CITATION: All Canada Crane Rental Corp. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 2023 ONSC 5757
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 037/23
DATE: 2023/10/13
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Sachs, Gordon and Schabas JJ.
BETWEEN:
All Canada Crane Rental Corp.
Applicant
– and –
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 793, Ontario Erectors Association Incorporated and Ontario Labour Relations Board
Respondents
Frank Cesario and Jonathan Maier, for the Applicant
Robert Gibson and Nick Ruhloff-Queiruga, for the Respondent, International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 793
Andrea Bowker, for the Ontario Labour Relations Board
Chris West, for the Intervenor, Ontario Erectors Association Incorporation
HEARD at Toronto: September 28, 2023
H. Sachs J.
Overview
[1] The Applicant, All Canada Crane Rentals Corp. (the “Employer” or “All Canada”) seeks to judicially review the decision of Vice-Chair Thomas Kuttner, K.C. of the Ontario Labour Relations Board (the “Board”) dated December 23, 2022 (the “Decision”). The Decision upheld a grievance brought by the International Union of Operating Engineers (the “Union”) in which the Union asserted that All Crane had violated the Provincial Collective Agreement (the “Provincial Agreement”) by failing to properly pay weekly Room and Board in accordance with that agreement. Ontario Erectors Association Incorporated appeared as an intervenor at the Board in support of All Canada’s position. It did the same before us.
[2] The Decision being challenged relates to the Board’s interpretation and application of the Provincial Agreement and its provisions providing for Room and Board. For the reasons that follow, I find that the Board’s decision is consistent with longstanding principles of collective agreement interpretation and is reasonable. Therefore, the application is dismissed.
Background
Events Leading to the Grievance
[3] The Union and the Operating Engineers Employer Bargaining Agency (the “EBA”) were subject to a 2019-2022 Provincial Agreement (the “Expired Provincial Agreement”) that required the payment of a room and board allowance to employees who worked out of town. Higher room and board allowances were paid when employees worked on longer out-of-town jobs. If an employee worked out of town at a faraway job for four days or less in a week, they received a daily allowance of $163.50. Once an employee exceeded this four-day threshold, they received a room and board allowance of $953.18. As the Board noted, at para. 4:
- The practical effect of these provisions is that when an employee is away for five (5) days, the weekly amount of $953.50 exceeds what would be the daily amount for 5 days: $817.50 However, if away six (6) or seven (7) days, pay for the daily amount exceeds that paid for the weekly amount: $981.00 and $1.144.50 respectively.
[4] In the spring of 2022, the Union and the EBA were negotiating a renewal of the Expired Provincial Agreement that would run from 2022-2025. These negotiations led to a Memorandum of Agreement (“April 30, 2022 MOA”) between the Union and the EBA, which the Union recommended for ratification by their membership. The April 30, 2022 MOA provided that “subject to ratification by the Union on or before May 15, 2022, the parties agree that the [Expired Provincial Agreement] will form the Renewal Agreement except for the following amendments as follows: …” Included in the changes proposed were changes to the room and board allowances payable to employees who worked out of town. Specifically, the April 30, 2022 MOA provided for a 5% annual increase in the rates set out for room and board in Schedule A of the Expired Provincial Agreement. That increase would apply to both the daily and the weekly rate.
[5] On May 1, 2022, despite the recommendation of the Union, the membership rejected the April 30, 2022 MOA and voted to go on strike The three primary issues that led to the rejection of the agreement by the membership were wage increases, payments for parking and room and board.
[6] On May 2, 2022, the province-wide strike commenced.
[7] The parties returned to the bargaining table on May 18, 2022 to try to reach an agreement that would be acceptable to and ratified by the membership. A number of proposals were exchanged and at 8:30 p.m. the Union presented its final offer, which was accepted by the EBA (“May 18, 2022 MOA”).
[8] On May 20, 2022, the May 18, 2022 MOA was ratified by Union membership, bringing an end to the strike.
