Schiller v. Goodlife Fitness Centres Inc., 2026 ONSC 1306

CITATION: Schiller v. Goodlife Fitness Centres Inc. 2026 ONSC 1306

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 22929

DATE: 20260312

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT

Sachs, Backhouse, A. Himel JJ.

BETWEEN:

rhonda schiller

Applicant

– and –

goodlife fitness centres inc., PABLO MIRANDA AND HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

Respondents

COUNSEL:

Jamie McGinnis and Nicole Sylvester, for the Applicant

Monica Machado and Joshua Gordon-Katz for the Respondents, Goodlife Fitness Centers Inc. and Pablo Miranda

Mindy Noble, for the Respondent, Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

HEARD at Toronto: March 2, 2026

A. Himel J.

Introduction

[1] The Applicant (or “Ms. Schiller”) seeks judicial review of the decision of Aslam Daud (the “Adjudicator”) of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“HRTO” or “Tribunal”) dated February 26, 2025 (the “Decision”), reported at 2025 HRTO 484.

[2] The Decision followed a hearing on its merits that took place on February 27 and 29, 2024.

[3] On February 26, 2025, the Tribunal dismissed Ms. Schiller’s Application for relief based on alleged sexual harassment, solicitation, advances and age discrimination.

[4] In this judicial review the Applicant submits that:

I. the Respondent Pablo Miranda, the assistant manager (the “Personal Respondent” or “Mr. Miranda”) breached the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19 (the “HRC”) in his behaviour and actions towards her; and,

II. the Respondent Goodlife Fitness Centres Inc. (“Goodlife”) failed in its duty to investigate the alleged sexual harassment and discrimination.

[5] Ms. Schiller argues that the Decision is unreasonable. She asks to set aside the Decision and remit this matter back to a differently constituted HRTO panel.

[6] The Respondents submit that the Decision is reasonable. They request that this court dismiss this Application and uphold the HRTO Decision.

[7] The HRTO makes submissions on the deferential standard of review, the HRTO’s power to control its processes and how it conducts its hearings. It takes no position on the merits of this judicial review.

[8] For the reasons that follow, I find that the Decision is reasonable. Consequently, I would dismiss the Application.

Background

[9] Ms. Schiller joined the Vaughan Keele Goodlife location on March 3, 2018. She was previously a member of other Goodlife location(s) for over 10 years. Mr. Miranda was the assistant manager.

[10] Mr. Miranda and Ms. Schiller interacted regularly at Goodlife. Mr. Miranda’s interactions included air kissing the Applicant, and other behaviors that the Applicant did not want and that made her feel uncomfortable. She never directly told Mr. Miranda how she felt about the interactions. Both parties were aware that the other person was in a serious romantic relationship.

[11] In January 2019, the Applicant told another Goodlife employee, Debbie Fischetti about comments that made her uncomfortable. Ms. Fischetti was shocked and later spoke to Mr. Miranda about the Applicant’s complaints.

[12] Thereafter, Mr. Miranda avoided the Applicant and ensured that another employee was present when they interacted.

[13] Ms. Schiller stopped attending Goodlife in February 2019 as she felt threatened.

[14] In July 2019, the Applicant filed a Member Complaint Form with Goodlife and followed up with a letter outlining her concerns in August 2019. She received a letter from Goodlife in September 2019, stating that her complaint about sexual harassment was not substantiated.

[15] In September 2019, Mr. Miranda left Goodlife to pursue another opportunity, in part because he was embarrassed about the complaint.

[16] On December 1, 2019, Ms. Schiller filed the HRTO Application alleging discrimination in goods, services and facilities based on sex and age, including allegations of sexual harassment.

[17] The Respondents deny sexual harassment and/or discrimination on any ground protected by the HRC.

The Statutory Provisions

[18] Section 1 of the HRC provides as follows:

Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, family status or disability.

