P-2006-2458

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

Under

THE PUBLIC SERVICE ACT

Before

THE PUBLIC SERVICE GRIEVANCE BOARD

BETWEEN

Robert Younger

Grievor

• and -

The Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of the Environment)

Employer

BEFORE

Kathleen G. O’Neil

Vice-Chair

FOR THE GRIEVOR

Robert Boswell Craig Boswell McDermot Barristers and Solicitors

FOR THE EMPLOYER

Sean Kearney Senior Counsel Ministry of Government Services

HEARING

June 11, 2007.

Decision

This decision deals with the employer’s preliminary objection to Mr. Robert Younger’s grievance, which claims compensation, including loss of pension income, as a result of alleged irregular management action after the parties signed Minutes of Settlement dated August 21, 2006, and before the grievor’s retirement on December 12, 2006. The employer maintains that the adjudication of this grievance should not proceed on the merits on any one of three separate grounds:

• it is foreclosed by the Minutes of Settlement;
• it deals with pay for performance; and
• Mr. Younger, a former employee who voluntarily retired, has no grievance rights. Further, it is alleged that the grievance amounts to an abuse of process, to which the Board should respond by ordering costs against the grievor.

By contrast, the grievor takes the position that the Minutes of Settlement do not cover the issue he is raising, and that it was an implied term of the Minutes of Settlement that his normal terms and conditions of employment, including an annual evaluation and pay for performance, would apply up until his date of retirement. Further, the Board’s longstanding practice of not ordering costs should be followed, in the grievor’s submission.

The facts

The facts necessary to this decision are not in dispute, and can be summarized as follows. The grievor, 65 at the time of the hearing of this matter, retired from his job as Labour Relations Officer with the Ministry of Environment with over thirty years of service on December 12, 2006. This retirement date was fixed in Minutes of Settlement entered into on August 21, 2006, when discussions took place prior to the hearing of an OPSEU grievance which included allegations that Mr. Younger had made inappropriate remarks at work, which he denied, then and now. Mr. Younger had the benefit of advice from his own counsel that day, before he entered into Minutes of Settlement, the terms of which read as follows:

Whereas the parties have agreed that the Employee shall retire from the Ontario Public Service Complainant effective December 12, 2006;

And whereas the parties wish to resolve any outstanding issues arising from the Employee’s longstanding employment with the Employer on a without prejudice and without precedent basis and without any admission of liability or wrongdoing on the part of any of the parties, and on the understanding that these Minutes shall not be referred to by either party in future for any purpose except enforcement or interpretation of these Minutes;

The parties agree to the following terms and conditions as confirmation as to the Employee’s retirement from the Ontario Public Service on December 12, 2006:

1. The parties agree that the terms of these Minutes of Settlement shall be kept confidential and will not be disclosed to any person, directly or indirectly, except as otherwise required by law or as required in order to implement the terms of this settlement.

2. The parties agree that for the purposes of this settlement, the Employee shall cease active employment with the Employer on September 6, 2006. The parties also agree that from the date of this settlement to September 6, the Employee shall not work on any active OPSEU files during that period.

3. The parties further agree that for the period from September 6 to September 25, 2006, the Employee will exhaust his accrued MCO days following his aforementioned cessation of active employment.

4. The parties further agree that for the period from September 26 to November 28, 2006, the Employee will be placed on a leave of absence with pay.

5. The parties further agree that for the period from November 29 to the date of his retirement on December 12, 2006, the Employee will be placed on a leave of absence without pay.

6. With respect to the accrued vacation days owed to the Employee, the Employer agrees to make its best efforts to pay the Employee the equivalent of same in early 2007.

7. The parties also agree and acknowledge that this settlement should in no way be constituted as a waiver of the Employee’s entitlement to the severance pay to which he would be entitled upon retirement on December 12, 2006 (ie. One week per year of service to a maximum of 26 weeks).

8. The Employer agrees to pay $1500 towards the legal expenses incurred by the Employee, with such sum to be made payable to Robert Boswell in trust.

