Court File and Parties

CITATION: 592182 Ontario Limited v. Red, 2024 ONSC 4935

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 600/23

DATE: 20240906

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: 592182 ONTARIO LIMITED o/a GOWAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, Landlord / Respondent

AND: MYLENE RED, Tenant / Appellant

BEFORE: D.L. Corbett J.

COUNSEL: Joseph Osuji, for the Appellant Spencer F. Toole, for the Respondent

Heard at Toronto: July 8, 2024

Endorsement

D.L. Corbett J.

[1] This is a statutory appeal from the decision of the LTB terminating Ms Red’s tenancy for failing to meet payment terms in a consent order made by the Board previously.

[2] This court has jurisdiction over an appeal from the LTB on questions of law pursuant to s.210(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act. I have jurisdiction over this appeal, as a single judge of the Divisional Court, by virtue of a direction from Associate Justice McWatt pursuant to s. 21(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

[3] The tenant raises two principal grounds of appeal. The first is that she submits that the hearing before the Board was without notice to her and breached her right to procedural fairness. Second, she submits that her non-compliance, as of the date of hearing before the LTB, has now been cured by payment of her arrears and ongoing rent.

[4] The first argument may be disposed of simply. The Residential Tenancies Act provides that a hearing in respect to non-compliance with a prior LTB order for payment of rent and/or arrears may be held without notice: Residential Tenancies Act, s. 78(1). While this provision might seem unfair, in that the tenant is not entitled to notice or an opportunity to be heard at an LTB hearing where an eviction order may be made, it is part of a complex set of procedural provisions that afford the tenant extensive rights. The landlord complied with the requirements for bring a motion under s. 78(1), and there is no reason to doubt that the order made as a consequence was justified in substance. The LTB did not err in law, and did not conduct its proceedings in a procedurally unfair manner, be hearing and granting the landlord’s motion pursuant to s. 78(1).

[5] The second ground of appeal may also be disposed of simply. An appeal in this court is not a de novo hearing on the merits. Nor is it an opportunity to cure defaults that existed at the time of the hearing before the LTB. In the absence of an error of law before the LTB, there is no basis for this court to intervene.

[6] Proceedings in this court are not an economical or convenient way for a tenant to delay a lawful eviction order made by the LTB. Where, as in this case, the tenant has been in chronic default in rent payment obligations and has been afforded several chances and a long period in which to cure the pattern of default, the LTB can proceed, as it did, to grant an eviction order in proceedings brought by the landlord under s. 78(1).

[7] The tenant made a heartfelt plea for “mercy” on the basis that she and her children need a place to live and she has been doing her best. This is a statutory court and has no jurisdiction to intervene where an LTB order discloses no error of law and no procedural unfairness.

[8] The landlord has an outstanding motion to quash this appeal because of non-compliance with interim payment terms ordered by this court pending appeal. That motion is dismissed as moot in light of my dismissal of the appeal.

[9] The appeal is dismissed, with costs of $4,000.00 payable by the tenant to the landlord within thirty days.

[10] The tenant argued that, if the appeal is dismissed, the eviction order should be stayed for a reasonable period to permit her to find alternative accommodation. Counsel initially suggested a period of one year, with an undertaking to keep rent current. I see no basis for this court to intervene in such a manner: the LTB did not err in granting an order for eviction and the tenant has already had ten months after that order as a result of bringing this meritless appeal.

[11] The eviction ordered by the LTB may be enforced on or after September 13, 2024.

[12] If the parties cannot agree upon the form of the order, they may send their proposed draft orders to me, by email to Divisional Court staff, and I will settle the form of the order.

“D.L. Corbett”

Released: September 6, 2024