PAY EQUITY HEARINGS TRIBUNAL

0708-00: Royal Crest Lifecare Group v. Group of Non-Union Employees; Pay Equity Commission; Doreen Lurie; Kadi Nabe

Before: Mary Ellen Cummings, Chair, and Members Margaret Kvetan and Catherine Bickley.

Appearances: Sandra Majic and Donna Spasic for the Applicant; Colleen Montgomery, Bev Rosser, Doreen Lurie and Kadi Nabe for the Respondents; Mandy Warner for the Groups of Employees

Cite as: Royal Crest Lifecare Group (March 16, 2001) 0708-00 (P.E.H.T)

1. Royal Crest Lifecare Group (the employer or the Applicant) has brought an Application with respect to a Review Officer’s Order dated June 21, 2000. Essentially, the Officer concluded that the employer had not made the adjustments required according to the terms of the pay equity plans posted by the employer for its non-union employees at 11 of its facilities. The Officer calculated the amount of the retroactive adjustments she thought owing, having regard to the total of the employer’s payroll in each year, and having regard to the amounts already paid out to unionized staff. The Officer directed that the adjustments be paid out by July 28, 2000, with interest.

2. The Application was filed on July 10, 2000. In order to understand the issues before the panel, we set out the whole of the Applicant’s particulars and remedies sought.

SCHEDULE “A”

The Employer Applicant is requesting a hearing respecting the enclosed June 21, 2000 order of Pay Equity Review Officer, Doreen Lurie, for the following reasons:

1. Ms. Lurie has conducted the investigation of the Applicant’s Pay Equity Plan with nothing

short of subjectivity and prosecutorial malice;

2. Prior to receiving or reviewing any documents which would either confirm or refute that

the Applicant had made appropriate Pay Equity payments to its employees, Ms. Lurie declared that she would render an Order to the Applicant for Pay Equity sums she had pre-determined, in the absence of any evidence;

3. The Pay Equity Review Department failed to conduct a fair and impartial investigation of all

Pay Equity complaints;

4. The Pay Equity Review Department refused to investigate any complaints or to respond to

same by employees of the Applicant who complained about the Commission’s interference with a negotiated and Commission Approved Pay Equity Plan;

5. Ms. Lurie, Ms. Nabe Kadi and the Pay Equity Commission have repeatedly refused to respond

to the Applicant’s innumerable requests for clarification and meetings to effect same throughout the investigations process;

6. Throughout the investigation process, Ms. Lurie, demanded documents unrelated to the

complaint i.e.: non–union employees filed a complaint re: Pay Equity payments and Ms. Lurie and the Commission demanded Pay Equity payment records for unionized employees;

7. Ms. Lurie’s March 9, 2000, Order and the Commission’s subsequent reiteration of that Order

for Royal Crest to submit specific documents within 21 days relating to all unionized Royal Crest employees for the past five years is grossly incongruous with Ms. Lurie’s previous confirmation that Pay Equity for unionized employees is not an issue. The fact that Ms. Lurie took it upon herself to investigate an issue where no complaint had been filed is evidence of her malicious prosecution of the Applicant;

8. The Pay Equity Commission’s Legal Counsel’s correspondence of March 23, 2000, which

reiterates Ms. Lurie’s March 9, 2000 request, specifically notes, in its reference line, that the subject investigation pertains to Royal Crest’s non-union employees. So, although complaints were filed respecting Royal Crest’s Pay Equity Schedule and Plan for its non-union employees and all of the correspondences from the Commission references the Applicant’s non-union employees, the Applicant is ordered to produce documents completely unrelated to non-union employees. That is, the Applicant is ordered to produce documents only related to its unionized employees.