9. The Employee agrees that he is fully informed of and understands the consequences of this settlement and enters into it voluntarily. The Employee further agrees that he has had proper representation with respect to this settlement, and has been afforded a reasonable opportunity and time to make an informed decision with respect to this settlement and his decision and agreement to retire.

10. In consideration of above, the Employee agrees and acknowledges that this settlement satisfies all claims and entitlements related to the Employee’s employment with the Employer and the conclusion of such employment on December 12, 2006, and hereby releases and forever discharges the Crown in right of Ontario and the Employer, its employees, servants, agents, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, elected officials, directors and assigns of and from any and all claims or possible claims, actions, causes of action, prosecutions, demands and proceedings of every nature and kind, statutory or otherwise, arising out of or as a result of any allegations which the Employee may make against the Employer either in respect of his employment with the Employer, or flowing from his retirement from employment with the Employer or any other matter up to and including the date of this settlement and the date of retirement, including but not limited to all claims under the Ontario Human Rights Code, the Employment Standards Act, the Public Service Act and the common law.

11. The parties agree that this settlement contains no admission of liability or wrongdoing on the part of any party.

12. This written agreement between the parties represents the complete settlement between the parties with respect to this dispute and any and all disputes arising from the Employee’s employment and retirement from employment with the Employer. The parties agree and acknowledge that they have not made any verbal or other agreements beyond what is contained in this written settlement.

The grievor had expected that, at the latest by the fall of 2006, his performance would be rated for the final full year of his employment - April 1, 2005 through March 31, 2006 - and that he would receive a performance increase as he had regularly throughout his long service with the employer. This would have then retroactively increased both his pay from April 1, 2006 onwards, as well as the basis for calculating pension income, vacation and termination pay. Further, he anticipated a lump sum performance award as he was at the top of the salary grid. When he inquired about this issue on the date of retirement, he was told that the outcome of his performance review was negative, and that no pay for performance award would be forthcoming. He felt unjustly treated, in that he was thus deprived of a face-to-face evaluation meeting, as well as what he felt were the fruits of his more than adequate service in the time period covered.

No one discussed the issue of pay for performance during the negotiation of the Minutes of Settlement, and Mr. Younger feels badly dealt with that the employer should remain silent about such a significant issue and then behave so differently than in any of his previous years of service without any notification or advice to him. He has come to see this as punishment and reprisal, an effort to hastily terminate his employment. He now wishes notice and reasons for his termination, which he has come to view as an illegal dismissal. He feels that he was let go because of an unjust accusation from a bargaining unit member, and denied the appropriate protection he should have been afforded as a manager by the employer.

For the purposes of this motion, I have accepted the facts asserted by the grievor to be true and provable, even though the employer disputes many parts of the allegations made by the grievor. Indeed, as noted, the facts necessary to this decision were not in dispute. It is their legal characterization which divides the parties.

In an attempt to not unduly lengthen these reasons, I have referred to only some of the case law and authorities relied on by counsel in their able arguments. All of it, which I have carefully considered, is cited in the attached appendix.

Do the Minutes of Settlement preclude this grievance from proceeding?

The Minutes of Settlement are a contract, and answering the question as to whether the Minutes of Settlement preclude this grievance from proceeding involves interpreting their terms to ascertain what the parties intended in that respect. The rules of interpretation include that the parties are assumed to have expressed their intentions in the words that they used, and that they are to be held to the plain meaning of those words, understood in context, unless to do so would lead to some absurd or illegal result.

A plain reading of the document, on its face, leaves no doubt that the parties intended that the Minutes of Settlement were to put an end to any and all further disputes between the parties arising out of the grievor’s employment. This is made very clear both in paragraphs 11 and 13, set out above. Starting with paragraph 13, the parties have agreed that the above writing is a “complete settlement…with respect to this dispute and any and all disputes arising from the Employee’s employment …and that they have not made any verbal or other agreements beyond what is contained in this written settlement.” This says in plain English that we are not to look any further than the Minutes of Settlement for the parties’ intentions as to any disputes that might arise about the grievor’s employment.