[9] The May 18, 2022 MOA contained the following provisions that are relevant to this application. First, it began with the following statement:
ALL ITEMS AND ATTACHED SCHEDULES AS AGREED TO IN MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT EXECUTED ON APRIL 30,2022 EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW
[10] Second, it contained the following provision with respect to room and board:
- Room and Board for ALL schedules:
(a) All Room and Board allowance to be paid on a daily basis for each day the employee is required to be away. The Employer may continue to pay the Room and Board allowance to keep the employee out of town, and the employee shall not be entitled to any travelling expenses, except and on the final day of the job, when the employee returns home. For clarity, employees remain entitled to travelling expenses and commuting allowance on the first day of the job.
(b) Should the cost of accommodation exceed the amounts identified below, the employer shall reimburse the employee the difference in cost of accommodation upon presentation of a valid receipt. The location of the accommodation is subject to approval by the employer, but approval shall not be unreasonably denied.
Current per day Board increases as follows (except Schedules E, F, & H who reached separate agreements on Board increases per day as per signed MOA dated April 30, 2022):
May 1, 2022: +6%
May 1, 2023: +7%
May 1, 2024: +6%
[11] The April 30, 2022 MOA made it clear that except as specifically amended in that document, the provisions of the Expired Collective Agreement were to continue to apply. Similarly, the May 18, 2022 MOA provided that except as specifically amended in that document, the provisions of the April 30, MOA would apply. The May 18, 2022 MOA referenced the “per day” Room and Board increases, but made no mention of a weekly rate.
[12] On September 22, 2022 the Union grieved All Canada Crane for failing to pay the weekly Room and Board amount to two members who were required to be away for five (5) days.
[13] Fundamentally, the question before the Board was whether the language of the May 18, 2022 was clear enough to take away the entitlement to a weekly rate. If it was not, the weekly rate provisions set out in the Expired Provincial Agreement, as amended by the April 30, MOA, continued to apply.
The Board Decision
[14] The Board began by defining the issue before it in the following manner:
At issue between the parties is whether Art. 4.1.d) i), which provides for weekly Room and Board, and which was incorporated into the renewal agreement, continues in effect – as submitted by the Union; or was superseded by the provisions in the May 18, Memorandum of Agreement, which provides that increases to the daily rate on all schedules, including schedule “A” are to be paid on a per day basis – as submitted by the Employer.
[15] The Board detailed the practical effect of the dispute from each party’s perspective:
The weekly rate of the Room and Board allowance effective May 1, 2022 is $1213.17, payable if the employee is away from the home base for five, six or seven days. The daily rate of the Room and Board allowance effective May 1, 2022 is $173.31.
The Employer position is that payment of a weekly Room and Board allowance has been superseded by the first sentence of Art.2 of the May 18th Minutes of Settlement which stipulates:
Room and Board for ALL Schedules
(a) All Board to be paid on a per day basis for each day the employee is required to be away from work.
The Employer would have the Room and Board allowance payable at the daily rate multiplied by the number of days the employee is away from home base so that on the fifth day, the employee would receive $865.55 ($173.31 x 5); on the sixth day away $1039.86 ($173.31 x 6); and only on the seventh day away does it equal the weekly rate of $1213.17 ($173.31 x 7).
[16] The Board began its analysis by articulating the applicable principles for contract interpretation laid out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 633. That decision confirmed that the courts must “have regard for the surrounding circumstances — often referred to as the factual matrix — when interpreting a written contract”: Sattva, at para. 46. The Board identified the following surrounding circumstances that had to be taken into account in its interpretative exercise, which it identified as more complicated than just interpreting one document; it involved reconciling Article 4.1 d) i) of the Expired Provincial Agreement with Article 2 of the May 18, 2022 MOA:
(a) The ongoing province-wide strike of employees, which had had an impact on the entire construction industry;
(b) The refusal of the membership to ratify the April 30, 2022 MOA, despite it having been recommended by the Union;
(c) The terms and conditions of the Expired Provincial Agreement;
(d) The “extreme pressure” on the negotiating teams to reach an agreement that would be acceptable to the Union membership;
(e) The three principal reasons why the Union membership refused to ratify the April 30, 2022 – wages, parking allowances, and “dissatisfaction with the percentage rate increases proposed for Room and Board.”
