P-2010-2013

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

Under

THE PUBLIC SERVICE ACT

Before

THE PUBLIC SERVICE GRIEVANCE BOARD

BETWEEN

Richard Mroz

Complainant

• and -

The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services)

Employer

BEFORE

Kathleen G. O’Neil

Vice-Chair

FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Richard Mroz

FOR THE EMPLOYER

Paul Meier Ministry of Government Services Labour Practice Group Counsel

HEARING

September 9, 2011.

Decision

1This decision deals with the employer's preliminary objection to the complaint filed by one of a group of Operational Managers claiming damages and reclassification for defamation and negative career and life impacts flowing from a 1996 report concerning disputed allegations of mistreatment of young offenders. The employer has objected to a hearing on the merits on the basis that the complaint, as grievances are now called, is out of time, and that the Public Service Grievance Board (“the Board”) lacks jurisdiction over both the core claim of the complaint and some of the remedies requested. Mr. Mroz, the complainant, urged the Board to take jurisdiction in order to remedy the wrong done to him and his colleagues who have filed similar complaints. Mr. Mroz’ complaint was listed for hearing first and the others are being held in abeyance pending the completion of this matter.

Factual Background

2It is important to note at the outset that, in accordance with the Board’s practice on preliminary objections such as this, I assume throughout these reasons, without making findings of fact one way or another, that the facts recounted are true and would be provable through evidence at a hearing.

3The grievor is an Operational Manager who was employed at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre (EMDC) in 1996 during a bitter 37 day strike by the Ontario Public Service Employees Union and the Correctional Officers it represents. A riot occurred at the Bluewater Youth Centre during that strike, as a result of which a group of young offenders were transferred to the EMDC. Some of those youth made serious allegations of mistreatment at the hands of Operational Managers during the process of their admission. In May 1996, two months after the end of the strike, Ontario’s Chief Advocate in the Office of Child and Family Advocacy, administered by the Ministry of Community and Social Services, issued a report. That document concluded, on the basis of the youths’ accounts, that there had been serious mistreatment by managers at EMDC, apparently without naming any individuals. In essence, the grievor and his colleagues complain that their careers and reputations have been unfairly damaged since 1996 by the inaccurate findings of that report.

4Specifically, Mr. Mroz alleges that the report was libellous and caused him post-traumatic stress. He states that because of the report, he was subject to a police investigation, involving wire-tapping and the parking of a cruiser outside his home, which damaged relations with his neighbours and his family, causing the loss of a volunteer position with a community organization and a lengthy separation from his spouse and children. Further, he states his career was damaged when he was removed from two major Ministry projects and had a secondment opportunity to the Correctional College cancelled. All of these facts are assumed true and provable for the purpose of this decision, although no findings of fact are made at this time.

5A similar grievance brought by a retired employee was dismissed by a preliminary decision dated March 3, 2011 on the basis that the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear grievances from retired employees. See Burt v. Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) P-2010-1988 (O’Neil) 2011 CanLII 23300 (ON PSGB).

6As with Mr. Burt’s grievance, the impetus for these grievances, so long after the issuance of the report, was the release of a decision of the Ontario Superior Court, Simpson v. Ontario, 2010 ONSC 2119, dated August 31, 2010. That decision dealt in detail with a lawsuit brought by George Simpson and Rowland Carey, the Superintendent and an Operational Manager at EMDC at the time of the allegations by the Bluewater youth in 1996. They had both been fired in the aftermath, and resolved their employment issues with the Ministry in 1997 and 1999. In 2002, they sued in tort, claiming defamation by Judy Finlay, author of the 1996 Chief Advocate’s report. Madam Justice Leitch took jurisdiction, despite the settlements with the employer, and found in her 2010 decision that the report was reckless and defamatory to Messrs. Simpson and Carey, awarding substantial damages. The Operational Managers whose grievances are now before this Board maintain that they too were defamed by the report, and are entitled to remedies from this Board as a result.

The employer’s Objections

7The employer's preliminary objection, to which I now turn, has two prongs. First is the question of timeliness and second is jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Timeliness

8The employer's position is that the grievance is so far out of time, being filed 14 years, rather than the required 14 days after the events complained of, that the Board should not allow it to proceed further. The fourteen day timeline is found in section 8(4), paragraph 3, of Ontario Regulation 378/07 under the Public Service of Ontario Act (PSOA) as follows:

8. (1) A person who proposes to file a complaint shall give notice of the proposal to the following person or entity:

9. A complainant who, at the material time, worked in a ministry shall give the notice to his or her deputy minister.

(4) The notice must be given within the following period:

3. For a complaint about a working condition or a term of employment, within 14 days after the complainant becomes aware of the working condition or term of employment giving rise to the complaint. O. Reg. 378/07, s. 8 (4).

