PSGB# P-2019-1191

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

Under

THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF ONTARIO ACT

Before

THE PUBLIC SERVICE GRIEVANCE BOARD

BETWEEN

Dixon

Complainant

• and -

The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of the Solicitor General)

Employer

BEFORE

Kathleen G. O’Neil

Chair

FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Andrew F. Camman Polishuk Camman & Steele Counsel

FOR THE EMPLOYER

HEARING

Sean White Treasury Board Secretariat Legal Services Branch Counsel February 14, 2020 (by teleconference)

Preliminary Decision

1This decision deals with a preliminary objection to the complaint filed by Barbara Dixon contesting her discharge from employment on July 11, 2019. The employer’s position is that the matter should not proceed to a hearing on the merits as the complaint was not filed in accordance with the mandatory time lines set out in Regulation 378/07, as it was too early. The complainant takes the contrary view.

Overview

2Counsel for the parties presented their arguments on the basis of the facts disclosed by the documentary record. There did not appear to be any dispute as to the underlying facts necessary to this decision, but the parties do not agree about the legal conclusions to be drawn from them.

3After the complainant’s termination from employment on July 11, 2019, she wrote a notice of her intent to file a complaint with the PSGB, dated July 11, which she sent on July 12 by registered mail. It was stamped as received in the Deputy Minister’s office on July 16, 2019. The Notice of Intent was acknowledged by the employer in a letter dated July 22, 2019, with the following relevant wording, “I am acknowledging receipt of your notice of proposal to file a complaint, dated July 16, 2019, in accordance with subsection 8(1) 1 of Ontario Regulation 378/07.”

4A dispute resolution meeting was originally scheduled for August 12, 2019 and was subsequently re-scheduled to August 21, 2019 at the request of the complainant. In the course of making these arrangements, there was an exchange of emails between the complainant and representatives of the employer which took on significance for the parties’ submissions.

5On August 7, 2019, an administrative assistant to the Deputy Minister’s designee sent an email to Ms. Dixon, which started with the wording, “Your July 11, 2018 notice of intent to file a complaint has been forwarded by the office of the Deputy Minister…” It proposed a date for a meeting, referred to as a hearing, with the Deputy Minister’s designee on August 12, 2019. Ms. Dixon responded, asking to reschedule, with the remark “It seems my lawyer is unavailable next week.” The administrative assistant replied as follows on August 8, 2019:

Yes, we can reschedule the hearing after August 12th, however, doing so will result in it occurring outside of the 30 day required timeline as required by the Employer.

Please confirm that you are requesting to reschedule the hearing via teleconference outside of the 30 day timeline at your request.

Ms. Dixon agreed to the August 21 meeting, but noted that this did not change the timelines, and wrote, “I will still be filing the grievance next week.”

6Then, on the day before the meeting, August 20, 2019, the Minister’s designee sent an email to Ms. Dixon, which started with this reference to the notice of proposal:

On July 11, 2019, you submitted a notice of proposal to file a complaint...

The designee outlined the employer’s expectations that, although the complainant was welcome to have counsel as a support person, she wanted to hear from Ms. Dixon directly at the meeting. She then added that, given the serious nature of the circumstances giving rise to the complaint, namely dismissal for cause, should Ms. Dixon choose to forego a meeting at this stage and move forward with her lawyer to file a formal complaint with the PSGB, they could proceed that way instead of holding the teleconference the next day.

7Ms. Dixon consulted with her lawyer, the August 21 meeting was cancelled, and no dispute resolution meeting was held.

8The issue in dispute concerns the application of provisions of Regulation 378/07 under the Public Service of Ontario Act, the most relevant part of which reads as follows:

Complaint about dismissal for cause

2. (1) A person who is aggrieved by his or her dismissal for cause under section 34 of the Act may file a complaint about the dismissal for cause with the Public Service Grievance Board,

(a) if the person is eligible under sections 5 and 6 to file such a complaint;

(b) if the person gives notice in accordance with section 8 of his or her proposal to file the complaint; and

(c) if the person complies with the filing requirements set out in section 10. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 2 (1).

(2) Subsection (1) does not affect the right of a person to file a complaint under Part V of the Act (Political Activity) or a complaint under Part VI of the Act (Disclosing and Investigating Wrongdoing). O. Reg. 378/07, s. 2 (2).