9. Section 16(4) of the Pay Equity Act clearly allows any one to file an objection respecting a

company’s Pay Equity Plan within 30 days of its posting. No such objection respecting Royal Crest’s Pay Equity Plan with its unionized and non-unionized employees was filed within this legislated timeframe. As such, it is most inequitable and unlegislated, for the Pay Equity Commission, six years after the fact, to take issue with our Plan for unionized and/or non-unionized employees. The Commission’s criticism and scrutiny of the Applicant’s Pay Equity Plans, in the absence of a complaint, is even more disconcerting in light of the fact that Review Officer, Rhona Fleming, endorsed these very non-union Pay Equity Plans in 1996. Section 15(8) of the Act explicitly provides for a deemed Commission approval where no objection is filed within the requisite timeframe;

10. Ms. Lurie has conducted covert meetings with a select few employees of the Applicant,

failing to include any employees who filed complaints against the Commission or to investigate their complaints that the Pay Equity Plan the Commission was seeking to impose would have an adverse economic effect upon them;

11. Ms. Lurie has made grievous defamatory and slanderous remarks in public forums to the

Applicant’s employees about the Applicant and its officers. The Applicant has received complaints about Ms. Lurie’s comments and conduct throughout the course of this investigation process.

12. The Commission has failed and/or refused to address or rectify the Applicant’s concerns

regarding Ms. Lurie’s open bias against the Applicant and her partial manner of investigating any complaints;

13. Ms. Lurie and the Pay Equity Commission have refused any meetings wherein the Applicant

could explain the forwarded documents which confirm how and when the Applicant made Pay Equity payments to its employees, according to Approved Pay Equity Plans;

14. The comments and calculation explanations in Ms. Lurie’s attached June 21, 2000, Order

unequivocally confirm that she and/or the Pay Equity Commission failed to review the Applicant’s submitted records proving payment or that she and/or the Commission misinterpreted same;

15. The Applicant’s current Pay Equity Plan for non-union employees is in tandem with industry

standards for the Nursing Home Industry. Adhering to Ms. Lurie’s June 21, 2000 Order would not only upset this standard, but it would create an inequity as this Order does not take into account the requisite job qualifications, job function, skills and ability requirement or responsibility level of the subject employee. Applying Ms. Lurie’s calculations would result in a less qualified employee being compensated more than a more qualified employee. Ms. Lurie’s Order creates inequity where none existed before.

16. On or about July 5, 2000, after failing to secure any complaints from unionized employees re:

pay equity payments, Ms. Lurie and/or the Commission forwarded this Order directly to one of the Applicant’s unionized employees. Ms. Lurie and/or the Commission have taken it upon themselves to forward this June 21, 2000, Order to unionized employees despite the fact that the Order is limited to non-union employees. The malice and unprofessional manner in which the Commission and/or its staff are prosecuting the Applicant, in the absence of any non-compliance with any previously Approved Pay Equity Plans, is reprehensible and has had an adverse impact upon the Applicant.

17. Despite the fact that the Commission received complaints from non-unionized employees

both questioning payments and complaining about the Commission’s interference with a plan that is more equitably favourable to them, and that these complaints were received simultaneously by Ms. Lurie and the Commission, these latter complaints were not even acknowledged until June 14, 2000. In a June 14, 2000 correspondence, a Program Specialist, not a Review Officer, indicated that the Complaint would not be addressed for some six months. It is grossly inequitable that different sides of the same issue or complaints should not be investigated in tandem by the same Review Officer. The patently different deference and commitment given by the Commission to one complainant over another respecting the same issue is grossly subjective and intended to prosecute the Applicant without proof. The Applicant requests that a Tribunal Hearing of this matter be ordered and that such Hearing address all complaints. The Applicant further requests that the Hearing of this matter be adjourned until such time as a review of these complainants concerning the Commission’s interference with negotiated Pay Equity Plans has been conducted.

18. Ms. Lurie and/or the Pay Equity Commission, through its failure and refusal to censure Ms.

Lurie for her outrageous behaviour, have endorsed the public maligning and registering of a grossly biased Order against the Applicant, such as can not be sustained as equitable.

SCHEDULE “B”

The Employer Applicant is requesting a hearing respecting the enclosed June 21, 2000 Order of Pay Equity Review Officer, Doreen Lurie, and the following remedies:

1. Endorsement by the Tribunal Board of the Applicant’s negotiated Pay Equity Plan currently

in place with employees;

2. An Order from the Tribunal Board that any and all future Pay Equity Reviews shall not be

conducted by Ms. Lurie;

3. An Order requiring Ms. Lurie and/or the Pay Equity Commission to immediately forward

the foregoing Order to each of the Applicant’s employees and to further post the Order on the Applicant’s job site in a visible location;

4. Ms. Lurie and the Pay Equity Commission be required to write a written apology, such

apology being subject to the Applicant’s approval, to the Applicant, its officers and employees, including a retraction of any and all mis-statements and defamatory remarks. This apology and retraction shall be forwarded by Ms. Lurie and/or the Pay Equity Commission to each and every employee of the Applicant and shall be posted on the Applicant’s premises in a visible location forthwith.

