2026 ONSC 1461
COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-310
DATE: 2026-03-30
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
VALENTIN BRADU, EUGEN A. CALCIU, MIHAI MINCU, NICOLAE MIHIT, and VIOREL GORGOS
J. Ginter, Counsel for the Appellants
Appellants
- and -
ROMANIAN CULTURAL ASSOCIATION (HAMILTON) INC.
K. Ley, Counsel for the Respondent
Respondent
L. Naidoo, Counsel for the Landlord and Tenant Board
HEARD: February 23, 2026
ENDORSEMENT ON APPEAL
The Honourable Justice M. Valente
Overview
[1] In this appeal pursuant to the s.210 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c.17 (the “Act”), the Appellants:
a. seek an extension of time to appeal the Landlord and Tenant Board’s (the “Board”) order, dated June 12, 2024 (the “Extension Order”), and should leave be granted, they appeal the Extension Order;
b. seek an extension of time to appeal the Board’s order, dated May 2, 2024 (the “Final Order”), and should leave be granted, they also appeal the Final Order; and
c. appeal the Board’s order, dated July 12, 2024 (the “Review Order).
[2] The Appellants seek three alternative forms of relief on appeal. They seek an order that:
i. the Board shall review the Extension Order;
ii. the Board shall review the Review Order; or
iii. the relationship of the parties is subject to the protection of the Act.
The Background Facts
a. The Parties
[3] The Respondent is the owner and operator of a campground located on 10th Concessions East in Freelton (the “Campground”) and units 11, 13, 17, 20, and 28 at the Campground (the “Campsites”).
[4] The Appellants are occupants of the Campsites.
b. The Application
[5] This appeal is brought by the Appellants respecting the Board’s decision that the Act does not apply to their respective Campsites (otherwise referred to as the “Final Order”), and the Board’s subsequent denial of an extension of time to permit the Appellants to file a request to review the Final Order ( otherwise known as the “Extension Order”) as well as the Board’s denial of the Appellants’ request to review the Extension Order (otherwise known as the “Review Order”).
[6] On April 22, 2021, the Appellants filed an application with the Board seeking a determination whether the Act applied to them and their occupation of the Campsites.
[7] The application was heard over four days.
[8] On May 2, 2024, the Board dismissed the Appellants’ application for want of jurisdiction pursuant to ss. 5(a) of the Act.
[9] On May 31, 2024, the Appellants filed with the Board a request for an extension of time to allow them to file a request to review the May 2, 2024 Final Order outside of the Act’s prescribed thirty-day limitation period.
[10] On June 7, 2024, the Appellants filed their review request with the Board.
[11] On June 12, 2024, the Board issued its endorsement refusing the Appellants’ request to extend the time to request a review of the Final Order (otherwise referred to as the “Extension Order”).
[12] On July 11, 2024, the Appellants filed a request that the Board review the Extension Order.
[13] On July 12, 2024, the Board issued its order denying the Appellants’ request to review the Extension Order (otherwise referred to as the “Review Order”).
[14] On August 9, 2024, the Appellants filed the appeal that is the subject of this Endorsement.
Extension of Time to Challenge the Extension Order and Appeal of the Extension Order and Review Order
[15] I turn now to the Appellants’ request to extend the time to appeal the Extension Order.
[16] Subsection 210(1) of the Act provides that “any person affected by an order of the Board may appeal the order to the Divisional Court within 30 days after being given the order, but only on a question of law”.
[17] The Extension Order was issued on June 12, 2024, but the Appellants’ notice of appeal was not filed until August 9, 2024, nearly sixty days after the issuance of the Extension Order. Likewise, the Appellants’ appeal of the Final Order runs afoul of ss.210(1) to the extent that the Final Order was issued on May 2, 2024, over ninety days prior to this appeal having been commenced.
[18] The relevant considerations for granting an extension of time to appeal to this court are not disputed. In Enbridge Gas Distribution v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131 (“Froese”) at para. 15, the Court of Appeal directs that the court must consider the following four factors to determine if the justice of the case requires that an extension be given:
i. Whether the moving party formed a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;
ii. The length of, and explanation for, the delay in filing;
iii. Any prejudice to the responding party counsel, perpetuated or exacerbated by the delay; and
iv. The merits of the proposed appeal.
