CITATION: RT HVAC Holdings Inc. v. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, 2023 ONSC 6066
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 131/23
DATE: 2023/11/22
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Sachs, E. Stewart and Tzimas JJ.
BETWEEN:
RT HVAC HOLDINGS INC.
Applicant
– and –
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPEFITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, LOCAL 787 AND THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondents
COUNSEL:
Frank Cesario and Ryan J. Freeman, for the Applicant
Mike Biliski, for the Respondent, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local 787
Aaron Hart, for the Respondent, the Ontario Labour Relations Board
HEARD at Toronto: October 23, 2023
H. Sachs J.
Overview
[1] In this application for judicial review the Applicant, RT HVAC Holdings Inc. (the “Company”) seeks to set aside the decision of Vice-Chair Kelly, dated February 1, 2023 (the “Decision”) of the Ontario Labour Relations Board (“Board”), which granted a certification application filed by the Respondent, the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local 787 (the “Union”), to represent certain employees within one division of the Company.
[2] The Company submits that the Decision is unreasonable because it refused to follow applicable Board practice, which it alleged was not to certify a bargaining unit within only one division (which is not a legal entity). It also argues that in making its decision the Board unreasonably concluded that the Company would not suffer concrete labour relations harm if the Union were recognized as the bargaining agent for the specified bargaining unit.
[3] For the reasons that follow, the application is dismissed. I do not accept the Company’s assertion that the Board unreasonably applied Board precedent and practice, which included the principle that a trade union will generally be granted the unit it applies for unless certifying that unit will generate serious labour relations difficulties for the employer. The Board considered the Company’s submissions about the labour relations difficulties the Company alleged it would encounter if the Union was recognized as the bargaining agent for the specified unit and reasonably concluded that those difficulties did not rise to the level of “serious”.
Background
Procedural History
[4] In setting out this history I am including some detail as to how the issues were framed before the Board. This is because I agree with the Union that the Company has framed the issue somewhat differently before us in its factum. In particular, it asserted before us that one reason the Board decision was unreasonable is that the specified bargaining unit is not a legal entity. I note that, while not abandoned in its oral submissions, this issue was not the focus of its submissions. This was appropriate, for, as detailed below, this issue would not form a basis for setting aside the Decision, unless that fact formed a basis for finding that the Board unreasonably concluded that the Company would not suffer serious labour relations difficulties.
[5] The Union filed an application for certification on July 4, 2021 against Atlas Service Company Inc. o/a Atlas Care. On July 8, 2021, the Company filed a response to the Application asserting that “RT HVAC Holdings Inc. o/a Atlas Service Company (Atlas Care)” was the correct name of the responding party.
[6] The Union responded on August 31, 2021. The Union agreed that the correct name of the responding party to the Application was RT HVAC Holdings Inc. However, the Union requested that the bargaining unit description sought by the Union be limited to only those employees working for the Atlas Care division on the basis that each division of RT HVAC Holdings Inc. operates as a distinct entity; that four divisions were already unionized; and that RT HVAC Holdings Inc. already shifts work between unionized and non-unionized divisions without labour relations issues.
[7] In reply, the Company recognized that the Union sought a certification against RT HVAC Holdings Inc in which the bargaining unit description was limited to “Right Time employees working under the Atlas Care brand.” The Company acknowledged that the Union’s position was that the “Board should find that [the Union’s] bargaining unit is appropriate for collective bargaining.” The Company also acknowledged that the starting point for the analysis “begins with the seminal case of Hospital for Sick Children”. Canadian Union of Public Employees v. Hospital for Sick Children, [1985] O.L.R.B. Rep. 266, at para. 23, sets out the following formulation of the appropriate test, which asks whether “the unit which the union seeks to represent encompass a group of employees with a sufficiently coherent community of interest that they can bargain together on a viable basis without at the same time causing serious labour relations problems for the employer.”
[8] The Company’s position was that the appropriate bargaining unit description was “all employees of Right Time (RT HVAC Holdings Inc.) performing bargaining unit work on the Application Filing Date.”