Notice of proposal to file a complaint

8. (1) A person who proposes to file a complaint shall give notice of the proposal to the following person or entity:

9. A complainant who, at the material time, worked in a ministry shall give the notice to his or her deputy minister.

(4) The notice must be given within the following period:

1. For a complaint about dismissal for cause, within 14 days after the complainant receives notice of the dismissal.

Period for dispute resolution

9. (1) A complainant is not entitled to file a complaint with the Public Service Grievance Board until the expiry of the period provided under this section for dispute resolution.

(3) If the complainant was required to give a deputy minister notice of the proposal to make a complaint, and if the deputy minister or his or her delegate meets with the complainant within 30 days after the deputy minister receives the notice, the period provided for dispute resolution expires on the earlier of,

(a) the day that is 30 days after the meeting; or

(b) the day on which the deputy minister gives written notice to the complainant of his or her decision about the proposed complaint.

(5) If the deputy minister or chair of the Public Service Commission, as the case may be, or his or her delegate does not meet with the complainant within 30 days after receiving the notice, the period provided for dispute resolution expires 30 days after the notice was given to the deputy minister or chair.

The Parties’ Positions

9The employer takes the position that the PSGB is without jurisdiction to hear this complaint because the complaint was filed too early. The employer’s view of the facts is that Notice to the Deputy Minister was given on July 16, when it was marked as received by the Minister. Thirty days later is August 15, so that the filing of the complaint at the PSGB on August 13, 2019 was two days before the expiry of the dispute resolution period described by the regulation, in the employer’s submission. The employer urges the Board to find she is not eligible to file the complaint, and it is therefore not within the Board’s jurisdiction.

10It is the employer’s view that the rescheduling and cancellation of the meeting are not material, because there was no meeting within the 30-day dispute resolution period contemplated by the regulation. Since this complaint concerns a dismissal for cause, the complainant, by virtue of paragraph 2 (c) must comply with s. 10, which encompasses s. 9. It is s. 9, subsections 3 and 5 which describe the two paths that the time lines take, depending on whether there is a meeting or not within the 30-day period after the receipt of the notice of proposal to file a complaint.

11Employer counsel refers to the following case law to support his position that the PSGB has no discretion to extend the time limits for untimely complaints: St Amant v Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2013 CanLII 4673; Doyle v Ontario (Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 2017 CanLII 52705 (ON PSGB); Morris et al v Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2018 CanLll 109220; Bourgeault v Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2013 Canlll 84294; Laforest v Ontario (Ministry of the Solicitor General), 2020 CanLII 10543 (ON PSGB).

12By contrast, counsel for the complainant takes the position that the complaint is timely and there is no need to extend the time limits. No issue is made about the lack of the Board’s jurisdiction to extend time limits if it were found to be untimely. Rather, issue is taken with the employer’s conclusion as to when notice of intention to file a complaint was given, and thus when the dispute resolution period started and expired.

13In support of his argument that the complaint was filed in a timely manner, i.e. after the expiry of the dispute resolution period, counsel for the complainant refers to the following facts, supported by the documents filed. First, the notice to the Deputy Minister was dated July 11, and mailed July 12. Secondly, the employer’s correspondence with the complainant contained two references to the Notice to the Deputy Minister as July 11, the first in the August 7 email setting August 12 as the initial date for a teleconference to discuss the matter and the second in the August 20 email from the Deputy Minister’s designee. When the complainant asked for the meeting to be moved from August 12, the employer indicated it was willing to schedule a meeting beyond that date, but stated that doing so would “result in it occurring outside of the 30 day required timeline as required by the Employer”, and requested that she confirm she was requesting to reschedule the hearing outside of the 30-day timeline.

14Further, complainant’s counsel refers to s. 64 of the Legislation Act, which reads as follows:

Rule of liberal interpretation

64 (1) An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.

(2) Subsection (1) also applies to a regulation, in the context of the Act under which it is made and to the extent that the regulation is consistent with that Act.

Counsel for the complainant argues that an interpretation of the language of s. 9(5) of Regulation 378/07 which gives meaning to its remedial intent of providing a complaint procedure at the PSGB should lead to a finding that the complaint was filed in a timely manner, and may proceed to being heard on its merits.