[19] Neither of the parties nor the Board addressed in their submissions any of the first three factors; rather the focus of their submissions was the merits of the appeal of both the Endorsement Order and Final Order. For this reason, my analysis respecting the request for an extension of time to appeal to this court will assess the merits of the proposed appeal. I undertake this assessment mindful of the Appellants’ submission, which I accept, that even where the merits of a proposed appeal are not readily apparent, a party is entitled to appeal if there is no prejudice to the other side (see: Howard v. Martin, 2024 ONCA 309, at para. 36; Aucielle v. Mahadeo, 2016 ONCA 414).
[20] The parties and the Board raise three issues with respect to the Appellants’ request for leave to extend the time to appeal the Extension Order and the merits of any appeal of the Extension Order. They also raise one of the same issues with respect to the merits of the appeal of the Review Order. They are:
i. Does this court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the Extension Order and the Review Order?
ii. Did the Board properly interpret and apply its discretion under Rule 16.4 of the Landlord and Tenant Board Rules of Procedure, made under s.176 of the Act (the “Board Rules”), in issuing the Extension Order?
iii. Must the Board grant an extension of the time for review when the justice of the case requires it and do the interests of justice require an extension of time in this instance?
i. Does the Court have Jurisdiction?
[21] The Respondent submits that an extension of time to appeal the Extension Order should not be afforded to the Appellants and an appeal of the Extension Order and Review Order should be dismissed because each of the orders are interlocutory in nature, and this court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals of interlocutory orders. In support of the submission the Respondent relies, in part, on this court’s decision in Leginj v. Rahman, 2025 ONSC 568 (“Leginj”).
[22] On the other hand, the Appellants submit that should the Extension Order and Review Order be interlocutory orders (an issue I address later in this Endorsement), the Orders are nonetheless appealable to this court on the authority of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hillmond Investments Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 1996 431 (“Hillmond Investments”).
[23] This court has consistently held that the Act does not give a right of appeal from an interlocutory order. I refer to the decisions of this court in Delic v. Enrietti-Zoppo, 2022 ONCA 1627 (“Delic”); Shearer v. Oz, 2024 ONSC 1890, and Leginj.
[24] I see no reason to deviate from the past direction of this court, and indeed, I adopt it.
[25] In Penney v. The Co-Operators General Insurance Company, 2022 ONSC 3874 (“Penney”), Swinton J., writing for a panel of this court, observes that there are many cases decided in Ontario which have reached the same conclusion with respect to the appeal provisions in other statutes governing a wide range of administrative tribunals, including the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, the Social Benefits Tribunal, the Licence Appeal Tribunal and professional disciplinary bodies (at para. 13).
[26] Ramsay J., also writing for a panel of this court, in Delic, at para. 11, states:
Jurisprudence in this court with respect to similar provisions for statutory appeals from other tribunals has consistently held that in the absence of an explicit right of appeal from an interlocutory decision, only a final order of a tribunal can be appealed [1].
[27] In a footnote, this court in Delic summarized the decided cases as follows:
[1] Roosma v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. (1988), 1988 5633 (ON SCDC), 66 OR (2d) 18 (Div. Ct.); Sazant v. R.M. and C.I.C.B., 2010 ONSC 4273 (Div. Ct.), Stockfish v. Ontario (Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, Registrar), [2008] O.J. No. 2052 (Div. Ct.), Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) v. Ontario Hospital Assn., 1991 CarswellOnt 914 (Div. Ct.), McCann v. Ontario (Police Services Act Board of Inquiry), 1994 CarswellOnt 894 (Div. Ct.), Butterworth v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario, [2001] O.J. No. 5265 (Div. Ct.), Rudinskas v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2011 ONSC 4819 (Div. Ct.), Ibrahim v. Ontario College of Pharmacists, 2010 ONSC 5293, rev’d on other grounds 2011 ONSC 99 at para. 4 (Div. Ct.), Blew v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2016 ONSC 8053 at paras. 6-11 (Div. Ct.), Free v. County of Norfolk and Dietrich Engineering Limited, 2017 ONSC 909 at para. 3 (Div. Ct.), Coughlin v. Director, Ontario Disability Support Program, 2021 ONSC 1236 (Div. Ct.).
