CITATION: Regional Municipality of York v 2090396 Ontario Ltd., 2026 ONSC 195
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 463/25 DATE: 20260114
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
Sachs, Backhouse and O’Brien JJ.
BETWEEN:
Regional Municipality of York
Appellant
– and –
2090396 Ontario Limited
Respondent
Regional Municipalities of Halton, Peel and Durham
Proposed Intervenors
Frank Sperduti, Lou Fortini and Michael Grant, Counsel for the Appellant
Mark Flowers and Andrew Valela, Counsel for the Respondent
Christopher Williams, Ajay Gataria and Matthew Patterson, Counsel for the Proposed Intervenors
Heard in writing
Ruling on Motion for Leave to Intervene
[1] The Regional Municipalities of Halton, Peel and Durham, (collectively, the “proposed intervenors”) seek to intervene in this appeal as friends of the court under rule 13.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The appeal was scheduled to be heard January 8, 2026. The proposed intervenors served this motion three and a half weeks before the scheduled hearing of the appeal, after substantially all of the appeal materials had been delivered. As a result, the panel directed that the motion would be heard at the outset of the hearing on January 8, 2026. As a result of illness, the hearing had to be adjourned and the parties were advised that the motion to intervene would be heard by the panel in writing.
[2] The proposed intervenors delivered a motion record, a factum on the motion, a reply and a proposed factum on the appeal if their motion is allowed. The respondent, 2090396 Ontario Limited, (“the claimant”) delivered a motion record and factum opposing the motion. The appellant, the Regional Municipality of York (“York Region”), filed a responding record supporting the motion.
[3] The proposed intervenors have not met their enhanced burden to demonstrate that their intervention in this private dispute is warranted. For the reasons set out below the motion is dismissed without costs.
[4] This appeal arises out of a compensation proceeding under the Expropriations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.26 relating to York Region’s expropriation of a portion of the property municipally known as 1500 Centre Street in the City of Vaughan, in York Region as well as a five-year temporary easement. The purpose of the expropriation is to accommodate road improvements that will enable the construction of a bus rapid transit system.
[5] York Region took possession of the expropriated lands on August 4, 2015. It paid the sum of $295,100 to the claimant in accordance with s. 25(b) of the Easement Act. The claimant commenced an application to the Ontario Land Tribunal and a 10-day hearing was held before the Tribunal in January 2025, to determine the compensation payable to the claimant under the Expropriation Act resulting from the expropriation. The main area of disagreement between the parties at the hearing was the highest and best use of the property prior to the expropriation.
[6] On April 17, 2025, the Tribunal released its decision (the “Decision”) awarding $2.3 million less the advance payment to the claimant. The Tribunal accepted the claimant’s submitted highest and best use of the property. Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in St. John’s (City) v Lynch, 2024 SCC 17 (“Lynch”), as well as the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Windsor (City) v Paciorka Leaseholds Limited, 2012 ONCA 431(“Paciorka”), the Tribunal found that certain land use planning policies and documents relied upon by the claimant should not be “screened out” under s. 14(4)(b) of the Expropriation Act, for the purposes of determining compensation.
[7] The costs of the compensation proceeding were adjudicated during the summer of 2025, and the Tribunal released a decision dated October 23, 2025, awarding the claimant its reasonable costs pursuant to s. 32 of the Expropriation Act, plus post judgment interest, payable within 30 days. The Region appealed that decision to the Divisional Court by way of a Notice of Appeal dated November 21, 2025. To date, no portion of the additional compensation or costs awarded by the Tribunal has been paid to the claimant.
[8] Rule 13.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for intervention as a friend of the court, states:
Any person may, with leave of a judge or at the invitation of the presiding judge or associate judge, and without becoming a party to the proceeding, intervene as a friend of the court for the purpose of rendering assistance to the court by way of argument.
[9] Granting leave to intervene is discretionary. In determining whether to grant a party leave to intervene as a friend of the court under Rule 13.02, the following factors are to be considered:
(a) the nature of the case;
(b) the issues that arise in the case;
(c) the likelihood that the proposed intervenor will be able to make a useful and distinct contribution not otherwise offered by the parties; and
(d) whether the intervention will cause injustice to the parties or undue delay.
(Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd. (1990), 1990 6886 (ON CA))
(a) Nature of the Case and (b) Issues Involved
[10] This is a private dispute between the claimant whose land was expropriated and York Region, the expropriating authority.
[11] Where the litigation in which the intervention is sought is a private dispute, the burden on the proposed intervenors will be heavier: Minas v Adler, 2022 ONSC 5579 (Div. Ct.) at para. 11; Authorson (Guardian of) v Canada (Attorney General), 2001 4382 (ON CA) at paras. 8-9.
[12] Intervention of third parties into essentially private disputes should be carefully considered as any intervention can add to the costs and complexity of litigation, regardless of an agreement to restrict submissions: Authorson (Litigation Guardian of) v Canada (Attorney General), 2001 4382 (ON CA) at paras. 8-9.