[19] Section 7 of the HRC deals with sexual harassment in accommodation and employment but not services. The Code does not contain similar provisions with respect to services. Section 1 does not contain an explicit prohibition against sexual harassment. However, the Tribunal has previously held that sexual harassment in the provision of services is a breach of section 1.[^1]

[20] Section 9 states:

No person shall infringe or do, directly or indirectly, anything that infringes a right under this Part.

[21] Section 10(1) states:

“harassment” means engaging in a course of vexatious comment or conduct that is known or ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome.

HRTO Decision

[22] The Decision included a summary of the Applicant’s allegations of sexual harassment by Mr. Miranda including:

I. greeting her at the gym with European/Spanish greeting of a kiss to her cheeks almost every time that she attended at the gym, which she felt was inappropriate and made her feel uncomfortable; and

II. continuous unwanted comments, touching and conduct which included kissing her on the cheeks, seeking her out at the gym, stating that he liked older women, showing her a photograph of himself with his shirt removed, and asking her out in a social context.

[23] In addition to the Applicant’s evidence, the Tribunal received evidence from three former Goodlife employees, Ms. Fischetti, Christian Smilynov (collectively the “former employees”) and Mr. Miranda. They were employed at Goodlife at the relevant time. The Adjudicator summarized and considered each witness’s evidence.

[24] The Adjudicator reviewed the relevant terms of the HRC and considered the legal and factual elements that are required to assess credibility and reliability. He found that the Applicant was not credible in several instances and appeared to exaggerate her claims. The Tribunal determined that the testimony of the Respondents’ witnesses was more credible in relation to the Personal Respondent’s conduct towards the Applicant.[^2]

[25] The Decision clarified that the Applicant bears the onus of establishing a prima facie case that a violation of the HRC has occurred. If established, the evidentiary burden shifts to the Respondent to provide a credible and rational explanation or raise a statutory defence to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the Applicant’s allegations do not amount to a violation of the HRC.

[26] The HRTO concluded that the Applicant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities that Mr. Miranda discriminated against her in the services sector on the grounds of sex, including sexual harassment, sexual solicitation, or advances and/or age.

[27] With respect to the Applicant’s allegations, the HRTO declined to find that Goodlife failed to fulfil its duty to investigate the sexual harassment and discrimination. Instead, the Adjudicator determined that Goodlife fulfilled its duty to investigate and responded back with their finding and dismissed the Application.

Standard of Review

[28] The presumptive standard of review on judicial review is reasonableness.[^3] The reviewing court asks, “whether the decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and intelligibility — and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision.”[^4]

[29] The Applicant has the burden of proving that the Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable.[^5]

[30] In applying the reasonableness standard, the court takes into account the expertise of the Tribunal: Ontario (Minister of Health and Long-Term Care) v. Association of Ontario Midwives, para. 82. The HRTO’s decisions are afforded the highest degree of deference due to the Tribunal’s specialized expertise in the interpretation and application of human rights law.[^6]

[31] Heightened deference is owed to the Tribunal’s assessment of credibility. The decision maker reviews the evidence, hears the witnesses, and is in a better position to assess credibility than the Court.[^7]

Issues:

[32] The Applicant raises several issues for judicial review:

I. Did the Tribunal reasonably interpret and apply Section 10 of the HRC?

II. Were the Tribunal’s evidentiary findings reasonable?

III. Did the Tribunal unreasonably conclude that Goodlife met the duty to investigate?

Issue 1: The Tribunal reasonably interpreted and applied Section 10 of the HRC

The Subjective and Objective Test for Sexual Harassment

[33] Section 10 of the HRC defines harassment. The definition includes a subjective component (whether Mr. Miranda knew the conduct was unwelcome) and an objective component (whether a reasonable person would know that the conduct was unwelcome).

[34] The Applicant does not dispute the Tribunal’s finding that she never advised Mr. Miranda that his conduct was unwelcome. Ms. Schiller submits that it is not a necessary condition for the complainant to object.[^8] I agree.