[28] The bar to the court entertaining an appeal from interlocutory orders of administrative tribunals generally, and the Board, in particular, has a rational basis in the administrative law context “where the objective is to provide efficient and timely adjudication through administrative tribunals” (see: Penney, at para. 25).
[29] Ramsay J. comments in Delic that objective is evidenced in s.2 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 22 (“SPPA”), and with respect to the Board specifically, in s.183 of the Act. That section provides:
183 The Board shall adopt the most expeditious method of determining the questions arising in a proceeding that affords to all persons directly affected by the proceeding an adequate opportunity to know the issues and be heard on the matter.
[30] Ramsay J. also concludes, and I concur, that “[i]t cannot be the legislature’s intention at the same time to put tribunal proceedings on hold every time an interlocutory decision is made” (at para. 12).
[31] I have considered the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hillmond in my analysis. I find it is of little assistance to the Appellant’s position. The case did not address the right of appeal from an administrative tribunal’s interlocutory order but rather appeal rights flowing from an interlocutory order of the Ontario Court (General Division).
[32] Having found that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of an interlocutory order of the Board, the question now to be addressed is whether the Extension Order and the Review Order are indeed interlocutory orders?
[33] The test to determine whether an order is final or interlocutory was settled some time ago by the Court of Appeal in Hendrickson v. Kallio, 1932 123 (ON CA), [1932] O.R. 675, where the Court provides this guidance:
The interlocutory order from which there is no appeal is an order which does not determine the real matter in dispute between the parties – the very subject matter of the litigation, but only some matter collateral. It may be final in the sense that it determines the very question raised by the application, but it is interlocutory if the merits of the case remain to be determined.
[34] This court in Leginj, at para. 21, observes that the Court of Appeal has confirmed this test numerous times and cites as an example the Court’s decision in Haudenosaunee Development Institute v. Metrolinx, 2023 ONCA 144, where at paras. 33 and 40, the Court states:
An interlocutory order is an order which “does not determine the real matter in dispute between the parties – the very subject matter of the litigation – or any substantive right”: Paulpillai Estate, at para. 16, citing Drywall Acoustic Lathing Insulation Local 675 Pension Fund v. SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., 2020 ONCA 375, at para. 16, and Hendrickson v. Kallio, 1932 123 (ON CA), [1932] O.R. 675, at p. 678. See also Ball. V. Donais (1993), 1993 8613 (ON CA), 13 O.R. (3d) 322 (C.A.). As Middleton J.A. observed in Hendrickson, at p. 678, an order “may be final in the sense that it determines the very question raised by the [motion or application before the court] but it is interlocutory if the merits of the case remain to be determined”.
In any event, even if the practical effect of the order is, as HDI indicates, that the litigation will come to an end, this does not make the order a final order…
[35] Finally, Ramsay J. succinctly states in Delic, at para. 7, “[a]n order is final if it disposes finally of a claim. An order is not final just because it is one of substance”.
[36] In Leginj, the order at issue was the Board’s denial of the tenant’s request for an extension of time to file a review request. Although this court did not finally determine the matter, Charney J., in his case conference endorsement, questioned the tenant’s position that the order was a final order. The court reasoned that the order:
is not a decision on the merits of the case of “the real matter in dispute between the parties”. It is a decision of the LTB not to grant an extension of time to file a request for review. Arguably, a decision on whether to grant an extension of time is akin to a decision on whether to grant leave to appeal, which is not subject to an appeal except in very limited circumstances: Haudenosaunee Development Institute v. Metrolinx, 2023 ONCA 122, at para. 8”.
[37] In Rao v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2024 ONSC 39 (“Rao”), Ms. Rao sought to appeal two orders of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”): the Tribunal’s decision denying an extension of time to appeal the ruling of the Tribunal that she was not catastrophically impaired and the Tribunal’s decision refusing a reconsideration of the denial of an extension of time.