15Counsel for the complainant emphasizes that the complainant could not know, unless informed by the employer, when the notice was received. Counsel submits that s. 9(5) of the regulation does not equate the words “give” and “receive” as the employer’s argument presumes. The complaint was filed 31 days after the postmark date of July 12, and should therefore be accepted as timely.

16In this case, counsel for the complainant submits that the employer did not advise the complainant when the notice was received. However, in the correspondence setting up the dispute resolution meeting, there were two references which are important to deciding the factual question of when notice was given. In the email setting up the meeting, the employer referred to the notice as her “July 11” notice, and communicated that the employer considered that the dispute resolution period ended on August 12. Complainant’s counsel queries: how could the complainant have known, before she forwarded her complaint to the PSGB, that the employer received the notice on July 16, or that it thought the dispute resolution period expired on August 15, as it now argues? Given the reference to July 11, the postmark being July 12, and the reference by the employer to the effect that dates after August 12 as being beyond the 30-day period, counsel argues that the dispute resolution period should be found to have expired on August 12, so that her filing with the Board on August 13 is timely.

17Complainant’s counsel refers to the finding of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, that the legislature is not to be found to have intended absurd, frivolous, unreasonable or inequitable results and that a result incompatible with other provisions, or with the purpose of the statute can be considered absurd. When considering the purpose of the statutory provisions here in issue, counsel for the complainant urges a finding that the overarching purpose is to provide a dispute resolution process for dismissals before the PSGB. Counsel submits that, although the immediate provision in issue is aimed at giving the employer 30 days to assess its case, it would not be consistent with the larger purpose of the statutory provisions to support the employer’s interpretation.

18Counsel submits that it would be an absurd result to find that the complainant is deprived of the intended dispute resolution mechanism because she was slightly ahead of 30 days, counting from the employer’s stamp, when she was not privy to that date. Further, it is submitted that the employer cannot be seen to be legitimately aggrieved in this case, where the facts are not like any of the case law relied upon by the employer. The complainant should be allowed to take the employer at its word in terms of when the dispute resolution period was over, and its reference to her notice of intent as its date, rather than communicating that it was relying on the date of receipt.

19In reply, employer counsel argues that accepting the argument made on behalf of the complainant would lead to the absurd result, rather than the reverse. It is the employer's view that the words “given” and “received” in s. 9(5) mean essentially the same thing, as the employer cannot take action in response to the notice of proposal until it is in its possession. In the employer’s view, it would be absurd to have two dueling 30-day periods, referring to the fact that the two competing interpretations would call for a finding that there were two different 30-day periods, one starting from the date the employer received the notice, and other starting from the date it was mailed by the complainant.

20Employer counsel observes that there would have been no dispute, if the complainant had sent the notice of proposal by fax or email, rather than sending it by post, creating the uncertainty about the date of delivery. Counsel refers to the Board’s remark in Bourgeault, cited above, to the effect that the Board could not deal with something it did not have, and draws the analogy with the employer in this case. Counsel for the employer submits that it simply makes sense that the dispute resolution period should start when the employer actually receives the complaint.

21Replying to the argument on behalf of the complainant that the employer referred to the notice as “your July 11, 2018 notice”, employer counsel observes that it was obviously an error to write 2018. Further, he urges a reading of the employer’s emails in context. In the August 7 email, in which the complainant asked for a rescheduling of the August 12 meeting, she said her lawyer was not available "next week". Counsel suggests that this should be taken to mean not just August 12, but the dates up to August 19. Counsel for the employer argues that at the end of the day, it does not matter how the emails are read, because the July 22 letter constitutes notice of when the time starts to run. He emphasizes that on July 22, 2019, the employer acknowledged receipt of the notice, saying, “I am acknowledging receipt of your notice of proposal to file a complaint, dated July 16, 2019”.

22Counsel for the employer argued that the decision in Rizzo, cited above, is completely distinguishable, and that in any event, he would not easily concede that the Public Service of Ontario Act is remedial legislation. He concluded his argument by saying that the complainant might like to proceed before the PSGB, but she would not be left without recourse if she was not permitted to continue with this complaint, presumably referring to the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts.

