusion could be supported by the evidence. He concluded that it could.
The evidence in support of escorted or accompanied community access was the evidence of the psychiatrist who conducted the assessment for the hearing that if the accused was on anti-psychotic medication and was closely scrutinized for psychotic episodes by the professional staff at the Hospital, he would not be a risk to the public on escorted or accompanied passes into the community when the Hospital felt he was ready for them.
We see no difference in principle between the conclusion of the Board in Kachkar, which was upheld on appeal, and our conclusion here.
However, with respect to privilege (e), we do not agree that the community in which he may enter should be defined as “Southern Ontario” for two reasons.
First, while Southern Ontario is a commonplace term, it has no legal definition that we are aware of, and its limits are open to debate. The term of an order should be sufficiently certain to permit enforcement without dispute.
Second, on any definition of Southern Ontario, it includes such far-flung communities as London and Windsor in the west and Kingston and Ottawa in the east. No rationale for Mr. Bistoyong to be in the community at such a great distance from Hamilton to the east has been offered. One is left to wonder why he should be permitted to be in Ottawa, but not in Parry Sound.
Following discussion with the parties, we have settled on a term authorizing the person in charge, in their discretion, to permit Mr. Bistoyong to enter the communities of Hamilton, Niagara and the Greater Toronto Area, escorted by staff.
We turn next to the last two requested terms, with the alteration of the definition of the community as discussed: authorizing the person in charge, in their discretion, to permit Mr. Bistoyong to enter the communities of Hamilton, Niagara and the Greater Toronto Area, (f) accompanied by staff or a person approved by the person in charge; and (g) indirectly supervised.
Starting with (f), for the same reasons that satisfied us that (e) is appropriate, we find (f) appropriate insofar as it permits Mr. Bistoyong to enter the community accompanied by staff. We are concerned, however, about him entering the community accompanied by a person approved by the person in charge. An approved person, as defined in the Guide to the Interpretation of Ontario Review Board Disposition Orders, is: “A person who is not a member of hospital staff who has been approved by the person in charge to provide supervision of an accused for the purposes of a particular activity.”
As can be seen, and without in any way doubting that the person in charge at St. Joseph’s will use good sense when exercising their discretion, the suggested term would leave it open to the person in charge to approve a person who is not trained to deal with a person diagnosed with a serious mental illness and not otherwise equipped to handle a situation where an accused decompensates. This possibility concerns us. Recall that Dr. Mamak said in her Psychological Risk Assessment that Mr. Bistoyong is in the early stages of the recovery process and his forensic journey and noted that members of his extended family and some of their friends hold significant anger and animosity towards him. The degree of extended family and community animosity towards, and contempt for, Mr. Bistoyong is a unique feature of his case. It is expected to be a considerable psychological stressor for Mr. Bistoyong, and safety planning regarding interactions with extended family will be required to minimize risk and support his on-going progress.
Similarly, Dr. Tan and Dr. Chaimowitz noted in their clinical risk assessment that Mr. Bistoyong is in the early stages of recovery and his commitment to psychiatric care, medication adherence and abstinence from substances outside of a highly controlled forensic inpatient environment remains untested. They went on to say that the intense community interest in Mr. Bistoyong’s trajectory presents a likely significant stressor and is an important factor to consider in the management of his personal risk and safety. As a result, they said, he would benefit from a gradual introduction of stressors to develop and monitor his stress tolerance. They emphasize that his access to the community must be gradual and increased incrementally, so that the treatment team can intervene immediately if there is any concern about his mental state.
We find these assessments convincing. As a result, it is clear that Mr. Bistoyong is nowhere close to being ready to be in the community accompanied by an untrained person who is not a member of staff. We say this given that he is in the early days of recovery and is untested in so many ways, and also because of the risk of inadvertently coming into contact with individuals who may be tempted to confront him and anyone accompanying him, and whose presence may otherwise cause him stress, bearing in mind that the group of family and friends of the deceased is very large, and the community in which he lives is not. Without proper management, Mr. Bistoyong would present a significant threat to the safety of the public.
This is not to say that we discount the possibility that as Mr. Bistoyong’s treatment continues over the next year, and as his treatment team is better able to assess his commitment to psychiatric care, medication adherence and abstinence from substances, a term permitting his entry into the community accompanied by someone other than staff might become appropriate. But while we do not doubt that the person in charge understands these concerns and would be cautious about implementing the “approved person” part of the recommended condition only gradually and incrementally, if at all, and while we have no desire to micromanage Mr. Bistoyong’s treatment, we are concerned that the provision not be used prematurely.
Turning to condition (g), the privilege of entering the community indirectly supervised, we have far greater concerns for essentially the same reasons. “Indirectly supervised”, as defined in Guide to the Interpretation of Ontario Review Board Disposition Orders, has the following meaning:
An accused need not be in the company of a staff member, approved person or delegate, but must agree to abide by the reporting and supervisory conditions established by the person in charge of the hospital (“person in charge”). Indirect supervision may include the required use of such tools as: itineraries and/or logbooks, telephone or in-person checks, or reporting to the person in charge or their delegate as required.
