CITATION: Houlden v. Ramdoo, 2025 ONSC 2683
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 619/24
DATE: 2025/05/06
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Sachs, R.D. Gordon and Matheson JJ.
BETWEEN:
Ashley Robyn Houlden
Appellant
– and –
Bryant William Ramdoo
Respondent
Michael Zalev and Isaac Risling, for the Appellant
Heather Hansen and Crystal Heidari, for the Respondent
HEARD at Toronto: April 14, 2025
H. Sachs J.
Overview
[1] The appellant, Ms. Houlden, appeals the interim order of Sharma J. dated September 19, 2024, granting the respondent, Mr. Ramdoo, equal parenting time with their two-year-old son, Wesley, pending trial (the “Order”). She requests that the Order be set aside and replaced with an interim order maintaining her primary care for Wesley.
[2] According to Ms. Houlden, the motion judge erred in ignoring the “status quo” parenting schedule and in granting increased parenting time in the face of a contested record where there were disputes about Wesley’s medical condition and allegations of family violence. She also alleges that the motion judge erred in his interpretation of the AFCC-O Guide and failed to explain why the equal parenting arrangement was in Wesley’s best interests.
[3] For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal. The interim decisions of judges in family matters attract a high degree of deference. Contrary to Ms. Houlden’s submissions, the reasons of the motion judge do not disclose an error of law or a palpable and overriding factual error.
Background
[4] The parties were married on August 28, 2015. Wesley was born on April 29, 2022. He was two and half years old at the time of the Order and is now three.
[5] At three months old, Wesley developed rashes and dry, itchy skin across his face and body and was diagnosed with eczema and seborrheic dermatitis. Ms. Houlden claims that during their marriage, she took primary responsibility for managing Wesley’s treatments, which included seeing an American specialist. Mr. Ramdoo asserts that he was equally involved. However, he submits that while the conditions were serious, they have improved over time. In his view, Ms. Houlden is now unduly concerned about Wesley’s conditions and is overstating their severity. In spite of this dispute, he is prepared to provide whatever care Wesley needs to treat his conditions.
[6] Mr. Ramdoo is a partner at KPMG. Ms. Houlden is a chartered accountant and chartered business valuator. Her last employment position before her maternity leave was as a Managing Director at Kroll, where she earned more than $350,000.00. When Wesley was born she went on maternity leave and was on extended maternity leave at the time of the Order. She has recently returned to work on a part-time basis. Mr. Ramdoo asserts that he has always played a very active role in Wesley’s care.
[7] According to Ms. Houlden, Mr. Ramdoo’s behaviour towards her was coercive and controlling, amounting to family violence. In particular, Ms. Houlden says that he was constantly angry with her. He insulted and belittled her. He “punished” her by giving her the “silent treatment” for weeks on end. He isolated her from her family and friends, demanded to know where she was at all times, tracked her spending and her vehicle. He intentionally locked her out of the house, woke her up in the middle of the night to deprive her of sleep and installed cameras and recording devices in their home to track her behaviour. He attempted to undermine her relationships with others by telling them she was unwell and crazy. After the parties separated, he entered the matrimonial home without her consent and was seen sitting in his car outside the home on several occasions. These allegations are disputed.
[8] The parties separated on May 19, 2023, but continued living in the matrimonial home until September 3, 2023 when Mr. Ramdoo voluntarily moved out. He maintains he did so to decrease the tension between him and Ms. Houlden, which was impacting their ability to co-parent Wesley. When he moved out, the parties agreed that Mr. Ramdoo would have parenting time with Wesley from 3:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. every Monday, Wednesday and Saturday. Mr. Ramdoo agreed to this schedule on a preliminary and without prejudice basis with the intention of moving towards a more balanced parenting schedule. In December of 2023, the parties agreed to increase his parenting time on weekends from four hours every Saturday to six hours every Saturday or Sunday.