23In response to a question from the Board about how the complainant knows when the employer has received the notice of intention to file a complaint, counsel indicated that if there was no communication of the date of receipt, there would be a stronger case for the complainant, in that it would be overly technical, but submitted that those were not the facts of this case.

Considerations and Conclusions

24The issues arising in respect of the above-noted facts are as follows, which will be dealt with as part of the discussion below:

a) When did the dispute resolution period expire in the facts of this case?

b) When was notice to the Deputy Minister given for the purposes of s. 9(5) of regulation 378/07?

c) Is the Public Service of Ontario Act a piece of remedial legislation?

25In order to determine whether the complainant’s July 13 filing of her complaint with the Board is too early, it must be determined how the wording of s. 9(1) of the above regulation applies in this case. The employer’s objection is based on the wording of that section to the effect that a complainant is not entitled to file a complaint until the expiry of the dispute resolution period; its contention is that Ms. Dixon filed before its expiry.

26When did the dispute resolution period expire on the facts of this case? Given the wording of subsection (5), the starting point is the date that the notice of intent to file a complaint was given. This is what determines the start of the 30-day dispute resolution period prescribed by the regulation. Specifically, is the date of the postmark the date notice was given? Can the day the notice is given be different from the day it is received with the wording of s. 9(5) of the regulation? No authority addressing this question was cited in argument, and it appears that the this point of interpretation has not arisen for the Board’s consideration before.

27The lack of jurisprudence on this point may reflect the reality that in the years since the current regulation has been in force, the delivery of notices and filings are most often done electronically, by email or fax, which typically results in the sending and the receiving of the notice being on the same date. Further, as the issue has not arisen, there is no rule of the Board deeming the date notice is given when it is not sent and received on the same day. This is in contrast to the situation in the Bourgeault decision cited above, relied on by the employer. In that case, the issue was when the complaint had been filed. The word “filed” is a defined term in the Board’s rules as “effective delivery of documents to the Secretary of the Board”. The Board found that effective delivery means that the material gets to the Board, and that putting the forms into a fax machine, with no confirmation of successful sending or receipt, does not amount to effective delivery, as the Board cannot act on something it does not have. It was not a dispute about the precise time it had been received, as nothing was received close to the time it was said to have been sent.

28Further, employer counsel relies on the Board’s decision in Morris, cited above, in which the complaint was dismissed as too early, despite the complainant’s contention that it should be accepted because the employer was said to have indicated verbally that they were not interested in dispute resolution at that time. However, there was no dispute about when notice was given in that case, as there is here.

29By contrast, complainant’s counsel distinguishes the facts of this case from the decisions cited by the employer, on the basis of the communications from the employer. Complainant’s counsel argues that the evidence shows that there were two confirmations from the employer which should be viewed as acknowledgements that the dispute resolution period ended on August 12, so that the August 13 filing of the complaint was timely. Counsel notes that the regulation differentiates between the giving of notice and the receiving, and asks how the complainant could know what the date of the latter was without clear communication from the employer.

30As noted above, counsel for the complainant relies on the modern approach to statutory interpretation stated in Rizzo, cited above, and the direction from the highest court to consider the consequences and the nature of the impact of one interpretation over the other on the parties in question. In particular, emphasis is placed on the Court’s reasoning about what consequences should not be considered to be part of the intention of the legislature. For example, the Court wrote as follows at paragraph 27:

27 In my opinion, the consequences or effects which result from the Court of Appeal's interpretation of ss. 40 and 40a of the ESA [Employment Standards Act] are incompatible with both the object of the Act and with the object of the termination and severance pay provisions themselves. It is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. According to Côté, supra, an interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment (at pp. 378-80). Sullivan echoes these comments noting that a label of absurdity can be attached to interpretations which defeat the purpose of a statute or render some aspect of it pointless or futile (Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, supra, at p. 88).