9At employer counsel’s request, the grievor filed particulars of his allegations. Counsel notes that none of the lost opportunities and events complained of occurred more recently than 1996, and the people named as acting on behalf of the employer are all long gone from the Ministry. As well, the employer notes that the grievor has taken advantage of other temporary assignments and secondment opportunities in the intervening years. In those circumstances, the employer argues that the Board, being a creature of statute, has no inherent jurisdiction, and what jurisdiction it has is limited by the statute such that it is not able to hear grievances brought after the time prescribed above.

10Further, the employer argues that the Board has no jurisdiction to extend the time limits, making the same argument outlined, but not decided, in the Board’s decision in Lee v. Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2011 CanLII 49517 (ON PSGB) as follows:

Further, counsel for the employer argues that the timelines in section 8 (1) of Regulation 378/07 are mandatory timelines that are not able to be extended by the Board. Counsel refers to Section 54 of the former regulation 977, no longer in effect, which provided the Board with jurisdiction to extend time limits. Counsel argues that when the new regulation 378/07 was implemented, it contained no similar provision, and thus any jurisdiction the Board had to extend time limits is no longer applicable.

In support of the employer’s arguments on timeliness, counsel relies on the following case law: Daniel Beauchamp 2010 Can LII 6691 and 11287, (ON L.R.B.), Service Employees International Union, Local 204 v. Leisureworld Nursing Homes Ltd., [1997] O.J. No. 1469, 99 O.A.C. (Divisional Court), affirmed by the Court of Appeal with brief reasons reported at [1997] O.J. No. 4815, 75 A.C.W.S. (3d) 854 (Ont. C. A.) and Kris Persad v. TTC et. al., 2009 HRTO 325. In the Daniel Beauchamp decisions, the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) found that in dealing with its jurisdiction over appeals under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, there was no language allowing for the extension of the timelines. In the result, despite sympathetic facts, which included a one day delay caused by solicitor inadvertence, the appeal was dismissed as untimely. In doing so, the OLRB also found that its broad power to control its own procedure did not give it jurisdiction to amend the timelines set by statute.

In the Divisional Court's decision in Leisureworld, affirmed on appeal, cited above, the Court found it to be unambiguous that when words relating to the power to extend time limits in provisions of collective agreements related to arbitration procedures were dropped from the Labour Relations Act, arbitrators lost jurisdiction to grant relief from time limits for referral to arbitration, as opposed to steps within the grievance procedure leading to the referral to arbitration. Counsel argues that the amendment to the regulation resulting in the absence of the provisions providing for the extension of time limits in Regulation 378/07 has similarly removed this Board’s jurisdiction to extend time lines. Without a statutory authority to extend the time limits, such as that in the Labour Relations Act or the Human Rights Code, an example of which is in the Persad case, cited above, counsel argues that there is no general equitable jurisdiction to extend time limits.

11Even if the Board had such discretion, in the employer’s view, the delay is so long, it should not be exercised here. For this alternative argument, Counsel relies on the factors in Becker Milk Company and Teamsters, Local 647 (1978), 1978 CanLII 3436 (ON LA), 19 L.A.C. (2^nd) 217 (Burkett) which have been applied by both the Grievance Settlement Board and this Board. These are a trio of factors which ground the consideration of whether or not to exercise discretion to extend time limits: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay and the nature of the grievance. Here, counsel argues that 14 years’ delay carries with it inherent prejudice, and there is actual prejudice to the employer in that potential witnesses are apt to be either unavailable or subject to the erosion of memory that is natural over such a length of time.

12Further, employer counsel argues that the complaint does not allege a continuing breach, so that it should not be viewed as a continuing grievance. Rather, the events in question occurred in 1996. Even though the subject still bothers Mr. Mroz today, it does not mean that his allegations amount to one of a continuing breach, in counsel’s submission.

