PSGB#P-2015-1619

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

Under

THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF ONTARIO ACT

Before

THE PUBLIC SERVICE GRIEVANCE BOARD

BETWEEN

Jeffery Telford

Complainant

• and -

The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Finance)

Employer

BEFORE

Kathleen G. O’Neil

Chair

FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Brian Johnston Counsel

FOR THE EMPLOYER

Roslyn Baichoo Treasury Board Secretariat Legal Services Branch Counsel

HEARING

March 4, 2016

Decision

1This decision deals with a preliminary objection raised by the employer in regards to the complaint of Jeffery Telford in which he contests his termination from employment. The employer asks that the complaint be dismissed, as it was not filed with the Board in the period required by regulation. The complainant asks that his complaint be allowed to proceed to a hearing on the merits, as a matter of procedural fairness in light of the seriousness of the issue of loss of employment.

The factual context

2The facts necessary to this motion are essentially undisputed. The complainant was terminated from employment by letter dated February 23, 2015 after over 20 years with the Ontario Financing Authority. Mr. Telford did not accept his termination as just, and sought legal advice in the matter, initially from lawyer Peter Eberhard. Three complaints, dated March 3, 31 and April 14, 2015, were filed on Mr. Telford’s behalf, related to the dismissal and the payment of vacation credits, seeking reinstatement and other remedies. There is no suggestion that these were untimely.

3Mr. Telford and his lawyer met with the delegate of the Chair of the Public Service Commission to discuss his complaints on April 21, 2015. A written decision denying them was dated May 19, 2015 and received by Mr. Telford on May 21, 2015. In an affidavit filed in support of his position on this motion, Mr. Telford states that, having initiated the process by filing a grievance within specific timelines, he was unaware that further time limits might apply. While he did not direct his mind to timelines, he was confident that his lawyer had or would comply with any necessary timelines. Having received the written decision, Mr. Telford e-mailed his lawyer without delay, including a partially filled out complaint form.

4In reply to his e-mail, Mr. Telford received the shocking news from Mr. Eberhard’s office that his lawyer had recently died. Mr. Telford informed his contact person with the employer of the unfortunate news the same day, May 22, 2015, advising he was seeking new counsel. She responded promptly as well, saying she was very sorry to hear the sad news, and asking Mr. Telford to let her know when he had representation. Mr. Telford states that in sending the e-mail as soon as he knew of Mr. Eberhard’s death, he was intending to make it clear to the employer that he was proceeding with his application/appeal and that he would need time to seek out and retain new counsel. He was not advised that further action was required in any time-line, and if he had been so advised, he states that he would have forwarded the partially completed application with the explanation that the grounds would be forwarded by counsel once retained and briefed.

5The Law Society of Upper Canada was appointed Trustee of Mr. Eberhard’s law practice and through them Mr. Telford arranged for the delivery of his file to his new counsel, Brian Johnston. Mr. Telford met with Mr. Johnston on July 7, 2015 and this application was filed on July 27, 2015. Mr. Telford states that he asserted to his new lawyer his firm belief that no time limitation affected his application to the PSGB.

Statutory References and Case Law Citation

6Relevant provisions of statute and regulations are attached as Appendix A for ease of reference.

7Case law referred to by counsel is cited in Appendix B, all of which has been carefully considered, whether or not referred to specifically in the discussion below.

Considerations and Conclusions

8The issue to be decided is whether the complaint of Mr. Telford is one that the Board is permitted to hear even though it was filed outside the time lines set out in the regulation. The Board only has the powers granted by the Public Service of Ontario Act, and regulations made under that legislation, such as Regulation 378/07. That regulation sets out a very specific set of time lines or “windows” of time in which steps must be taken to file complaints. A complaint about a dismissal for cause, such as Mr. Telford’s, may be filed with the Board if the preconditions referred to in s. 2 of Regulation 378/07 are fulfilled. The one at issue here, found in s. 10 (1) of that regulation, requires that the complaint be filed with this Board within 14 days after the end of the period of dispute resolution provided for in the regulation.

9Section 9 of the Regulation describes the dispute resolution period, and when it is deemed to have ended, i.e. the earlier of 30 days after the dispute resolution meeting (if it is held within 30 days of the notice of complaint) or the date the employer’s notice of its decision is given. In this case, a meeting was held on April 21, 2015, which was within the thirty day period after the notice of at least two of the complaints sent to the employer, so that the dispute resolution period ends on the earlier of 30 days after the meeting on April 21, which is May 21, or the date the employer’s notice of decision dated May 19, 2015 was given. Mr. Telford received the employer’s decision on May 21. Mr. Telford had 14 days after the end of the dispute resolution period to file his complaint with this Board. It is common ground that the filing on July 27, 2015 falls outside the 14 day time line.