[17] Taking these circumstances into account, the Board found, at para. 39:
As the May 18th Memorandum of Agreement had as its objective to improve, or colloquially speaking “sweeten” the three provisions of the April 30th Memorandum of Agreement – granted minimally on the part of the Employer, while satisfactory to the Union membership – it seems counterintuitive that the membership would ratify a proposed settlement which detracted from the Room and Board Allowance found in the Expired Agreement.
[18] The Board applied the following principle in its caselaw – namely that clear language is needed to take away a contract benefit. In this case the Board found, at para. 41, that there was nothing in the language of the May 18, 2022:
which would indicate that the parties [sic] intent was to delete, or remove Art.4.1 d) i) of the expired Collective Agreement which provided for a Room and Board Allowance at a weekly rate. By way of contrast, there are several changes to the Schedules of the expired Collective Agreement, in the April 30th Memorandum of Agreement, where the parties explicitly deleted or removed current contract language: Thus, Schedule “A”, Art. 2 Seniority, 2.7 c) “Amend Provision delete…”provided they accept the drivers rate”; Schedule “C”, Art. 1 Classifications and Wages, 1.10,” Modify language delete reference to Class “D” Driver’s license”.
[19] The Board found that it was not essential to the purposive operation of the Provincial Agreement to ignore the provisions applying a weekly rate, which would be the “practical effect of the Employer’s argument that they have been ‘superceded’ by the provisions of Article 2 (a) of the May 18th Memorandum of Agreement.” According to the Board, meaning had to be given to Article 4.1 d) i), particularly given the maxim “generalia specialibus non derogant” – general provisions cannot derogate from particular provisions. In this case the general provisions of Article 2(a) had to yield to the specific provisions of Appendix “A” Article 4.1d) i) of the Expired Provincial Agreement.
[20] For these reasons the Board sustained the grievance.
Standard of Review
[21] All parties agree that the Decision must be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness.
[22] In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, the Supreme Court of Canada instructed reviewing courts that “[r]easonableness review is an approach meant to ensure that courts intervene in administrative matters only when it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process”: at para. 13. The decision must be examined to determine if it “bears the hallmarks of reasonableness – justification, transparency and intelligibility – and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision”: Vavilov, at para. 99. The burden to demonstrate unreasonableness is on the party challenging the decision and the alleged flaws in the decision “must be more than merely superficial or peripheral to the merits of the decision”: Vavilov, at para. 100.
[23] A reviewing court cannot interfere with a decision because it would have decided the matter differently or because an alternative interpretation would have been open to the tribunal. Thus, in conducting a reasonableness review, a court must develop what has been described as a “reasons first” approach. The court starts with the reasons of the tribunal and examines them with a view to considering whether the rationale for the decision and the outcome of the decision were reasonable. It does not “conduct a de novo analysis or seek to determine the “correct” solution to the problem”: Vavilov, at para. 83.
[24] The Supreme Court also found that “minor missteps” are not a proper basis to find that a decision is unreasonable. A tribunal’s decision is unreasonable “only if there is no line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived”: Vavilov, at para. 102.
[25] Vavilov holds that decisions must be read in light of the “history and context of the proceedings” including the evidence before the tribunal, the submissions of the parties, policies and past decisions of the tribunal. The Supreme Court held, at para. 94, that attention to the history and context of the proceeding:
may explain an aspect of the decision maker’s reasoning process that is not apparent from the reasons themselves, or may reveal that an apparent shortcoming in the reasons is not, in fact, a failure of justification, intelligibility or transparency.
[26] While expertise is no longer a factor in determining the applicable standard of review, it is a factor in applying it. Both before and since Vavilov courts at all levels have recognized the Board’s specialized expertise in determining grievances filed under s. 133 of the Act and have held that the Board should be afforded the highest degree of deference in its interpretation of collective agreements.
[27] In Electrical Power Systems Construction Association v. Labourer’s International Union of America, 2022 ONSC 2313, [2022] O.L.R.B. Rep. 497 (Div. Ct.), the Divisional Court held, at paras. 14 and 15:
[14] In reviewing a Board, judges should remain mindful of its expertise. Labour relations is a complex and sensitive field of law. The Ontario Court of Appeal has observed that “the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, over the course of many decades, show an unbroken commitment to affording labour relations boards the highest levels of judicial deference on matters within their exclusive jurisdiction.” (Maystar General Contractors Inc. v. International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, Local 1819, 2008 ONCA 265, [2008] O.J. No. 1353, at para. 42).
