The United Steelworkers of America, Local 6976 v. Glengarry Industries Ltd.
0325-92 The United Steelworkers of America, Local 6976, Applicant v. Glengarry Industries Ltd., Respondent
Before: Raphael Palumbo, Vice-Chair; Susan Genge and Donald Dudar, Members
Appearances: Paula Turtle, Sue Milling and Tom Reid for the Applicant; No one appearing for the Respondent
Cite As: Glengarry Industries Ltd. (1992), 3 P.E.R. 27
Practice and Procedure - Consent Orders
The Tribunal will issue what is in effect a consent order where it is satisfied that it has the jurisdiction to make the order sought, a contrary result is not dictated by the Act, and where it is satisfied that the order would not result in the non-compliance or contravention of the Act. The Tribunal will require an agreed statement of fact and, if necessary, documentary evidence upon which to base its decision.
Pratique et procédure - Ordonnances de consentement
Le Tribunal prononcera ce qui est de fait une ordonnance de consentement s'il est convaincu qu'il a compétence pour rendre l'ordonnance demandée, si la Loi ne dicte pas un résultat différent et s'il est convaincu que l'ordonnance n'aboutira pas à la non-conformité à la Loi ou la violation de la Loi. Le Tribunal fondera sadécisionsur une déclarationde fait établie d'uncommun accord et, le cas échéant, sur des preuves documentaires.
DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL, JUNE 1, 1992
- These proceedings arose out of an Application made pursuant to subsection 24(6) of the Pay Equity Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7 (the "Act") which provides as follows:
(6) An employer or bargaining agent named in an order under this section may request a hearing before the Hearings Tribunal with respect to the order, and, where the order was made following a complaint but the complaint has not been settled, the complainant may also request a hearing.
1The Application was with respect to an Order of Review Services dated January 13, 1992. The order stated:
2After the Application was filed with the Tribunal, both parties sought to have the Review Officer's order varied. They requested that the second sentence be deleted. They also requested that the reference to the "modified" SES system be deleted and replaced with a reference to the SES system.
3Pursuant to subsection 25(1)(b) of the Act the Tribunal must hold a hearing where a request for a hearing is made under subsection 24 (6). In this case, therefore, the Tribunal scheduled a hearing which the Applicant attended.
4At the hearing we gave an oral decision which we now set out in writing:
Iherebyorder the parties to use the agreedto modifiedSES systemas the gender-neutral job evaluation system. All costs for the system are to be shared equally by both parties.
Based upon the joint request of the parties, their written agreement dated April 21, 1992, which was entered into evidence, and the submissions of counsel, the Review Officer's order of January 13, 1992 is varied as follows:
(i) the order requiring that all costs for the SES system must be shared equally by both parties is to be deleted; and
(ii) the parties are to utilize the SES system.
1 In this case, the parties jointly requested that the Tribunal vary the Review Officer's Order. They executed a written agreement which outlined their joint obligations in regard to the gender neutral comparison system, and the amendments to the order they were seeking. The parties filed their written agreement and jointrequesttovarytheorderwiththeTribunal. Furthermore, the order the parties sought was one which the Tribunal in its discretion could make. In these circumstances, it would have been appropriate to process the application in a manner which would have avoided the delay and expense of requiring the parties to attend personally at a hearing of the Tribunal, while still complying with subsection 25(1)(b) of the Act. That is,thisapplicationcouldhavebeen dealt with by way of written submissions to the Tribunal without the necessity of an oral hearing.
2 In our view, before the Tribunal can issue what amounts to a consent order, we must have jurisdiction to make the order, and be satisfied that the order sought is within the discretion of the Tribunal to make, in the sense that a contrary result is not dictatedbythe Act. We must also be satisfied, based on sufficient evidence,thattheorderwouldnotresult innon-compliancewith, or acontraventionof, the Act. We would require an agreed statement of fact, and documentary evidence, if necessary, upon which we can base a decision.
3 The process of proceeding with a hearing based on written submissions and documentation would allow the Tribunal to deal with this type of application in an expeditious manner. We must caution, however,thatwhereinsufficientevidenceisprovidedtotheTribunal, or whereothercircumstancesdemand that an oral hearing be held, the Tribunal will schedule a hearing in the usual course.