Jurisdiction

13As to the Board’s jurisdiction over the subject matter, the employer argues that the grievor’s true complaint is a tort claim against the author of the report, Dr. Finlay, as she is now known, rather than a complaint about his terms and condition of employment, and thus the matter is not a proper grievance under the regulation. In this respect, counsel refers to Mendoza v. St. Michael’s Centre Hospital Society, (1998) 1998 CanLII 4797 (BC SC), 36 C.C.E.L. (2d) 252, in which the Court took jurisdiction over a claim for defamation by one employee against another, and Piko v. Hudson’s Bay Co. (1998) 1998 CanLII 6874 (ON CA), 39 C.C.E.L. (2d) 46, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal found that the courts had jurisdiction over a law suit by an employee against her former employer for malicious prosecution in the criminal courts. As well, counsel observes that the Simpson decision relied on by the grievor is in itself a precedent for pursuing the matter in tort rather than at arbitration.

14Here, where the employer was not the source of the act complained of, the Board is urged to find that the core of the complaint is not an employment matter over which the Board has jurisdiction. Counsel also refers to a decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Stuart v. Hugh, 2007 BCSC 1411, for the appropriate analysis in this regard.

The Grievor’s Response

15In response to these arguments, Mr. Mroz made extensive, deeply felt, submissions about the extent of the negative impact of the 1996 allegations on his career and those of his colleagues. As he said, each of them has their own story of anguish to tell. For his part, he had been experiencing a steady rise in his career, access to desired secondments and other developmental assignments, such as stewardship of a remand project new to the area, and other indicators of approbation and support for his talents and future prospects in the Ministry. He saw that all change after the report. He said senior management appeared to believe what had been reported, despite the fact that it was not true. He was excluded from assignments he had been previously welcome to take on. He and his colleagues felt that their actions were under a microscope. He asserts that the superintendent assigned after the firing of George Simpson, poisoned his work environment. He detailed the serious impact of the police investigation on him and his family life. Indeed, he stated that since he has never been told that the investigation is over, he can only assume it is ongoing. He referred to what he referred to as a debriefing session with a psychologist arranged through work during which the psychologist told him and his colleagues that they were suffering from severe post- traumatic stress. He stated that of the managers involved, only two have been promoted permanently, compared to colleagues with similar education. In sum, he is of the view that if it had not been for the reckless report and its republication in 1998 and the fact that senior ministry staff gave it undue credence, he would never have had to endure the personal humiliation, mental stress and destruction to his career that ensued.

16Mr. Mroz acknowledges that things settled down somewhat in the subsequent years, part of which he attributes to a change in superintendent in his institution in 1999 or 2000. At that point, he says that he was past the stage of trying to grieve about the consequences and had moved on to try to recover and rebuild his life, as had his colleagues. From his point of view, the decision of the Superior Court in August of 2010 provided a new opportunity to finally file a grievance and have things made whole. In her decision, Madame Justice Leitch confirmed that the report written by Dr. Finlay had no regard for consequences to Superintendent Simpson, Mr. Carey or the other managers involved. He and his colleagues are among the other managers involved and they are looking for recognition of the damage done by a reckless report to them as well. He notes the Court’s finding at paragraph 344 that the six months’ limitation period under the Public Authorities Protection Act did not apply because of her conclusion that Ms. Finlay acted outside the scope of her mandate by writing an investigative report with reckless disregard for her official duties and the injury she would cause the plaintiffs.

17Mr. Mroz rejects employer counsel's argument that this grievance is essentially a tort claim. Rather, he sees it as a claim for redress of a breach of his terms and conditions of employment. He refers to Charlton v. Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) P-2006-0291 (Carter) 2007 CanLII 24192 (ON PSGB), 2007CanLII 24192 (ON P.S.G.B.) and Morrison v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 1997 CanLII 10282 (ON PSGB) for cases in which the board has given damages for mental distress or stated that it has the authority to do so. As well, he states categorically that it is not a classification grievance, but that remedies such as an assignment to a higher classification have been granted against this Ministry. In this respect, he refers to a 1998 decision in which remedies in regards to the reclassification of the complainant Michael McKinnon and his spouse were granted. See the decision of a Board of Inquiry under the Human Rights Code: McKinnon and Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services), Frank Geswaldo, George Simpson, P. James and Jim Home (1998) 1998 CanLII 29849 (ON HRT), 32 C.H.H.R. D/1 (Ont. Board of Inquiry).

