CITATION: Pourshian v. Walt Disney Company, 2021 ONSC 4840

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 629/19 and 632/16 DATE: 20210712

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT

BETWEEN:

DAMON POURSHIAN

Appellant/Respondent by Cross-Appeal

– and –

WALT DISNEY COMPANY, WALT DISNEY PICTURES INC., PIXAR ANIMATION STUDIOS, DISNEY ENTERPRISES INC., DISNEY SHOPPING, INC., WALT DISNEY STUDIOS HOME ENTERTAINEMENT, DISNEY CONSUMER PRODUCTS AND INTERACTIVE MEDIA, WALT DISNEY STUDIOS MOTION PICTURES and AMERICAN BROADCAST COMPANY, INC.

Respondents/Appellants by Cross-Appeal

Michael Crichton and Guy Régimbald, for the Appellant/Respondent by Cross-Appeal

Timothy M. Lowman and Trent Horne, for the Respondents/Appellants by Cross-Appeal

HEARD at Toronto (by videoconference): October 20, 2020

Favreau J.:

Introduction

[1] The plaintiff, Damian Pourshian, brings an action against the defendants for copyright infringement. Mr. Pourshian claims that the 2015 film “Inside Out” produced and distributed by the defendants was based on a film also titled “Inside Out” he made around 2000 while a student at Sheridan College.

[2] The defendants brought a motion before Master Graham to stay the action on the basis that Ontario does not have jurisdiction over the claim against them, with the exception of the claim against Disney Shopping Inc. In a decision dated October 15, 2019, the Master granted an order staying the action against all defendants, except for Pixar Animation Studios (“Pixar”), Walt Disney Pictures Inc. and Disney Shopping Inc.

[3] Mr. Pourshian appeals the order staying the action against six of the defendants. He argues that the Master misapplied the test for determining whether there is a real and substantial connection between the claim against these defendants and Ontario, and that he only focused on the allegations in the statement of claim without any regard to the evidence.

[4] The defendants Pixar and Walt Disney Pictures Inc. bring a cross-appeal from the order dismissing their motion for a stay. They too argue that the Master ignored the evidence on the motion. They also argue that the Master erred in finding that these companies carry on business in Ontario.

[5] For the reasons below, Mr. Pourshian’s appeal is allowed in part and the defendants’ appeal is dismissed. While the Master stayed the action against six defendants, I find that only the claim against the Walt Disney Company and American Broadcasting Company Inc. should be stayed. The action should be allowed to proceed in Ontario against all other defendants. The Master made a number of errors, including disregarding the evidence on the motion, that require this Court to review afresh whether the Ontario court should take jurisdiction over the claim against these foreign defendants. I find that there is a good arguable case supporting such a finding in respect of all but two of the defendants.

Background

The parties and their films

[6] Mr. Pourshian lives in Toronto, Ontario and is a film maker. Mr. Pourshian claims that, in 1998, while he was in high school, he came up with the idea for a film in which five of the protagonist’s organs become personified and guide his behaviour. In 2000, while Mr. Pourshian was a student at Sheridan College in Oakville, Ontario, he wrote a screenplay and produced a short movie titled “Inside Out” based on this idea. The film was widely shown at Sheridan College.

[7] On June 19, 2015, Pixar released its animated film titled “Inside Out” that features an 11-year-old girl whose emotions are depicted as anthropomorphized characters that attempt to influence her behaviour. The film won various awards, including the Academy Award for Best Animated feature.

[8] As referred to by the parties in their materials, throughout this decision Mr. Pourshian’s film is referred to as Inside Out while the defendants’ film is referred to as INSIDE OUT.

The claim

[9] Mr. Pourshian commenced this action on July 17, 2018.

[10] The claim seeks a declaration that Mr. Pourshian owns the copyright to the screenplay, live theatrical production and short film titled Inside Out and a declaration that the defendants infringed his copyright through their production, reproduction and distribution of INSIDE OUT. Mr. Pourshian also seeks a permanent injunction and damages.