[38] This court found that the Tribunal’s decision denying an extension of time is not a final order because it did not decide the merits; rather the Tribunal declined to grant an extension of time to pursue an internal route to have the merits reconsidered by the Tribunal (at para. 20). The court also held in Rao that the Tribunal’s decision denying reconsideration of the denial of an extension of time is not a final order giving rise to a right of appeal. Matheson J. observes at para. 22, that:
[i]t cannot be that simply requesting a reconsideration would give rise to a right of appeal where the underlying decision has no such right. If that were so, there could be an appeal to this Court from every interlocutory decision, indirectly, by seeking a reconsideration. On the contrary, the statute grants a right of appeal from final decision only.
[39] I find that there are no appeal provisions in the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act 1990, S.O. 1990, c. 12 Sched G., that distinguishes it from those provisions in the Act that would cause me to reach any conclusion other than that which was decided in Rao with respect to the Extension Order and Review Order. The former does not decide the merits of the application notwithstanding it may be a decision of some substance, and the latter cannot be said to give rise to an appeal right when its foundational order has no right of appeal.
[40] I therefore find that both the Extension Order and the Review Order are interlocutory orders for which there is no right of appeal to this court for want of jurisdiction.
[41] If I am mistaken in my conclusion that the Extension Order is an interlocutory order with no right of appeal, I will consider the two remaining issues with respect to the merits of the proposed Extension Order appeal.
ii. Did the Board Properly Interpret and Apply its Discretion under Rule 16.4?
[42] The Appellants submit that the Board did not properly interpret and apply the discretion afforded to it under Rule 16.4 in issuing the Extension Order.
[43] Rule 16.4 of the Board’s Rules states:
The following factors may be considered in deciding requests to extend or shorten any time requirement under the RTA or these Rules:
a. the length of the delay, and the reason for it;
b. any prejudice a party may experience;
c. whether any potential prejudice may be remedied;
d. whether the request is made in good faith; and
[44] The Appellants submit the Board failed to properly apply its discretion in refusing to grant an extension of time to file a request to review the Extension Order because it failed to fairly and liberally interpret the Act to promote the Act’s tenant protection focus. The Board failed to generously interpret the Act because it lost sight of this court’s direction that the Board’s strict adherence to its own rules is inconsistent with natural justice where a party demonstrates due diligence in pursuing a remedy (see: s.183 of the Act; Duncan v. Toronto Community Housing Corp., 2015 ONCA 4728).
[45] More specifically, the Appellants submit that the Board misapplied its discretion because it failed to consider all of the enumerated factors in Rule 16.4 but instead considered such irrelevant matters as the availability of alternative counsel to represent the Appellants’ interests.
[46] Finally, the Appellants rely on the decision of this court in Massoumi v. Manos, 2024 ONSC 5115, (“Massoumi”) where the Board’s refusal to grant the tenant’s request for a rescheduling of the hearing was found to be procedurally unfair and an error of law.
[47] On the other hand, the Respondent submits that the use of the modal auxiliary verb “may” in Rule 16.4 plainly denotes that the consideration of the factors enumerated in the Rule is discretionary. Because the application of Rule 16.4 is an exercise of discretion and the exercise of that discretion falls within the Board’s authority to control its own processes, and any disagreement with the manner in which the Board exercises its discretion is neither a question nor error of law, the Board’s decision is outside this court’s jurisdiction.
[48] Finally, the Respondent submits that should Rule 16.4 establish a legal test to extend or shorten time then whether the facts determined by the Board satisfy the applicable test are questions of mixed fact and law, and again, beyond the purview of the court.
[49] Subsection 210(1) of the Act stipulates that appeals from the Board may be brought “only on a question of law”. A question of law is a question about what the correct legal test is. A question of fact is a question about that actually took place between the parties. A question of mixed fact and law is a question about whether the facts satisfy the legal tests (see: Canada (Direction of Investigation and Research) v. Southern Inc., 1997 385 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, at para. 35).
[50] In sum, questions about whether the Board applied the correct legal test can be appealed to this court. Questions about whether the facts determined by the Board satisfy the applicable legal tests are question of mixed fact and law and cannot be appealed to this court (see: “Lafontaine v. Grant”, 2019 ONCA 552, at para. 6-7; Capreit v. Veiga, 2022 ONSC 958 (“Capreit”), at para. 46).