[35] Ms. Schiller also argues that the Adjudicator unreasonably imported an objective standard and ignored the subjective element of the test. I disagree.

[36] With respect to the cultural greeting of the double air kiss, the Tribunal found as follows: a reasonable and objective person taking both parties’ perspectives into account would not perceive that behavior as a form of sexual harassment, sexual advance or sexual solicitation. The Applicant conceded that the Tribunal’s conclusion, on this behaviour alone, was not unreasonable.

[37] The Applicant argued that the Tribunal failed to consider the totality of her complaints, and that, if viewed collectively, a reasonable and objective person would find Mr. Miranda’s actions met the test for sexual harassment.

[38] The problem with this argument is that it takes the Applicant’s evidence at its highest and ignores the Tribunal’s findings that: (a) the Personal Respondent did not engage in at least some of the behaviors; and, (b) the Applicant misrepresented, exaggerated and/or misinterpreted other interactions.

[39] Much of the reasonableness or unreasonableness assessment lies with the Tribunal’s determinations in respect of the facts, and its credibility findings. The adjudicator had the benefit of a fulsome hearing; the Court does not. It is well established that the Court must show a high degree of deference to the Tribunal on findings of facts and credibility.

[40] The Adjudicator preferred the Personal Respondent’s evidence, finding that his testimony was candid, credible and reliable. Mr. Miranda did not deny certain behaviours, such as his Spanish greeting or air kiss (which he explained are a normal Spanish cultural gesture and not romantic). Mr. Miranda admitted to walking the Applicant to her car and giving her gym passes. He also acknowledged suggesting that Ms. Schiller could stop by the Starbucks (where he liked to work) if she was around.

[41] The Adjudicator found that Mr. Miranda’s evidence was consistent and corroborated by the two former employees. The witnesses were not friends (and were no longer in contact) with Mr. Miranda or each other. They had no motivation to lie and no longer worked at Goodlife.

[42] In contrast, the Adjudicator found that the Applicant’s evidence was erratic and unreliable. For example, in respect of the elliptical issue described further below, he concluded that Ms. Schiller’s evidence was inconsistent and impractical, if not impossible. The Adjudicator concluded that the Applicant’s evidence that she was not aware of the Spanish style greeting with an air kiss was weak, especially for someone who has lived in a multicultural society and where a simple search on the internet will show what it means.

[43] The Tribunal noted that the Applicant was quite emotional and cried during her cross-examination. The Applicant’s reaction seemed disproportionate to the allegations, particularly given that the incidents allegedly took place five years earlier. The Adjudicator determined that the Applicant appeared to exaggerate certain evidence.

[44] Two other examples of the parties’ contradictory evidence, and the Adjudicator’s findings, are as follows.

[45] First, the Applicant alleged that after leaving the gym one day Mr. Miranda followed her to her car. Without further context that uncontradicted fact is concerning. However, the Applicant failed to disclose that she had a shoulder injury at that time, and that Mr. Miranda carried her bag to the car to help her.

[46] With respect to the parties’ discussion at the Applicant’s car, the Adjudicator preferred Mr. Miranda’s version (that she could stop by the Starbucks) rather than the Applicant’s version (that he invited her to go clubbing and she reminded him that she has a boyfriend).

[47] Second, the Applicant testified that she had to hide from Mr. Miranda to avoid him at the gym. She denied ever initiating contact with Mr. Miranda and calling him “babe”. This contradicted the evidence provided by the former employees and Mr. Miranda. The Applicant sought out Mr. Miranda to obtain free passes (which all staff give out) and for assistance with her membership (several times), which Mr. Miranda did not deny. They observed that the Applicant often called him “babe’ (which also contradicted Ms. Schiller’s evidence that her dealings with Mr. Miranda were always professional).