10Employer counsel recognizes that the facts of this case are sympathetic to the complainant, given the death of his lawyer shortly before the time lines in the regulation expired. However, counsel argues that sympathetic facts are not enough to overcome the mandatory nature of the time lines in the regulation. Employer counsel argues that the Board, as a creature of statute, has to be correct in interpreting the time lines set out there. By counsel’s count the referral was over six weeks late. The Board is invited to take notice of the fact that the Board regularly receives complaints from unrepresented individuals, and that a lapse in representation does not give authority to change the regulation or extend the time lines.

11Counsel underlines that until the enactment of the current Regulation 378/07, the Board had specific power to extend or abridge the time limits, but that it no longer does. Unfortunate though it is that Mr. Eberhard passed away, it is the employer’s position that it does not trigger any discretion in regards to the time lines.

12In support of the proposition that the absence of the power to extend time lines in the current regulation means the Board lacks the jurisdiction to do so, counsel refers to Service Employees International Union, Local 204 v. Leisureworld Nursing Homes Ltd., cited in Appendix B. In that decision, the Divisional Court found it to be unambiguous that when words relating to the power to extend time limits in provisions of collective agreements related to arbitration procedures, as opposed to grievance procedures, were dropped from a statute, in that case, the Labour Relations Act, arbitrators lost the right to extend those time limits. In a similar fashion, it is the employer’s position that this Board no longer has the power to extend the time limits set out in Regulation 378/07, given the removal of the wording extending that power from the governing regulation. Counsel emphasizes that the Court’s decision in Leisureworld that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to proceed on the basis of an untimely referral to arbitration, involved facts dealing with someone’s livelihood, much like the present case. Nonetheless, the Court agreed with the arbitrator’s decision that there was no longer any discretion to extend or amend the time lines, as the language granting the discretion had been removed when the legislation changed.

13Counsel notes that the Board has adopted a similar approach in decisions such as St. Amant and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), Hasted and Berezowsky and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), and Burkholder and The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), cited in Appendix B. As well, counsel cites a decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB), Hall and Beauchamp, cited in Appendix B. In that case, through no fault of the applicant, a mandatory deadline for an appeal under the Occupational Health and Safety Act was missed by 24 hours through inadvertence of counsel. The OLRB made clear it would have extended the time lines if it had the power, given the facts of that case, but found that its power to determine its own practice and procedure did not give it the ability to do so in the face of a violation of a statutory time line.

14Further, counsel submits the employer had no obligation to direct Mr. Telford as to the time limits, but in any event the employer did refer him to Regulation 378/07 when it advised him of his right to grieve the decision in the termination letter. Reference is also made to it on the Board’s complaint form, known as Form 1, which he downloaded after he received the employer’s decision. Nonetheless, in the employer’s view, the fact that the employer might have given information about the regulation does not get over the statutory prohibitions. The employer submits that the Board simply does not have the discretion or equitable power to grant anything such as an extension of the time limits, as requested by the applicant.

15By contrast, complainant’s counsel invited a different focus, based on the themes of estoppel/waiver and procedural fairness or natural justice.

16Referring to the chronology set out above, counsel emphasises that on May 22, 2014 when Mr. Telford found himself without a lawyer, but clearly wanting to proceed with his case, he did what any reasonable person would do - he contacted the other side to let them know of the development. In communicating that he would let the employer know who counsel was when he found someone, he was clearly communicating that he wanted to proceed, but that being unrepresented, he needed more time to get counsel in order to proceed. Counsel submits that he was clearly asking for an indulgence to proceed because of Mr. Eberhard’s death.

17Noting that the response from the employer raised no concern, counsel submits that the employer was essentially saying, “Please let me know; we understand your problem; it’s not a problem from the employer’s point of view”. The employer could have come back and said we are relying on the time lines, but they did not. Counsel submits that they were not heartless; they granted the indulgence requested. Counsel argues that Mr. Telford was entitled to rely on that as an arrangement that he had time to get a new lawyer. It is the complainant’s position that such an arrangement creates an estoppel against the employer, so that it should not be permitted to raise a timeliness issue.