Agreed Statement of Facts
[9] The parties filed an Agreed Statement of Facts. Of particular relevance to this application for judicial review is the fact that the Company had twelve divisions that operated in the Province of Ontario. All twelve of those divisions operate under their “own unique brand and have their own contact number and sales team that are used to generate business for the specific brand.” Each division also “has a dedicated Operations Manager and roster of employees who are based at the specific brand. Operations Managers are responsible for overseeing the assignment of work to individual workers or a crew of workers, depending on the work order to be completed and work availability.”
[10] The Company was bound by a number of collective agreements, involving separate divisions. It was bound by: a collective agreement with the Construction Workers Union, CLAC Local 6 covering the employees of the division known as Boonstra Heating and Air Conditioning; a collective agreement with Unifor Local 1999, covering the employees of the division known as Mr. Furnace Heating and Air Conditioning; and a collective agreement with the Union covering the employees of the divisions known as Francis Home Environment Heating and Air Conditioning as well as Home Aire Care Heating and Air Conditioning.
Collective Agreements
[11] The Board found that the above collective agreements all contained provisions permitting the contracting out of work. For example, the collective agreement that covered the employees of the Boonstra division permitted that division to make use of employees from Company divisions as long as the Boonstra employees were fully employed.
[12] The Board found that should the Union be certified in the application, “the Union’s bargaining rights would arise pursuant to the GTA Unit” of the Residential Agreement. That agreement permits the contracting out of work in the GTA under the following conditions:
The Employer will make all reasonable efforts to schedule work with its employees first;
All qualified and active employees covered under the Collective Agreement are presently working or have declined work;
The Employer has exhausted the list of available UA Local 787 Residential Contractors qualified and available to perform the work;
(i) The Employer will report a listing to the UA Local 787 of work they are subletting including the name of the contractor, scope of work, location and date it is to be performed by a non -union contractor prior to such occurrence.
Sharing of Employees
[13] The Company frequently shares labour and equipment between divisions, particularly “among Divisions that are in relatively close proximity to one another, namely Divisions in the Greater Toronto Area.” The Board found that Atlas Care obtained workers from other Company divisions, mainly from Boonstra, Mr. Furnace, M & K, Peel and Limcan.
[14] Rahim Shamji, the Human Resources Manager for the Company, testified that neither CLAC nor Unifor voiced concerns about labour sharing arrangements. Nuno Mansouri, the Operations Manager at the Atlas Care Division, testified that “he was not even aware that the workers at Mr. Furnace were represented by Unifor.” Anthony Dagg, the Company’s Director of Finance and Administration, “was unaware of the presence of unions at Boonstra and Mr. Furnace”. Salil Aggarwal, the Company’s Director of Finance “conceded he knew nothing about the applicable collective agreements.”
The Board Decision
[15] In the Decision, the Board noted the Company’s objections to the granting of the application before it. First, it argued that in the non-ICI construction industry, bargaining rights are organized on a geographical basis, with areas being defined by the Board. The Union was attempting to obtain bargaining rights for only a portion of Board Area 8 (the GTA area). Second, the Company argued that the Board should not certify a division, which is not a legal entity. Third, the Company submitted that the Union’s proposed bargaining unit would cause it serious labour relations problems for the following two reasons:
(a) The Union’s proposed bargaining unit would contribute to a patchwork of bargaining units represented by different trade unions, thus limiting the Company’s reliance upon a mobile and interactive workforce, and restricting work opportunities for its workers; and
(b) If Atlas Care wishes to subcontract work, before it can look to other Company divisions for available workers, it will first be required to take other measures, including possibly having to engage workers from the Company’s competitors.
[16] The Board found that Union’s proposed bargaining unit that “was structured along a single-Division model” was “prima facie appropriate unless Right Time can establish serious (“concrete and demonstrable”) labour relations harm.”
[17] On the issue of harm, the Board found that the Company did not prove that the Union’s bargaining unit description would lead to serious labour relations harm. As put by the Board, “[i]t is difficult to conceive that the Company would be forced to make any significant change to its operational structure in order to accommodate a unionized AtlasCare, just as it has not been required to do so to accommodate the other four unionized Divisions.”
