CITATION: Freedman v. FRO (for the Benefit of Rashell Freedman), 2026 ONSC 787
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-1703
DATE: 20260210
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Fitzpatrick, O’Brien, Tranquilli JJ
BETWEEN:
GORDON FREEDMAN
Appellant
– and –
THE FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY OFFICE (FOR THE BENEFIT OF RASHELL FREEDMAN)
Respondent
J. Schuman, J. Valliere, R. Weitz, for the Appellant
R. Kako, H. Puchala and S. Tripodi (Student-at-Law), for the Respondent
HEARD January 23, 2026 at Oshawa
Fitzpatrick J.
[1] On January 23, 2026, the Court gave the following decision:
For written reasons to follow, the Appeal of the order of Krause J. dated September 30, 2025 and the motion by Gordon Freedman to introduce fresh evidence on this appeal are dismissed with costs. Costs of today are payable forthwith by Mr. Freedman to the Director of the Family Responsibility Office in the amount of $20,000.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements. The Court further directs the director of Court Operations or such other person having responsibility for the issuance of warrants of committal from the Family Court, Superior Court of Justice at Barrie, Ontario to reissue the warrant of committal issued by Krause J. on September 30, 2025 in respect of Gordon Freedman. For greater clarity, the stay of the warrant of committal at issue is hereby lifted.
[2] Here are the written reasons referred to above.
[3] The Appellant, Gordon Freedman (“Mr. Freedman”), appeals the issuance of a warrant of committal ordered by Justice P. Krause of the Superior Court of Justice (Family Court) on September 30, 2025 (“Warrant of Committal”). The Warrant of Committal was sought on motion by the Respondent in this appeal, the Director of the Family Responsibility Office (“FRO”) to enforce the terms of a Default Order made by Justice Douglas on March 5, 2024 (“Final Default Order”).
[4] The Warrant of Committal was for a term of six months. Mr. Freedman did not respond to the Warrant of Committal pending his appeal. It was stayed in December 2025 pending the decision of this panel.
[5] According to the FRO, in late September 2025, Mr. Freedman was approximately 3.5 million dollars in arrears of child and spousal support in respect of the Final Default Order. For the purposes of the Warrant of Committal that she ordered, Justice Krause found that the amount necessary to cure Mr. Freedman’s default was $973,950.00.
[6] Mr. Freedman brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence on this appeal. In respect of the main appeal, Mr. Freedman raises three issues on the appeal:
Whether Krause J. erred by prioritizing the satisfaction of a judgment respecting property over the satisfaction of a support order, which is alleged to be contrary to s. 2(3) of the Creditors’ Relief Act, 2010, SO 2010, c 16, Sch 4;
Whether Krause J. erred by failing to conduct an inquiry into what funds Mr. Freedman’s ex-spouse, the recipient of the Final Default order, had already received and/or had access to; and
Whether Krause J. erred by failing to consider the reasonableness and proportionality of the FRO’s previous enforcement attempts.
Background
[7] The matter had multiple attendances and was subject to several decisions of experienced family law judges of the Central East Region. The matter arises in what Mr. Freedman freely admits is a bitter family law dispute. The particulars of the trajectory of the relationship at issue and the proceedings have been well laid out in the various decisions that have come before: see Freedman v. Freedman, 2019 ONSC 2111; Ontario (Family Responsibility Office) v. Freedman, 2025 ONSC 6817. This limits the degree to which the particulars of the background of the matter will be set out here. In addition, it is important to note that the issue before this Court is quite narrow. A general overview of the background is sufficient to set out the context for this decision.
[8] Mr. Freedman and Ms. Rashell Freedman (now Feldman) separated in May 2015 although that date has been disputed by Mr. Freedman at various times in the litigation. He suggests it occurred in 2017. There were five children of the relationship. The oldest is now 24. The youngest, twins, are about to turn 13. Apparently, they have all been estranged from Mr. Freedman since about 2019. Family Court proceedings were commenced in 2017.
[9] In 2022, an uncontested trial was held before Eberhard J.: see Freedman v. Freedman, 2022 ONSC 4823. The matter proceeded this way because Mr. Freedman’s pleadings had been struck due to his failure to make complete and fulsome disclosure of his significant financial assets. Among other things, Eberhard J. found, at para. 45,
that the Applicant is a licensed lawyer with expertise in tax and finance as part of his patents practice; that the Applicant has a demonstrated history of putting title and income into other people or company names, that the Applicant previously avoided obligations to his first spouse by putting property in the Respondent's name, that the Applicant refused to comply with disclosure orders that were necessary to ascertain his income sources and quantum, that he has previously generated income to live lavishly; I find that he has the potential to earn income from a variety of pursuits, that he has the skill and experience to car income from a patents practice, investment, development of new ventures and that he is intentionally underemployed during the currency of his matrimonial litigation.