5. Monetary compensation for intentional and malicious prosecution and damages for

defamation as well as the Applicant’s costs of having to pursue this Tribunal Hearing.

3. Because the Pay Equity Office and employees Doreen Lurie and Kadi Nabe were named as Respondents, they were given notice of the proceedings. By letter dated August 29, 2000, counsel to the Pay Equity Office advised that she wanted to bring a motion seeking the dismissal of the Application on the basis that it failed to make out a prima facie case for the remedies sought; that the remedies sought were not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to order; and that the Pay Equity Office and its employees were not appropriate parties.

4. The motion was heard by the Tribunal on February 9, 2001. The groups of anonymous employees were represented by an agent who chose not to take an active role in this part of the proceedings.

5. Counsel for the Pay Equity Office and its employees submitted that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to dismiss an application for failure to make out a prima facie case was first set out in Peterborough (1991), 2 P.E.R. 86, commencing at paragraph 4:

4 . We have concluded that the Tribunal has the authority to dismiss an application for failure to present a prima facie case. We also conclude that it is appropriate to dismiss this application on that basis. Our reasons for both conclusions follow below.

5. We first examine whether the opportunity to call oral evidence is a necessary component of a "hearing" within the meaning of paragraph 25(1)(b) of the Act, since if it is, we could not dismiss on the basis of the pleadings.

6. On a motion for dismissal on the basis of failure to make out a prima facie case, a tribunal must decide whether the applicant has made out a case on the face of the written material filed as the application. For this purpose, the applicant is permitted to make its best case by treating everything it has alleged as if it were true. A failure to establish a prima facie case means that even if the applicant could prove all its allegations, the tribunal could do nothing for it because the facts alleged do not constitute a violation of the relevant statute. If the applicant's best case does not provide the basis for a remedy, the application is dismissed; if it would provide a basis for a remedy, however, the assumption of truth is forgotten: the case proceeds to permit the applicant to prove its allegations and the respondent to respond to them.

7. An applicant must make out a set of circumstances which, if proved, the Tribunal can rectify in the manner requested by the applicant. There are times when the applicant may make out a case which could be rectified by the Tribunal, but does not provide sufficient information for the respondent to answer the case fully; then the Tribunal might order the applicant to provide further particulars about the circumstances underlying its claim. But such cases must be distinguished from those in which it is clear on the material filed by the applicant that the Tribunal could not rectify the circumstances set out by the applicant in the manner requested; then there is no point in proceeding: hence the authority to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case.

8. Counsel for the Commission and its employees submitted that accepting all of the employer’s allegations as true, they do not make out a violation of the Pay Equity Act (the Act). Even if the conduct complained of constituted a violation of the Act, the Tribunal would decline to hear any evidence about it because the Tribunal has consistently held that the de novo hearing provided by the Tribunal remedies any concern about the process at Review Services. The Tribunal’s consistent practice is summarized in City of Brampton (No.2) (1995), 6 P.E.R 10 at paragraph 39:

Even if the facts did support a finding that the process followed by the Review Officer was contrary to the statute, this Tribunal would not have heard evidence on that issue. Tribunal jurisprudence has established that the process at Review Services, and the conduct of the Review Officer, are not issues relevant to proceedings by hearing de novo before the Tribunal: Cybermedix Health Services Ltd. (1990), 1 P.E.R. 41; New Liskeard Police Association (No.1) (1990), 2 P.E.R. 39; Brampton Public Library Board (1993) 4 P.E.R. 81. The Tribunal adopted this approach in its rulings on January 4, 1995.