Standard of Review
[18] All parties agree that the Decision must be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness.
[19] In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, the Supreme Court of Canada instructed reviewing courts that “[r]easonableness review is an approach meant to ensure that courts intervene in administrative matters only when it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process”: at para. 13. The decision must be examined to determine if it “bears the hallmarks of reasonableness – justification, transparency and intelligibility – and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision”: Vavilov, at para. 99. The burden to demonstrate unreasonableness is on the party challenging the decision and the alleged flaws in the decision “must be more than merely superficial or peripheral to the merits of the decision”: Vavilov, at para. 100.
[20] A reviewing court cannot interfere with a decision because it would have decided the matter differently or because an alternative interpretation would have been open to the tribunal. Thus, in conducting a reasonableness review, a court must develop what has been described as a “reasons first” approach. The court starts with the reasons of the tribunal and examines them with a view to considering whether the rationale for the decision and the outcome of the decision were reasonable. It does not “conduct a de novo analysis or seek to determine the “correct” solution to the problem”: Vavilov, at para. 83.
[21] The Supreme Court also found that “minor missteps” are not a proper basis to find that a decision is unreasonable. A tribunal’s decision is unreasonable “only if there is no line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived”: Vavilov, at para. 102.
[22] Vavilov holds that decisions must be read in light of the “history and context of the proceedings” including the evidence before the tribunal, the submissions of the parties, policies and past decisions of the tribunal. The Supreme Court held, at para. 94, that attention to the history and context of the proceeding:
may explain an aspect of the decision maker’s reasoning process that is not apparent from the reasons themselves, or may reveal that an apparent shortcoming in the reasons is not, in fact, a failure of justification, intelligibility or transparency.
[23] While expertise is no longer a factor in determining the applicable standard of review, it is a factor in applying it. Both before and since Vavilov courts at all levels have recognized the Board’s specialized expertise in determining grievances filed under s. 133 of the Act and have held that the Board should be afforded the highest degree of deference in its interpretation of collective agreements.
[24] In Electrical Power Systems Construction Association v. Labourer’s International Union of America, 2022 ONSC 2313, [2022] O.L.R.B. Rep. 497 (Div. Ct.), the Divisional Court held, at paras. 14 and 15:
[14] In reviewing a Board, judges should remain mindful of its expertise. Labour relations is a complex and sensitive field of law. The Ontario Court of Appeal has observed that “the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, over the course of many decades, show an unbroken commitment to affording labour relations boards the highest levels of judicial deference on matters within their exclusive jurisdiction.” (Maystar General Contractors Inc. v. International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, Local 1819, 2008 ONCA 265, [2008] O.J. No. 1353, at para. 42).
[15] The interpretation of collective agreements is at the very heart of the Board’s jurisdiction. In line with Vavilov, labour arbitrators and boards should be afforded the highest degree of deference in their interpretation of these agreements. [Citation omitted.]
[25] In Turkiewicz (Tomasz Turkiewicz Custom Masonry Homes) v. Bricklayers, Masons Independent Union of Canada, Local 1, 2022 ONCA 780, 476 D.L.R. (4th) 421, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dealt with an appeal from a Divisional Court decision that quashed three decisions of the Board. In allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal made the following comments about the role of expertise, at para. 61:
[61] I would add that the reviewing court must bear in mind the expertise of the administrative decision maker with respect to the questions before it. At para. 31 of Vavilov, the Supreme Court states that “expertise remains a relevant consideration in conducting a reasonableness review”. Being attentive to a decision maker’s demonstrated expertise may reveal to a court why a decision maker reached a particular outcome or provided less detail in its consideration of a given issue (para. 93). Moreover, decision makers’ specialized expertise may lead them to rely, when conducting statutory interpretation, on “considerations that a court would not have thought to employ but that actually enrich and elevate the interpretive exercise” (para. 119). As such, relevant expertise of the administrative decision maker must be borne in mind by a court conducting a reasonableness review, both when examining the rationality and logic of the decision maker’s reasoning process and the decision itself, in light of the factual and legal constraints bearing on it.