Again, given that Mr. Bistoyong is in the early days of recovery and is untested in so many ways, and also because of the risk of his inadvertently coming into contact with individuals whose presence may cause him stress, bearing in mind again that the group of family and friends of the deceased is very large, and the community in which he lives is not, Mr. Bistoyong would present a significant threat to the safety of the public if he was permitted to be in the community indirectly supervised at present. As a result, once again we are we are concerned that this provision not be used prematurely.
As a result, we find ourselves in a position similar to the one addressed in Sookram (Re), 2024 ONCA 823. In Sookram, the accused asked the Board to include an indirectly supervised community access privilege, as well as a community living privilege in his detention order. The Board declined to include the community living term, concluding that it must first be demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the responsible treatment team at St. Joseph’s, that the accused was ready for that transition. For reasons that need not be canvassed in full here, the Court of Appeal concluded that the Board had not given adequate consideration of this proposed term. Of note, the Court said that the Board erred in failing to consider whether including the term might not have therapeutic or motivational value. But what is pertinent to the situation here is that, adopting language from its earlier decision in Kelly (Re), 2014 ONCA 269, the Court stated, at para. 23:
“[i]f the Board was concerned that the treatment team might use the provision prematurely, it could have made provision for reporting or returning to the Board for approval before it was implemented”. This condition offers a sensible compromise when the lingering concerns are rooted in the accused not having been observed in a less secure setting.
- And in fact, the Court did exactly that in resolving the appeal. It stated, at para. 29:
For these reasons, I would allow the appeal. I would amend the disposition order to provide that the appellant is permitted to live in the community in accommodation to be approved by the person in charge at St. Joseph’s Healthcare Hamilton, and that St. Joseph’s must give notice to the Board in the event that it is considering discharge to the community, so that the Board may approve any implementation of this term.
In this instance, we are similarly concerned that the extent of Mr. Bistoyong’s community access privileges not be broadened prematurely, placing the safety of the community at risk, and we will follow the example of the Court of Appeal in Sookram. This does not signify a lack of faith in the wisdom or judgment of the treatment team or the person in charge, nor is it an effort on the part of this panel to micromanage Mr. Bistoyong’s treatment. We are simply attempting to fulfil our duty of ensuring that the execution of our disposition order reconciles the “twin goals” of protecting the public from dangerous offenders and treating NCR patients fairly and appropriately. We simply want to ensure that Mr. Bistoyong’s treatment has progressed sufficiently and that the treatment team has had the opportunity to better assess his commitment to psychiatric care, medication adherence and abstinence from substances, before deciding that a term immediately permitting his entry into the community either accompanied by someone other than staff or indirectly supervised is appropriate.
We raise a practical concern about how we can best craft a provision requiring the Hospital to report or return to the Board for approval before community access accompanied by a person approved by the person in charge or indirectly supervised is implemented. In Sookram, the Court required the hospital to give notice to the Board in the event that it is considering discharge to the community, so that the Board may approve any implementation of this term. However, the Board can only approve implementation of a term before the next annual review at a discretionary review pursuant to s. 672.82 of the Code. Accordingly, we will include paragraphs (f) and (g) in the disposition as recommended by the parties, but amending the description of the community as we have indicated, and also making it a term of the disposition that:
The person in charge may not permit the accused to enter the said communities accompanied only by an approved person or indirectly supervised without first obtaining the Board’s approval at a discretionary review pursuant to s. 672.82 of the Criminal Code.
One final observation in respect of Mr. Bistoyong’s community access. We have adverted to the fact that some members of Mr. Bistoyong’s extended family and some of their friends hold significant anger and animosity towards him, that this group is large and their community is small, and that there is a risk that inadvertently coming into contact with these individuals may cause Mr. Bistoyong stress. This could negatively affect his recovery and could even trigger violence. Greater community access would cause less concern if Mr. Bistoyong were transferred, for example, to Southwest Centre for Forensic Mental Health in St. Thomas.
When asked whether he thought it would be better to transfer Mr. Bistoyong to another hospital, Dr. Chaimowitz said that there were benefits for him being away from the community because of the reduced chance of his coming into contact with victims. He said that it had been contemplated, but Mr. Bistoyong did not want to be transferred.
We are not in a position to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of a transfer in the future, but we would urge the parties to consider it.
Conclusion
We find that Mr. Bistoyong represents a significant threat to the safety of the public, and we further find that a detention order is the necessary and appropriate disposition on the terms we have enumerated and for the reasons we have outlined.
In making this disposition, we reviewed the provisions of section 672.54 of the Code and carefully considered the safety of the public, which is the paramount consideration, Mr. Bistoyong’s mental condition, his reintegration into society, and his other needs. The panel concluded that this was also the least onerous and least restrictive disposition for Mr. Bistoyong at this time.
DATED this 12th day of March 2026, at the City of Toronto, in the Region of Toronto.
The Honourable Michael Dambrot, K.C.
Chairperson
__________________
Office of the Registrar
Ontario Review Board
Footnotes
- In these reasons, to avoid confusion, we will refer to the accused as Mr. Bistoyong except in our description of the index offence and will refer to other members of the Bistoyong family by their first name.
- https://www.orb.on.ca/scripts/en/legal/Guide-for-Interpretation-of-Disposition-Orders.pdf