[11] The claim describes each of the defendants by stating where they were incorporated and their general corporate role or responsibilities as follows:

a. Walt Disney Company is a Delaware corporation and is the parent company of each of the other Defendants.

b. Walt Disney Pictures Inc. is a California corporation that releases and distributes films made by Pixar.

c. Pixar is a California corporation that films and produces Walt Disney Company’s animated films.

d. Disney Enterprises Inc. is a Delaware corporation that is the copyright owner of INSIDE OUT and owns various trademark registrations for INSIDE OUT in Canada.

e. Disney Shopping, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, with a subsidiary responsible for the retail of merchandise associated with Walt Disney Company’s animated films.

f. Walt Disney Studios Home Entertainment is a California corporation, which is the home video distribution division of Walt Disney Company.

g. Disney Consumer Products and Interactive Media is a California corporation responsible for the merchandising and development of Walt Disney Company’s “physical products and digital experiences”, including those associated with its animated films.

h. Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures is a California corporation responsible for the distribution, marketing and promotion of films released by the defendants, including Pixar.

i. American Broadcasting Company is a New York corporation responsible for the television distribution of films released by Pixar and other defendants.

[12] In the statement of claim, Mr. Pourshian describes how he conceived his film Inside Out in high school, and how it was produced and shown while he was at Sheridan College.

[13] The claim states that INSIDE OUT was produced by Pixar and Walt Disney Pictures Inc. The claim also describes INSIDE OUT’s success and its similarities to Inside Out.

[14] Mr. Pourshian claims that the defendants would have had access to Inside Out through various screenings at Sheridan College. He claims that Pixar and “Disney”, which is an undefined term, had a close relationship with Sheridan College and that some of the students who were at Sheridan College in early 2000 ended up working on the production of INSIDE OUT.

[15] Mr. Pourshian claims that he had intended to further develop Inside Out after leaving Sheridan College but did not have an opportunity to do so before the release of INSIDE OUT. He claims that the defendants released INSIDE OUT without his authorization or consent and that he has suffered damages as a result of the Defendants’ infringement of his copyright in Inside Out.

[16] The statement of claim states that the service of the claim is permitted outside of Ontario pursuant to subsections (a), (i), (n) and (p) of Rule 17.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the claim against the defendants relates to:

a. Personal property in Ontario;

b. An injunction preventing the defendants from doing certain things, or affecting real or personal property in Ontario;

c. Authorization by or under the Copyright Act; and

d. Persons carrying on business in Ontario.

The jurisdiction motion and the Master’s decision

[17] The defendants brought a motion to set aside service ex juris of the claim. The defendants conceded that Ontario has jurisdiction over the defendant Disney Shopping, Inc. because it had directly sold some INSIDE OUT merchandise to people in Ontario. However, they argued that the Ontario court does not have jurisdiction over any of the other defendants.

[18] In support of the motion, the defendants filed the following affidavits:

a. an affidavit sworn by Jonathan A. Garson, who is Senior Vice President of Worldwide Marketing of Pixar. In his affidavit, Mr. Garson describes the development and success of INSIDE OUT. He also sets out the various sources of inspiration for INSIDE OUT and a list of films with the same title.

b. An affidavit sworn by Michael Salama, who is Vice President of The Walt Disney Company. In his affidavit, Mr. Salama states that The Walt Disney Company is the ultimate corporate parent of all defendants. He states that the Company does not carry on business in Ontario and that it was not involved in the creation or distribution of INSIDE OUT. He goes on to describe each of the other defendants, stating that none of them engages in business in Ontario. Mr. Salama also refers to an action brought by Mr. Pourshian in California which was terminated by “Notice of Voluntary Dismissal” on August 15, 2018.

[19] Mr. Garson and Mr. Salama were both cross-examined on their affidavits.

[20] The only affidavit evidence filed on behalf of Mr. Pourshian was sworn by Jayson Dinelle, a law clerk in his lawyers’ office. The affidavit attaches a number of websites showing the distribution of INSIDE OUT by various companies in Canada.

[21] In a decision dated October 15, 2019, the Master found that Ontario has jurisdiction over the claims against Pixar, Walt Disney Pictures Inc. and Disney Shopping, Inc., but not against any of the other defendants.