Paragraph 11 recites that the settlement covers “all claims and entitlements related to the grievor’s employment with the Employer and the conclusion of such employment” and releases the employer and all its agents from “any and all claims or possible claims…and proceedings of every nature and kind…arising out of or as a result of any allegations which the Employee may make against the Employer either in respect of his employment…or flowing from his retirement…including…claims under …the Public Service Act.” This is a claim under the Public Service Act, related to the grievor’s employment with the employer. The parties have expressly turned their minds to whether the grievor should be entitled to bring such a claim. They have expressed their intention in very clear terms. The answer they gave is that the grievor has agreed not to bring a claim such as this. Absent duress, which is not alleged, or some other circumstance that would justify not enforcing this clear contract, it is the Board’s duty to enforce that settlement, rather than to re-open it. As the Board wrote in De Boer and the Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) (O’Neil) PSGB #P-2005-1033 at pg. 10:

It is very important as a matter of policy that agreements voluntarily signed be upheld, or workplace parties would not be able to have confidence in the finality of agreements made and their ability to govern their affairs accordingly. The question of finality of agreements is fundamental to the entire legal system, and is especially important in the ongoing operation of any workplace. Otherwise, parties would be constantly wondering which agreement they could count on, and which one would be subject to being reconsidered indefinitely in the future. It would be overly prejudicial to the employer and all concerned to create a precedent which would amount to a questioning of the finality of the agreement between the parties that lead to the grievor’s voluntary retirement, and the severance of the employment relationship that followed.

See, to similar effect, Gottwald and the Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of the Attorney General) (Leighton) PSGB #P/0127/96.

The Board has considered the facts asserted in Mr. Younger’s grievance and the submissions of his counsel, which are dealt with in turn below, to see whether there is anything in the context of the signing of the Minutes of Settlement and the release which would suggest some reason why the plain wording of the parties’ agreement should not be given effect. See Pritchard vs. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1999) 1999 CanLII 15058 (ON SCDC), 45 O.R. (3d) 97 (Divisional Court) for a discussion of the circumstances such as duress, which might lead to such a result. Having done so, and although it is very clear that the grievor has come to have hard feelings about his dealings with the employer’s representatives relating to the Minutes of Settlement, there is no basis in fact or in law for me to interfere with the arrangements made between the parties or to consider the current complaint as not covered by them.

Mr. Younger’s counsel submitted that the release in the Minutes of Settlement was not a license to conduct future offences that would be shielded by the release. The Board is invited to find that the unfair, irregular treatment alleged by the grievor in regards to his non-evaluation falls outside the scope of what the release was intended to cover. At a minimum, counsel notes, the release talks about further entitlement to severance and vacation pay, the calculation of which is dependent on the appropriate evaluation of the grievor’s performance in accordance with the employer’s own rules. This aspect can be seen as a matter of enforcing the settlement, or quantifying what is owed under it in counsel’s submission. In this respect, it is important to underline that there is no dispute over the calculation of the amounts paid out, except as they relate to the negative effect of the alleged failure to conduct an evaluation of the grievor’s performance. In a related point, Mr. Younger asserts in his written submissions to the Board that Item 8 of the Minutes of Settlement attests to the fact that there would be no adverse impact on legislated severance pay, and that the Ministry’s “after-the fact determination and failure with respect to work performance detracts from and contravenes this clause.” The Board does not agree that there is any outstanding issue concerning calculation of vacation or severance pay, or contravention in respect of paragraph 8, which warrants further inquiry by the Board. Paragraph 8 made clear that the settlement was not to constitute a waiver of severance pay, but did not provide that there would be no adverse impact. It would have necessitated very different wording than that used in the Minutes of Settlement to find that the employer had warranted that Mr. Younger’s severance, vacation or other payments would be calculated on a basis which included performance pay in an amount not less than the amount anticipated by Mr. Younger.

