CITATION: Lyle-Mayes v. Lazar et al., 2026 ONSC 1659
COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-259
DATE: 2026-03-30
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
SHYLO-LYNN LYLE-MAYES
M. Blashko, Counsel for the Applicant/Affected Person
Applicant/Affected Person
- and -
AZIZ LAZAR and SERGIO AGOTINO PTEOLI
E. Fellman, Counsel for the Landlord and Tenant Board
No one appearing for the Respondents
Respondent/Landlord and Respondent/Tenant
HEARD: March 16, 2026
ENDORSEMENT ON APPEAL
The Honourable Justice M. Valente
Overview
[1] In her notice of appeal the Appellant seeks an order setting aside the ex parte eviction order of the Landlord and Tenant Board (the “Board”), LTB-L-064099-23, issued on August 25, 2023 (the “ex parte Order”), as well as the Board’s review order of the ex parte Order, LTB-064099-23-RV, issued on January 26, 2024, confirming the ex parte Order (the “Review Order”).
[2] The appellant also seeks an order replacing the ex parte Order and the Review Order with an order declaring the Appellant a tenant, restoring her to possession of the rental unit, and dismissing the Respondent Landlord’s application to evict.
[3] The Appellant submits in support of this relief that the Board lacked jurisdiction to issue the ex parte Order or to confirm it on review.
[4] In the alternative, the Appellant seeks an order remitting to the Board for a hearing de novo of the Appellant’s request to review the ex parte Order with any appropriate direction from this court.
[5] The Appellant submits that she is entitled to this relief because the Board applied the wrong test in respect of the definition of “landlord”, misinterpreted the law as it relates to the authority of agents, and failed to appreciate relevant evidence in respect of the authority of agents.
[6] During the hearing, counsel for the Appellant clarified that his client was no longer seeking possession of the rental unit but rather an order declaring her a tenant and dismissing the Respondent Landlord’s application to evict together with the alternative relief as I have explained it above.
[7] Neither the Respondent Landlord nor the Respondent Tenant appeared on the appeal.
[8] In keeping with the normal practice of the Board, its counsel took no position on the appeal other than to provide guidance on the applicable legal principles. Counsel did, however, submit that should this court find an error of law in the Review Order, the matter be remitted to the Board for a hearing de novo.
Summary of the Background Facts
[9] The Respondent Landlord and Respondent Tenant entered into a lease, dated December 17, 2021, with respect to the property municipally known as 1957 Rymal Road East, in Hamilton. The rental unit is a detached house.
[10] In December 2022, the Appellant moved into the house. The Appellant and her daughter occupied two rooms in the house while the Respondent Tenant occupied a second room and a couple lived in a third room. The Appellant paid the Respondent Tenant $1,000 in monthly rent.
[11] In early June 2023, the Respondent Tenant was forced to leave the rental unit because of alleged criminal activity.
[12] Later in June 2023, the Appellant met with the rental unit’s property manager, Mike Somo, to discuss she and her daughter continuing to live in the rental unit. Ultimately, the Appellant and Mike Somo negotiated the terms of a verbal lease agreement.
[13] Shortly thereafter, Mr. Somo advised the Appellant that the Respondent Landlord considered the Respondent Tenant the only tenant of the rental unit, that his lease was to terminate on July 31, 2023, and the Appellant was to provide vacant possession on the same date.
[14] In the meantime, the Respondent Landlord had arranged for the Respondent Tenant to sign a N11 Agreement to terminate his tenancy. The N11 Agreement was signed on or around July 18, 2023, and provided for a termination date of July 31, 2023.
[15] With an N11 Agreement in hand, a landlord can move before the Board for an eviction order pre-emptively prior to the eviction date or evict a tenant who failed to adhere to the agreement to vacate by the agreed termination date.
[16] On or around August 17, 2023, the Respondent Landlord filed a L3 Eviction Application based on the N11 Agreement without naming the Appellant on the application or serving it on her.
[17] The L3 Eviction Application was filed with the Board without reference to the fact that the Respondent Tenant had already moved out by the agreed termination date.
[18] The Respondent Landlord admitted that the L3 Eviction Application was filed with the intention of evicting the Appellant.
[19] On August 25, 2023, the Board issued the ex parte Order. The Order included a determination that based on the record, the Respondent Tenant had not vacated the rental unit by the agreed termination date.
[20] On October 10, 2023, the Sheriff attended the rental unit to evict the Appellant and provide vacant possession to the Respondent Landlord on the authority of the ex parte Order.
[21] The Appellant first learned of the ex parte Order on October 10, 2023.