[22] In reaching this conclusion, the Master reviewed the statement of claim and the applicable law. He focused specifically on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 and whether any of the presumptive connecting factors identified in that decision apply. He first looked at the issue of whether any of the defendants carry on business in Ontario, finding that Walt Disney Pictures Inc. and Pixar carry on business in Ontario, reasoning as follows at paras. 25-27:

Even considering the matter with the caution mandated by Van Breda, the release of a film in Canada, which would include Ontario, presumably so that people would go to a movie theatre and pay to see it, is precisely the sort of actual presence in the jurisdiction contemplated by the Court. Pourshian’s pleading that Walt Disney Pictures Inc. released INSIDE OUT in Canada creates a “good arguable case” that that defendant carried on business in Canada in relation to the subject matter of the action.

Similarly, Pourshian pleads in paragraph 30 of the statement of claim that the defendants Pixar and Walt Disney Pictures Inc. are the producers of INSIDE OUT. The court can reasonably infer that these defendants made the film in the expectation that people would pay to see it, which required that it be shown in movie theatres. Pixar, by releasing INSIDE OUT to be shown in theatres in Ontario, even if through another entity, was in substance offering it for sale to the province’s movie-going public, thus creating at least a “good arguable case” that Pixar was carrying on business in Ontario.

Accordingly, by producing INSIDE OUT and releasing it for distribution to Ontario movie theatres, the defendants Pixar and Walt Disney Pictures Inc. were carrying on business in Ontario. The presumptive connecting factor of carrying on business in Ontario is therefore established.

[23] The Master went on to consider whether the claim is in respect of a tort committed in Ontario. He found that the claim against Walt Disney Pictures Inc. was with respect to a tort committed in Ontario based on section 27(2) of the Copyright Act, which provides that it is an infringement for any person to distribute or import into Canada, a copy of a work “that the person knows or should have known infringes copyright or would infringe copyright if it had been made in Canada by the person who made it”. Given that the claim alleges that Walt Disney Pictures Inc. distributed the film in Ontario, the claim against this defendant is in respect of a tort committed in Ontario.

[24] The Master went on to consider whether any other connecting factors give Ontario jurisdiction over the claim. He found that the claim is “in respect of property in Ontario”, because of Mr. Pourshian’s claim of copyright in Inside Out. The Master found that no other connecting factors apply. In doing so, he rejected Mr. Pourshian’s argument that the action was authorized by statute, finding that the Copyright Act does not apply to copyright infringements outside of Canada.

[25] Finally, while the Master held that there were no factors connecting the claim to any defendants other than Walt Disney Pictures Inc. and Pixar, he also found that these defendants were not able to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction. The Master concluded as follows:

In summary, the production of INSIDE OUT by Pixar and Walt Disney Pictures Inc., in part for the purpose of carrying on business in Ontario, and the release of INSIDE OUT by Walt Disney Pictures Inc. for distribution to theatres in Canada, do create a good arguable case of a real and substantial connection between the claims against those defendants and Ontario. This conduct on the part of the defendants Pixar and Walt Disney Pictures Inc. would constitute secondary infringement of Pourshian’s copyright in his Inside Out in Ontario, such that the presumptive connecting factors are not rebutted.

[26] Mr. Pourshian appeals the Master’s order in so far as it stays the action against the six defendants referred to above, and Pixar and Walt Disney Pictures Inc. appeal the decision in so far as the Master found that Ontario has jurisdiction over the claim against them.

The standard of review

[27] The appellate standard of review applies to an appeal from a Master’s decision. Errors of law are to be reviewed on a standard of correctness. Errors of fact or mixed fact and law, except for extricable errors of law, are to be reviewed on a standard of palpable and overriding error.

General principles applicable to issues of jurisdiction

[28] In Van Breda, the Supreme Court of Canada established the legal framework for determining whether the court has jurisdiction over a claim brought against foreign defendants. The three-part analytical framework is as follows:

a. First, the court must determine whether there is a presumptive connecting factor between the claim and the jurisdiction. In the context of a tort action, the Supreme Court identified the following presumptive factors:

i. The defendant is domiciled in the province;

ii. The defendant carries on business in the province;

iii. The tort was committed in the province; or

iv. A contract connected with the dispute was made in the province.

b. Second, if there is no presumptive connecting factor, the court is to determine whether a new presumptive connecting factor should be recognized. The Court identified the following relevant considerations to this determination:

i. Similarity of the connecting factor with the recognized presumptive connecting factors;

ii. Treatment of the connecting factor in the case law;

iii. Treatment of the connecting factor in statute law; and

iv. Treatment of the connecting factor in the private international law of other legal systems with a shared commitment to order, fairness and comity.

c. Even if there is a presumptive connecting factor, the defendant can rebut the presumption by establishing facts “which demonstrate that the presumptive connecting factor does not point to any real relationship between the subject matter of the litigation and the forum or points only to a weak relationship between them.”.