18Mr. Buglass, one of the managers who filed similar grievances, gave evidence in support of Mr. Mroz’ submissions. He underlined the view that the Finlay report was not an investigative report, and that the Court’s decision shows that by her own admission, then Ms. Finlay was not a qualified investigator, nor investigating on behalf of the Ministry (then the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services). Her role was to report findings from the perspective of youth. Although the Ministry apparently did its own investigation, the results were never disclosed to the managers involved.

19As an Operational Manager who was present when the Bluewater youth were admitted and was subject to a criminal investigation, Mr. Buglass echoed Mr. Mroz’ view of the seriously negative and unfairly damaging fallout from the report for all of the Operational Managers at EMDC. He was convinced that the report even interfered with Mr. Mroz getting proper accommodation after a serious injury in the late 90’s. Mr. Buglass referred to extra stress from the fact that there appeared to be separate but overlapping investigations by the Ministry, Ontario Provincial Police and the City of London police. He says that the names of Operational Managers who did nothing wrong stayed on file with the police as people with a propensity to violence, something he learned when he went to renew his firearms permit, even though he had never been charged with any offense. He stated that the problem with something like this is that it never stops.

20In respect of the time limits in the regulation, Mr. Buglass notes they run from the awareness of the facts of which one complains. He mentions that he was not aware that Ms. Finlay had republished the report in 1998 until he read the decision of the Court in August 2010. For purposes of deciding the time limits, Mr. Buglass says that it was not until then that they had knowledge of what actually happened since the employer did not keep them up to date and they had to find things out from the media. He submits that Ms. Finlay was acting as an agent for the same government who employs the Operational Managers. In his view, the further publication of the information in 1998 in a public forum certainly affects his life, career and working conditions, for which the government should be held accountable. He stated that the reality is that if he had disclosed the information that she disclosed he would have been fired. He makes reference to paragraph 332 of the court's decision in Simpson which records the fact that Dr. Finlay acknowledged she had no regard for the consequences to Mr. Simpson and the managers when she drafted the EMDC report. He states that after the report, unionized employees were treated better than the Operational Managers, who were essentially blamed for the accusations of what happened to the youth, rather than anyone higher up.

21Mr. Buglass makes reference to the Ministry’s statement of ethical principles issued in March 2010 and the fact that the Operational Managers just want to be treated fairly, as that document requires. Given the statement of ethical principles, the matter is timely in his view and should be resolved. No one has ever found them to be innocent or absolved them of the unproven allegations. Since no one will provide closure, the matter is still ongoing for the Operational Managers involved. He underlined his view that this is not a case for the civil courts but rather a case about achieving a harassment-free workplace. Working conditions have been diminished since 1996 because the Operational Managers have been in survival mode, in his view.

22Rowland Carey, the only one of the Operational Managers to go to trial for the events of the commission of the Bluewater youth, was acquitted of all charges. He testified that he strongly believes the managers have been scapegoated because of problems with the implementation of the legislative mandate to protect children from abuse. He asserted that rather than being presumed innocent, they have all been presumed guilty. He believes he was fired because of the number of charges that followed, not because of the evidence.

23Mr. Carey referred to the period after the report as an "onslaught" against the Operational Managers carried out by a superintendent who has since been removed. He says the Operational Managers remained silent closer to the time as they were in survival mode because of all the consequences of the report in the institution and the attitude of the management at the time. He said that he and Mr. Simpson grieved because they had been fired; the rest of the Operational Managers were still employed. He asserts that upper management still does not believe or accept what happened to all of the other managers nor is the employer taking responsibility for it. He stated that the first glimmer of hope was the judge's decision in August 2010, when they felt that it was finally believed there was no wrongdoing. It renewed the subject, so that he is of the view that now is the time to give the Operational Managers a fair hearing, which would not have been available before. He referred to the fact that there are different impacts for each of the grievors: some of them lost service time; some of them have left the Ministry; some had their careers severely impacted despite the dropping of the charges; the subject continues to affect them all emotionally. He submitted that all they want is treatment with dignity and respect which they never got. The grievance was delayed because of complex reasons and should nonetheless be considered timely as the grievors were not believed before the 2010 Court decision. He said he himself has spent half his life since 1996 trying to defend his integrity for something he did not do.

The employer’s reply

24Employer counsel replied, underlining that he had heard what had been said and would bring it back to those instructing him.

25Nonetheless, the employer maintains its position that the complaint before the Board deals with events in 1996 which it is now too late for the Board to entertain.