18In support of his submissions, complainant’s counsel refers to Ryan v. Moore (Cabot Insurance), cited in Appendix B, which provides a review by the Supreme Court of Canada of the law of estoppel. Counsel underlines that acquiescence, and even mere silence, can give rise to an estoppel. Further, counsel asserts that there was more than that here, that there was an express representation, and nothing to the contrary. No employer representative said in any way that there was any problem with the matter being continued. In counsel’s view, this establishes one of the essential elements of estoppel, detrimental reliance. The idea is that one party would suffer detriment if the other were permitted to act in a manner inconsistent with their representation. Counsel emphasizes that, if Mr. Telford’s complaint is not permitted to proceed, he suffers the detriment of the loss of the opportunity to have a remedy like reinstatement.

19Counsel submits that the facts here demonstrate the elements referred to by the court as necessary for estoppel, including a shared assumption of fact and detrimental reliance such that it would be unfair to allow the employer to depart from the common assumption. It is counsel’s submission that the parties agreed to waive time lines, so that it is not now open to the employer to say that Mr. Telford has breached them.

20In terms of procedural fairness and natural justice, counsel submits that administrative tribunals have to give deference to procedural fairness and natural justice, such as the case of Prassad v.Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), cited in Appendix B. Fairness in human terms would dictate that a tribunal would do whatever it can to see to it that Mr. Telford’s right to access the Board and be heard on the merits not be derailed by events beyond his control, in the complainant’s view.

21Counsel emphasizes that the importance of the issue is highly relevant to what procedures are sufficient to provide natural justice. The law is clear that the more that is at stake, the more there is a duty to apply procedures and practices to not be unfair to the applicant.

22In the present case, counsel submits there is a contest between the right to counsel and the wording of the time limit in the regulations. In the complainant’s view, if it comes down to a conflict between right to counsel and a procedural provision, the board should not give paramountcy to the provision that would deprive him of counsel.

23In terms of the regulation itself, counsel observes that Regulation 977 provided that the Board could extend time lines, but did not give any criteria. Counsel notes that the current regulation is simply silent on the issue; it does not really revoke the power to extend time limits. Counsel submits that the board is back in the position prior to Regulation 977, when it was free to control its own procedure, including, in appropriate circumstances, to amend the time lines to allow fairness.

24Counsel’s review of the provisions of Regulation 378/07 emphasized its complexity. Noting that s. 8 of the current regulation gives a 14 day period to deliver notice of intent to file a complaint to either the Minister or the Chair of the Public Service Commission, counsel queried, what would happen if a complainant sent it to the wrong place? Is the consequence of that that he is completely out of luck - that the mandatory time frames apply and the person loses his grievance? Or that a complainant loses the right to complain by filing too early? Counsel offers such examples as unjust results, which demonstrate why the board needs the power to control its own procedure.

25Further, counsel submits that the regulation is hard to read to the point that he invites a finding that it is so non-functional and inconsistent with the Board’s mandate that it should not be treated as binding. For instance, control of the time lines is transferred from the complainant to a date to be determined by the action or non-action of the deputy or the deputy’s delegate. Counsel notes that if the deputy announces the intention to have a meeting within the thirty days, and then it does not occur within that time line, the time lines change again, creating further opportunity for the complaint’s right to be heard to be defeated.

26Counsel remarks on what he saw as a further oddity, in that if the deputy does hold a meeting, but does not give a decision within 30 days, the complainant either loses his right to grieve by waiting to hear what the decision is, or is required to appeal from a decision that he does not have, which could even be in his favour. As well, counsel notes that the regulation does not say there is a penalty or specify what the consequences are if it is not complied with. In counsel’s view, natural justice and procedural fairness are much more reliable guides as to how missed time lines should be treated.

27In reply, employer counsel emphasizes that, even though the regulation may appear confusing initially, the Board’s case law has clarified it. Counsel refers to the Board’s decision in Burkholder, cited in Appendix B, which, in the employer’s view, clears up any doubt about s. 8 of the regulation, in a case where, like Mr. Telford’s, the delay is at the stage of referral to arbitration of a challenge to a discharge. Employer counsel submits that whatever counsel for the complainant thinks the legislation meant prior to the predecessor of the current legislation, the current jurisprudence leaves no doubt that there is no jurisdiction to entertain this matter in the face of the employer’s objection. Counsel underlines that the change in the regulation was not limited to the removal of the express power to extend time limits, but also involved a change in the wording of the time limits themselves, to wording that has been found to be clearly mandatory.