[48] The Applicant could have (but certainly was not obliged) to use the Women’s Only section at the gym if she wanted to hide from the Personal Respondent. Rather than addressing this option, the Applicant denied knowing that there was a Women’s Only section. The Tribunal found that this evidence was not credible given that: (a) the Applicant admitted to being a member of Goodlife gyms for over 10 years; and (b) the Women’s Only section is situated outside the women’s changeroom.

[49] Mr. Miranda testified that it is common to socialize with members, and that no other patron complained about his behavior. The former employees observed that the Applicant preferred to go to Mr. Miranda over other staff. She would talk casually with Mr. Miranda and was always laughing and smiling with him. Ms. Fischetti described the gym as a very social place. The former employees never observed the Applicant showing signs of discomfort when interacting with Mr. Miranda.

[50] The Adjudicator favored the consistent evidence provided by Mr. Miranda and the former employees over that of the Applicant. Ms. Schiller’s behavior did not align with her testimony that she needed to hide from Mr. Miranda. The Tribunal concluded that the Applicant’s actions in seeking out Mr. Miranda for gym passes and help with her membership, “discredits her story because it does not make sense that she would feel sexually harassed by a person and yet also feel comfortable to go to him for help on multiple occasions.”[^9] I do not agree that the Tribunal must have reached these conclusions based on impermissible myths and stereotypes as alleged by the Applicant.

[51] The Adjudicator found that Ms. Schiller’s evidence about avoiding Mr. Miranda and needing to hide was not credible.

[52] The Adjudicator also considered Mr. Miranda’s behaviour once he learned about Ms. Schiller’s complaints. After speaking with Ms. Fischetti in January 2019, he stopped doing the air kisses. The Personal Respondent also avoided interacting with the Applicant and took steps to ensure that another staff member was present when they communicated.

[53] In other words, once he was informed that the Applicant felt uncomfortable, Mr. Miranda’s behavior changed, and he distanced himself from her. Ms. Schiller admitted that Mr. Miranda no longer approached her, and was avoidant. In contrast, Mr. Smilynov observed that Ms. Schiller continued to engage with Mr. Miranda (which he did not understand given the complaint).

[54] I am not persuaded that the Adjudicator unreasonably failed to consider the “ought to have known” element of the test for sexual harassment. It was open for the Tribunal to conclude that Mr. Miranda, under the reasonable person standard, may not have known that his comments and conduct were unwelcome until he was informed of the same.

Other Allegations of Sexual Harassment

[55] Ms. Schiller alleges that the Tribunal selectively focused on certain conduct while ignoring other alleged incidents altogether. She says that the failure to consider the evidentiary record and the factual matrix was unreasonable.

[56] The Applicant testified that Mr. Miranda said that he liked older women and used to go out with older woman. When asked how this conversation was sexual, she responded that Mr. Miranda had commented that older women have fun and have “their shit together”. Mr. Miranda denied making these statements.

[57] The Tribunal declined to find that Mr. Miranda made these comments. Earlier in the Decision the Adjudicator explained why he found the Respondents’ evidence more credible in relation to Mr. Miranda’s conduct towards the Applicant. He accepted the Respondents’ evidence on a balance of probabilities.

[58] The Adjudicator reflected that even if Mr. Miranda had made statements about liking older women, “it is hard to see how sharing that he had previously dated an older woman and that they had broken up, amounts to discrimination or targeting of the Applicant.”[^10] While the Tribunal’s comments in this regard do raise a concern, the Adjudicator’s comments are superfluous. He was not persuaded that Mr. Miranda made these statements.

[59] The Applicant alleges that the Tribunal summarized but did not specifically address the allegations that Mr. Miranda once came over and showed her a picture on his phone s of himself shirtless[^11] She states that the evidence was directly relevant in determining whether there was conduct to establish sexual harassment, yet it was not considered and the allegation was never adjudicated.