[13] The Court of Appeal for Ontario has also confirmed that leave to intervene as a friend of the court is more likely to be granted in private litigation where the litigation raises issues of public policy or novel issues of law, as opposed to issues that are essentially fact driven: Techhi Holdings Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch Canada Inc., 2005 2492 (ON CA) at para. 4.
[14] The issues raised in the case can be summarized as:
whether the Tribunal failed to properly interpret and apply s.14(4)(b) of the Expropriations Act. S.14 (4) (b) is the codification of the common law principle that the purposes for which a property is being expropriated should not be considered in the assessment of the property’s market value. This is referred to as the Pointe Gourde Rule.
whether the Tribunal erred in interpreting and applying s.14(1) of the Expropriation Act which provides:
The market value of land expropriated is the amount that the land might be expected to realize if sold in the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer.
- whether the Tribunal failed to properly interpret and apply the test for injurious affection.
[15] The SCC in Lynch at para 46 refers to a jurisprudential trend in the application of the Pointe Gourde principle where the key question in determining market value is whether the enactment was made with a view to the expropriation or, conversely, was an independent enactment. The Court references s.14(4(b) of Ontario’s Expropriation Act as being one of several expropriation statues that have been interpreted in that manner and references Paciorka, at paras. 22 and 27. At para.47 of Lynch, the Court finds that this is normally a factual determination to be made by the board or other authority tasked with determining compensation, absent an extricable error of law.
(c) The likelihood that the proposed intervenor will be able to make a useful and distinct contribution not otherwise offered by the parties
[16] York Region on the appeal raises the issues of the interpretation and application of s.14(4)(b) and s.14(1) of the Expropriations Act, the relevant legislation and policy, the relevant legal framework and the relevant policy history. It specifically raises the point the proposed intervenors seek to raise--that Lynch was based on Newfoundland and Labrador’s Expropriation Act, which it submits contains notable differences to Ontario’s version of the Act and involves a significantly broader analysis than Newfoundland’s scheme, and the Supreme Court recognized that such distinctions will alter the analysis. York Region argues that the Tribunal erred in taking into account policies and documents that should have been screened out because they were made with a view to the purposes for which the property was being expropriated.
[17] The proposed intervenors submit that their argument will focus on the implications of Lynch for the interpretation of Ontario’s Expropriations Act and on the test and legal framework that should govern that act. They submit that the Decision did not consider the differences in the statutory schemes of Newfoundland and Ontario and the specific nuances of the Ontario legislation and the scheme it creates for determining market value. These are the very issues raised in York Region’s factum.
[18] The proposed intervenors express concerns about the legal implications that the Decision will have on future expropriations, specifically in relation to determining what policies and documents form part of the expropriation scheme and should therefore be “screened out”. As the Supreme Court instructed in Lynch, this is normally a factual determination to be made by the board, absent an extricable error of law.
[19] We are not satisfied that the proposed intervenors will be able to make a useful and distinct contribution not otherwise offered by York Region. The concerns they wish to bring to the court’s attention are already raised by York Region’s material and fundamentally reflect York Region’s concerns. The legal arguments that the proposed intervenors wish to make could or will be addressed by counsel for York Region. They were certainly raised before the Tribunal below and are addressed in their factum filed on the appeal.
[20] Duplicative submissions of others are not useful and can in fact imperil the fairness of the hearing. Repetition or “me too” submissions provide no assistance to the court: Jones v. Tsige, 2011 99894 (ON CA) at para.9.
[21] The proposed intervenors have not explained how their “broader perspective” translates into a materially different legal submission.
(d) Whether the intervention will cause injustice to the parties or undue delay
[22] The proposed intervenors also propose to make submissions regarding the implications of the Decision for capital planning in their regions and to make submissions on how the Decision impacts their Regional Capital Plans and the planning and infrastructure which they submit differs for each region.
[23] The issue before the court in this appeal is whether a specialized land tribunal adjudicator erred in determining the compensation payable to the claimant for land expropriated from it. This is not the appropriate case to broaden the scope of this private dispute and engage in a detailed analysis about capital planning in the regions of the proposed intervenors. The Tribunal’s findings with respect to the scheme are specific to policies and documents adopted by York Region or the City of Vaughan. They are unrelated and have no connection to Halton, Peel, or Durham. The proposed intervenors’ involvement will distort the focus of the appeal, broadening and complicating it and place undue focus on the concerns of other municipalities’ planning processes.
Conclusion
[24] The motion is dismissed without costs.
___________________________ Backhouse J.
I agree___________________________ Sachs J.
I agree___________________________ O’Brien J.
Released: January 14, 2026
CITATION: Regional Municipality of York v 2090396 Ontario Ltd., 2026 ONSC 195
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 463/25 DATE: 20260114
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
Regional Municipality of York
Appellant
– and –
2090396 Ontario Limited
Respondent
Ruling on Motion for Leave to Intervene
Released: January 14, 2026