28Acknowledging that the board is bound to operate accordingly to rules of procedural fairness and natural justice, employer counsel nonetheless underlines that a matter has to be properly before the Board for them to be engaged. Counsel returns to the decision of the OLRB in Hall v. Beauchamp for a clear example of the principle that an administrative tribunal’s control over its own procedure does not extend to the ability to accept an untimely complaint in the face of statutory time lines. Counsel for the employer urges a decision that there is no case properly before the board that would trigger the obligations of procedural fairness. Employer counsel distinguishes the Prassad decision, relied on by complainant’s counsel, on the basis that it did not involve a statutory limitation such as the one in issue here. Rather, it was a decision about an adjournment, after the Immigration Appeal Board had taken undisputed jurisdiction of the matter. Counsel argues that there is no conflict between Prassad and the case law such as the OLRB’s decision in Hall and Beauchamp. Once a complaint is within a Board’s jurisdiction, “in the door” so to speak, the Board’s control of its own process is active, but not before. Further, the situation is not like that in the cases cited on behalf of the complainant where there were competing pieces of legislation in the mix.

29Turning to the complainant’s argument about estoppel, employer counsel argues that the essential elements are not present. Counsel emphasizes that Mr. Telford’s e-mail to the employer when he had learned of the death of his lawyer did not ask for an extension of time. To the contrary, he asserts in his affidavit that he thought that there were no applicable time lines. In those circumstances, there could be no common assumption of fact to form the basis for an estoppel, or any representation from the employer on which to base any understanding that the employer was waiving the statutory time lines. Further, counsel submits there is nothing in the complainant’s affidavit from which the Board could find that he had relied on the employer’s response to affect the legal relationship between the parties. Counsel emphasizes as well that factual situations where the complainants were not aware of the time lines applicable to the PSGB, such as Halsted and Berezowsky; have not been found to permit the Board to ignore them.

30Counsel distinguishes the Ryan v. Moore and Cabot Insurance decision, cited in Appendix B, referred to by complainant`s counsel, on the basis that the Court does not say that there would be an estoppel in circumstances such as the one here where the parties did not discuss the time lines. Employer counsel submits that silence or inaction would be considered a representation if a legal duty existed to inform the other party of something. Counsel underlines that the employer did not owe a legal duty to Mr. Telford to have advised him that he risked missing the time lines while he sought a new lawyer.

31Employer counsel urges a decision consistent with the Board`s own jurisprudence and that of the OLRB to the effect that, even in circumstances where there is a sympathetic factor, Boards of arbitration and statutory tribunals have found they could not extend the time limits in the face of mandatory language.

32Prior to the current regulation, during the period when Regulation 977, set out in the Appendix to this decision, was in effect, the Board had the discretionary power under s. 54 of that Regulation to extend time limits, and exercised that discretion in appropriate cases. What was considered appropriate depended on the facts, including whether the delay was not too extensive, there were reasonable grounds for the delay and/or no prejudice to the other party. This was similar to the power provided in s. 48(16) of the Labour Relations Act (LRA), which gives an arbitrator under a collective agreement the power to extend time lines where there are reasonable grounds for the extension and the opposite party will not be substantially prejudiced by the extension, unless the parties agree that such power is not applicable. The situation changed when the current regulation was put in place without the equivalent power.

33The Board has accepted in St. Amant and Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), cited in Appendix B, that the current wording of the regulation means that compliance with the time limits set out in the regulation is a precondition to the Board’s assuming jurisdiction over a case. Further, the Board found that it has no power to relieve against or extend those times limits, given the removal of that power from the wording of the current regulation. This is consistent with the case of Leisureworld, cited above, where despite the lack of explicit language repealing a previous power to relieve against a time limit for submissions to arbitration, the Court found that the removal of the wording allowing it was equivalent to the repeal of the power.

34In Burkholder, relied on by the employer, this Board considered the time limits set out in Regulation 378/07, and wrote as follows at paras. 10 and 11:

There still remains the issue of whether the PSGB has any authority to extend the time limits set out in section 8 of Regulation 378/07 in light of the complainant's claim that the delay was due to a stress related illness. Even though the Board's statutory power to extend time limits had been revoked in 1996, there are PSGB decisions arising during the period from 1996 until Regulation 378/07 came into force where the Board exercised its discretion to extend time limits. These cases, however, all dealt with the time limits set out in former Regulation 977 and these time limits had been clearly expressed in directory language. The language used to prescribe time limits in the new Regulation 378/07, however, is significantly different and leaves no doubt as to its mandatory nature. This choice of mandatory language can lead to no other conclusion than that compliance with these time limits is a precondition to the PSGB assuming jurisdiction over a matter.