As to the case law referred to by employer counsel, Mr. Boswell submitted that most of those cases referred to the resolution of a grievance which had been prompted by an action of the employer to which an employee objected, and as a result of which the employee did not return to work. Counsel argues that Mr. Younger’s settlement was not made in similar circumstances, and did not have the same finality because Mr. Younger went back to work for a period, and then was on leave, continuing to be employed until December 12, and actively at work until September 6. Counsel submits that paragraphs 2 through 8 assume continuity of employment and related events, and that the employer’s approach is tantamount to saying that the grievor could have been paid $1 a day for the period during which he returned to work, and would have no recourse. Just as neither party thought it necessary to put in the salary to be paid or any of the normal terms associated with the grievor’s continued employment, counsel submits that the normal performance evaluation process was part of the agreement to continue the grievor’s employment. Although this argument would have some appeal if in fact the employer had attempted to withhold part or all of Mr. Younger’s then regular salary after the signing of the Minutes of Settlement, it cannot be accepted as applying to Mr. Younger’s current claim. This is because there is no dispute over any aspect of the grievor’s treatment during his period of continued employment other than the lack of what the grievor considered a proper evaluation and pay for performance. That subject matter is specifically excluded by Regulation from the grievances which can be brought to this Board, such that it would not be reasonable to infer that the Minutes of Settlement were premised on an implied mutual agreement that the grievor could later complain to this Board about the evaluation of his performance, or the monetary results of it.

Further, although Mr. Younger was not a grievor and had not been dismissed when he signed the Minutes of Settlement, and thus was not in exactly the same situation as the grievors in the cases cited, he did sign a contract similar to those dealt with in many of those cases, agreeing to release the employer from any claims and proceedings. And there was no suggestion that the contract was not binding, or that it did not meet the basic requirements for a valid contract. It is clear that it does meet those requirements, as it contains mutual promises for consideration which included, among other things, a series of leaves, much of it with pay, and legal expenses.

Counsel acknowledged that the settlement was final, but submitted on the grievor’s behalf that it was not final for things it does not purport to deal with, and that the grievor could not have known of or released a wrongdoing that had not happened yet. One of the grievor’s core concerns is that he did not get a salary increase for periods of service which were not criticized until after the agreement. Thus, he feels mislead, in that he was not aware of the employer’s concerns about his performance until after he signed the Minutes of Settlement. There is no authority that I am aware of, or that was cited to me, for the proposition that a party to a contract cannot give up the right to bring claims in the future, even based on facts that have not occurred yet. Nor is there any basis before me to find that the employer had a duty to communicate to Mr. Younger its concerns about his performance or its intention, if any, about his entitlement, or lack thereof, to an increase under the pay for performance plan. The context of the mutual covenants set out above was that the grievor was leaving the active employ of the government sixteen days after the signing of the Minutes of Settlement, and would thereafter be on leaves during which no work was required until his official retirement date a few months later. For all practical purposes, he was on the eve of the end of his career with the employer when he signed the Minutes of Settlement, at a time when he was at or near traditional retirement age. In those circumstances, there is nothing unusual, absurd or illegal about mutual covenants to tie up all the “loose ends” of the relationship by agreeing that there would be no more claims or issues between them arising out of the employment relationship.

Moreover, the case law is clear that a settlement will not be set aside because a party later feels he or she might not have entered into it on the same terms if further information had been available to them, (see Re Selkirk College v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union, (1996), 1996 CanLII 20430 (BC LA), 59 L.A.C. (4th) 14 (Chertkow, B.C.) at pg. 11) or because each and every possible compensation issue which might have been addressed by the perfectly informed party was not included in the final package of settlement terms (see Re Canada Post Corp and CUPW, (1993) 36 L.A.C. (4th) 216 (Jolliffe) at pg. 14). As well, the fact that the parties did not specifically cover every possible entitlement does not diminish the effect of comprehensive release language. (See Toronto (City) v. Toronto Civic Employees’ Union, Local 416, (2002) 106 L.A.C. (4th) 59 (Luborsky) at pg. 6.)

