Administrative Law - ONSCDC

The applicant, a municipal councillor, brought a motion to exclude specified material from the record of proceedings filed by the respondents in her underlying application for judicial review.

The judicial review application challenged the Integrity Commissioner's finding that the applicant breached the municipality's code of conduct and the municipal council's subsequent decision to suspend her pay for 90 days.

The applicant argued the Integrity Commissioner did not exercise a statutory power of decision and that the material was irrelevant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the Integrity Commissioner did exercise a statutory power of decision and that the targeted material was relevant to the procedural fairness and bias issues raised by the applicant herself.

The moving party sought to review a judge's direction refusing to schedule a motion to extend the time for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner decision.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering dismissing the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process due to the moving party's lengthy, unexplained delay and failure to comply with previous court orders.

Finding that the moving party failed to adequately explain the delay or demonstrate arguable merit in the underlying application, the court dismissed the motion to review.

The moving party, a crypto asset trading platform, sought a stay of an Investigation Order and Summons issued by the Ontario Securities Commission pending judicial review.

The moving party argued the summons was overbroad, an abuse of process, and violated section 8 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, applying the RJR-MacDonald test.

The court found no serious issue to be tried, noting the reduced expectation of privacy in regulated business records, and concluded the moving party failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) applied for judicial review of a Coroner's preliminary ruling in an inquest into a fatal helicopter crash.

The Coroner had ordered the disclosure of certain aggregate and specific information about witness statements obtained during the TSB's investigation.

The TSB argued this information was protected by the statutory privilege in s. 30 of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act (CTSA).

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding the Coroner's decision unreasonable as it conflicted with the broad statutory privilege and the mandatory procedure for disclosure under s. 30(5) of the CTSA.

The appellant municipality appealed a Drainage Referee's order denying it costs and sought a declaration that a referee who conducts a pre-hearing cannot preside at the hearing.

The respondent landowners cross-appealed the Referee's finding that a proposed drainage project was an 'improvement' under the Drainage Act rather than a new drainage works requiring a petition.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the costs award and holding that a declaration was unnecessary given existing rules.

The cross-appeal was also dismissed, as the Referee correctly distinguished prior case law and made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the project was an improvement despite an increase in capacity.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Licence Appeal Tribunal regarding statutory accident benefits.

In the first appeal, the appellant argued that an adjudicator reconsidering their own decision violated procedural fairness.

In the second appeal, the appellant argued that the Tribunal's withdrawal of a decision mistakenly rendered by an adjudicator who did not hear the oral evidence created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed both appeals, finding that the Tribunal's reconsideration process is procedurally fair and that correcting an administrative error by withdrawing the mistaken decision and having the correct adjudicator issue a new one cured any procedural defect without raising a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the College of Physicians and Surgeons' Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) ordering him to undergo a second specified continuous education or remediation program (SCERP) for ongoing medical record-keeping deficiencies.

The applicant argued the decision was an abuse of process and unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no abuse of process despite a minor procedural fairness breach, and held that the ICRC's decision to escalate remediation was a reasonable and proportionate response to the applicant's persistent record-keeping issues.

The applicant sought an urgent judicial review of a decision by a voluntary association suspending him from its executive committee.

The court noted that judicial review is only available for exercises of state authority of a public character.

Finding that the court likely lacks jurisdiction over a non-government voluntary association, the court stayed the application and directed the registrar to issue a notice under Rule 2.1.01, giving the applicant an opportunity to explain why the application should not be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The applicant sought judicial review of a supplementary award by a Board of Arbitration that granted improved vacation benefits for part-time nurses.

The original award had increased vacation entitlements for full-time nurses but was silent on part-time nurses.

The Board issued a supplementary award, stating the omission was an oversight and rejecting the applicant's argument that it was functus officio.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision that it was not functus officio was reasonable, as the omission was an error in expressing the manifest intention of the Board and the Board remained seized of the implementation of the award under the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act.

The respondents in an appeal brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence regarding subsequent actions the Township proposed to take to remedy inconsistencies in its zoning by-laws.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the potential remedial work by the Township would not assist in interpreting the by-law under review.

The court held that the proposed evidence did not meet the test for fresh evidence, as it was not necessary to deal fairly with the issues on appeal and declining to admit it would not lead to a substantial injustice.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing his discrimination complaint against his former employer for failing to file within the one-year limitation period.

The applicant argued his delay was caused by a severe crack cocaine addiction.

The HRTO dismissed the application because the applicant failed to provide medical evidence establishing a causal link between his disability and his inability to file on time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the judicial review, finding the HRTO's requirement for medical evidence and its procedure were both reasonable and fair.

The appellants appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board evicting them as unauthorized occupants.

The Divisional Court found that the Board denied the appellants natural justice by refusing to consider their position that they resided on the premises based on an agreement with the landlord, not as tenants or unauthorized occupants.

The Board erred in law by ordering their eviction without any evidentiary basis under section 100 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing was ordered.

The applicants sought judicial review of an interlocutory ruling made by a coroner at the outset of an inquest into a police shooting.

The ruling limited the scope of cross-examination of two police officers regarding their consultations with counsel prior to making their notes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application on the basis of prematurity, holding that courts should not intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings, particularly coroner's inquests, absent exceptional circumstances that would result in a fundamental failing of justice.

The applicant, a police officer, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his appeal for delay.

The appeal was from a disciplinary decision of the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.

The applicant failed to perfect the appeal and did not respond to the respondent's inquiries.

The court applied the four factors for setting aside a dismissal order and found that the applicant failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay, did not act inadvertently, failed to move promptly to set aside the order, and that the merits of the appeal were highly questionable.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant physician brought a motion to stay the proceedings of a Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons pending the outcome of an application for judicial review.

The discipline hearing concerned allegations of sexual misconduct involving a former patient.

The court applied the RJR-Macdonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be determined, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in allowing the self-regulating profession to proceed with its disciplinary hearing without premature judicial intervention.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision dismissing its grievance regarding post-65 retirement benefits under a collective agreement following municipal amalgamation.

The union argued the arbitrator unreasonably rejected extrinsic evidence and misinterpreted a grand-parenting clause.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's conclusions on both the extrinsic evidence and the interpretation of the eligibility requirements were reasonable.

The applicant, a manager of a hazardous waste facility, sought judicial review of a justice of the peace's order compelling him to submit to an interview and produce documents under s. 163.1(2) of the Environmental Protection Act.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the order, finding that the statutory provision authorizes investigators to use devices and techniques but does not explicitly confer the power to compel third parties to answer questions or produce documents.

The Law Society of Upper Canada appealed a decision of its Appeal Panel restoring the membership of a former judge who had resigned following findings of serious sexual misconduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Appeal Panel's findings that the Hearing Panel erred in applying the enhanced 'Bernstein' standard of proof and in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to impose conditions on a restored licence.

The Court confirmed that the standard of proof for restoration is a simple balance of probabilities, the burden of proof lies on the applicant, and the Law Society has broad jurisdiction to impose conditions on a restored licence to protect the public interest.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Racing Commission finding him liable for a strict liability drug offence involving a racehorse.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and quashed the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission failed to identify any evidence that the applicant's conduct fell below a reasonable standard of care.

The court noted that the Commission appeared to have improperly applied a standard of absolute liability rather than strict liability.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Board of Arbitration decision finding it had discriminated against a unionized security officer.

The employer had stopped offering the employee temporary management shifts after she attended a union convention.

The Divisional Court applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determining the standard of review was patent unreasonableness.

The Court found the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement's anti-discrimination clause was logical and rational.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.