[29] In Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2013 ONSC 2527, at para. 76, the Court of Appeal for Ontario set out the evidentiary requirements and burdens on a motion to set aside service of a statement of claim on the grounds that there is no real and substantial connection between the claim and Ontario. Where a defendant moves to set aside service ex juris on the ground that there is no real and substantial connection with Ontario, the question is whether there is a “good arguable case” that the connection exists. The analytical path for determining whether there is a good arguable case is as follows:

a. The statement of claim is the starting point for the analysis. Any allegation of fact that is not put into issue by the defendant is presumed to be true for purposes of the motion. The plaintiff is under no obligation to call evidence for any allegation that has not been challenged by the defendant.

b. However, where a pleading lacks sufficient particularity with respect to the required jurisdictional connections, the plaintiff bears the burden of supplementing the pleading with affidavit evidence establishing a connection.

c. Also, if the foreign defendant files affidavit evidence challenging the allegations in the statement of claim that are essential to jurisdiction, the threshold for the plaintiff to meet is that it has a "good arguable case" in respect of those allegations.

[30] The “good arguable case” standard is a low threshold. The court is not to resolve issues of fact on a civil standard, but rather to decide whether there is a good arguable case. This is akin to determining whether there is a "serious issue to be tried" or a "genuine issue" or “some chance of success".

[31] In addition, in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Rothmans Inc., 2013 ONCA 353, at para. 106, the Court of Appeal emphasized that a jurisdiction motion is not the same as a motion challenging the adequacy of pleadings:

In our opinion, on a jurisdiction motion, the motion judge is not required to subject the pleadings to the scrutiny applicable on a rule 21 motion. So long as a statement of claim advances the core elements of a cause of action known to law and appears capable of being amended to cure any pleadings deficiencies such that the claim will have at least some prospect of success, the issue for the motion judge is whether the claimant has established a good arguable case that the cause of action is sufficiently connected to Ontario to permit an Ontario court to assume jurisdiction. If an Ontario court can assume jurisdiction, the issue of the adequacy of the pleadings is properly dealt with on a motion brought under rule 21.01(1)(b).

Errors made by the Master

[32] In this case, in my view, the Master made at least three legal errors.

[33] First, the Master found that Pixar and Walt Disney Pictures Inc. carry on business in Ontario based only on the allegations in the statement of claim that Pixar produced INSIDE OUT and that Walt Disney Pictures Inc. distributed it. There was no analysis of what “carrying on business” in Ontario means or how it has been interpreted in other cases. In Van Breda, at para. 87, the Supreme Court expressed caution about overextending the reach of this presumptive connecting factor:

Carrying on business in the jurisdiction may also be considered an appropriate connecting factor. But considering it to be one may raise more difficult issues. Resolving those issues may require some caution in order to avoid creating what would amount to forms of universal jurisdiction in respect of tort claims arising out of certain categories of business or commercial activity. Active advertising in the jurisdiction or, for example, the fact that a Web site can be accessed from the jurisdiction would not suffice to establish that the defendant is carrying on business there. The notion of carrying on business requires some form of actual, not only virtual, presence in the jurisdiction, such as maintaining an office there or regularly visiting the territory of the particular jurisdiction… [emphasis added]

[34] In this case, there is no allegation in the statement of claim or evidence that Pixar and Walt Disney Pictures Inc. had some form of actual presence in Ontario. Mr. Pourshian relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Google Inc., 2015 BCCA 265, aff’d at 2017 SCC 34, to argue that it is sufficient for a party to “target customers in a jurisdiction” for a finding that the party carried on business in the jurisdiction. However, unlike in this case, Equustek dealt with the scope and reach of Google’s activities online. The Court conducted a detailed analysis in support of its finding that Google carried on business in British Columbia, including a finding that Google entered into advertising contracts with British Columbia residents and that it gathered information through proprietary software in British Columbia. On that basis, the Court found that Google carried out “key” parts of its business in British Columbia. In this case, there was no similar analysis and the Master had no regard to the caution in Van Breda about the need for an actual presence in Ontario to support a finding that a party is carrying on business in the province. The fact that Pixar and Walt Disney Pictures Inc. produced and distributed a film that ended up being viewed in Ontario may be relevant to other connecting factors but it is not sufficient for making a finding that there is a good arguable case that they are carrying on business in Ontario.