[10] On August 25, 2022, Eberhard J. made a final order for child and spousal support orders against Mr. Freedman. The quantum of the orders involved substantial amounts of money. She ordered:
a) Arrears of child support for 5 children from separation to June/22 in the sum of $998,564;
b) Arrears of spousal support from separation to June/22 in the sum of $962,754;
c) Ongoing child support for 5 children from July 1/22 on imputed income of $800,000 of $16,631/month;
d) Ongoing spousal support from July 1, 2022 on imputed income of $800,000 per year of $11,500 per month;
e) Equalization payment from the applicant to the respondent in the amount of $6 million; and
f) Costs payable by the applicant to the respondent in the amount of $460,000, of which $115,000 was enforceable as support.
[11] Mr. Freedman has largely ignored the final order of Eberhard J. He did not appeal the order. The FRO brought default proceedings. In February 2024, two notices of default were placed before Douglas J. at Barrie. In a decision dated March 5, 2024, Douglas J. wrote:
I find Payor has failed to demonstrate valid reasons for his failure to pay the arrears or to may [sic] subsequent payments under the order of August 25/22.
As I have concluded Payor has not demonstrated valid reasons, there is no need to consider whether there is a prima facie case to be made for change to the order of August 25/22 (see Director, Family Responsibility Office v. Janic, 2022 ONSC 3848, at para. 22, citation added).
[12] While Douglas J. declined to issue a warrant of committal, he declared that any further incident(s) of default could lead to a period of 30 days incarceration for Mr. Freedman.
[13] In early 2025, the FRO brought a motion to obtain a warrant of committal. Ultimately, it was heard by Krause J. on July 9, 2025. She reserved her decision. Justice Krause released the decision under appeal on September 30, 2025. At paras. 32 – 34, Krause J. found:
The SP (Mr. Freedman) has made no reasonable efforts to comply with the final Default Order. As Justice Douglas found at the default hearing, the SP had made no efforts to comply with the final Order of Eberhard J.
At the default hearing Douglas J. found it appropriate to impose a period of incarceration for each default in payment. Having found no material change in circumstances since that Order was made, a Warrant of Committal must issue.
Douglas J. imposed a period of incarceration of 30 days for each default. Based on the Director's Statement of Arrears, there have been 14 defaulted payments, taking into account the monies received from the SP. FRASEA limits the period of imprisonment to 180 days.
[14] The focus of the decision, and indeed all that was relevant on the attendance before Krause J. were the issues of whether Mr. Freedman made the required payments and presented evidence of any material change subsequent to the date of the default order. The legal test on a warrant for committal will be addressed later in this decision and in more detail in the discussion of the main appeal.
The Motion to Introduce Fresh Evidence
[15] On December 19, 2025, Mr. Freedman brought a motion for an order to admit the following nine documents as “fresh evidence” on appeal:
• The Affidavit of Rashell Feldmann dated May 6, 2022, and the exhibits attached thereto (doc 1);
• The Forensic Accounting Report of John Douglas dated August 5, 2022 (doc 2);
• The Affidavit of Graham Wheatley dated March 14, 2025, and the exhibits attached thereto (doc 3);
• The Affidavit of Rashell Feldman dated April 17, 2025, and the exhibits attached thereto (doc 4);
• The Affidavit of Michael Inskip dated May 30, 2025, and the exhibits attached thereto (doc 5);
• The Affidavit of Jonah Paritzky dated July 2, 2025, and the exhibits attached thereto (doc 6);
• The Affidavit of Gordon Freedman dated September 24, 2025, and the exhibits attached thereto (doc 7);
• The Affidavit of Amel Elie dated September 26, 2025, and the exhibits attached thereto (doc 8); and
• The Affidavit of Gordon Freedman dated October 29, 2025, and the exhibits attached thereto (doc 9).
The Test on a Motion to Introduce Fresh Evidence
[16] The law in this area is well-known and the parties agreed on the applicable test.
[17] Subsection 134(4)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, provides that “in a proper case,” an appellate court may “receive further evidence by affidavit, transcript of oral examination, oral examination before the court or in such other manner as the court directs ... to enable the court to determine the appeal.”