[51] Where the Board’s power is discretionary, the appellant must raise a ground of appeal asserting some error in principle (see: Capreit, at para. 47). A disagreement alone with the tribunal’s exercise of its discretion is not an error of law (see: Chan v. Tralen Investments Ltd., 2023 ONSC 4345, at para. 12).
[52] I agree with the Respondent that the Board’s authority under Rule 16, and specifically Rule 16.4, is discretionary. The Appellants’ ground of appeal suggest that the Board’s equal consideration of all factors in Rule 16.4 is a matter of right as is the requirement that the Board disabuse itself of any matters that the Appellants determine to be irrelevant. It is not. The Board has the discretion pursuant to Rule 16.4 to consider what factors it deems relevant in determining whether to extend or shorten any time requirements; just as it is afforded discretion pursuant to ss.21.2(1) of the SPPA, and the Board’s Rules to review is orders.
[53] Otherwise, I find that this court’s decision in Massoumi to be of little assistance in addressing the Board’s discretion pursuant to Rule 16.4 because that case is distinguishable on its facts. Rule 16.4 was not at issue before the court. Rather this court was asked to rule on the procedural unfairness of the Board’s refusal to review a decision that dismissed the tenant’s application but granted the landlord’s in circumstances where the tenant was unable to attend the hearing because of medical issues. That is not the case here. The Appellants participated in four days of hearing which resulted in the Final Order.
[54] I therefore find that the Appellant’s appeal does not raise any error in principle with respect to the Board’s exercise of its discretion pursuant to Rule 16.4.
iii. Does Justice of the Case Require an Extension of Time?
[55] The Appellants submit that the ultimate question to be addressed by the Board in considering whether to grant an extension of time is whether the justice of the case warrants the requested extension as informed by a consideration of the same four factors to be weighed by the court in extending the time to file a notice of appeal to an appellate court (see: Froese, at para 15).
[56] The Appellants submit that this court has entrenched the “justice of the case” test for other administrative tribunals, like the Licencing Appeal Tribunal, in the exercise of their discretion to extend deadlines.
[57] The Appellants argue that the imposition of the test in these circumstances is reasoned because the “justice of the case” is a deeply rooted principle of the common-law duty of fairness. Although the principle may be recognized by the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, the test is an independent principle to be applied when parties seek appeals.
[58] Finally, the Appellants submit that in the circumstances, the interests of justice required that the requested extension of time should have been granted to request a review of the Final Order.
[59] The Respondent submits that this ground of appeal is nothing more than an attempt by the Appellants to replace the Board’s Rules and the discretion afforded to it with the court’s established test on a motion to extend time to file a notice of appeal. The Respondent submits that the justice of the case principle has no place in a review of the Board’s decision to grant or dismiss an extension of time where the Board has the authority pursuant to s.25.01 of the SPPA to determine its own procedure and practices and establish its own rules.
[60] Moreover, the Respondent submits that the permissive language of ss.21.2(1) of the SPPA clearly makes the granting of a review of a decision an exercise of the Board’s discretion which is not a question of law, and therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
[61] Otherwise, the Respondent submits the Appellants were not denied procedural fairness at any stage of the proceedings. They participated in the four-day hearing and participated in the usual manner for requesting an extension of time and a review of the Extension Order.
[62] Based on the record, I find that it is unnecessary for me to make any finding whether the “justice of the case” test is to be applied by the Board in considering any request for an extension of time. I reach this conclusion because I find that the “justice of the case”, was considered by the Board prior to rendering the Extension Order.
[63] It is evident from the Extension Order that the Member considered all relevant circumstances prior to concluding that it was not appropriate to grant the requested extension of time to file a request to review the Final Order. In my view that conclusion was not only within the purview of the Baord’s discretion but also reasonable.
[64] In the end, because in my view the appeal of the Extension Order and the Review Order are devoid of merit, leave is denied to extend the time to appeal the Extension Order, and the appeal of the Review Order is dismissed.