26In reference to the reclassification remedy given to Michael McKinnon and his spouse Vicki Shaw-McKinnon, referred to by the grievor, counsel submits that it followed on a timely complaint following a job competition and is therefore not comparable to the situation here. It was determined that the two McKinnons were subject to discrimination, including the determination by some in management they would never be promoted, directly related to a job competition. There was concrete evidence brought in a timely way which the Board of Inquiry under the Ontario Human Rights Code had jurisdiction to rule on. They did not wait 14 years to bring their complaint.

Disclosure issues

27Mr. Buglass also maintained that it was difficult for the grievors to make some of the points they wished to make because no disclosure has been provided by the employer, who has responded instead with procedural objections. Without the disclosure, he is of the view that the deck is stacked against the grievors. Mr. Buglass asked for occurrence reports about threats of bodily harm in late 1996 by the then superintendent of the EMDC and any evidence about whether the Ministry acted. He stated that there may be others than the ones he knows of so he thought it would be relevant to have any later documents about abuse and criminal misconduct towards people who were considered to be associated with Mr. Simpson or had been present during the admission of the young offenders to EMDC in 1996. He sees this as relevant to the timeliness objection and the mindset of the managers because the time lines should only run from when the managers could be believed, which was not the case in the years following the report. In his view, they were finally believed in August 2010, and that is the point from which the clock should start ticking in terms of the time lines. Prior to that, Mr. Carey believes the Ministry had been allowing the abuse of its employees.

28Employer counsel responded that the request for occurrence reports from 1996 was completely irrelevant to the decision about the timeliness of the Mroz complaint which is before the Board. Counsel notes that Mr. Mroz did not deny he knew what his rights were in 1996, and that the PSGB has always been a fair tribunal, in 1996 and now. Rather, Mr. Mroz said that in 2010 he found out that he was a victim of libel and that is what prompted his grievance. Counsel notes that Mr. Mroz’ complaint makes no mention of intimidation so that what Mr. Buglass is asking for is outside the scope of the complaint and is not relevant to a decision on its timeliness. The potential existence of complaints about the behaviour of the superintendent in the late 90’s does not change the complainant’s awareness of the facts of which he now complains and his ability to act on them. The jurisdiction over the grievance comes from the complaint and the facts contained therein which determines what is relevant. Mr. Mroz’ complaint relates to the knowledge that he was libelled as triggering the grievance. It is the employer’s submission that the grievor had enough information to make the decisions he needed to make in 1996, rather than just in 2010.

29For the purpose of this decision, it is not necessary to have further disclosure, as I accept the complainant’s evidence about the cause for the delay in grieving, and it is not necessary to resolve disputed facts at the moment.

Should this matter be dismissed for Delay?

30The complainant and his witnesses raise a number of reasons why they believe the case should be heard despite the lengthy lapse of time. Foremost is the idea that the decision in August 2010 was a new departure, providing information that they did not formally have. The main piece of information is that that the 1996 report was found to be libellous of two of the other managers, so that Mr. Mroz says that he now knows that he too was a victim of libel. Additionally, there is the fact that Mr. Buglass learned for the first time in 2010 that the report had been republished in 1998. I agree with employer counsel that it is not necessarily the case that the fact that the report was found to be libellous against two other individuals, Mr. Simpson and Mr. Carey, would mean that it is also libellous of the complainant. However, given the breadth of the reasons of the Court, it is quite understandable that the complainant would conclude that the report was also libellous of him, and for the purposes of this motion, the statement that he too was libelled by the Chief Advocate’s report is assumed to be true and provable.

31Nonetheless, the fact that the Court’s decision may mean the report was libellous, does not make the complaint timely. The regulation measures the timeliness of a complaint from when the complainant became aware of the “working condition or term of employment giving rise to the complaint”. The events complained of by Mr. Mroz include the investigation in 1996, and career effects, such as a cancellation of a secondment which also occurred in 1996. There is no suggestion that Mr. Mroz was not aware of those, or of the report which he believes caused them, close to the time they occurred. Nor is there any suggestion that anything happened in August or September 2010 that amounts to a “working condition or term of employment” which could have given rise to the complaint. The Court decision itself is not a working condition or term of employment; at most it contains conclusions about some working conditions in 1996.