[18] The seminal 1979 Supreme Court of Canada case, Palmer v. The Queen, 1979 8 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759; (1979), 106 D.L.R. (3d) 212 (S.C.C.), established the test that must be met for the appellate court to admit further evidence. For “fresh” evidence to be admitted, the Court found at p. 775 that all of the following criteria must be met:
The evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at trial provided that this general principle will not be applied as strictly in a criminal case as in civil cases;
The evidence must be relevant in the sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue in the trial;
The evidence must be credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief; and
It must be such that if believed it could reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected the result.
Positions of the Parties on the Motion
[19] Mr. Freedman submits he brings this fresh evidence motion solely to fill in evidentiary gaps in the record. He argues his lawyer before Krause J. inexplicably failed to submit some of the material he now seeks to place before this Court. The FRO submits all of the alleged fresh evidence fails to meet some aspect of either or all of prong one, three, and four of the Palmer test.
Disposition of the Motion
[20] I agree with the submissions of the FRO concerning the nature of the nine documents constituting alleged “fresh evidence.” All fail some or all of the four prongs of the Palmer test. I will now deal with each document of alleged “fresh evidence.”
Doc 1
[21] This evidence was before Eberhard J. It was created in 2022. It has nothing to do with whether Mr. Freedman made the required payments and presented evidence of any material change subsequent to the date of the Default Order.
Doc 2
[22] This evidence was before Eberhard J. It was created in 2022. It has nothing to do with whether Mr. Freedman made the required payments and presented evidence of any material change subsequent to the date of the Default Order.
Doc 3
[23] This affidavit details financial events between Mr. Freedman and Rashell Feldman between 2003 and 2019. It has nothing to do with whether Mr. Freedman made the required payments and presented evidence of any material change subsequent to the date of the default order.
Doc 4
[24] This affidavit of Rashell Feldman is 37 pages long with 234 paragraphs and 39 exhibits. It details the history of the litigation and ultimately her opposition to Mr. Freedman’s motion to set aside the order of Eberhard J. on the basis of fraud. It also sets out her dealings with funds Mr. Freedman asserts could have been used to pay off his outstanding arrears. Ms. Feldman flatly denies taking any funds from the Temple Group. This affidavit does nothing to tell the Court of any material change in Mr. Freedman’s circumstances between the date of the default hearing and the hearing before Krause J.
Doc 5
[25] This affidavit deals with Mr. Freedman’s employment from 2020 to 2021. It has nothing to do with whether Mr. Freedman made the required payments and presented evidence of any material change subsequent to the date of the default order.
Doc 6
[26] This is an affidavit of Mr. Freedman’s former lawyer, Johah Partizky. It details Mr. Freedman’s alleged attempts to access funds that he argues would satisfy his outstanding arrears, during the period May to July 2025.
[27] Mr. Freedman, in his “fresh evidence” affidavits, makes allegations in respect of Mr. Partizky’s conduct before Krause J. It is difficult to understand how, in this context, Mr. Freedman can at the same time expect the Court to accept whatever Mr. Partizky says as credible, if the Court is prepared to accept the foundational principle of this motion that it is being brought only to correct the evidentiary record, apparently negligently created in part by the actions of Mr. Partizky. Further, the affidavit cannot answer the question of whether Mr. Freedman made the required payments, because he did not. In addition, the affidavit contains repeated allegations about efforts Mr. Freedman made with respect to the Temple funds, which were before Douglas J. in 2024 and 2025. It is not evidence of a material change in circumstances from the time Douglas J. made the Default Order to the time when the matter was before Krause J.
Doc 7 and 9
[28] These are affidavits sworn by Mr. Freedman after the hearing before Krause J. They are self-serving and repeat arguments that were before Krause J. except for Mr. Freedman’s veiled allegations of negligence against his former counsel and a reference without support about some new legal efforts to get at monies that he alleges he has not been able to access for at least three years. However, the affidavits do not address the central question before Krause J. They restate arguments and repeat Mr. Freedman’s perspective about what has occurred in the litigation. There is no new information in the affidavits. The October 29, 2025 affidavit vaguely refers to new legal steps Mr. Freedman has taken to access various funds, which the affidavit also indicates he has been trying to do for years. Curiously, the affidavit does not exhibit the pleadings for this alleged new proceeding. Basic evidence like the pleadings would be expected from anyone remotely familiar with the legal system who is trying to prove that something new in the nature of a new legal avenue has been undertaken.