[15] The interpretation of collective agreements is at the very heart of the Board’s jurisdiction. In line with Vavilov, labour arbitrators and boards should be afforded the highest degree of deference in their interpretation of these agreements. (cite omitted).
[28] In Turkiewicz (Tomasz Turkiewicz Custom Masonry Homes) v. Bricklayers, Masons Independent Union of Canada, Local 1, 2022 ONCA 780, 476 D.L.R. (4th) 421, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dealt with an appeal from a Divisional Court decision that quashed three decisions of the Board. In allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal made the following comments about the role of expertise, at para. 61:
[61] I would add that the reviewing court must bear in mind the expertise of the administrative decision maker with respect to the questions before it. At para. 31 of Vavilov, the Supreme Court states that “expertise remains a relevant consideration in conducting a reasonableness review”. Being attentive to a decision maker’s demonstrated expertise may reveal to a court why a decision maker reached a particular outcome or provided less detail in its consideration of a given issue (para. 93). Moreover, decision makers’ specialized expertise may lead them to rely, when conducting statutory interpretation, on “considerations that a court would not have thought to employ but that actually enrich and elevate the interpretive exercise” (para. 119). As such, relevant expertise of the administrative decision maker must be borne in mind by a court conducting a reasonableness review, both when examining the rationality and logic of the decision maker’s reasoning process and the decision itself, in light of the factual and legal constraints bearing on it.
[29] In this case, the Board was interpreting a Provincial Collective Agreement within the construction industry. The Divisional Court has observed that “the Board’s work within the construction industry is essentially a specialty within a specialty”: I.B.E.W. Local 894 v. I.B.E.W. First-District Canada, 2014 ONSC 1997, [2014] O.L.R.B. Rep. 423 (Div. Ct.), at para. 34. The court has repeatedly taken note of this in dismissing applications for judicial review (see most recently Strasser & Lang v. Carpenter’s District Council of Ontario et al., 2023 ONSC 2247).
Analysis
The Applicant’s Position as to why the Decision is unreasonable.
[30] The Applicant submitted that the Decision was unreasonable because:
(a) The Board did not give the words in the May 18, 2022 MOA their plain and ordinary meaning. Instead it chose to “read down” or ignore certain of those words (particularly the words “All Board to be paid on a daily basis”) “in order to uphold the Union’s narrative.” The Board did not interpret the May 18, 2022 MOA as a whole. Its interpretation means that the second sentence of paragraph 2 (a) of the May 18, 2022 MOA serves no purpose. That sentence reads: “The Employer may continue to pay the Room and Board to keep the employee out of town, and the employee shall not be entitled to any travelling expenses, except on the final day of the job when the employee returns home.” If there is a weekly Board allowance, the entirety of that allowance becomes available to the employee as soon as they are “required to be away for more than four (4) days between Monday and Sunday, inclusive, in any week”. In other words, no further compensation is payable after thefifth day. Therefore, there would no additional amount for the employer to “continue to pay” to keep the employee out of town for the remainder of the week. This interpretation renders the second sentence of paragraph 2 entirely redundant.
(b) Instead of focusing on the express contractual matrix and subordinating the Vice-Chair’s consideration of the factual matrix to the actual language used, the Board focused on the Union’s subjective bargaining objectives, which is contrary to the law of contractual interpretation and the parol evidence rule.
(c) The Board unreasonably applied a principle of collective agreement interpretation aimed at addressing “specific” and “general” provisions within the meaning of the same agreement. In this case, the Board applied the principle to an entirely different context – it used it to “constrain the clear and prescriptive meaning ascribed to the May 18, 2022 MOA, based only on the prior language in the 2019 -2022 Provincial Agreement. This was unreasonable.”
Did the Board fail to give the words of the May 18, 2022 MOA their plain and ordinary meaning?