Extension of Time to Challenge the Final Order
[65] The Appellants submit that an extension of time should be granted to them to appeal the Final Order and that the Final Order set aside in favour of this court finding that the parties’ relationship is subject to the Act. The Appellants make this submission on the basis that they were denied their right to an impartial and independent decision.
[66] The Appellants submit that the Final Order incorporated without attribution substantial material from a distinguishable decision of the Board, never raised at the hearing, such that a reasonable person would conclude that the Member did not put their mind to the facts and issues and decide them impartially and independently. In this way the Appellants argue that the Board committed an error of law.
[67] Specifically, the Appellants submit that paragraphs 35 to 59 of the Final Order were pasted verbatim or substantially verbatim from paragraphs 10 to 36 of the Board’s decision in SWT-68358-14(Re), comprising some factual analysis and the whole of the Final Order’s legal analysis. The Appellants submit that because 68358 is distinguishable on its facts from the instant case, there is a mismatch between the pasted legal analysis and the facts. It is also the Appellants’ position that paragraph 37 of the Final Order, copied from 68358, is a misstatement of the law.
[68] The foundation for this ground of appeal of the Final Order is the Supreme Court’s decision in Cojocaru v. British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health Case Centre, 2013 SCC 30 (“Cojocaru”). In Cojocaru, the Supreme Court states at para. 13:
To determine whether a defect relating to reasons for judgment is evidence of procedural error negating a fair process, the alleged deficiency must be viewed objectively, through the eyes of a reasonable observer, having regard to all relevant maters: see e.g. R. v. Teskey, 2007 SCC 25… The question is whether a reasonable person would conclude that the alleged deficiency, taking into account all relevant circumstances, is evidence that the decision-making process was fundamentally unfair, in the sense that the judge did not put her mind to the facts, the arguments and the issues, and decide them impartially and independently.
[69] The Respondent submits that the Appellants’ assertion that some of the Member’s factual analysis was copied from 68358 is incorrect on its face.
[70] The position of the Respondent is that this ground of appeal is an attempt to relitigate the facts as they are found in the Final Order. It submits the Member provided a detailed account of the extensive evidence received by the Board and adopted the language of the Board in 68358 primarily to describe the context around a history of decisions regarding the relevant s.5(a) exemption in the Act. The purpose of the Member’s adoption of the 68358 language, does not, however, suggest that the Member failed to be an impartial and independent adjudicator and thereby committed an error of law.
[71] The Respondent further submits that Cojocaru does not stand for the prima facie assumption that extensive copying produces a procedural error amounting to procedural unfairness. Rather as the Supreme Court observes at para. 35, “a judge may copy extensively from the briefs in setting out the facts, the legal principles and the arguments, and still assess all the issues and arguments comprehensively and impartially”.
[72] Like their submissions with respect to the extension of time to appeal the Extension Order, so too did the parties’ submissions with respect to extending the time to appeal the Final Order focus on the merits of the appeal. For this reason, my analysis once again will address, at least in the first instance, the merits of the proposed appeal of the Final Order.
[73] I accept the Respondent’s submission that the Supreme Court’s decision in Cojocaru does not establish a prima facie assumption of procedural unfairness when there is extensive copying. The ratio in Cojocaru is that the presumption of judicial integrity and impartiality is only rebutted when the evidence convinces a reviewing court that a reasonable person would conclude that the judge did not perform their duty to review and consider the evidence and the applicable law with an open mind.
[74] I do not accept the Appellants’ submission that the Member in her Final Order copied some of her factual analysis from 68358. The paragraphs in the Final Order challenged by the Appellants are paragraphs 35 to 59. The Member’s detailed recitation of the underlying facts as she found them comprise paragraphs 2 to 34 of the Final Order.
[75] Whereas paragraphs 35 to 46, 49 to 50, and 53 to 57 of the Final Order are copied from 68358, for the most part these paragraphs comprise a jurisprudential and historical review of how the Board and appellate courts have interpreted the relevant exemptions in the Act and its predecessor statutes where the provisions remained “substantially unchanged”. These paragraphs provide instructive context and a description of the reasons of the Board, its predecessor tribunals, and appellate courts for determining whether the relevant ss.5(a) exemption applies to various rental units similarly situated to those of the Appellants.
