CITATION: Andrews v. Law Enforcement Complaints Agency, 2025 ONSC 792

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 2876/24

DATE: 2025-02-07

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: Jill Andrews, Applicant

AND:

Law Enforcement Complaints Agency, Respondent

BEFORE: RSJ Edwards, O’Brien and L. Bale, JJ.

COUNSEL: Jill Andrews, Self-Represented Colin Bourrier, for the Respondent

HEARD by videoconference at Ottawa: February 3, 2025

ENDORSEMENT

[1] The applicant, Ms. Andrews made a complaint to the Office of the Independent Police Review Director, now the Respondent Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA)[^1] in relation to an incident on December 24, 2022. On that date, Constable Kyle Brown apprehended her because of concerns about her mental health and took her to the hospital.

[2] Constable Brown had received a call from the applicant’s sister requesting a welfare check because she was concerned the applicant was experiencing mental stress and may have been evicted from her home in Ottawa. The applicant’s sister reported the applicant was going to try to bicycle across Canada. After speaking with the applicant’s brother and son, who were similarly concerned about the applicant’s declining mental state, Constable Brown tracked the applicant to a Tim Horton’s in Arnprior, Ontario. Constable Brown was concerned for the applicant’s safety, as she was on bicycle and intending to travel to a western province with no specific destination, was not properly equipped, and there was a province-wide snowstorm approaching. The applicant was admitted to hospital and her belongings were taken to a detachment of the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP).

[3] The applicant complained to the Director, alleging she was apprehended without cause. She also alleged that her bicycle and bicycle trailer containing her personal possessions were seized without authority. LECA referred the complaint to the OPP for investigation. The OPP Professional Standards Branch investigator concluded there were no reasonable grounds to believe Constable Brown or other OPP officers had committed misconduct. He found Constable Brown was justified in taking the applicant to an appropriate place for examination by a physician under s. 17 of the Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. M.7 (MHA). The Commissioner of the OPP adopted the findings of the investigation report and found that the allegations of misconduct were unsubstantiated.

[4] The applicant then requested that the Director review the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to s. 71 of the Police Services Act (PSA). The Director found that the investigation had adequately addressed the complaint and the findings were supported by the available evidence. The Director therefore confirmed the decision that the allegations were unsubstantiated.

[5] The applicant now seeks judicial review of the Director’s decision. The standard of review for a decision of the Director is reasonableness: Engels v. Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2024 ONSC 5104, at para. 30.

[6] The applicant submits the OPP was not justified on the evidence in apprehending her. She further submits the Director had a reasonable apprehension of bias, that the apprehension by the police and the police’s investigation report caused her reputational harm, and that the apprehension by the police violated her mobility rights and her right to counsel under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The applicant also complains about the police conduct in seizing her belongings and not returning them.

[7] There is no basis to interfere in the Director’s decision. With respect to the submission that the OPP was not justified in apprehending her, the Director accepted that Constable Brown acted on the information provided by the applicant’s concerned family members. Constable Brown also considered the dangers of being on the Trans-Canada Highway on a bicycle in extreme winter conditions as well as the applicant’s lack of planning, preparation, and equipment. Although the applicant states she was well-dressed, it was open to the Director to conclude that Constable Brown’s decision to take the applicant to an appropriate place for examination by a physician was justified under the applicable legislation including the MHA and was reasonable in all the circumstances.

[8] The applicant submits the Director also improperly relied on her admission to hospital for seven weeks to justify the decision. She states she was never assessed by hospital staff because she refused to speak to them in protest. However, the applicant’s hospital stay was just one of several factors the Director considered in confirming the Commissioner’s decision. There is also no dispute the applicant remained in hospital for an extended period, regardless of whether she cooperated with an assessment. The Director’s reliance on this factor did not render his decision unreasonable.

[9] The Director also reasonably upheld the finding that there was no misconduct with respect to seizing the applicant’s belongings. The Director considered the evidence that the applicant’s belongings were secured at an OPP detachment and that the investigator offered to transport the property to the applicant at her convenience, which she refused. There is no basis to interfere in this aspect of the decision.

[10] There is no merit to the submission that the Director exhibited a reasonable apprehension of bias. The applicant submits that the OPP had a “vested interest” when investigating the conduct of its own officer. However, pursuant to s. 61(5) of the PSA, the Director is authorized to refer a complaint about the conduct of a police officer to the chief of police of the police force to which the complaint relates. There is a presumption of impartiality. The onus rests on the applicant to demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias, and the threshold is a high one. The applicant has not pointed to any specific concern that could demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of either the investigating officer or the Director in this case.

[11] The applicant’s allegations that her Charter rights were violated were raised for the first time on this application. Because they were not raised in the applicant’s complaint, the investigator did not consider any facts surrounding these allegations. There are no findings, for example, on whether or not Constable Brown made statements to the applicant about a right to counsel. There are also no conclusions in the investigative report addressing whether the OPP was required to advise the applicant of a right to counsel, nor whether a failure to do so would constitute misconduct. In these circumstances, the Director was not required to address this issue in his decision. This ground of review fails.

[12] The applicant raised numerous additional issues that were not properly before the court. For example, the application before the court is not the appropriate procedure to address concerns that arose in the Divisional Court’s scheduling process. The applicant did not challenge the Divisional Court’s case management directions and it is too late to do so now. The application before us also is not a review of the decision of the Consent and Capacity Board, nor does the court have jurisdiction on this application to review the conduct of hospital staff or Crown counsel.

[13] The applicant also requested remedies that are not available on this application. For example, she requested that all records related to the December 24, 2022 event be expunged. We are not aware of, and the applicant has not pointed to, any authority that would authorize the Director or court to order the deletion of the records. The applicant has also submitted the conduct of the police caused her reputational harm and has requested $500,000. Even if we concluded the Director’s decision was unreasonable, which we do not, the PSA does not provide for monetary awards.

[14] The application therefore is dismissed. The Director does not seek cost of the application and none are ordered.

Edwards, R.S.J.

O’Brien J.

L. Bale J.

Date: February 7, 2025

[^1]: On April 1, 2024, the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. P 15 was repealed and replaced with the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, c. 1, Sched 1 (CSPA). The CSPA created the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA), which replaced the former Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD). Pursuant to s. 130(1) of the CPSA, the Independent Police Review Director is now referred to as the Complaints Director. The Complaints Director (the Director) exercises the powers and duties of the Independent Police Review Director in respect of complaints made under the PSA. The PSA continues to apply to all matters arising before April 1, 2024.