7. Further, counsel for the Pay Equity Office pointed out that even if the Tribunal were prepared to hear the evidence, none of the relief sought falls within the Tribunal’s remedial ambit, as set out in section 25(2) of the Act:

25.(2) Orders. The Hearings Tribunal shall decide the issue that is before it for a hearing and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, the Hearings Tribunal,

(a) where it finds that an employer or a bargaining agent has failed to comply with Part II, III.1 or III.2, may order that a review officer prepare a pay equity plan for the employer's establishment and that the employer and the bargaining agent, if any, or either of them, pay all of the costs of preparing the plan;

(b) where it finds that an employer has contravened subsection 9 (2) by dismissing, suspending or otherwise penalizing an employee, may order the employer to reinstate the employee, restore the employee's compensation to the same level as before the contravention and pay the employee the amount of all compensation lost because of the contravention;

(c) where it finds that an employer has contravened subsection 9 (1) by reducing compensation, or has failed to make an adjustment in accordance with subsection 21.2(2), may order the employer to adjust the compensation of all employees affected to the rate to which they would have been entitled but for the reduction in compensation and to pay compensation equal to the amount lost because of the reduction;

(d) may confirm, vary or revoke orders of review officers;

(e) may, for the female job class that is the subject of the complaint or reference, order adjustments in compensation in order to achieve pay equity, where the Hearings Tribunal finds that there has been a contravention of subsection 7(1);

(e.1) may determine whether a sale of a business has occurred;

(f) may order that the pay equity plan be revised in such manner as the Hearings Tribunal considers appropriate, where it finds that the plan is not appropriate for the female job class that is the subject of the complaint or reference because there has been a change of circumstances in the establishment; and

g) may order a party to a proceeding to take such action or refrain from such action as in the opinion of the Hearings Tribunal is required in the circumstances. R.S.O. 1990, c.P.7,s.25(2); 1993, c.4, s.15(2-4).

8. The remedial provisions, counsel argued, anticipate that the Tribunal will look to the substantive issues in dispute between workplace parties, not to the conduct of Review Officers and other employees of the Pay Equity Office. The Tribunal, counsel submitted, simply does not have jurisdiction to order the Pay Equity Office to issue an apology; or to order compensation for malicious prosecution or defamation.

9. Counsel also submitted that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to hold a hearing where the issues sought to be litigated related to the conduct of the Officer and not the merits of an order. Counsel noted that section 25(1) sets out the circumstances in which the Tribunal will hold a hearing:

25 (1) The Hearings Tribunal shall hold a hearing,

(a) if a review officer is unable to effect a settlement of a complaint and has not made an Order under subsection 24(3)

(b) if a request for a hearing, as described in subsection 23(4) or 24(6), is received by the Hearings Tribunal; or

(c) if a review officer refers a matter to the Hearings tribunal under subsection 24(5).

10. Clearly, 25(1)(a) and (c) do not apply; the Review Officer has issued an Order and the Review Officer did not refer the matter to the Tribunal. The operation of section 25(1)(b) counsel submitted, requires that the request relate to section 23(4) or 24(6). Section 23(4) governs situations in which the Officer has made a decision that the complaint is either trivial, frivolous, vexatious or outside the jurisdiction of the Commission, and the complainant seeks a hearing with respect to that decision.

Section 24(6) provides:

An employer or bargaining agent named in an order under this section may request a hearing before the Hearings Tribunal with respect to the order, and, where the order was made following a complaint but the complaint has not been settled, the complainant may also request a hearing.

11. The Application of the employer in this case, counsel for the Pay Equity Office concluded, was not made “with respect to the order”, but rather with respect to the alleged conduct of the Officer leading up to the Order. Counsel reminded the Tribunal that the employer has sought no relief with respect to the substance of the Order, nor has the employer made any allegations or set out any material facts that relate to the substance of the Order.

12. In summary, the Office submitted that the Tribunal ought to dismiss the Application because it fails to make out a prima facie case; because the remedies sought are outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; and the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to hold a hearing with respect to the allegations made because the Application does not relate to the substance of the Order.

13. In the alternative, the Pay Equity Office submitted that neither it nor its employees are proper parties to a workplace dispute about a pay equity plan, because the Office does not have a “substantial interest” in the outcome of the proceedings, the test the Tribunal has long used in determining who should be a party to a proceeding. In the further alternative, counsel for the Pay Equity Office submitted that the allegations with respect to Ms. Lurie and Ms. Nabe should be struck.

14. Counsel for the employer urged the panel not to interpret the Act in such a manner as to give impunity to the conduct of the Review Officer. The employer alleges that it prepared a plan in 1996, with the assistance of another Review Officer, and that it has complied with that plan. The employer vigorously denies the Officer’s conclusion that it has not paid out the pay equity adjustments required for its non-union employees.