[9] Mr. Ramdoo continued to request increases to his parenting time, which Ms. Houlden refused. As a result, in March of 2024, seven months after having moved out, he commenced these proceedings in which he requested equal parenting time under s. 16.1 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.). Ms. Houlden filed a response requesting an order that Wesley remain in her primary care.
[10] Two short motions were scheduled – one to deal with Ms. Houlden’s request for interim child and spousal support and the other to deal with Mr. Ramdoo’s request for interim equal parenting time. Mr. Houlden’s motion for interim support was granted on September 10, 2024 by Des Rosiers J. That motion is not the subject of this appeal.
The Motion Judge’s Interim Decision
[11] On September 19, 2024, the motion judge heard Mr. Ramdoo’s motion for equal parenting time.
[12] While Ms. Houlden agreed that Mr. Ramdoo’s parenting time should be increased to include overnight access, she opposed the move to equal parenting time on several grounds. First, she argued that she was Wesley’s primary caregiver and that Mr. Ramdoo had a limited involvement in Wesley’s medical care and daily routine since his birth. Mr. Ramdoo denied this and stated that at all times he was actively involved in Wesley’s care. She stated that Mr. Ramdoo tended to minimize the severity of Wesley’s skin conditions and did not take them seriously enough. While Mr. Ramdoo questioned the present severity of Wesley’s conditions, he asserted that he was and continued to be committed to doing whatever was necessary to treat those conditions. Ms. Houlden questioned Mr. Ramdoo’s ability to care for Wesley on a fifty percent basis given his busy work schedule. Mr. Ramdoo stated that his work schedule was flexible and that he was in a position to provide the care that Wesley needed. Finally, Ms. Houlden alleged that the family violence that occurred during their marriage meant that an equal parenting arrangement would not be in Wesley’s best interests. Mr. Ramdoo denied Ms. Houlden’s allegations of family violence.
[13] The motion judge found that it was in Wesley’s best interests to make an order that would gradually increase Wesley’s parenting time with Mr. Ramdoo such that by May 1st, 2025, he would be spending half his time with his father. He came to this conclusion for the following reasons:
(1) At two years old, Wesley was able to withstand more separation from his primary caregiver. While he required stability and consistency, the motion judge saw no reason why consistent routines could not be developed and implemented in Mr. Ramdoo’s home. With proper communication, consistent care could exist in both homes.
(2) The motion judge found that Wesley had a close and loving relationship with both parents. Wesley was at an age where critical bonding occurs. The motion judge found that Wesley had not had an overnight with his father because his mother had refused to expand the father’s parenting time. This in turn was depriving Wesley of the bonding that can occur when a parent has a child on an overnight basis. While there was no evidence that the father had sought to interfere with the mother’s relationship with Wesley, the mother had consistently opposed increases to the father’s parenting time, which raised a concern about the mother’s willingness to support Wesley’s relationship with his father.
(3) The motion judge found that even if it were true that Mr. Ramdoo has had limited involvement in the child’s daily routine, in such a circumstance, the AFCC-O guide “recommends a step-up plan to gradually increase a parent’s involvement in the life of the child.”
(4) With respect to Mr. Ramdoo’s capacity to care for Wesley, Ms. Houlden’s concerns centred around Wesley’s medical conditions. With respect to Wesley’s skin conditions, while Ms. Houlden argued that Mr. Ramdoo does not take these conditions seriously enough, Mr. Ramdoo did not deny that Wesley has these conditions, kept an EpiPen for the child and expressed his willingness to “follow the child’s diet, routines and medical requirements.” The motion judge found that through “proper and effective communication” there was no reason to believe that Mr. Ramdoo was not capable of treating Wesley’s skin condition and allergies. Ms. Houlden also alleged that the father had failed to detect that Wesley had a fever during his parenting time. The motion judge found that young children often have fevers, that there was no evidence that the father’s care had caused Wesley’s fevers and that, given the brevity of the father’s parenting time, it was probable that he did not have time to detect the decline in Wesley’s health. The motion judge found that there was no evidence to suggest that if the father was given more parenting time he would be unable to treat a fever.