And at para. 26:

Finally, with regard to the scheme of the legislation, since the ESA is a mechanism for providing minimum benefits and standards to protect the interests of employees, it can be characterized as benefits-conferring legislation. As such, according to several decisions of this Court, it ought to be interpreted in a broad and generous manner. Any doubt arising from difficulties of language should be resolved in favour of the claimant (see, e.g., Abrahams v. Attorney General of Canada, 1983 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 2, at p. 10; Hills v. Canada (Attorney General), 1988 CanLII 67 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 513, at p. 537). It seems to me that, by limiting its analysis to the plain meaning of ss. 40 and 40a of the ESA, the Court of Appeal adopted an overly restrictive approach that is inconsistent with the scheme of the Act.

31The approach of the Supreme Court of Canada in Rizzo was recently reaffirmed in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, as follows at para 117-118:

117This Court has adopted the “modern principle” as the proper approach to statutory interpretation, because legislative intent can be understood only by reading the language chosen by the legislature in light of the purpose of the provision and the entire relevant context: Sullivan, at pp. 7-8. Those who draft and enact statutes expect that questions about their meaning will be resolved by an analysis that has regard to the text, context and purpose, regardless of whether the entity tasked with interpreting the law is a court or an administrative decision maker.

118A court interpreting a statutory provision does so by applying the “modern principle” of statutory interpretation, that is, that the words of a statute must be read “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21, and Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 26, both quoting E. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87. Parliament and the provincial legislatures have also provided guidance by way of statutory rules that explicitly govern the interpretation of statutes and regulations: see, e.g., Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21.

32At para 135, the Court highlighted a heightened responsibility on the part of administrative decision makers to consider the consequences of a decision and to ensure that those consequences are justified in light of the facts and law. At para 192, the Court held that the administrative decision maker in that case should have considered the potential harsh consequences of her interpretation and the question whether, in light of those possible consequences, Parliament would have intended the statutory provision in question to apply in such a manner.

33Further, at para. 175, the majority of the Court reaffirmed the idea that it is generally consistent with the principle of statutory interpretation that a legislature intends each word in a statute to have meaning. One of the cases cited in the Vavilov decision, Nova Tube Inc./Nova Steel Inc. v. Conares Metal Supply Ltd., 2019 FCA 52 put it this way at para. 40:

40 These differences attract the “different words, different meaning” component of the presumption of consistent expression: “[w]hen an Act uses different words in relation to the same subject such a choice by Parliament must be considered intentional and indicative of a change in meaning or a different meaning”: Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed. (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis, 2014) at §8.36.…

34Applying the above jurisprudence to the facts of this case, how should the word “the date notice is given” be read, to give effect to their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of the legislature?

35The Act here in question is of course the Public Service of Ontario Act [PSOA], which gives the PSGB its statutory mandate. In respect of the question of whether the PSOA is a remedial statute, any doubt raised by the employer’s argument must be resolved in the affirmative because of the provisions of the Legislation Act, quoted above. Further, the purposes of the PSOA are stated in s. 1, and include the goal of setting out roles and responsibilities in the administration of the public service of Ontario, and providing a framework in law for the leadership and management of the public service of Ontario. Part of that framework is the PSGB’s mandate to resolve complaints from non-unionized public servants, if they comply with the restrictions in Regulation 378/07.

36With those principles in mind, I return to the wording of the regulation. It provides that the complainant is not entitled to file a complaint until the expiry of the dispute resolution period. It is fair to attribute to the drafters of the regulation an intention that the complainant would be able to know when that was. From the complainant’s point of view, the immediately available dates known to her are the date she drafted and sent the complaint, and the evidence confirms that date to be July 12, by registered letter. In order to know when the dispute resolution period expires, the complainant is directed by s. 9(5) of the regulation to count 30 days from the date the notice was given, in circumstances, such as here, where there was no meeting. In my view, as a matter of the plain meaning of the words in their ordinary usage, the conclusion that August 12th was the expiry date, and that filing on August 13 would be timely, was a reasonably available one.

37Further, when one reads the employer’s communications as a whole, they tend to confirm, rather than contradict, that conclusion. Employer counsel submitted that the July 22 letter gave notice of the date of receipt, but I do not find that to be the case, as it refers to “your notice dated July 16”. Although, from the employer’s point of view, that may have been intended to communicate that the notice was received on July 16, that is not what it says, and could reasonably be taken as a mistake as to the date of the notice, known to the complainant, i.e. July 11, mailed on July 12. This is ever more the case when the next two references by the employer to the date of the notice refer to it as July 11, which is consistent with the date that she had actually put on the notice. The fact that one of the references to July 11 was to 2018 rather than 2019 is of no consequence here, other than to illustrate that typographical errors are a fact of life. However, they can create uncertainty in the eye of the reader.