Given the mandatory nature of these time limits and the lack of any express statutory authority to relieve against these mandatory time limits, the Board must conclude that it has no power to alter the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to comply with the 14 day time limit to file the Form 1 Application. It is for this reason that this complaint must be dismissed. This conclusion is in no way a reflection on the merits of the complaint itself but merely a determination that the Public Service Grievance Board, as a tribunal created by statutory enactments, can only stay within the limits of these enactments.

35This lack of power to relieve against the time limits means that the reasons for not meeting the time lines, however reasonable or sympathetic, are not matters that the Board can rely on to extend the time lines.

36Counsel for the complainant urges the Board to find that the restrictions in the regulation are so problematic in the ways set out above, that they should not be considered binding in the way that the Board has found them to be in its previous decisions interpreting Regulation 378/07. Despite the accuracy of counsel’s observations about what one could term a lack of user-friendliness of the wording of the regulation, as well as the fact that it can work hardship in particular cases, I do not find it appropriate to depart from the Board’s established jurisprudence. The Board’s case law, in my view, has been faithful to what the regulation says, interpreted in light of Court decisions such as Leisureworld. As well, Courts at the highest level, as demonstrated in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ryan v. Moore and Cabot Insurance, have upheld the concept of limitation periods prescribed by the legislature, albeit in that case, of the much longer variety applicable in civil law suits.

37Further, consistency, short of rigidity, in tribunal decision making is highly desirable, as affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, in IWA v. Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd., [1990] 1 SCR 282, 1990 CanLII 132 (SCC). This Board’s interpretation of the time limits in Regulation 378/07 has been articulated in a consistent way whenever issues have been raised about them, and it is for the regulatory process to change course if so advised.

38I have also considered the complainant’s argument that the doctrine of estoppel should be applied. This is a rule of fairness which prevents one party from enforcing its strict rights, where it has represented to the other party that it would not do so, and the other party has relied to its detriment on that representation. I do not find there to be any evidence of a representation in this case to the effect that the employer would not rely on the statutory time lines. The courteous reply of the employer’s representative to the distressing news of Mr. Eberhard’s death does not deal with the issue. Further, although it is accurate to say that estoppel can arise from silence or acquiescence in certain circumstances, I do not find this case to be one of them. The communication by Mr. Telford that he was seeking other counsel occurred at a time when he was still within the period of a timely complaint. It did not ask for an extension of the time limits, or mention them at all. The fact that the employer said nothing in the circumstances does not lead to a clear inference of intention to not rely on the time limits or communication from which the complainant could draw the conclusion that they would not. The employer’s silence is at least as consistent with the idea that they had not been raised at all.

39For similar reasons, I do not find that the employer has waived its rights to bring this motion. To find waiver, there would have to be a communication, by action or acquiescence, of an intention to give up a right. I do not find the facts of this case to be sufficiently clear to support the conclusion that the employer waived its rights to rely on the applicable regulatory time lines.

40Therefore, the complaint is not eligible to go forward because it was filed late, and the Board no longer has the authority to extend the time limits. It is therefore not in a position to hear and determine the merits of Mr. Telford’s complaint, and the above decision is in no way a comment on the issue of whether there was just cause for his dismissal.

41In the circumstances, for the above-noted reasons, the complaint is dismissed.

Dated at Toronto, Ontario this 25th day of May 2016.

APPENDIX A

Excerpt from Regulation 378/07 under The Public Service of Ontario Act

Complaints Authorized by This Regulation

Complaint about dismissal for cause

2. (1) A person who is aggrieved by his or her dismissal for cause under section 34 of the Act may file a complaint about the dismissal for cause with the Public Service Grievance Board,

(a) if the person is eligible under sections 5 and 6 to file such a complaint;

(b) if the person gives notice in accordance with section 8 of his or her proposal to file the complaint; and

(c) if the person complies with the filing requirements set out in section 10. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 2 (1).

Filing a Complaint

Notice of proposal to file a complaint

8. (1) A person who proposes to file a complaint shall give notice of the proposal to the following person or entity:

9. A complainant who, at the material time, worked in a ministry shall give the notice to his or her deputy minister.

10. A complainant who, at the material time, worked in a Commission public body shall give the notice to the chair of the Public Service Commission. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 8 (1).