(5) The motion judge accepted that Mr. Ramdoo could make arrangements to pick up and care for the child when the child was with him. However, the motion judge provided that if the father was not able to care for the child on an overnight basis, he was to promptly advise the mother who was to be given the right to care for the child.
(6) The motion judge found that there was evidence that the parties did have difficulty communicating and cooperating together, but that this was chiefly around the child’s medical conditions. However, he found that this did not mean that this was a “high conflict case”, particularly since the father was willing to follow the child’s current diet and medical regime. Further the mother admitted that the child’s eczema had improved and it was a question of remaining vigilant so that it continued to be managed.
(7) With respect to the allegations of family violence, the motion judge accepted that he could not resolve the question of whether the alleged behaviour had occurred. What he had to assess was whether, if it had, it would impact on the parties’ ability to cooperate with each other to care for the child. The motion judge found that the behaviours alleged would not reoccur now that the parties had separated. Further, both parties would be motivated to be on their best behaviour until trial to make the parenting schedule work.
(8) The motion judge found that a child of Wesley’s age should be given as much time as possible with each parent consistent with the child’s best interests. It was in Wesley’s best interests for him to implement a step-up approach to the father ‘s parenting time, resulting in equal time when he was three.
[14] The motion judge made a three-phase interim parenting order. In phase 1, which was effective immediately, Mr. Ramdoo’s parenting time was increased to include one overnight per week. In phase 2, which started on January 6, 2025, Mr. Ramdoo’s parenting time was increased to include one overnight every week and every alternate weekend. Effective May 1, 2025 (when the child was three), the motion judge ordered that the parents share parenting time on a 2-2-3 schedule. In addition, the parties were ordered to share holiday time. If one parent was unable to exercise their parenting time, they were to advise the other parent, who would have the right to care for the child during those times.
[15] On the appeal, Ms. Houlden took the position that, with some minor modifications, the schedule that was implemented as of January 6, 2025 (phase 2) should remain in place until trial.
Issues Raised
[16] Ms. Houlden asserts that the motion judge made the following errors:
(a) He ignored the status quo and the impact of changing it;
(b) He minimized the significance of serious allegations of abuse and family violence;
(c) He made a decision after expressly acknowledging that he had not considered all of the evidence and allegations;
(d) He failed to explain why a 50-50 parenting arrangement was in Wesley’s best interests;
(e) He purported to rely on the recommendations contained in the AFCC-O Guide, but made an order that was wholly inconsistent with it; and
(f) He applied the wrong legal test.
Standard of Review
[17] The parties agree that appellate courts owe significant deference to decisions concerning a child’s best interests, and should “only intervene when there has been a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error of law”: Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60 at paras. 11–15; J.N. v. C.G., 2023 ONCA 77.
Analysis
The motion judge did not err in his treatment of the status quo
[18] Subsection 16.1(2) of the Divorce Act gives the court jurisdiction to make interim parenting orders. When making such an order, s. 16(1) mandates that the best interests of the child is the only relevant consideration. When determining the best interests of the child on an interim parenting motion s. 16(3) sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court must consider. These include the child’s age and stage of development, the history of care, each parent’s ability and willingness to meet the child’s needs and any family violence. Section 16(6) of the Divorce Act requires the court to “give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.”
[19] Ms. Houlden asserts that the motion judge erred by ignoring several important principles that have emerged from the caselaw that apply to interim parenting motions, including that courts are to exercise caution before changing established parenting arrangements, and that compelling reasons are required before an established status quo will be changed pending trial.
[20] In support of her argument, Ms. Houlden refers to several cases- S.H. v. D.K., 2022 ONSC 1203 (Div. Ct.); Southern v. Ree, 2019 ONSC 1298 and Lang v. Qureshi, 2025 ONSC 585. S. H. v. D.K. is a case where what was being sought was a temporary variation of a final parenting order. In Southern v. Ree, the Court made the point that “where parties have agreed to a time sharing arrangement, that arrangement best reflects their initial assessment as to the best interests of the child”: at para. 13. In Lang v. Qureshi, the parties had entered into a written agreement providing for equal time, which the mother was seeking to vary on an interim basis.