[26] In this case, the Board was dealing with a certification application within the construction industry. The Divisional Court has observed that “[t]he Board’s work within the construction industry is essentially a specialty within a specialty”: I.B.E.W. Local 894 v. I.B.E.W. First-District Canada, 2014 ONSC 1997, [2014] O.L.R.B. Rep. 423 (Div. Ct.), at para. 34. The court has repeatedly taken note of this in dismissing applications for judicial review (see, most recently, Strasser & Lang v. Carpenter’s District Council of Ontario et al., 2023 ONSC 2247 (Div. Ct.)).
[27] With respect to the certification provisions of the Labour Relations Act and the determination of the appropriate bargaining unit, the Divisional Court has noted that the “Board was created over 70 years ago. From the outset of its creation, the Board has had the obligation to certify trade unions to represent employees in appropriate bargaining units. If there can be said to be a prime example of the Board’s core functions, this is it”: Audio Visual Services (Canada) Corp. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board, 2019 ONSC 5717, [2019] O.L.R.B. Rep. 677 (Div. Ct.), at para. 58.
Issues Raised
[28] As already noted, the Company argued that the Decision was unreasonable for two reasons. First, it “failed to follow a well-established and understood Board practice against certifying a trade union in respect of an employer that is not a legal entity.” In oral submissions the Company’s focus was less on the fact that the bargaining unit was not a “legal entity”, and more on the fact that the bargaining unit was a division within a company. Second, the Company argued that the Board unreasonably disregarded the labour relations harm the Company would suffer if the Board certified a bargaining unit based on a single division. The specific harms alleged were fragmentation and the restrictions against contracting out in the applicable collective agreement that the Company argued could have the effect of forcing it to give work to its competitors rather than using the employees of other divisions within the Company.
Analysis
The Board did not issue a certificate in respect of an employer that is not a legal entity.
[29] The Company is correct that the Board jurisprudence contains a principle that in the absence of the agreement of the parties, “the Board ought not to certify a trade union in respect of an employer that is not a legal entity”: Canadian Construction Workers Union v. Newton Group Ltd., at para. 7.
[30] However, as the above recital of the facts indicate, the Union accepted this principle and agreed in its submissions of August 31, 20121 that the correct identity of the responding party employer was RT HVAC Holdings Inc. RT HVAC Holdings Inc. is the legal entity named in the certificates issued in the application, and is the legal entity for whom the Union has gained bargaining rights to represent its employees.
There is no well-established Board practice against limiting bargaining units to a division of a legal entity.
[31] In the Decision, the Board dealt with the Company’s submission on this point as follows, at paras. 42-45:
The parties agree that RT HVAC Holdings Inc. is the correct name of the responding party. However, the Union seeks to be certified in relation to a single Division or business Division of Right Time. Right Time contends that bargaining units described in such a manner are not appropriate for collective bargaining.
In Forma-Finishing, the displacing trade union applied to represent all cement masons and cement masons’ apprentices employed by a Division (Forma Finishing) of a numbered corporate responding party. There was another Division, Forma-Con, controlled by the same numbered corporation. The responding party and the incumbent union took the position that the applicant was required to apply for both Divisions, relying on the Board’s preference as articulated in Beatrice Foods (Ontario) Limited, [1982] OLRB Rep. June 815, to identify a corporate entity rather than a Division as employer.
The Board in Forma Finishing rejected any notion that bargaining units structured on Divisional lines are automatically inappropriate for collective bargaining. The Board stated, as a general principle, that the Board will find as appropriate an applicant trade union’s proposed bargaining unit “unless concrete and demonstrable serious labour relations problems will arise from the granting of that bargaining unit.” In that case, neither the employer nor the incumbent union could establish such problems with the trade union’s proposed Divisional bargaining unit.
I agree with the approach taken by the Board in Forma Finishing. On the face of it, the Union’s proposed bargaining units structured along a single-Division model are prima facie appropriate unless Right Time can establish serious (“concrete and demonstrable”) labour relations harm. The issue before the Board is not whether the bargaining unit proposed by the Company is preferable or superior. The question is whether the Union’s proposed unit is “viable for collective bargaining” (paragraph 28, Alstom Canada, supra, referring to Hospital for Sick Children, supra).