15. Counsel for the employer submitted that section 23 and 34(2) require Officers to investigate complaints:

23.(1) Investigation of complaints. Subject to subsection (2), when the Commission receives a complaint, a review officer shall investigate the complaint and may endeavour to effect a settlement.

23.(2) Idem. The review officer shall notify the parties and the Hearings Tribunal as soon as he or she decides that a settlement cannot be effected and that he or she will not be making an Order under subsection 24(3).

23.(3) Decision to not deal with complaint. A review officer may decide that a complaint should not be considered if the review officer is of the opinion that,

(a) the subject-matter of the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith; or

(b) the complaint is not within the jurisdiction of the Commission.

23.(4) Hearing before Tribunal. The review officer shall notify the complainant of his or her decision under subsection (3) and the complainant may request a hearing before the Hearings Tribunal with respect to the decision. R.S.O. 1990, c.P.7, s.23.

34.(2) Review officers, duties. Review officers shall monitor the preparation and

implementation of pay equity plans, shall investigate objections and complaints filed with the

Commission, may attempt to effect settlements and shall take such other action as is set out in

this Act or in an order of the Hearings Tribunal.

16. Counsel for the employer alleges that a number of employees have filed complaints taking issue with the Officer’s Order, and the Pay Equity Office has refused to investigate those complaints. Counsel submitted that this Order ought to be suspended and any hearing into this matter adjourned until the Office has completed its investigation into the other complaints.

17. Counsel also submitted that the Pay Equity Office and its employees have violated section 9(2) of the Act:

9.(2) Intimidation prohibited. No employer, employee or bargaining agent and no one acting on behalf of an employer, employee or bargaining agent shall intimidate, coerce or penalize, or discriminate against, a person,

(a) because the person may participate, or is participating, in a proceeding under this Act;

(b) because the person has made, or may make, a disclosure required in a proceeding under this Act;

(c) because the person is exercising, or may exercise, any right under this Act; or

(d) because the person has acted or may act in compliance with this Act, the regulations or an order made under this Act or has sought or may seek the enforcement of this Act, the regulations or an order made under this Act.

18. Counsel argued that the Pay Equity Office, acting on behalf of some of the employer’s employees, has coerced, intimidated and penalized the employer by maliciously prosecuting it through this proceeding. The employer’s counsel did not elaborate on what protected activity the employer was engaging in that would bring the matter within section 9(2).

19. Counsel considered it “ridiculous” for the Pay Equity Office to submit that the Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to deal with outrageous behaviour. Counsel indicated that while the employer wanted to deal with the substance of the Order, it did not believe that the Pay Equity Office’s conduct could be allowed to pass without remark or censure.

20. The representative of the groups of anonymous employees disputed the employer’s assertion that adjustments had been paid.

Decision

21. The Tribunal, as early as its first decision in Cybermedix (above), signalled that since hearings before the Tribunal are de novo, it is inappropriate and unnecessary to hear evidence about the process or conduct of the Pay Equity Office. A de novo hearing gives the workplace parties a full opportunity to present all evidence and make full submissions on the issues that were placed before the Review Officer. Parties are not limited to the submissions or information they put before the Review Officer. And the Tribunal neither receives nor reviews the information that the Review Officer considered, unless one of the workplace parties seeks to introduce it.

22. The Tribunal has consistently held that a de novo hearing provides a complete remedy to any frailties in the process undertaken by Review Officers, with the result that there is nothing to be gained by an inquiry into alleged inadequacies in the investigation.

23. As counsel for the Pay Equity Office outlined, the very structure of the Act and the description of the circumstances in which the Tribunal will hold a hearing and the remedies it can award, all point to a scheme that envisions the Tribunal focusing on the substantive disputes between workplace parties.

24. The remedial powers in section 25(2) are entirely devoted to addressing substantive issues. The Tribunal can order reinstatement of employees; adjust compensation; determine if a sale of business occurred; order the revision of a pay equity plan; and generally, confirm, vary or revoke the orders made by Officers. Nowhere does the Act give the Tribunal the power to censure the conduct of Review Officers.

