CITATION: Pornaras v. Swadi, 2025 ONSC 1867
COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-00000484-0000
DATE: 20250326
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO DIVISIONAL COURT
RE: Chris Pornaras, Appellant
AND:
Omar Swadi, Respondent
BEFORE: Justice S. Nakatsuru
COUNSEL: Alan G. McConnell, Counsel for the Appellant
Yasmin Fahd, Counsel for the Respondent
HEARD in Toronto: March 24, 2025, by videoconference
ENDORSEMENT
[1] A dispute has arisen as to who the “true” owner of the property located at 218 Lee Avenue, Toronto is. But that is not the issue on this appeal. The issue is whether a landlord/tenant relationship existed.
[2] The appellant, Chris Pornaras, has been living at the property since it was purchased by the respondent, Omar Swadi. There was no formal lease agreement between the parties. Due to Mr. Pornaras’ failure to pay rent, Mr. Swadi successfully obtained an order from the Landlord and Tenant Board (“LTB”) finding that the parties were indeed in a landlord and tenant relationship and that Mr. Pornaras had failed to pay a significant amount of the required rent. Unless he paid rental arrears and voided the order, Mr. Pornaras was to be evicted.
[3] Mr. Pornaras now appeals the decision of the LTB. He argues that the LTB erred in law by drawing conclusions (i.e., that the parties were in a landlord and tenant relationship) that were not grounded in the totality of the evidence. His position is that he is not a tenant but rather the beneficial owner of the property. Mr. Pornaras submits that after separating from his spouse and during his divorce proceedings, his friend, Mr. Swadi helped him buy 218 Lee Avenue and they agreed that he would live there. Thus, Mr. Pornaras was not paying rent but was paying the costs of maintaining the property (realty taxes, maintenance, and renovation costs) and would, once his divorce was finalized, reimburse Mr. Swadi in full for the purchase price and closing costs of acquiring the property, plus interest.
[4] Mr. Swadi denies this arrangement. His position is that Mr. Pornaras has no beneficial interest in the property. He was just paying rent.
[5] On July 29, 2024, the LTB member decided in Mr. Swadi’s favour.
[6] Mr. Pornaras seeks to set aside the LTB decision and to obtain an order dismissing Mr. Swadi’s application for rental arrears and eviction on the basis that the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (“RTA”) does not apply.
A. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
[7] The Divisional Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, but only on a question of law: s. 210(1) of the RTA.
[8] Appellate standards apply. The standard of review on questions of law is correctness: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235.
[9] The main issue on this appeal is whether the LTB erred in law in its findings of fact or its assessment of the evidence. There are limited circumstances in which findings of fact, or the administrative decision-maker’s assessment of evidence, may give rise to an error of law alone for the purposes of appeal. If the adjudicator ignored items of evidence that the law required them to consider in making the decision, then the adjudicator erred in law: Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., 1997 385 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, at para. 41. It is also an error of law to make a finding of fact on a material point if the factual finding is based solely on (a) no evidence, (b) irrelevant evidence, or (c) an irrational inference: Johannson v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2019 SKCA 52, at paras. 24-25.
[10] This Court does not have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an LTB order on a question of fact or mixed fact and law: Ieraci v. Parsons, 2024 ONSC 2013 (Div. Ct.), at para. 45.
B. ANALYSIS
[11] I find that the LTB made no reversible error of law for the following reasons. Each of the alleged factual errors pointed to by the appellant do not amount to an error of law.
[12] First, Mr. Pornaras submits that the LTB drew the conclusion that a landlord and tenant relationship existed without any evidence supporting that conclusion. I do not agree. The member weighed the relevant evidence and drew appropriate inferences from that evidence, in particular the text messages exchanged between Mr. Pornaras and Mr. Swadi, which demonstrated an understanding that rent would be paid, thus satisfying the definition of rent in s. 2(1) of the RTA. Specifically, the LTB member accepted that the texts from 2023 acknowledged Mr. Pornaras’ obligation to pay rent. Moreover, the member made a finding that Mr. Pornaras paid Mr. Swadi compensation for expenses and labour. Finally, the actions of Mr. Swadi were consistent with the definition of a landlord in s. 2(1) of the RTA, including his attempts to enforce his rights over the property as evidenced by the text messages and his conduct.
[13] In short, Mr. Pornaras’ submission on appeal ignores the evidence that was before the member. In my opinion, rather than there being “no evidence” of a landlord and tenant relationship, his real criticism is the sufficiency and the interpretation of the evidence that the member relied upon to make this finding. Regardless of whether I might share the member’s ultimate conclusion on this issue, I find those findings were adequately grounded in the evidence.
[14] Second, Mr. Pornaras submits that the inference of a tenancy from the texts was irrational. There is no merit to this argument. According to the member’s factual finding, the contents of the texts showed that the parties treated one another as landlord and tenant from which an implied tenancy could arise. This is a logical and rational inference. Mr. Pornaras’ submission about the incompleteness of the member’s references in her decision to the texts, or alternative interpretations of them when other texts or evidence are considered, does not raise a question of law but rather a question of fact or mixed fact and law, which is not open to be raised as a ground of appeal.
[15] Third, the member did not err by ignoring pieces of evidence supporting Mr. Pornaras’ belief that he held a beneficial ownership in the property. In particular, Mr. Pornaras submits that the member ignored the confirmatory evidence of Mr. Ray Thompson about Mr. Pornaras’ beneficial interest in the property. Moreover, he submits that the member failed to resolve issues regarding the large payment made Mr. Pornaras to Mr. Swadi, which is alleged to be payment for the property rather rental arrears or other loans.
[16] In my view, the member’s decision must be seen in context. The member rightfully alluded to the principle that the fact of an outstanding claim in the Superior Court of Justice with respect to whether Mr. Pornaras is the beneficial owner of the property has no legal bearing on the eviction application that was before the LTB: Warraich v. Choudhry, 2018 ONSC 1267. While acknowledging this, the member was clearly aware that ownership of 218 Lee Avenue was an issue before her; she made a specific finding that Mr. Swadi was the legal owner. While Mr. Pornaras points to other evidence not referred to in the member’s decision, there is no mandatory requirement that the member refer to each item of evidence in her decision. In the circumstances of this case, the member properly assessed the evidence that was significant to her decision. She was required to make findings about the existence of the landlord and tenant relationship, but she was not required to spell out in her decision all the other evidence pointed to by the appellant as being relevant. Reasons are not held to the standard of perfection.
[17] Fourth, it is submitted that the member erred in law by failing to ascertain the true substance of the transaction, as required by s. 202 of the RTA. This ground of appeal has no merit. The member considered the evidence and the submissions of the parties and resolved the true substance of the primary factual issue, which was whether a landlord and tenant relationship existed or not.
[18] Fifth, Mr. Pornaras argues that the LTB incorrectly characterized the compensation paid by Mr. Pornaras to Mr. Swadi for “a portion of expenses” as falling within the definition of “rent” in s. 2(1) of the RTA as it was unknown what “portion of expenses” the member was referring to in her decision.
[19] Compensation flowing from the tenant to the landlord can include payment of household expenses, labour commenced in the house, or utility charges. The member found this to be the case and characterized it as rent. It was unnecessary for the member to delineate the exact amount of this being the “portion of the expenses”.
[20] The appeal is dismissed.
[21] As per agreement between counsel, the appellant shall pay fixed costs in the amount of $10,000 all inclusive.
Justice S. Nakatsuru
Released: March 26, 2025