PAY EQUITY HEARINGS TRIBUNAL

0503-94 National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Canada (CAW-Canada) and Local 397, Applicants and TRW Canada Limited, Transportation Electronics Division, Respondents

0510-94 TRW Canada Limited, Transportation Electronics Division, Applicant and Canadian Auto Workers, Respondent

Before: Katherine Laird, Vice Chair and Members Charles Taccone and Bruce Budd

Appearances: M. Failes, M. Layton, G. Male and G. Gallant for TRW Canada Limited, Transportation Electronics Division and TRW Canada Limited; C. Gilbert, S. Ross, D. Webster, L. Squires and D. Anderson for CAW-Canada and Local 397

Cite as: TRW Canada Limited (October 19, 1995) 0503-94; 0510-94 (P.E.H.T.)

DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL, OCTOBER 19, 1995

[1]. The Tribunal has received and reviewed correspondence from the parties advising the panel that all outstanding matters have been resolved in these two applications.

[2]. In a letter dated August 21, 1995, counsel for TRW Canada Limited, requests that application of TRW Canada Limited, Transportation Electronics Division be withdrawn and the Review Officer Order, dated March 9, 1994, be amended in accordance with an attached document entitled REQUESTED ORDER . Also enclosed in the letter is an AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS outlining the basis for the requested variation in the Order. Counsel further advises the Tribunal that TRW Canada Limited is consenting to the request of CAW-Canada and Local 397 for leave to withdraw its application.

[3]. In a letter dated August 31, 1995, counsel for CAW-Canada and Local 397 confirms that it is seeking leave to withdraw its application and is consenting to the withdrawal of the TRW Canada Limited application and the requested variation in the Review Officer Order.

[4]. In Glengarry Industries Limited (1992) 3 P.E.R. 27 at 28, the Tribunal established guidelines with respect to consent orders as follows:

In our view, before the Tribunal can issue what amounts to a consent order, we must have jurisdiction to make the order, and be satisfied that the order sought is within the discretion of the Tribunal to make, in the sense that a contrary result is not dictated by the Act. We must also be satisfied, based on sufficient evidence, that the order would not result in non-compliance with, or a contravention of the Act. We would require an agreed statement of fact, and documentary evidence, if necessary, upon which we can base a decision.

[5]. It appears from the materials filed that the order sought would be within our jurisdiction and not in contravention of the statute. However, we note that the Tribunal has declined to issue consent orders where it finds that it does not have sufficient information as to the basis on which the parties reached certain conclusions: de Havilland (1993), 4 P.E.R. 1; Prescott Police Services Board (1993), 4 P.E.R. 14. In the present case, the panel has heard no evidence on the substance of the issues in dispute. We do not find the materials filed in support of the agreed terms of settlement sufficient in themselves to answer all pertinent questions which the Tribunal could reasonably have. It would probably be necessary for the panel to hear evidence to resolve these questions satisfactorily.

[6]. Moreover, the need for consent orders incorporating settlement agreements has been affected by 1993 amendments to the Pay Equity Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 7) Pursuant to s. 25.1, settlements in writing of matters pending before the Tribunal are now binding on the parties. Where there is a bargaining unit, such settlements bind the represented employees. If a settlement agreement is not complied with, an application for enforcement may be made to the Tribunal.

[7]. In the circumstances, we decline to issue the requested order.