25. Further, as counsel for the Pay Equity Office noted, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hold a hearing is set out in section 25(1). That provision determines the circumstances in which the Tribunal can hold a hearing. The only subsection potentially relevant to these proceedings is 25(1)(b), which, in turn, requires a consideration of section 24(6). As set out above, section 24(6) envisions that a request for a hearing is made “…with respect to the order”.

26. The Tribunal concludes then, that its jurisdiction to hold a hearing requires that a request for hearing is made “…with respect to the order” and that its remedial powers are pointed towards addressing substantive pay equity issues. That legislative structure influenced the Tribunal in its determination that hearings before it would be de novo. The proceedings should focus only on the substantive pay equity disputes between the parties.

27. Turning now to an examination of the employer’s Application, and specifically its statement of particulars, and remedies sought, the Panel concludes that all of the particulars alleged focus on the conduct of the Pay Equity Office. It must be remembered that the Order in issue directed the employer to make pay equity adjustments in accordance with its posted plans. None of the employer’s particulars in its Application were made “with respect to the order” as required in section 24(6). None of the employer’s particulars address that substantive issue, but instead complain vigorously about the quality of the investigation, and general unfairness. Equally important, the employer has not sought remedies “with respect to the order”.

28. Having regard to the whole of the Application, the Panel concludes that the employer has failed to make out a prima facie case. The employer has not pleaded particulars that are within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider or remedy. Further, having regard to the Tribunal’s longstanding practice of conducting de novo hearings, there would be no practical purpose served by enquiring into the Pay Equity Office’s conduct. This Application is dismissed. Of course, the employer is free to file a proper application, and the Pay Equity Office is free to refer the matter to the Tribunal in the event the employer fails to comply with its Order.

29. Having concluded that the Tribunal will not inquire into the allegations made about the Pay Equity Office does not necessarily mean that the employer is without remedy. Parties have traditionally used the Judicial Review Procedure Act R.S.O. 1990 CJ1, as amended to seek the enforcement of public duties. In Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre [1999] O.O.H.S.A.D. No. 290 (application for judicial review pending) the Ontario Labour Relations Board considered whether it had jurisdiction, pursuant to its remedial powers in the Occupational Health and Safety Act, to order Ministry of Labour inspectors to carry out inspections in jails. The Board wrote:

30. At its most basic, the Act is about establishing safe workplace practices. It places obligations on persons and entities who can have an impact on workplace safety, including workers, joint health and safety committees, employers, contractors. The role of the inspector, at its most basic, is to make determinations about whether those persons and entities are meeting their obligations, and if they are not, to encourage or require compliance. Inspectors have a range of options (some mandatory and some discretionary) to achieve those goals. The scheme of the Act is not concerned with "policing" the actions or non-actions of inspectors and the Ministry. While the conduct of the inspector will often be an issue in an appeal under section 61, the inspector is relevant only to the extent necessary to illuminate the adjudication of the workplace dispute. For example, parties can bring appeals only with respect to issues brought to the attention of the inspector. Parties can appeal only orders made (or failed to be made) by an inspector; they cannot appeal advice or counsel provided by an inspector.

31. The focus of an appeal under section 61 is always the substantive workplace health and safety concern, not how the inspector investigated (or failed to investigate). That is not to say that the inspector's conduct is not critical to the enforcement of the Act. However, I am satisfied that another forum, not a section 61 appeal, is more appropriate for enforcing, what are essentially public duties. The Judicial Review Procedure Act permits the bringing of an application for judicial review, seeking a remedy in the nature of mandamus. An order in the nature of mandamus is the typical means used to compel the performance of a public duty. I note that in this case, OPSEU has brought an application for judicial review seeking an order in the nature of mandamus. Without, of course, commenting upon whether such a remedy should issue, I am satisfied that the Divisional Court is the more appropriate forum to litigate the manner in which the inspectors are carrying out their duties pursuant to section 43.

32. We are, similarly, not commenting on whether the Divisional Court should issue a remedy with respect to the conduct complained of. We want only to answer the employer’s submission that the alleged conduct should not go without censure. In our view, the Tribunal is not the appropriate forum for enforcing the Review Officers’ public duties, but there is another forum potentially available.

Dated at Toronto, Ontario, this 16th day of March, 2001.

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Mary Ellen Cummings, Chair

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Margaret Kvetan, Member

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Catherine Bickley, Member