[22] The Appellant filed a request to review the ex parte Order which request was granted.
[23] In its Review Order, the Board found that there was no tenancy agreement between the Appellant and Mr. Somo because the Board was not satisfied that Mr. Somo had the authority to enter into a tenancy agreement for the rental unit that would bind the Respondent Landlord. Therefore, the Board found that rather than a tenant, the Appellant was an occupant of the rental unit under the Respondent Tenant’s tenancy and had no legal right to occupy the unit after the Respondent Tenant’s tenancy was terminated by agreement.
Guiding Legal Principles
[24] Appeals to this court from the Board are restricted to questions of law alone (see: Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (the “Act”) s. 210).
[25] The applicable standard of review on questions of law is correctness (see: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilo, 2019 SCC 65, at para. 37).
[26] On a statutory appeal limited to questions of law alone, the focus is on “whether the decision-maker correctly identified and interpreted the governing law or legal standard relevant to the facts found by the decision-maker” (see: Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2021 ONSC 2507, at para. 28 (Div. Ct.), affirmed on other grounds, 2022 ONCA 446, appeal granted on other grounds, 2024 SCC 8).
[27] Any error of law must be material to the result to warrant this court’s intervention. Subsection 134(6) of the Courts of Justice Act provides that a “court to which an appeal is taken shall not direct a new trial unless some substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred”. Appellate courts have held that errors that are inconsequential or do not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice are insufficient to justify a rehearing (see: Town of Petrolia v. Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, 2022 ONSC at paras. 31-32 (Div. Ct.)).
[28] Appellate courts have provided the following guidance in applying the correctness standard on questions of law:
• Appellant courts apply a presumption that the first instance decision maker knows the law and applied the correct legal standard, unless it can be demonstrated that the incorrect standard was applied: F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC at para. 54;
• The failure to discuss a relevant factor in depth, or even at all, is not itself a sufficient basis for an appellate court to reconsider the evidence, unless there is a reasoned belief that the first-instance decision maker “must have forgotten, ignored, or misconceived the evidence in a way that affected his conclusion”: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 at para. 39; Powerhouse Corporation v. Registrar of Alcohol, Gaming and Racing, 2021 ONSC 4116 at para. 69 (Div. Ct.);
• The decision maker is presumed to have reviewed the full record, absent proof to the contrary: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 at para. 46; Said v. Certas, 2022 ONSC 2071 at para. 31 (Div. Ct.);
• The reasons must be reviewed in light of the record, which may allow the appellate court to determine that the reasons are more comprehensible: Maple Ridge Community Management Ltd. v. Peel Condominium Corporation No. 231, 2015 ONCA at paras. 30-32; and
• An interpretation of the reasons that maintains internal consistency is preferred: Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Ontario Energy Board, 2006 10734 at para. 22 (Ont. C.A.).
[29] This court has also emphasized the need to respect a tribunal’s specialized function due to its subject matter and expertise even when the applicable standard of review is one of correctness (see: Reisher v. Westdale Properties, 2023 ONSC 1817, at para. 10 (Div. Ct).
[30] The Act at ss. 2(1) defines “landlord” as including,
a) The owner of a rental unit or any other person who permits occupancy of a rental unit, other than a tenant who occupies a rental unit in a complex and who permits another person to also occupy the unit or any part of the unit,
b) The heirs, assigns, personal representatives and successors in title of a person referred to in clause (a), and
c) A person, other than a tenant occupying a rental unit in a residential complex, who is entitled to possession of the residential complex, and who attempts to enforce any of the rights of a landlord under a tenancy agreement or this Act, including the right to collect rent; (“locateur”).
[31] In Slapsys ,1406393 Ontario Inc. v. Abrams, 2010 ONCA 676 (“Slapsys”) at paras. 7-8, the Ontario Court of Appeal observed that the Act’s definition of “landlord” can include “a person who permits occupancy of a rental unit”. This determination, the Court held, will “depend upon the facts, including particularly whether the person has the ultimate authority to permit occupancy”.
Analysis
[32] In my view, the Member conducting the review of the ex parte Order, correctly identified the central issue to be decided by him. That issue is whether the Appellant’s communications with Mr. Somo had the effect of creating a tenancy agreement. It is also my view that this appeal may be disposed of by determining whether the Member applied the correct legal test in concluding that no tenancy agreement had been created once the Respondent Tenant’s tenancy came to an end.