[31] If the Board had accepted the Employer’s position that interpreting the Provincial Collective Agreement provisions respecting Room and Board only required considering one document – the May 18, 2022 MOA, then the Employer’s argument as to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in question would have merit. However, as the Board made clear at para. 35 of the Decision, it found that it was faced “with a more complex task of interpretation: reconciling two distinct terms of the renewal Collective Agreement, one found in the terms of the expired Collective Agreement and incorporated into the renewal Collective Agreement; the other in the Minutes of Agreement of May 18, 2022, ratified and incorporated into the renewal Collective Agreement.”
[32] Given that the terms of the Expired Collective Agreement continued to apply unless specifically modified in the May 18, 2022 MOA, this conclusion was not an unreasonable one. In fact, interpreting what the Board referred to as the renewal Collective Agreement involved considering a third document as well, the April 30, 2022 MOA, which also continued to apply unless specifically modified by the May 18, 2022 MOA.
[33] The Employer submits that the words in para. 2 of the May 18, 2022 MOA were sufficiently clear so as to supersede the language at Article 4.1 d) i). The Board disagreed, relying on Board jurisprudence that clear language is needed to eliminate a benefit. In this case, in contrast to the wording used in the April 30, 2022 MOA when the status quo was changed, the May 18, 2022 MOA did not delete the language under Article 4.1 d) i). There is nothing unreasonable about this reasoning or its conclusion.
[34] The Employer also argues that the Board’s conclusion was based on a “reading down” of the “all-encompassing language” in the May 18, 2022 MOA and that this approach was “antithetical” to one of the fundamental rules of collective agreement interpretation that the Board relied on in its decision – namely that “all words must be given meaning” and “words or phrases cannot be inferred or ignored unless it is essential to the purposive operation of the collective agreement”: the Decision, at para. 42. However, again, this argument ignores the fact that the Board saw itself as needing to interpret the words and phrases in not one, but two documents. The Board reasonably weighed and analyzed the wording of the May 18, 2022 MOA as against the wording of Article 4.1 d) i) of Schedule “A” and determined that it could not ignore the words in the latter document.
[35] The Employer’s argument that the Board’s decision renders the second sentence in para. 2(a) of the May 18, 2022 MOA redundant also has no merit. The purpose of that sentence is to limit the claim for travelling expenses that an employee can make if the Employer elects to have them stay out of town and pays the applicable Room and Board.
Did the Board unreasonably focus on the “factual matrix” contrary to the law of contractual interpretation and the parol evidence rule?
[36] The Employer asserts that the Board made two errors that undermined its reasoning when it considered the “factual matrix” surrounding the formation of the May 18, 2022 MOA. First, it erred in allowing its findings regarding the surrounding circumstances to overwhelm the clear wording in that agreement. Second, crucial to its view of the surrounding circumstances were what the Employer describes as the Union’s subjective and self-serving statements about its collective bargaining priorities, intentions that should have been irrelevant to the interpretative exercise the Board was performing.
[37] In the Decision, at para. 31, the Board quoted Arbitrator Surdykowski’s decision in Loblaws Supermarkets Ltd. and UFCW, Local 1006A (2018MJO001), Re, 140 C.L.A.S. 90, to demonstrate how arbitrators have accepted the approach laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sattva. In that quoted section, Arbitrator Surdykowski states:
Although extrinsic context evidence is admissable because it may inform the interpretation of a collective agreement by demonstrating the mutual intention of the parties, context cannot change or “overrule” the meaning of the words used by the parties (Sattva, paragraph 60).
[38] Taken in context, it is clear that the Board was aware of and applied the principles laid down in Sattva as summarized by Arbitrator Surdykowski. As outlined above, the Board did not accept the Employer’s view about the clarity of the language in the May 18, 2022 MOA. In the Board’s view, that document could not be considered in isolation and had to be considered in light of the fact that, unless explicitly and clearly modified, the provisions of the Expired Collective Agreement continued to survive. I have already found that the Board’s reasoning on this point was reasonable.