Further, counsel for the grievor notes that employer counsel drafted the Minutes of Settlement, and submitted that therefore the principle of contra proferentem should be applied to give an interpretation of the Minutes of Settlement favourable to the grievor, or to find that it is the employer who should have made it explicit in the settlement that the grievor was not entitled to his usual performance review if that is what they intended. Ministry counsel’s response to this was to assert that although he had drafted them, there was back and forth, and ample opportunity for the grievor to propose additional terms, such as ones dealing with pay for performance. Contra proferentem is a Latin term which has been described in the text Labour Arbitration in Canada, by Brown and Beatty, at topic 4:1552 as follows: the canon of construction which posits that where the language of a document is equivocal, it should be interpreted against the party who prepared it. An example of the application of this doctrine can be found in Re Medis Health and Pharmaceutical Services Ltd. and Teamsters, Chemical and Allied Workers, Local 424 (2000), 2000 CanLII 50185 (ON LA), 93 L.A.C. (4th) 118 (Armstrong). I find no basis for the application of this doctrine in this case because I do not find the terms of the Minutes of Settlement to be equivocal or ambiguous. The wording of paragraphs 11 and 13 provided in the clearest of terms that no further claims were available to the grievor once he agreed to retire on the terms set out above.

Mr. Younger also writes that the fact that there is no reference in the Minutes of Settlement to any adverse impact on his pension, “would indicate detrimental reliance on my part in respect of a lack of employer good faith.” The facts before me do not establish a sufficient basis for a case of bad faith on the part of the employer representatives. There was simply no discussion of the issue of pay for performance. There is no basis in the material before me to find that the employer representatives had a duty to have raised pay for performance and its potential impact on the grievor’s pension. Nor is there any other foundation in the circumstances before me on which the Board could conclude that the settlement should be revisited on the basis of bad faith.

Mr. Younger also indicated in his written materials that the representatives of the Ministry on the day the Minutes of Settlement were signed were in conflict of interest for not representing his legal interests at the time, when he should have been able to rely on Ministry counsel’s advice. Although, as a long-service manager, the grievor may well have had a different relationship with the employer’s representatives on other occasions, the fact that the grievor was separately represented that day by experienced counsel is a complete answer to this assertion. In any event, the fact that a different bargain could have been struck, or seems preferable in hindsight, is not a sufficient reason to allow one party to avoid the clear terms of an agreement voluntarily entered into, even if the grievor had not had the independent legal advice that he did prior to signing the Minutes of Settlement in issue here.

In his written submissions to the Board, Mr. Younger refers to the Minutes of Settlement and related procedures as constituting illegal acts contrary to Ontario law and statutory requirements. However, there is nothing in the content of the Minutes of Settlement or the facts surrounding them that convinces me that that is the case. If authority is needed for the idea that the grievor was free to settle all his rights and obligations, including those flowing from statute, on termination of employment, it can be found in Bucyrus Blades v. McKinley and Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal, 2005 CanLII 1491 (ON S.C.D.C.), a decision of the Ontario Divisional Court dated January 24, 2005. The grievor has come to the conclusion that the voluntary retirement was a constructive dismissal in disguise, but this does not assist the viability of his grievance in the face of the clear language of the Minutes of Settlement. The language of the release is more than adequate to cover any claims arising out of a constructive dismissal from employment.

In sum, the Minutes of Settlement prevent the Board from entertaining this grievance.

Is the grievance precluded by Regulation 977?

Employer counsel submits that even without the Minutes of Settlement, this matter should not be permitted to proceed because of the provisions of subsection 31 (4), subparagraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Regulation 977 under the Public Service Act, which provide as follows:

31. …

(4) No grievance shall include a complaint in respect of the following matters:

1. A complaint that a position should be classified.

2. A complaint that a position is in the wrong classification.

3. A complaint relating to a release from employment under subsection 22 (4.1) of the Act.

4. A complaint regarding the method of evaluating an employee’s performance.

5. A complaint regarding the evaluation of an employee’s performance.

6. A complaint regarding the compensation provided or denied to an employee as a result of an evaluation of his or her performance. O. Reg. 59/03, s. 1.