[76] This leaves impugned paragraphs 47 to 48, 51 to 52 and 58 to 59.
[77] Paragraph 47 distinguishes the occupancy agreements in the instant case from those considered by the Court of Appeal in Matthews v. Algoma Timberlakes Corporation, 2010 ONCA 468 (“Algoma”), based on the factors as the Board found them at paragraphs 5 to 18 of the Final Order.
[78] Paragraph 48 further distinguishes the Court of Appeal’s decision in Algoma based on the contents of the agreements at issue and the facts found by the Member in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Final Order.
[79] Paragraph 51 reflects findings of fact made by the Board Member in paragraphs 13 to 18 of the Final Order.
[80] While paragraph 58 of the Final Order copies its first sentence from 68358, the sentence accurately reflects the Appellants’ main argument. The balance of the paragraph is the Member’s original analysis of the evidence.
[81] Finally, paragraph 59 adopts similar reasoning and phrasing to that of 68358 in its first sentence but contains the Member’s application of the law to the facts as she found them. The second sentence of the paragraph is copied but reflects a conclusion by the Member based on findings of fact found in paragraphs 2 to 34 of the Final Order. The third sentence is copied as well but reflects a basic principle of contract law.
[82] I turn next to the Appellants’ submission that the Final Order includes a misstatement of the law with respect to the application of the ss.5(a) exemption of the Act to the evidence.
[83] In paragraph 37 of the Final Order, the Board Member states:
The Courts’ analysis with regard to the application of subsection 5(a) and its predecessor exemptions has shifted over time and crystallized with the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Matthews v. Algoma Timberlakes Corporation. However, even in earlier decisions, the analysis centred on the actual contract between the parties, rather than any conduct that existed contrary to that agreement.
[84] The Appellants submit that the Member’s propositions contradict each other, and the latter proposition also contradicts subsequent applications of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Algoma. I do not disagree. However, if the Final Order is read as a whole, as I am required to do, it is apparent that the Member considered all of the evidence, and only after analyzing the totality of the evidence did the Member find that the Appellants’ residential complex is intended to be occupied for a seasonal temporary period, and therefore, not subject to the protection of the Act.
[85] In my view, it cannot be said that the Member erred in law in determining the true nature of the parties’ agreement by focusing solely on the terms of the written agreement between the Appellants and the Respondent.
[86] For these reasons, while I am prepared to grant an extension of time to appeal the Final Order because I am not persuaded that there is any prejudice to the Respondents should leave be granted, the appeal of the Final Order is dismissed.
Disposition
[87] For the reasons as I have explained them, an Order will issue on the following terms:
a. Leave is denied to the Appellants to extend the time to appeal the Extension Order;
b. Leave is granted to the Appellants to extend the time to appeal the Final Order;
c. The appeal of the Final Order is dismissed; and
d. The appeal of the Review Order is dismissed.
Costs
[88] I acknowledge that prior to the hearing of this appeal, the parties were unable to reach an agreement as to costs. Nonetheless, I would strongly encourage them to address the issues once again in light of my decision. In the unfortunate event, however, that they are unable to agree, I will consider written cost submissions. The party(ies) seeking costs may make written submissions within 15 days of the released of this Endorsement and the responding party(ies) will have 10 days after receipt of the submissions of the party(ies) seeking costs to respond. There shall be no reply. Each party’s costs submissions will not exceed three double-spaced pages, excluding offers to settle, cost outlines and authorities. All cost submissions are to be sent to my attention via my Judicial Assistants at HamiltonSopinka.SCJJA@ontario.ca. If cost submissions are not received within this timeframe, the issue of costs will be considered as resolved.
Justice M. Valente
Released: March 30, 2026
2026 ONSC 1461
COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-310
DATE: 2026-03-30
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
B E T W E E N:
VALENTIN BRADU, EUGEN A. CALCIU, MIHAI MINCU, NICOLAE MIHIT, and VIOREL GORGOS
Appellants
- and –
ROMANIAN CULTURAL ASSOCIATION (HAMILTON) INC.
Respondent
ENDORSEMENT ON APPEAL
Justice Valente
Released: March 30, 2026