[21] In this case, the parties did agree to a parenting arrangement when the father left the matrimonial home. However, it was clear that from the father’s perspective the time agreed to was to exist on a short-term basis only and to expand as the child got older. A variation to expand that time was agreed to a few months later. The father then continued to press for more time so that he could begin to have the child on an equal basis. As the motion judge found, Ms. Houlden resisted these attempts resulting in a motion for equal parenting time being brought. Thus, this is not a case where it can be said that the parties agreed to a time sharing arrangement that was to persist for any length of time. In other words, the status quo in existence at the time of the motion was not one that Mr. Ramdoo had ever conceded was in the best interests of the child on anything but a very short-term basis.
[22] Furthermore, by the time of the motion, both parties agreed that the existing status quo should change to provide the father with more parenting time. Thus, unlike the cases relied upon by Ms. Houlden, this was not a case where there was an established status quo that the parties had expressly or impliedly accepted or that the court had imposed that the parties were now requesting be varied.
[23] The question before the motion judge was how much more parenting time the father should have and when. In answering this question, the motion judge correctly “only considered the best interests of the child.” He then considered the relevant factors under s. 16(3).
[24] First, he considered the age of the child and found that at two years old, the child was old enough to withstand separations from his primary caregiver and that his need for stable and consistent routines could be met in both his father’s and his mother’s homes.
[25] He then looked at the history of the child’s care and determined that, while he could not sort out on the record before him whether the father had a history of extensive involvement in the child’s daily routine prior to separation, the evidence was that the child had a close and loving relationship with his father. Furthermore, while there was no evidence that the father was trying to interfere with the child’s close and loving relationship with the mother, there was evidence that the same was not true for the mother, In particular, she had consistently opposed increases to the father’s parenting time, which raised questions about her commitment to supporting the child’s relationship with his father.
[26] The motion judge then focused on the father’s ability and willingness to care for the child. He found that the main evidence that pointed to concern was the evidence about the child’s medical condition. He then assessed that evidence and found that, while the father thought the mother was overly anxious about the child’s current condition, he was able and willing to do whatever was necessary to manage that condition, which the mother admitted was more stable than it had been.
[27] Finally, the motion judge considered the evidence of family violence. He agreed that he could not resolve the dispute about whether the behaviours alleged by the mother had occurred, but he found that considering the nature of those behaviours, they were unlikely to reoccur now that the parties had separated. He then looked at the issue of whether there was evidence to support the conclusion that the parties could co-operate with each other pending trial and found that there was. First, the parties had cooperated in the past and second the parties had an incentive to be on their best behaviour with each other pending trial.
[28] All of these findings were factual findings that were available to the motion judge, given the record before him. None of them disclose a palpable and overriding error.
[29] In terms of the amount of time the child should spend with the father, the motion judge considered the direction in s. 16(6) of the Divorce Act that a child should have as much contact with both parents as is consistent with their best interests pending trial. He then turned to the AFCC-Ontario Parenting Plan for guidance. That guide makes it clear that the children of separated parents do better “when both parents have stable and meaningful involvement in their children’s lives.” It also supports a step-up plan that moves from multiple weekly day time contacts to one to two overnights per week for children between the ages of 18 months and 3 years and then at three years old to a 2:2:3 schedule. The motion judge’s reasoning on this issue reveals no error of law or palpable and overriding factual error.
The motion judge made no reviewable error in his treatment of the allegations of family violence
[30] Ms. Houlden submits that the motion judge made a “clear error” when he characterized her evidence as to Mr. Ramdoo’s behaviour towards her as “regrettable” but not “uncommon”. It minimized what the Ontario Court of Appeal has recognized as a serious and pervasive social problem. She also asserts that the motion judge erred when he found that even if the allegations were true, they would have no impact on the parties’ ability to co-operate in an equal parenting arrangement.