[29] Mr. Freedman deposes “although I have a law degree and an engineering degree, I did not use them, at least not much to earn money during the marriage.” This statement lacks credibility Mr. Freedman practiced law, previously deposed he was employed in a patent agent firm and was licenced by the Law Society of Ontario. In my view, this is an astonishing statement made by a litigant who has repeatedly ignored court orders in what he described elsewhere as a “war” with his former spouse.
[30] I agree with the submissions of the FRO that Mr. Freedman is not a credible witness. Ordinarily, appellate courts do not engage in such weighing of evidence. We deal with what was in front of the adjudicator whose decision is being reviewed.
[31] As the current motion requests this Court to consider “fresh evidence,” the Palmer test permits an inquiry as to whether the evidence is credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief. A theme of avoidance and not performing basic required duties of financial disclosure permeate the length of the proceeding. In respect of Mr. Freedman’s evidence, conduct, and submissions to the Court, it is difficult not to see this “fresh evidence” as a continued “piling on” of evidence already brought before the Courts before that do not address the real issues at stake. This leads this Court to reject it out of hand. The affidavit does not address why Mr. Freedman has not paid the support he owes and what is different now from when Krause J. heard the matter. Repeating the old arguments as alleged “fresh evidence” is not persuasive; nor is it fresh evidence that should be admitted on this appeal before the Court.
Doc 8
[32] This is the affidavit of Amel Elie, a case management officer of the FRO sworn after the hearing before Krause J. It confirms Mr. Freedman’s ongoing default. It states that Mr. Freedman’s counsel on this appeal filed a 14B family motion alleging it was on consent of the FRO when it clearly was not. The affidavit does not assist Mr. Freedman on this appeal. It is not relevant.
The July 2, 2025 Affidavit
[33] I note that Mr. Freedman’s notice of motion did not expressly seek leave to place his July 2, 2025 affidavit before the Court on this appeal. I agree with the submissions of the FRO that it does not address what was relevant before Krause J. Like the other affidavits sought to be filed as “fresh evidence,” it repeated arguments and allegations made before Douglas J. It was not relevant to the considerations of this panel, and it was disregarded.
[34] None of the alleged fresh evidence, including the affidavit of July 2, 2025, meet all of the prongs of the Palmer test.
[35] For these reasons, this motion is dismissed.
The Appeal
The Test on a Motion for a Warrant of Committal
[36] Overall, the appeal did not raise any issue that would permit this panel to interfere with the decision of Krause J. The appeal as framed suggests errors of law, which are not relevant to the test Krause J. was required to apply, or errors of mixed fact and law. The standard of review for a question of law is correctness and for a question of mixed fact and law (where there is no extricable principle) is palpable and overriding error: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235.
[37] The decision of Krause J. was sound and without any palpable and overriding errors. Krause J. properly applied the two-part test for a hearing dealing with a warrant of committal.
[38] In order to deal with the appeal, it is first necessary to address the test on a motion for a warrant of committal. A motion for warrant of committal may be brought by the FRO after a temporary or final default order is made in a default hearing. At a default hearing, a support payor is presumed to have an ability to pay. The court may impose committal terms for unpaid support through a default order pursuant to subsection 41(10)(h) and (i) of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996 S.O. 1996 c. 31 (FRSAEA). Where the court makes a default order pursuant to that subsection and the support payor fails to comply with repayment terms, the Director may bring a motion pursuant to Rule 30(9) of the Family Law Rules, O Reg 114/99, seeking for a warrant of committal to issue in accordance with the terms set out in the default order.
[39] A motion for warrant of committal is a summary proceeding where the only issue is whether the support payor has complied with the payment terms of the default order. If the support payor advances reasons for failing to make the required payments, the reasons must refer to matters or events that arose subsequent to the date of the default order.
[40] Pursuant to s. 41(15) of the FRSAEA, the court may vary a default order only if the support payor has demonstrated a material change in circumstances since the making of the default order. Any circumstances that predate the default order are irrelevant at a warrant of committal proceeding. A warrant of committal hearing is not a trial de novo of the default hearing: Ontario (Director of Support and Custody Enforcement) v. Levenson, 1990 3985 (Ont. C.J.), at para. 9(4).
[41] As such, the test for a warrant of committal is a two-part test:
Has the support payor complied with the payment terms of the default order? If no;
Has the support payor provided evidence to satisfactorily demonstrate that they experienced a material change in their circumstances since the default order was made such that the terms of the default order should be varied?