(4) The notice must be given within the following period:

1. For a complaint about dismissal for cause, within 14 days after the complainant receives notice of the dismissal.

2. For a complaint about a disciplinary measure, within 14 days after the complainant receives notice of the imposition of the disciplinary measure.

3. For a complaint about a working condition or a term of employment, within 14 days after the complainant becomes aware of the working condition or term of employment giving rise to the complaint. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 8 (4).

Period for dispute resolution

9. (1) A complainant is not entitled to file a complaint with the Public Service Grievance Board until expiry of the period provided under this section for dispute resolution. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 9 (1).

(4) If the complainant was required to give the chair of the Public Service Commission notice of the proposal to make the complaint, and if the chair or his or her delegate meets with the complainant within 30 days after the chair receives the notice, the period provided for dispute resolution expires on the earlier of,

(a) the day that is 30 days after the meeting; or

(b) the day on which the chair gives written notice to the complainant of his or her decision about the proposed complaint. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 9 (4).

(5) If the deputy minister or chair of the Public Service Commission, as the case may be, or his or her delegate does not meet with the complainant within 30 days after receiving the notice, the period provided for dispute resolution expires 30 days after the notice was given to the deputy minister or chair. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 9 (5).

Filing a complaint

10. (1) Within 14 days after the expiry of the period, if any, provided for dispute resolution under section 9, the complainant may file the complaint with the Public Service Grievance Board by delivering it to the chair of the Board. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 10 (1).

(2) The complaint must set out the reasons for the complaint and must include the notice of the proposal, if any, to make the complaint and such other information and documents as the Board may specify. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 10 (2).

(bolding added)

Excerpt from Regulation 977, under the Public Service Act, now superseded

37. A person who has received a notice under subsection 13(13) and who believes he or she is being dismissed unjustly may, within twenty-one days of the receipt of the notice, apply to the Board for a hearing, by delivering to the Chair of the Board and application for a hearing including his or her grievance.

38. The Board or a Classification Rating committee may, of its own motion,

(a) abridge the procedure set out in this Part and hear the grievance at any time under section 48: or

(b) extend the time limits specified in this Part, RO 1980, Reg, 881, s. 61.

Excerpt from s. 48 of the Labour Relations Act:

s. 48

(16) Except where a collective agreement states that this subsection does not apply, an arbitrator or arbitration board may extend the time for the taking of any step in the grievance procedure under a collective agreement, despite the expiration of the time, where the arbitrator or arbitration board is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the extension and that the opposite party will not be substantially prejudiced by the extension. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A, s. 48 (16).

APPENDIX “B”

Authorities relied on by the Employer

1. Public Service Act, Reg. 977, Part V – Grievance Procedure.

2. Public Service of Ontario Act, 2006, Ontario Reg. 378/07- Public Service Grievance Board: Complaints and Hearings.

3. S.E.I.U., Local 204 v. Leisureworld Nursing Homes Ltd., 70 A.C.W.S.(3d) 281 [1997] O.J. No. 1469, 99 O.A.C. (Divisional Court), affirmed by the Court of Appeal with brief reasons reported at [1997] O.J. No. 4815, 75 A.C.W.S. (3d) 854 (Ont. C. A.).

4. St. Amant (Complainant) v. The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), PSGB No. P-2012-0601, January 31, 2013, 2013 CanLII 4673 (ON PSGB) (Carter).

5. Hall v. Beauchamp, 2010 CLB 2419.

6. Mike Lee et al and Jim Allen (Complainants) v. The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), PSGB No. P-2010-0702, P-2010-1055, July 21, 2011 (O’Neil).

7. Martin Ois (Complainant) v. The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), PSGB No. P-2013-0884, November 13, 2014 (O’Neil).

8. Hasted/Berezowsky (Complainants) v. The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), PSGB No. P-2014-2665, January 18, 2016 (Nairn).

9. Donn Burkholder (Complainant) v. The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Government Services), PSGB No. P.-2013-0846, November 8, 2013 (Carter).

Authorities relied on by the Complainant

10. Excerpt from Halsbury’s Laws of Canada – Administration Law (2013 Reissue), Guy Régimbald, Matthew Estabrooks (Contributors); HAD – 4 Procedural fairness and natural justice.

11. Prassad v.Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1989 CanLII 131 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 560.

12. Ryan v. Moore and Cabot Insurance Company, 2005 SCC 38, 2005 S.C.C. 38.