[31] With respect to Ms. Houlden’s first submission, the motion judge’s remarks, taken in context, cannot fairly be read as an attempt to minimize the problem of family violence. What they speak to is the fact that since the recent amendments to the Divorce Act, allegations of family violence in the form of coercive and controlling behaviour have become far more common. If these allegations are true (and the motion judge made no findings that they were not) this was “regrettable”.
[32] The motion judge accepted that he could not resolve the question of whether Ms. Houlden’s allegations of family violence were true. He then looked at the behaviours alleged and concluded that they were unlikely to reoccur now that the parties were separated. Given the nature of the behaviour alleged – recording and filming Ms. Houlden in the home, waking her up, giving her the “silent treatment”, “gaslighting”, name calling – it cannot be said that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error in coming to this conclusion. On the question of co-operation, the motion judge was alive to the issue and examined the uncontested evidence that spoke to the parties’ ability to co-operate. As noted above, he made no palpable and overriding error, nor did he make such an error when he concluded that the parties had an incentive to be on their best behaviour pending trial.
The motion judge did not make a reviewable error in his consideration of the evidence
[33] The motion judge’s reasons contain the following paragraph:
- There are numerous other allegations and pieces of evidence that the parties recount in their affidavits. I have considered both party’s affidavits and factums. I find that it is not necessary for me to consider all of the evidence and allegations in the context of this 1-hour motion.
[34] According to Ms. Houlden, this was an admission by the motion judge that he was choosing to disregard evidence that related to the following best interests factors:
(i) Pursuant to s. 16(3)(d), the motion judge was required to consider Wesley’s history of care yet the motion judge did not set out Wesley’s history of care in his endorsement.
(ii) Subsection 16(3)(g) required the motion judge to consider the parties’ plans of care. According to Ms. Houlden, the motion judge failed to address serious gaps in Mr. Ramdoo’s plan of care, including how Mr. Ramdoo would be able to pick Wesley up from daycare during the week at noon, given his busy work schedule and how his parents would be able to assist him with caring for Wesley, given that they live two hours away.
(iii) Subsection 16(3)(i) required the motion judge to consider the parties’ ability and willingness to communicate and cooperate yet he did not address Mr. Ramdoo’s withdrawal of his consent to Wesley being treated by an American doctor in June of 2024, Mr. Ramdoo’s refusal to consent to Ms. Houlden’s request to enrol Wesley in daycare until days before the school year began and his attempt to make his consent conditional on Ms. Houlden returning to work.
[35] There is no requirement on a judge to mention every piece of evidence that he has reviewed. The motion judge’s reasons make it clear that he was familiar with the history of Wesley’s care and with the parties’ dispute about the American doctor. As far as the daycare issue was concerned, the parties did resolve that issue. In terms of Mr. Ramdoo’s plan of care, the motion judge was satisfied that Mr. Ramdoo was able to care for Wesley given his flexible work schedule, but provided that if he could not, Ms. Houlden was to be contacted and given the right to step in. He made the same provision if Ms. Houlden encountered difficulties caring for Wesley. His failure to mention the details adverted to above do not, either individually or collectively, rise to the level of palpable and overriding error.
The motion judge’s reasons were not inadequate
[36] Ms. Houlden submits that the motion judge’s reasons do not explain why he moved towards a 50-50 parenting order on an interim basis. According to her, this amounts to an error of law.
[37] As the Divisional Court noted in Pletch v. Pletch Estate, 2024 ONSC 1411, at para. 33, “the failure of a judge to give any or sufficient reasons is an error of law”. The reasons, read in context and as a whole, in light of the live issues, must explain what the judge decided and why they decided that way in a manner that permits effective appellate review: R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at para. 69.