[60] Ms. Schiller raises a similar complaint that the Tribunal failed to analyze that Mr. Miranda told the Applicant she “looked good” on two occasions. The Applicant submits that these statements were sexualized, directed at her physical appearance and showed a pattern of alleged harassment. This omission undermines the reasonableness of the Decision and fails to consider the totality of the Applicant’s evidence.

[61] The HRTO is not required to explicitly address every allegation or argument raised by the parties in its written decisions. Rather, the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that an administrative “decision-maker is not required to make an explicit finding on each constituent element, however subordinate, leading to its final conclusion”.[^12]

[62] In Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), the Supreme Court of Canada held that such a decision will be reasonable “if the reasons allow the reviewing court to understand why the tribunal made its decision and permit it to determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes”.[^13]

[63] I find that the Adjudicator summarized each of the Applicant’s allegations in both the background and Applicant’s evidence portions of the Decision. Even if he had not done so, a tribunal’s failure to explicitly mention every subordinate allegation, alone, does not constitute a reviewable error, provided the decision as a whole discloses the reasoning and evidentiary basis for its conclusions.[^14] In my view, the Decision reaches this threshold.

[64] I find no basis to intervene with respect to Issue 1.

Issue 2: The Tribunal’s Evidentiary Findings were Reasonable

Character Evidence

[65] Ms. Schiller alleges that the Tribunal admitted and relied on impermissible character evidence to make credibility findings in favour of Mr. Miranda.

[66] The Applicant argues that the HRTO has repeatedly held that evidence suggesting a respondent did not harass or discriminate against others is inadmissible character evidence and irrelevant to whether they harassed or discriminated against the applicant. In Rubio, the HRTO found that testimony from the respondent’s witnesses that they had never been sexually harassed, and the respondent’s wife’s statement that he rarely drank alcohol, were inadmissible and of no probative value.[^15]

[67] The Decision includes a summary of each witness’s evidence, including statements from which one could infer that Mr. Miranda had “good character”, or is not the type of person who would sexually harass someone. [The Adjudicator was live to the issue stating that no weight would be given to the character-related aspects of the evidence.[^16]]

[68] To refute the Applicant’s testimony the Personal Respondent relied on evidence that he does not drink and does not go clubbing. I agree that this is the type of character evidence that the HRTO rejected in Rubio. However, in this case the Tribunal admitted it.

[69] Even if the Adjudicator improperly admitted and/or assigned inappropriate weight to the former employees’ evidence that they never went out (or clubbing) with the Personal Respondent and did not observe that he drank (alcohol), these errors are not fatal. There was sufficient admissible evidence (in the form of the witnesses’ observations and interactions, and consistent and inconsistent evidence), as well as circumstantial evidence to enable the HRTO to make the credibility and reliability findings. I turn to that evidence next.

Credibility Findings

[70] The Applicant alleges that the Decision lacks a rational and coherent chain of analysis justifying its credibility findings in favour of Mr. Miranda despite the presence of clear factual disputes, rendering the decision unreasonable. She also argues that the Tribunal relied on irrelevant evidence in assessing credibility.

[71] Ms. Schiller disagrees with how the Tribunal weighed the evidence, who the Adjudicator believed when faced with contradictory testimony, and the factual findings that followed.

[72] For example, the Applicant disputes the Tribunal’s findings about the elliptical issue.

[73] The Applicant testified that she stands at five feet and eight inches. She stated that Mr. Miranda reached up and kissed her cheek when she was at his eye level while on the elliptical (and it was in its lowest position).

[74] Mr. Miranda denied the allegation and explained that he is only five feet and six inches tall. Ms. Schiller admitted that the elliptical would place her approximately one foot higher off the ground. The Tribunal found that it would be “impractical if not impossible” for Mr. Miranda to reach up and kiss her while on an elliptical machine.