[32] The Company asserts that the Board unreasonably applied the general principle cited in Hospital for Sick Children and relied on in Operative Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ International Association of the United States and Canada Union Local 598 v. 1033803 Ontario Inc. o/a Forma-Finishing (“Forma-Finishing”). The Company asserts that Board used this general principle—that the Board will find a union’s proposed bargaining unit appropriate if it is viable for collective bargaining unless serious labour relations harm can be demonstrated—"to push aside an accepted and well-understood Board practice” against granting a certification in relation to a bargaining unit made up of a division of a company. In support of its submission that there was such an “accepted and well-understood Board practice” the Company relied on the decision of the Board in Millwright District Council of Ontario, Local 1410 v. Alcan Aluminum Limited, 35 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 51, where the Board stated the following, at para. 53:
- However, I do think it appropriate to make the following observations. The Board has generally not found it appropriate to limit a construction industry bargaining unit in the manner proposed by the Alcan business units except on agreement of the parties, or perhaps where the “division” to which the bargaining rights are restricted is either in fact the only division of the employer, or is the only part or division of the employer which conducts all of the employer’s business in the construction industry as a separate entity.
[33] It is misleading to rely on the Alcan Aluminum decision for the proposition that there is a Board practice against certifying bargaining units composed of divisions that displaces the general principle cited in Hospital for Sick Children that the Board relied on in making its decision. In Alcan Aluminum, the union sought to certify a bargaining unit composed of all the company employees. The respondents opposed the company-wide bargaining unit and maintained that the bargaining unit description ought to be limited to one division. Thus, in rejecting the respondents’ argument, the Board made a decision that was in keeping with the principle in favour of accepting a union’s description of its bargaining unit if the unit is viable for collective bargaining and no serious labour relations harm is demonstrated.
[34] The Company was unable to point to a single authority in support of its proposition that the Board acted unreasonably in its application of this principle. Further, in Beatrice Foods, one of the decisions relied on by the respondents in Forma-Finishing to oppose a bargaining unit description that only contained the employees of one division, the Board, after concluding that a legal entity must be named in the style of cause as the employer, goes on to say, at para. 3, that the bargaining unit description may be limited by division:
If, as in the present case, it is appropriate to restrict the applicant’s bargaining rights to employees who work in a particular division that has been established by their corporate employer, this can be accomplished by referring to that division in the description of the bargaining unit as was done in the aforementioned decision dated May 31, 1982 in which the unit was described as “all employees of the respondent in its Model Dairy Division at Sault St. Marie…”. [Emphasis in original.]
[35] For these reasons there is no merit to the Company’s submission that the Board acted unreasonably in finding that there is no presumption that a division-based bargaining unit is inappropriate.
The Board’s conclusion that the Company had failed to demonstrate that certifying the bargaining unit proposed by the Union would cause “serious” labour relations harm was reasonable.
Fragmentation
[36] The Company submits that the Board did mot deal with its assertion that allowing the Union’s bargaining unit description would leave the Company “open to becoming organized by a different trade union. That would lead to a potential conflict in bargaining rights, jurisdictional disputes, grievances and further limitations on the mobility of its own employees.”
[37] There is no merit to this submission.
[38] At para. 36 of the Decision, the Board sets out the Company’s position on this issue:
The Company further contends that the Union’s proposed bargaining structure will potentially contribute to a patchwork of bargaining units represented by different trade unions, thus limiting Right Time’s reliance upon a mobile and interactive workforce, and restricting work opportunities for its workers.
[39] At para. 38, the Board notes the Company’s reliance on the decision in National Automobile Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) v. Christion Horizons for the principle that:
…the narrower unit would cause a real potential for fragmentation and jurisdictional disputes should another union organize the remaining non-union employees performing the same work in similar facilities and in close geographic proximity but beyond the boundaries of the union’s bargaining unit.