[38] The motion judge’s reasons do permit effective appellate review. They arise from the judge’s basic findings that Wesley has a warm and loving relationship with both his parents, that both his parents are willing and able to care for him (including the willingness and ability to treat his medical conditions), that both his parents have shown that they can cooperate together and will be able to do so in the future so as to ensure that he has stable and consistent regimes in both their homes, that he is at an age where his best interests dictate that he have the maximum opportunity to forge meaningful bonds with both his parents and that the behaviour that the mother asserted constituted family violence did not include physical or sexual abuse, was not directed at the child and would not reoccur now that the parties were separated.
[39] Ms. Houlden also argues that the motion judge implicitly relied on a presumption that a 50-50 parenting arrangement is always in a child’s best interests unless the opposing party can conclusively prove otherwise. Nowhere in the motion judge’s reasons does he rely on such on a presumption. Rather, he relies on the maximum contact principle set out in s. 16(6) of the Divorce Act and the AFCC-O for guidance as to the approach he should take to Wesley’s care pending trial.
The motion judge did not make an order that was wholly inconsistent with the AFCC-O
[40] Ms. Houlden accepts that the AFCC-O Guide “has been found by many courts to be of great assistance in determining parenting schedules that are in a child’s best interests, depending on the age of the child and his/her development stage.” Although it is not binding on the courts, the Guide provides a great deal of helpful information and reflects a professional consensus in Ontario about the significan[ce] of current child development research for post-separation.”: Melbourne v. Melbourne, 2022 ONSC 2299 at paras. 19-21; Dupuis v. Dupuis, 2024 ONSC 4836 at para. 28.
[41] Ms. Houlden asserts that what the Guide actually says about the care of a three-year old child is that if one parent has had limited involvement with the child’s daily routine, there should be a step-up plan to gradually increase the involvement of that parent with the child. In this case, the motion judge found that that limited involvement had occurred because the mother had resisted the father’s legitimate desire to spend more time with his child. Therefore, the motion judge imposed a schedule that gradually increased the father’s involvement, a step-up approach that is consistent with the suggestions in the Guide for children who are between the ages of 18 and 36 months.
[42] Ms. Houlden also argues that the AFCC-O makes it clear that equal parenting is “rarely appropriate” where there is a high level of parental conflict, the parents do not communicate well together and may be “less appropriate” where a child has special needs. The motion judge addressed each of those concerns, and, as outlined above, made findings that were available to him on the record, namely that the concerns were not of the kind that would make an equal parenting order inappropriate. Again, these findings do not disclose a palpable and overriding error.
The motion judge did not apply the wrong legal test
[43] In his reasons the motion judge made the following statement: “The test is not whether the Father has imparted confidence to the Mother that he is capable of caring for the child. It is whether he has established that he is willing and able to care for the child.” Ms. Houlden submits this statement discloses that the motion judge was applying the wrong legal test.
[44] There is no merit to this submission. The paragraph in which this statement appears (para. 3(e)), begins with the statement that “I have only considered the best interests of the child, with reference to the factors under s. 16(3) of the Divorce Act.” The motion judge then goes on to consider those factors, one of which is the ability and willingness of each parent to care for and meet the needs of the child. It is in the context of dealing with this factor that the motion judge made the impugned statement. Viewed in context, the statement is correct, not wrong. The issue is not whether the mother believes that the father has the capacity and willingness to meet the child’s needs; it is whether the father does in fact have that capacity and willingness. The motion judge concluded that he did and, as already noted, there is no basis to find that he made a palpable and overriding error in doing so.
Conclusion
[45] For these reasons the appeal is dismissed. As agreed by the parties, Mr. Ramdoo, as the successful party, is entitled to his costs of this appeal ( including the motion for leave to appeal) in the amount of $29,000.00. It is so ordered.
Sachs J.
I agree _______________________________
R. D. Gordon J.
I agree _______________________________
Matheson J.
Released: May 6, 2025
CITATION: Houlden v. Ramdoo, 2025 ONSC 2683
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 619/24
DATE: 2025/05/06
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Sachs, R.D. Gordon and Matheson JJ.
Ashley Robyn Houlden
Appellant
– and –
Bryant William Ramdoo
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Sachs J.
Released: May 06, 2025