[75] The HRTO’s assessment included both factual and credibility findings that are afforded significant deference. The Decision contains a logical conclusion based on the parties’ heights, and the Adjudicator’s finding that he preferred Mr. Miranda’s evidence over Ms. Schiller’s.

[76] The Respondents submit that the Tribunal appropriately weighed the evidence to determine the version of events that best aligns with the totality of the evidence on a balance of probabilities. In doing so the Adjudicator reasonably assessed the witnesses’ credibility and reliability. I agree.

Issue 3: The Tribunal Reasonably Concluded that Goodlife Met the Duty to Investigate

[77] The Applicant expected to be free from unwanted vexatious comments and conduct from staff and other members. The Applicant also expected Goodlife to appropriately investigate her complaint. She alleges that Goodlife failed to do so.

[78] As is evident from the witnesses’ contradictory evidence at this hearing, the line between friendly behaviour and sexual harassment can be difficult to identify within the context of a gym. Mr. Miranda testified that it was common to socialize with clients to make them feel welcome. The former employees described Goodlife as, “a very social place”, where “personal conversations, socializing was normal gym culture – it was about keeping it friendly”.[^17]

[79] It was (and is) important that Goodlife comply with its legal obligation to investigate and address complaints of sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination.

[80] The Adjudicator reviewed when and how Ms. Schiller shared her complaints and Goodlife’s response.

[81] The Applicant raised her concerns for the first time in January 2019, when Ms. Schiller spoke to Ms. Fischetti. The former employee testified that Goodlife provides training on sexual harassment and has a policy on sexual harassment. If Ms. Schiller had expressed unwanted touching or kissing, or used the word “sexual harassment,” the former employee would have reported this to the manager.

[82] Ms. Fischetti described the discussion as a casual conversation and does not recall the Applicant yelling or being irate. After Ms. Fischetti provided her opinion about Mr. Miranda (which was positive), the Applicant responded that maybe it was her and her hormones.

[83] Ms. Fischetti also testified that she was surprised by the Applicant’s comments. When she spoke with Mr. Miranda he too was shocked to learn of the complaint.

[84] The Adjudicator declined to find that the sexual harassment complaint was made in January 2019.

[85] The Tribunal accepted that Goodlife first learned of the Applicant’s sexual harassment complaint when Ms. Schiller completed a Member Complaint Form on July 11, 2019, and sent a follow up email on August 9, 2019. The Adjudicator was satisfied that the organization then complied with the legal duty to investigate. On August 30, 2019, the Applicant submitted a detailed letter setting out her complaint (and admitted during cross-examination that her Member Complaint Form did not have sufficient details to investigate).

[86] The HRTO accepted the Respondents’ evidence that a Senior Operations Divisional Manager called the Applicant to speak with her about the complaint and advised that they would be in touch once they investigated. The Applicant admitted to speaking with someone on the phone about her complaint.

[87] The investigation included a consideration of the Applicant’s written (emails and letter) and verbal (telephone call) complaints, and discovery meetings with Mr. Miranda and other staff to obtain their statements. Goodlife’s legal counsel determined that Ms. Schiller’s complaint was unsubstantiated and did not meet the threshold for sexual harassment. To demonstrate that Goodlife takes complaints of this nature seriously, Mr. Miranda was obliged to repeat the Workplace Harassment and Discrimination training.

[88] The Applicant acknowledged that she received a letter from Goodlife on September 6, 2019, stating that her complaint about sexual harassment was not substantiated. The letter explained that certain factual components of the allegations were not supported by the evidence, while other aspects did not meet the legal threshold for sexual harassment.

[89] While Ms. Schiller complains about the duration of the investigation, there is no legal requirement that a sexual harassment investigation be completed in a prescribed timeframe, unlike in an employment context. Ms. Schiller also complains that the letter failed to include detailed findings, explain how credibility was assessed, or how conclusions were reached. However, she provides no authority for such a standard where the complaint is grounded in a “service” rather than alleged workplace harassment.