Mr. Boswell submitted on Mr. Younger’s behalf that the employer had failed to conduct his performance review in the manner it should have, which constitutes a breach of his working conditions within the meaning of s. 34(1) of Regulation 977 under The Public Service Act. He maintained that the matter is not precluded by the above-noted subsection 31(4) because the Board is not being asked to evaluate any of the prohibited subjects. Rather, the issue is that the employer failed to follow its own guidelines so that what occurred in the employee’s absence was not a true evaluation. Mr. Boswell argued that previous cases had generally asked for a review of how the grievor had been rated, and that the decision in Tyrrell v. Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, PSGB # 2003-2687, December 7, 2004 (Carter) turned on the procedural question of reconsideration, rather than a rejection on the merits of the argument made in that case that no evaluation had been done.

Employer counsel submits that the attempt to circumvent the above subsection argued by grievor’s counsel is the same as the one tried by the grievors in Tyrell, cited above. Counsel submits that the Board’s decision was very clear, that if a claim deals with the area of pay for performance, the grievor is not entitled to grieve.

There is no doubt that certain aspects of the employer’s pay for performance program are properly considered terms or conditions of a manager’s employment. However, by virtue of subsection 31(4), complaints regarding it are excluded from the grievances over which this Board has jurisdiction, as they are complaints regarding the method (the how, addressed in subparagraph 4 above) of evaluation of the employee’s performance, the evaluation itself (the what or the content of the evaluation, addressed in subparagraph 5 above) and the compensation provided or denied as a result (the fruits of the evaluation, addressed in subparagraph 6 above). It is very clear from the written submissions of the grievor as well as the oral submissions of counsel, that the core of the grievor’s complaint is about how he was evaluated (not in the way it had been done before and as he had expected, after a face-to-face meeting), the content of the evaluation itself (negative, and not giving sufficient recognition to the high quality of his achievement) and the compensation provided or denied as a result of that evaluation (a zero percentage merit award). This is exactly the kind of claim excluded by subsection 31(4) and thus the Board has no authority to deal with it.

Should costs be awarded against the grievor?

As both counsel acknowledge, the Board’s general policy is not to award costs against an unsuccessful litigant except in egregious cases. This has been most recently affirmed in the Board’s June 27, 2007 decision in Charlton and the Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) PSGB #P-2006-0291 (Carter) at page 14. The only case identified by either counsel where costs have been awarded by this Board was Callaghan and the Crown in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Agriculture and Food) PSGB #P/0009/89. In that case, the employer had abolished the grievor’s position during the period in which the hearing concerning that position was going on, without any notice to the grievor or the Board, necessitating a second grievance, with its attendant expense for the grievor, to achieve the result that the Board had ordered in the first grievance. As a matter of remedy in the second proceeding, some of the grievor’s costs were awarded against the employer. Employer counsel submits that the situation here is similar in that Mr. Younger’s action in bringing this grievance has engaged the employer in an additional legal proceeding that it should not have had to defend. The Board is invited to find that this proceeding is abusive in that the grievor has brought a grievance that, as a human resources professional, he should have known was without merit and precluded by both the statute and the Minutes of Settlement. In the same vein, the employer argues, he made serious unfounded allegations against the Ministry and its officials in the written materials filed with this grievance, for which cost consequences would be appropriate.

Grievor’s counsel submits that there was a legitimate issue of interpretation that the grievor needed to have resolved, and the fact that there is an argument to be made counters the idea that this is an abusive or vexatious proceeding. On behalf of the grievor, counsel relies on Daley v. Ministry of Correctional Services, PSGB # 0027/91, (Willes, Agarwal) and Hall v. Ministry of Health, PSGB # 0009/99, (Willes), cases in which costs were not awarded.

Although litigating in the face of a settlement as clear as the one the grievor entered into in this case is something the Board wishes to discourage, the facts before me do not establish that this grievance was brought in bad faith or in an effort to abuse the process. Further, the circumstances are not as compelling as those in Callaghan and are not such as to lead the Board to award costs against an unsuccessful grievor, something for which no precedent was cited.