[33] I find that the Member did not apply the correct legal standard in concluding that no Tenancy had been established. I reach this conclusion because in the Member’s analysis, he focuses exclusively on the general principles of agency law in concluding that Mr. Somo did not have the authority to enter into a lease with the Appellant on behalf of the Respondent Landlord. Instead, in my view, the Member should have considered the central question whether Mr. Somo satisfied the expansive definition of “landlord” under the Act. By failing to analyze this issue, I find that the Member did not apply the correct legal test to decide whether a tenancy was created.
[34] The Act’s definition of “landlord” is intentionally broad to ensure that it is consistent with the legislation’s tenant protection purpose and is a reflection of both the practical complexities and power imbalances in landlord and tenant relationships, including in their formation. The creation of legal relationships and obligations than can be potentially enforced against multiple actors assists to ensure that legal remedies are more easily accessible for tenants and prospective tenants.
[35] In Slapsys, the Court of Appeal recognized that the definition of “landlord” allows for there to be more than one “landlord” for a single rental unit (at para. 7). The Court also emphasized that by virtue of s. 202 of the Act, the Board is obligated to ascertain the true substance of the transaction and the good faith of the parties when making findings (at para. 13).
[36] In Law Society of Upper Canada v. Chiarelli, 2014 ONCA 391, at paras. 59-60, Juriansz J.A. (as he then was), dissenting in part, addressed some of the reasons that an expansive definition of “landlord” has long been seen as important for the protection of tenants. He observed that tenants sometimes deal only with property managers, and do not know the identity of the owners, which would otherwise bar them from initiating applications to enforce their rights if property managers did not fall within the definition of “landlord”. Juriansz J.A. further noted that “the expansive definition serves the purpose of providing an informal and efficient procedure for determining disputes between landlords and tenants; this purpose ‘is facilitated by permitting such individuals as property managers to assume the role and status of landlords for the purpose of invoking the procedures and remedies of the [landlord and tenant legislation]’ [citations omitted]” (at para. 60).
[37] After having considered the clear direction of the Court of Appeal in Slapsys that in making findings on any application the Board must ascertain the true substance of the transaction and the good faith of the parties, as well as the tenant protection rationale for the Act’s expansive definition of “landlord”, I find that the correct test in deciding whether the Appellant’s communications with Mr. Somo created a tenancy agreement is to determine whether in all of the circumstances Mr. Somo is a “landlord” as defined by the Act. I further find that in not answering this question, the Member committed an error of law that resulted in a substantial wrong that warrant’s court intervention.
[38] In reaching this conclusion, I do not mean to suggest that the law of agency plays no role in the determination of the status of landlord under the Act. Depending on the circumstances, it may be one of many factors to be analyzed by the adjudicator, particularly given the guidance of the Court of Appeal in Slapsys.
[39] When addressing the issue of ostensible authority, however, one must not limit the analysis to the words of the principal; the analysis also includes a consideration of their conduct. The Court of Appeal provides this guidance in Monachino v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 2000 5686 at para. 35, where it states:
Where a person, by words or conduct, represents or permits it to be represented that another person has authority to act on his behalf, he is bound by the acts of the other person with respect to anyone dealing with him as an agent on the faith of any such representation, to the same extent as if such other person had the authority that the was represented to have, even though he had no such authority.
[40] Nowhere in the Member’s analysis of the issue of ostensible authority does he consider the Respondent Landlord’s conduct. In my view, that omission is not an inconsequential error of law.
[41] Notwithstanding that I have found an error of law in the Review Order warranting this court’s intervention, I recognize the Board’s experience and expertise, and therefore, I am prepared to accede to the request of the Board’s counsel and grant the alternative relief sought by the Appellant in her notice of appeal.
[42] Accordingly, the matter will be remitted to the Board for a hearing de novo of the Appellant’s request to review the ex parte Order subject to this court’s direction that the Board determine whether the Appellant’s communications with Mr. Somo established a tenancy agreement by considering whether Mr. Somo meets the definition of “landlord” under the Act.
Disposition
[43] For the reasons as I have explained them, the appeal is allowed, and the Review Order is set aside. The matter is to be remitted to the Board for a hearing de novo of the Appellant’s request to review the ex parte Order subject to the direction of this court.
[44] As the Appellant is not seeking costs, there will be no order with respect to costs.
Justice M. Valente
Released: March 30, 2026
CITATION: Lyle-Mayes v. Lazar et al., 2026 ONSC 1659
COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-259
DATE: 2026-03-30
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
SHYLO-LYNN LYLE-MAYES
Applicant/Affected Person
- and –
AZIZ LAZAR and SERGIO AGOTINO PTEOLI
Respondent/Landlord and Respondent/Tenant
ENDORSEMENT ON APPEAL
Justice Valente
Released: March 30, 2026