[90] Goodlife submits that in accordance with HRTO caselaw, it appropriately investigated the complaint and communicated the results to the Applicant.[^18]

[91] The Tribunal agreed. The Adjudicator found that: (a) Goodlife has a policy on sexual harassment and staff are trained to handle such complaints; (b) the organization fulfilled its duty to investigate and responded back to the Applicant with their finding; and (c) Goodlife treated the complaint seriously and responded within a reasonable time period, in the circumstances.

[92] It was open to the HRTO to find that Goodlife complied with its legal duties under the HRC. The Tribunal reasonably concluded that Goodlife met the duty to investigate.

Conclusion

[93] Interpersonal interactions between members and staff at a gym can be interpreted differently by different people (or by the same people at different times).

[94] The Adjudicator recognized that the Applicant may sincerely and honestly believe what she alleged.

[95] However, the test for sexual harassment is not based on the complainant’s perception alone. It is, instead, whether Mr. Miranda knew or ought to have reasonably known that he was expressing vexatious comments or engaging in conduct that was unwelcome.

[96] An investigation into sexual harassment must be reasonable in respect of timeliness, responsiveness, and a consideration of both parties’ perspective and communication.

[97] The HRTO considered various examples of the Applicant’s inconsistent and contradictory evidence, reviewed the evidence provided by the Respondents’ witnesses, and assessed the parties’ credibility and reliability. The Tribunal reviewed the facts as alleged by both parties against the evidence provided at the two-day hearing.

[98] Ultimately, the Tribunal found that the Applicant did not meet the onus to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment, sexual solicitation, or advances and/or age. Consequently, the onus did not shift to Mr. Miranda or Goodlife to provide a credible and rational explanation demonstrating, on a balance of probabilities, that their actions were not discriminatory.

[99] The Decision provides a clear explanation for dismissing the Application. The reasons contain appropriate justification, transparency and intelligibility. It is reasonable in relation to the relevant and factual constraints that bear on the decision. The Tribunal’s reasons were not, and need not be perfect. The HRTO’s conclusion falls within the range of possible, acceptable conclusions.[^19]

[100] The Application is dismissed. As agreed, costs are payable by the Applicant to the Respondent in the amount of $5,000.

A. Himel J.

I agree _______________________________

Sachs J.

I agree _______________________________

Backhouse J.

Date: March 12, 2026

[^1]: Haykin v. Roth 2009 HRTO 2017, at paras. 41-43. [^2]: Decision, at para. 21. [^3]: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653. [^4]: Vavilov, at para. 99. [^5]: Vavilov, at para. 100. [^6]: Yan v. 30 Forensic Engineering Inc., 2023 ONSC 6475, at para. 27; Ontario (Minister of Children, Community and Social Services) v. Robinson-Cooke, 2024 ONSC 3556, at para. 75. [^7]: Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, at para. 38; Alabi v. Madkour, 2018 ONSC 7006 (Div. Ct.), at para. 17; Graham v. New Horizon System Solutions, 2023 ONSC 310 (Div. Ct.), at para. 36. [^8]: J.D. v. The Ultimate Cut Unisex, 2014 HRTO 956, at para. 66. [^9]: Decision, at para. 37. [^10]: Decision, at para. 41. [^11]: Decision, at para. 29(d). [^12]: Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, at para. 16. [^13]: Newfoundland at para. 16. [^14]: Newfoundland at para. 16. [^15]: Rubio v. A Voz-Portuguese Canadian Newspaper Ltd., 1997 24779 (ON HRT), at paras. 23-25. [^16]: Decision, at paras. 35, 45 and 46. [^17]: Decision, at paras. 31(a) and 32(l). [^18]: Bidwali v. Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board, 2024 HRTO 1092, at para. 49. [^19]: Vavilov, at paras. 91-92, 99, 100 and 102; Wall v. Chartered Accountants of Ontario, 2019 ONCPA 13, at para. 25.