Although employer counsel also raised the issue of the status of an ex-employee to grieve in a case not involving dismissal, it is not necessary to address that issue, as the grievance fails on both the grounds dealt with above, either of which would have been sufficient to prevent the matter from going forward.

For the above reasons, the grievance is dismissed, but without costs.

Dated at Toronto this 18^th day of July, 2007

Cases Cited in Parties’ Briefs

On behalf of the grievor:

Kanga v. Ministry of Health, PSGB # 0003/85, 20 June 1986 (Simmons, Emrich, Jackson)

Gleason v. Ministry of Transportation, PSGB # 0040/92, 20 February 1998 (Leighton)

McConnell et al. v. Ministry of Transportation, PSGB # 0051/93, 20 February 1998 (Leighton)

McLuhan v. Ministry of Transportation, PSGB # 0053/93, 19 March 2002 (Maeots)

Chyczji v. Ministry of Labour, PSGB # 2002-0003, 4 July 2006 (O’Neil)

Garratt et al. v. Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, PSGB # 2003-1670, 7 May 2005 (O’Neil)

Bucyrus Blades v. McKinley and Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal, 2005 CanLII 1491 (ON S.C.D.C.)

Daley v. Ministry of Correctional Services, PSGB # 0027/91, 18 August 1993 (Willes, Agarwal)

Hall v. Ministry of Health, PSGB # 0009/99, 13 January 2000 (Willes)

On behalf of the employer:

Ted de Boer v. Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, PSGB# P-2005-1033, May10, 2006(O’Neil)

K. Gottwald v. Ministry of Attorney General, PSGB# P/0127/96, March 13, 1998 (Leighton)

Lundie/Lavoir v. Ministry of Solicitor General and Correctional Services, PSGB# P/0090/98, May16, 2000 (Leighton)

Carey v. Ministry of Solicitor General and Correctional Services, PSGB #P/0010/97, February16, 2000 (Leighton)

OPSEU (Young) v. Ministry of the Attorney General, GSB# 2005-2137, January 23, 2004 (Abramsky)

OPSEU (Asselstine) v. Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, GSB# 2005-2137, December 22, 2006 (Carrier)

OPSEU (Harrison et al) v. Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services, GSB# 1164/92, October 21, 1999 (Knopf)

OPSEU (Schaefer) v. Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities, GSB#1839/99, December14, 2001 (Abramsky)

OPSEU (Clarke) v. Ministry of Natural Resources, GSB# 0260/98, March 11, 2003 (Brown)

Re Ottawa Hospital v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, 2002 CanLII 79020 (ON LA), 105 L.A.C. (4th) 134 (Kaplan)

Re Selkirk College v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union, 1996 CanLII 20430 (BC LA), 59 L.A.C. (4th) 14

Re Canada Post Corp v. CUPW, (1993) 36 L.A.C. (4th) 216 (Jolliffe)

Toronto (City) v. Toronto Civic Employees’ Union, Local 416, (2002) 2002 CanLII 79089 (ON LA), 106 L.A.C. (4th) 159 (Luborsky)

Extracts from Sullivan and Driedger on the Constructions of Statutes

R. Dileo v. Metropolitan Toronto Convention Centre, PSGB# P/0001/91, December 19, 1991 (Willes)

Tyrrell v. Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, PSGB# 2003-2687, December 7, 2004(Carter)

Mike Lee v. Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, PSGB# P-2003-2372, March 21, 2006 (Leighton)

Callagahan v. Agriculture and Food, PSGB# p/0009/89, January 10, 1991 and February 4, 1992 (WilIes)

T. Jones v. Ministry of Correctional Services, PSGB# p0012/89, August 24, 1994 (Willes)

Vipari v. Ministry of Community and Social Services, PSGB# P/0033/94, November 14, 1994 (Lynk)

S. McCorkell v. Ministry of Community and Social Services, PSGB# P/0130/96, July 15, 1997 (Leighton)