[40] At para. 46, the Board addresses the Company’s submission as follows:
As the Union points out, several of Right Time’s Divisions were unionized several years prior to the filing of the applications for certification in this proceeding. That structure, a mix of union and non-union Divisions, has not produced evidence of any impediment to the inter-Division sharing of human resources. In fact, the employees working for Boonstra, Mr. Furnace, Francis Home Environment and the Home Aire Care Divisions work harmoniously under very different terms and conditions of employment despite the centralization of a number of Right Time’s operational functions. AtlasCare has deployed its non-union workers to Boonstra’s and Mr. Furnace’s union shops and has borrowed bargaining unit personnel from both of those Divisions with no negative labour relations outcome despite the fact that the terms and conditions of employment in each Division varied in a number of respects, such as wage rates and benefit entitlements, to name a few. None of the Company’s witnesses, except Mr. Shamji, disclosed any problems with these arrangements. In fact, Mr. Dagg was unaware of the presence of unions at Boonstra and Mr. Furnace; Mr. Aggarwal conceded he knew nothing about the applicable collective agreements; and Mr. Mansouri, AtlasCare’s Operations Manager, was indifferent to whether Mr. Furnace’s staff were in a union (he did not know).
[41] Thus, far from ignoring the Company’s submission, the Board considered its arguments and found that there already were unions with bargaining rights for various divisions of the Company with overlapping work jurisdictions and the sharing of labour, and found that the Company had not identified any labour relations issue that had arisen as a result of that structure. Its analysis and conclusion in this regard were reasonable.
Alleged Harm That Would Be Caused by the Collective Agreement at Issue
[42] The Company argued that unlike the collective agreements that are in place with Boonstra and Mr. Furnace, the collective agreement at issue could force its AtlasCare Division to offer work within the Union’s bargaining rights to competitors who are also bound to the Union before contacting other Right Time divisions for labour.
[43] The Company’s evidence on this issue came from Mr. Shamji. That evidence is summarized at para. 31 of the Decision:
Mr. Shamji testified that, in his view, the above conditions for subcontracting would be potentially onerous to Right Time and its practice of sharing labour among Divisions in the GTA. He held that view despite the fact that as of the date of his testimony on August 31, 2022, there was only one subcontractor in the GTA bound to the Union. Mr. Shamji stated that that could change in future, that many more subcontractors in the GTA could become bound to the Union. Furthermore, even if the current bound subcontractor has sufficient work to keep its employees fully employed, Mr. Shamji said that that too could change in a matter of weeks.
[44] The Board considered that evidence and, at para. 48, found it be “more on the speculative side.” The Company is essentially asserting before us that this assessment of the evidence was “unreasonable”.
[45] To reach this conclusion would require us to do our own weighing of the evidence at issue. This runs contrary to the function of a reviewing court on a reasonableness analysis. Our task is to assess the reasonableness of the Board’s decision, in the context of the labour relations expertise of the tribunal below, not to reweigh the evidence that it has already considered.
[46] The Company also argued that the Board ignored a key aspect of the collective agreement at issue – namely, that the Company is not a party to the agreement; the agreement is between the Ontario Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Contractors’ Association and the Union. According to the Company, this will cause them serious labour relations harm as it will not be able to bargain directly with the Union if difficulties do occur.
[47] I agree with the Union that this is not an attack on the reasonableness of the Decision; it is an attack on the accreditation provisions of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A that mandate that employers must work with a bargaining agency. I also find that there was no need for the Board to address this argument as it found that the current wording of the collective agreement would not cause serious labour relations harm. It was therefore not necessary for it to address whether the Company would or would not have the opportunity to change the language of that agreement.
Conclusion
[48] For these reasons the application is dismissed. As agreed by the parties, the Company is to pay the Union its costs, fixed in the amount of $7,500.00, all inclusive.
H. Sachs J.
I agree _______________________________
E. Stewart J.
I agree _______________________________
Tzimas J.
Released: November 22, 2023
CITATION: RT HVAC Holdings Inc. v. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, 2023 ONSC 6066
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 131/23
DATE: 2023/11/22
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Sachs, E. Stewart and Tzimas JJ.
BETWEEN:
RT HVAC HOLDINGS INC.
Applicant
– and –
UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPEFITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, LOCAL 787 AND THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
H. SACHS J.
Released: November 22, 2023