[39] With respect to the second assertion, the Board’s summary of the surrounding circumstances or factual matrix appears at para. 36 of the Decision. It reads:
- The surrounding circumstances or “factual matrix” within which the May 18, 2022, Memorandum of Agreement were negotiated were firstly, the ongoing province-wide strike of employees which had an impact on the entire construction industry; secondly, the refusal of the membership to ratify the April 30, 2022 Memorandum of Agreement, despite its having been recommended for ratification by the Union; thirdly, the terms and conditions of the expired Collective Agreement. There was extreme pressure on the negotiating teams to reach a settlement acceptable to the Union membership. [Emphasis added.]
[40] The Board’s consideration of the ongoing province-wide strike, the refusal of the membership to ratify the April 30, 2022 MOA, and the terms and conditions of the expired Collective Agreement are objective facts that have nothing to do with the subjective intentions of the Union.
[41] The Employer takes issue with the Board’s observation that the May 18, 2022 MOA had as its objective to “sweeten” or improve the provisions of the April 30, 2022 MOA. According to the Employer, this observation demonstrates that the Board was considering the purpose of the May 18, 2022 MOA solely from the Union’s perspective. I do not agree. The Board’s observation is grounded in an objective assessment of the realities of the situation facing the parties. There was pressure on the parties to reach a deal that would end a strike that was affecting the construction industry around the province. The reason there was no deal yet was because the Union membership had refused to ratify the April 30, 2022 MOA for three reasons – one of which was that they were dissatisfied with the proposed provisions for Room and Board. In order to reach a deal that would be ratified by the membership, improvements would have to be made to the April 30, 2022 MOA to satisfy that membership.
[42] In any event, the Board’s decision is ultimately grounded in the language of the May 18, 2022 MOA, which contained no reference to deleting or removing Article 4.1 d) i) of the Expired Collective Agreement. The Board found that the April 30, 2022 MOA made it clear that when the parties intended to delete a provision from the Expired Collective Agreement they did so explicitly. As outlined above, the Board’s findings on this issue meet the threshold of reasonableness.
[43] Thus, there is no merit to the Employer’s assertion that the Board unreasonably considered only the Union’s “subjective assertions” about the purpose of the May 18, 2022 MOA.
Did the Board’s reliance on the doctrine that the specific provisions in an agreement will prevail over the general provisions in that agreement render the Decision unreasonable?
[44] In its factum the Employer admits that this doctrine is an appropriate interpretative tool when considering the provisions of one agreement. It objects to the fact that the Board allowed a specific provision of the Expired Collective Agreement to override the wording of the May 18, 2022 MOA.
[45] This objection is rooted in the fundamental difference between the Employer and the Board as to the interpretative exercise that had to be performed – a difference that has already been highlighted in these reasons. From the Employer’s perspective the language of the May 18, 2022 MOA had deleted the language of the Expired Collective Agreement when it came to Room and Board. From the Board’s perspective, it had not (I have already found that the Board’s perspective on this issue was reasonable). Therefore, the Board saw itself as considering and reconciling the provisions of two documents, both of which contained provisions that made up the agreement between the parties on the issue of Room and Board. To reconcile the apparent discrepancy between these provisions it was reasonable for the Board to apply the doctrine that in such a situation a more specific provision will prevail over a provision that is more general.
Conclusion
[46] For these reasons I find that the Employer has not met its onus to satisfy this Court that the Decision is unreasonable. While another interpretation may also have been reasonable, there is a “line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived.” (Vavilov, at para. 102).
Disposition
[47] For these reasons, the application is dismissed. As agreed by the parties, the Union is entitled to its costs from the Employer, fixed in the amount of $6000.00, all inclusive. There are no costs to or from the Board or the Intervenor.
H. Sachs J.
I agree _______________________________
R.D. Gordon J.
I agree _______________________________
P. B. Schabas J.
Released: October 13, 2023
CITATION: All Canada Crane Rental Corp. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 2023 ONSC 5757
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 037/23
DATE: 2023/10/13
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Sachs, Gordon and Schabas JJ.
BETWEEN:
All Canada Crane Rental Corp.
Applicant
– and –
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 793, Ontario Erectors Association Incorporated and Ontario Labour Relations Board
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Released: October 13, 2023