32As for the information that the report was republished in 1998, there is no event complained of in 1998 or after that could be affected by this fact. Thus, I do not find that the Court’s decision in August 2010 revived the events of 1996, so that they could be considered fresh and timely in 2010. Similarly, the publication of the Ministry’s statement of ethical principles in 2010 does not revive the events of 1996.

33Another theme was that the Court decision marked the first time that anyone had believed the managers’ side of the story, and that should persuade the Board to hear the matter. Although one can understand a decision not to grieve at a time when the complainant or his colleagues did not think anyone would believe them, that is not a reason that can excuse 14 years of delay. Complaints are very often about situations in which one party does not feel believed, and the hearing is for the purpose of sorting that out, something that is increasingly difficult to do with the passage of time. Similarly, the idea that there was a period of suspicion and scrutiny of the managers by the administration in place in the period after the issues concerning the admission of the Bluewater youth came to light, cannot render a grievance timely fourteen years later. The administration changed by 2000 in any event, which still leaves an interval of ten years.

34There is also the idea that, for the managers, the effects have never stopped. However, the law on timeliness of grievances makes clear that continuing effects of a completed action in the past do not make the matter continually timely. There are arbitration decisions in which grievances have been considered continuing grievances, where it is considered that there are recurring breaches of a term or condition of employment. For instance, if a person is paid incorrectly, each pay period may be considered a new occasion of improper pay. However, when a grievance complains of action taken at a specific time in the past, even if it has continuing consequences, it is not properly considered a continuing grievance. See for instance, Re Port Colborne General Hospital and O.N.A. (1986), 1986 CanLII 6715 (ON LA), 23 L.A.C. (3d) 323 (Burkett). There is no allegation that the employer repeatedly violated some term and condition of employment between 1996 and 2010. In these circumstances, I do not find this to be properly considered a continuing grievance still timely in the fall of 2010.

35I do understand that enduring the consequences of an unjustified accusation is very difficult indeed, so that it is not surprising that the managers who are convinced of their innocence would renew their efforts to clear their names, now that the Court has concluded that the report they complain of was defamatory and reckless. Nonetheless, having considered everything before me, I find I agree with the employer’s submission that it is too late, fourteen years later, for the Board to allow this complaint to proceed.

36Even discharge grievances brought long after the event have been dismissed where the delay is too long, and much less than 14 years. Here, the effects complained of, although significant, are much less severe, such that the nature of the grievance would not assist the complainant in obtaining a discretionary extension of the time limits. I have considered the length of the delay and the reasons for it, discussed above, together with the nature of the grievance, and do not find that there are sufficient grounds to exercise any discretion to extend the time limits. Without such sufficient grounds, it would not be appropriate to proceed to hear this complaint, whether or not the Board still has the discretion to extend time limits since the amendments to the PSOA in 2006.

37This Board, and other statutory tribunals, have consistently recognized over the years that there is inherent prejudice in requiring any party to face allegations that they would reasonably have believed were no longer live issues. Memories fade, witnesses become unavailable, records may not have been preserved as they would have been if the other party were on earlier notice of the complaint. Even if witnesses are still available, it is often very difficult to sort out issues such as causation years after a lengthy interval, given the huge number of variables in the intervening years and the layering of memories of later experience over those of the original events. Both parties would be hampered in proving their cases, and the Board’s ability to discern the truth would be affected accordingly. For examples of this Board’s decisions to similar effect, see: Kroeger v. Ontario (Ministry of Solicitor General and Correctional Services) P/0060/98, decision dated March 18, 1999 (Willes); Rice v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services) P-2006-2687 [2008] O.P.S.G.B.A. No. 1 (Leighton), and Marshall v. Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care) P-2004-2738 [2005] O.P.S.G.B.A. No. 10 (O’Neil) and for the Grievance Settlement Board, Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services)- Grievance of Faulkner), GSB #2006-2093 (Petryshen). In a similar vein is the Ontario Labour Relations Board’s oft-cited decision, The Corporation of the City of Mississauga, [1982] OLRB Rep. Mar. 420, where that Board said that the limit to its discretion to extend time limits would be delays measured in months rather than years.

38Given the Board's view that it is not appropriate to hear this complaint, given the lapse of 14 years since the events complained of, it is not necessary to deal with the employer’s jurisdictional arguments as to discretion to extend time limits, jurisdiction over the subject matter, or remedies such as reclassification.

39For the reasons set out above, this complaint is dismissed.