38I have carefully considered the employer’s submissions that “given” and “received” in the context of section 9(5) mean the same date. It is true that very often, the only difference between the time referred to by the two different words is point of view. To the giver who is physically present with the recipient, a gift is given at the moment that it is handed to the recipient, who views it as received at the same moment. So, there is no necessary contradiction in the words of the section, especially where there is no time lag. But the idea that the legislature is deemed to mean different things when it uses different words, points to another available meaning. Even though there is no necessary difference between the dates something is given and something is received, there is no necessary identity either, and the wording does not make it clear to the reader that the intention was that they would always be the same date.

39A complainant or employer representative can know for certain when a meeting is held, and if informed of the date of receipt of notice, one can also ascertain with certainty whether it is within thirty days of the date the notice was received by the deputy minister. When there is no meeting, and/or when the date of receipt has not been communicated clearly, the only date that a complainant can independently know for sure is the date when the notice left her possession to be delivered to the employer. One of the dictionary definitions of the word “give” is to cause or allow (someone or something) to have something, which does not necessarily imply immediate receipt.

40It is worth noting that there is no precision available here about when the people with the authority to act on the employer’s side received the notice. The parties proceeded on the basis that the date stamp on the Notice was the date of receipt, and that is a common business convention. But it has nothing necessary to say about when the deputy or his designee actually received the notice in the sense of being personally aware of its contents and apprised of the information necessary to take action on it. Indeed, in any situation of giving and receiving which is not an immediate person-to-person hand over, there can be an element of deeming as to the date it occurred.

41On the facts of this case, where the employer’s communication tended to confirm that the date of the notice was the date it was written or sent, it is my finding that the dispute resolution period ended on August 12, and that the complaint was filed with the Board in a timely manner.

42The Supreme Court of Canada has instructed decision makers faced with a statute with more than one possible application to facts to consider the effect on the people concerned. When considering the effects of the two available results here, accepting the employer’s motion means that the complainant would not be able to utilize the dispute resolution procedure designed by the legislature for this particular group of government employees, and the employer would have had a couple more days to consider its position. To deny the motion would enable the complainant to proceed to utilize the specialized process the drafters intended, in circumstances where the employer’s representative had specifically invited the complainant to forego the meeting which had been proposed. From the evidence and argument, there is no reason to believe that anything would have changed if the employer had a few more days to consider its position before the dispute resolution period was deemed to have expired. Thus, I find no prejudice to the employer in the facts of this case, but considerable prejudice to the complainant if she is unable to access the dispute resolution process devised by the legislature for the purpose. If one applies the analysis endorsed by the Court in Rizzo to the facts of this case, the question becomes: would the legislature have intended that a complainant be deprived of the intended dispute resolution process because she acted on the information she had in filing her complaint 30 days after she sent her notice to the deputy by registered mail? I cannot, with any confidence, find that it would.

43This case, and a companion one, being released at the same time, Beach and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of the Solicitor General) are cases that illustrate the confusing wording and difficulty of application of the wording of the timeliness provisions of the present regulation. The time lines are written in complicated language, with a dispute resolution period of variable length, which can make it difficult to know when it is too late, or even too early, to forward a complaint to the PSGB. This, together with the lack of legislative provision for the extension of time lines in appropriate cases, can lead to unnecessary frustration of parties seeking to solve serious workplace problems, leaving a problem unaddressed, to the detriment of the morale of all concerned. The lack of “user-friendliness” leads to the extensive use of time and resources, including those of the parties and the Board’s administrative staff and adjudicators, in explaining and dealing with technical objections which might be better used for other purposes, including solving the underlying problem that gave rise to the complaint.

44The Board has nonetheless applied the regulation’s wording consistently in light of the mandatory time lines, in cases where the facts were clear that a breach had occurred. As discussed above, that is not the case here.

45In summary, the employer’s motion is denied because the Board finds that the complaint was filed with the Board in a timely manner.