Issue 1: The Alleged Priority Error
[42] Mr. Freedman submits Krause J. erred by prioritizing the satisfaction of a judgment respecting property over the satisfaction of a support order, which is alleged to be contrary to s. 2(3) of the Creditors’ Relief Act. (CRA) This submission makes no sense. Krause J. made no such order and did no such prioritizing. She only made a reference to what Eberhard J. found in her July 22, 2022 final order. At paras. 29-30 of the written reasons of Krause J. dated September 30, 2025, she states:
The submissions advanced by the SP (Mr. Freedman) on this motion to avoid committal should have been made during the default hearing before Douglas J. The SP was aware or should have been aware of the circumstances he advances before me at that time.
I reviewed Eberhard J.’s decision. Her comments in reference to beneficial ownership relate to her analysis of equalization of net family property. The amounts were ascribed to the SP in that calculation. Those assets relate to the equalization payment ordered; not support.
[43] In any event, this is not a case of competing priorities among execution creditors that would require the CRA to establish priority. Mr. Freedman owes the support recipient both an equalization payment and support arrears. There is no competing creditor to be considered. This ground of appeal has no merit.
Issue 2: Alleged Error Regarding Consideration of the Actions of Ms. Feldman
[44] Mr. Freedman argues that Krause J. erred by failing to conduct an inquiry into what funds Mr. Freedman’s ex-spouse, the recipient of the Final Default order, had already received and/or had access to. Such an inquiry was beyond the scope of the narrow issues before Krause J. It was unnecessary to conduct such an inquiry. Nevertheless, at paras. 25-28 of her judgment, Krause J. clearly addressed this argument by Mr. Freedman. Those paragraphs state:
The SP says there are monies being held in trust for him by the support recipient which will satisfy the outstanding support obligation. The SP relies [on]certain paragraphs in the reasons of Eberhard J., for example paragraph 73 of her decision. All this information was available to the SP at the time of the default hearing. None of these issues were raised with Douglas J. during that hearing.
During the default hearing, the SP raised the issue of the recipient terminating his signing authorities with various companies.
In this Motion, the SP points to Eberhard J.’s comments in her Reasons for Judgment relating to beneficial ownership by the SP to assets in the support recipient's name. It is those assets the SP says he must have access to in order to satisfy the support arrears. He says the support recipient refuses to allow him access.
In my view this is not new information. The SP could have advanced this position before Douglas J. during the default hearing. He did not. This is not a new issue nor, in my view, does it amount to a material change in circumstances since the final Default Order was made.
[45] Again, this ground of appeal does not address the central issue that was before Krause J. It has nothing to do with whether Mr. Freedman made the required payments and presented evidence of any material change subsequent to the date of the default order. To the extent Mr. Freedman submits he has new information since the hearing before Douglas J. that he is unable to access his funds, there is no adequate explanation as to why he did not try to get those funds in time for the Default hearing. His submission that he did not have adequate notice of the Default hearing is entirely unpersuasive, including because the matter came before Douglas J. over several appearances spanning multiple months before it was finally heard on its merits. This ground of appeal has no merit.
Issue 3: The FRO’s Enforcement Attempts
[46] Mr. Freedman submits Krause J. erred by failing to consider the reasonableness and proportionality of the FRO’s previous enforcement attempts. This ground of appeal also has no merit. The FRO’s actions were not at issue at the stage the matter was before Krause J. I agree with the submissions of the FRO that a warrant of committal hearing is not a judicial review of the enforcement actions of the FRO. In any event, s. 6 of the FRSAEA gives the FRO the discretion to enforce an order in any manner that is practical. Further, given the nature of the proceedings to date, it seems to me that Mr. Freedman’s recalcitrant attitude now calls for a remedy of last resort. Incarceration is appropriate. As with the other grounds for appeal, this ground does not address the nature of the issues that were properly before Krause J and must be dismissed.
Conclusion
[47] Justice Krause properly found:
Mr. Freedman failed to comply with the payment terms of the March 5, 2024 Final Default Order; and
Mr. Freedman did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances since the March 5, 2024, Final Default Order was made.
[48] For all the reasons above, the motion to introduce fresh evidence and the appeal is dismissed with costs fixed at $20,000.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements as agreed by the parties payable forthwith by Gordon Freedman to the Director Family Responsibility Office.
Fitzpatrick J.
I agree _______________________________
O’Brien J.
I agree _______________________________
Tranquilli J.
Released: February 10, 2026
CITATION: Freedman v. FRO (for the Benefit of Rahell Freedman), 2026 ONSC 787
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-1703
DATE: 20260210
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
GORDON FREEDMAN
Appellant
– and –
THE FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY OFFICE (FOR THE BENEFIT OF RAHELL FREEDMAN)
JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
Fitzpatrick J.
Released: February 10, 2026