Court File and Parties
CITATION: Edwards v. Zenith Insurance Company 2026 ONSC 806
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 970/25
DATE: 20260210
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
DIVISIONAL COURT
RE: Richann Edwards, Applicant
- and -
Zenith Insurance Company and The Licence Appeal Tribunal, Respondents
BEFORE: L. Brownstone J.
COUNSEL: Kenneth Chiupka and Zaid Shams, for the Applicant Kevin S Adams and Laura Bruce, for the respondent Zurich Insurance Company Sabrina Fiacco, for The Licence Appeal Tribunal
HEARD: In writing
Endorsement
[1] On January 14, 2026, I directed the registrar to give notice to the applicant in Form 2.1A that the court is considering making an order under r. 2.1.01(2). The registrar provided that notice and invited written submissions from the applicant as to why the proceeding should not be dismissed.
[2] Having received and considered those submission, I have determined, for the following reasons, that the claim should be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.
[3] The applicant applied for judicial review of a decision of the respondent Licence Appeal Tribunal that granted a three-month adjournment to the respondent Zurich Insurance Company. Counsel for Zurich who previously had carriage of the file had recently terminated his employment, and new counsel required time to familiarize itself with the case. The applicant opposed the adjournment request.
[4] In reasons dated November 10, 2025, the tribunal granted the request and adjourned the hearing to a date to be canvassed with the parties between January 5 and February 23, 2026. The hearing was scheduled to recommence February 9, 2026.
[5] On December 19, 2025, the applicant’s application for judicial review of the interim order granting the adjournment request was issued. The case management directions, which were provided to the parties with the r. 2.1 notice, set out the following concerns for the applicant to address in its r. 2.1 submissions:
The decision the applicant seeks to review is an interim decision of the Tribunal. The Tribunal process is ongoing, with resumed hearing dates scheduled for February 2026.
Absent exceptional circumstances, the court will not intervene on judicial review in an ongoing administrative proceeding.
There do not appear to be any exceptional circumstances that would warrant the court’s intervention at this stage of the Tribunal’s proceeding.
If the applicant is ultimately unsuccessful before the Tribunal, it will remain open to him to seek judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision and to raise the procedural orders in that application.
[6] Rule 2.1.01(1) provides as follows:
The court may, on its own initiative, stay or dismiss a proceeding if the proceeding appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
[7] This rule is not for “close calls”. The jurisprudence is clear that the rule is a blunt instrument. The frivolous, vexations, or abusive nature of the proceeding should be apparent on the face of the proceeding: Tewari v. Sekhorn, 2024 ONCA 123 at para. 5. The rule allows the motion judge to perform a gatekeeping function. It is to be robustly applied to weed out, in a summary manner, litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process: Scaduto v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733 at paras. 8 and 12.
[8] The applicant concedes that the matter is moot and that the adjourned hearing is recommencing February 9, 2026. She acknowledges that it is only in exceptional circumstances that the Divisional Court will entertain a review of an interlocutory ruling. The applicant submits this is such a case, because the tribunal did not consider or acknowledge her arguments, did not consider her competing interests, and did not require affidavit evidence from Zurich in support of its adjournment request.
[9] In support of her argument, the applicant relies on AIG Insurance Company v. Riddell, 2025 ONSC 1979. In Riddell, the tribunal refused an adjournment request, despite both counsel being unavailable to proceed. The court found that the tribunal’s actions warranted intervention by the court. The court noted, however, that:
This court rarely reviews an interlocutory order of an administrative tribunal, in this case,
an order denying an adjournment request. Administrative tribunals have broad authority to regulate their own schedules, and the strong policy reasons underlying the principle of prematurity have obvious application when it comes to matters of scheduling: the orderly processing of administrative decision making would be prejudiced if this court was to start micro-managing scheduling issues: [citations omitted].
[10] The situation in Riddell is markedly different from that before the court here. In the case before me, the tribunal granted an adjournment request to a date upon which all counsel are available and able to continue. The result of Riddell was to stay the decision refusing the adjournment, vacate the imminent hearing dates, and require the tribunal to schedule the hearing on dates available to the parties and their counsel. In the case before me, the adjournment has already occurred. The matter has resumed before the tribunal. The only prejudice the applicant referred to, that the matter would be delayed until the summer of 2026, did not materialize. The matter is being heard in early February. Even if there were exceptional circumstances warranting interim intervention, which are not apparent on the record, this court can provide no practical relief.
[11] The applicant argues that despite the matter being moot, the court should hear the application because the situation is “capable of repetition, yet evasive of review”. Therefore, under the principles established in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989 123 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 342, 57 D.L.R. (4th) 231, the court should exercise its discretion to hear the matter. The result will be that the tribunal will be more careful with adjournment decisions in the future.
[12] I do not agree. The question is not whether the ruling with which the applicant takes issue can be reviewed. The issue is simply when it can be reviewed. Procedural rulings can form part of any review that the applicant may ultimately bring. The ruling is not evasive of review, rather, the appropriate time for its review is at the conclusion of the hearing.
[13] The application is premature and, as conceded by the applicant, can also be considered moot. If the applicant is dissatisfied with the results of the tribunal’s proceeding, she can apply for judicial review of the tribunal’s final decision. Any procedural complaints may form part of that application.
[14] The application is dismissed. The dismissal is without prejudice to the applicant’s ability to raise the procedural issue raised in the application in any application for judicial review or appeal she may bring after the conclusion of the tribunal’s hearing.
Brownstone J.
Date: February 10, 2026