[35] Second, and probably more significantly, the Master’s decision only had regard to the allegations in the statement of claim and disregarded the evidence filed by the parties. Therefore, contrary to the framework set out above, he failed to consider the allegations in the statement of claim and the evidence to determine whether there was a good arguable case for assuming jurisdiction. As set out in Chevron, while the allegations in the statement of claim are the starting point for determining jurisdiction, the plaintiff can supplement the allegations with evidence and the defendants can rebut them with evidence. Here, the Master had no regard to the evidence put forward by the parties. Therefore, while the Master found that the Ontario court has jurisdiction over Walt Disney Pictures Inc. and Pixar because of the allegation in the statement of claim that they distributed INSIDE OUT, the Master had no regard to the evidence for the purpose of determining whether these defendant rebutted the allegations in the statement of claim or whether the evidence supported a finding that the court should assume jurisdiction over the other defendants. Ultimately the Ontario court may have jurisdiction over Walt Disney Pictures Inc. and Pixar and may not have jurisdiction over the other defendants, but it was a legal error for the Master not to consider the relevant evidence in reaching his conclusions.

[36] Third, while the Master identified “property” in Ontario as a valid connecting factor, he did not identify which of the defendants this factor might apply to. Rather, implicitly, he seemed to limit its relevance to Pixar and Walt Disney Pictures, based on his finding that these are the only defendants who are alleged to have done anything in Ontario.

[37] In combination, these three errors mean that the Master failed to apply the requisite test in determining the issues on the motion. Ultimately, the outcome may be the same or similar, but it must be arrived at on correct legal principles.

[38] Section 134(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, empowers an appellate court to make an order or decision that ought to or could have been made by the court from which the appeal arises. Generally, when an appellate court determines that an error may have affected the outcome of a lower court’s decision, the matter is remitted to that court for determination. However, in circumstances where the appellate court has a complete record, the final resolution of the dispute has already been delayed and there is no special advantage in remitting the matter back to the court in first instance, it will be appropriate for the appellate court to finally determine the issues between the parties: Hollis v. Dell Corning Corp., [1995] 4 S.C.R. 634, per Sopinka J. (dissenting on other issues): at para. 95. This is such a case. Given that the motion was argued on the basis of the statement of claim and affidavit evidence, there would be no utility in sending the matter back to be decided by a Master and doing so would have the effect of further delaying the proceedings. Accordingly, I proceed below to determine whether Ontario has jurisdiction over the claim against the defendants.

Is there is a real and substantial connection between Ontario and the claim against the defendants

[39] Before turning to an analysis of the claim against each defendant, it is necessary to address some of the general arguments made by the parties about what is required to establish a real and substantial connection in this case.

[40] On appeal, Mr. Pourshian argues that jurisdiction in this case arises from three connecting factors. First, based on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in SOCAN v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, he argues that Ontario has jurisdiction over the defendants because Ontario is the jurisdiction of “reception” for INSIDE OUT. Second, he argues the claim is in respect of “property in Ontario” given that the copyright for Inside Out is in Ontario. Third, he maintains that some of the defendants carry on business in Ontario.

[41] For their part, the defendants, other than Disney Shopping Inc., argue that the Ontario court has no jurisdiction over the claim against them because the Copyright Act has no extra-territorial reach. They also argue that the plaintiff’s argument about the Ontario court’s jurisdiction relies on claims of copyright infringement that have not been properly pleaded in the statement of claim or that are impermissible at law.

[42] Before addressing each of the connecting factors Mr. Pourshian relies on, it is helpful to start with an overview of the relevant provisions of the Copyright Act and address the pleading defects the defendants claim are a bar to establishing jurisdiction in this case. I then turn to a discussion of each of the presumptive connecting factors the plaintiff relies on, followed by an analysis of whether the plaintiff has established a good arguable case for assumption of jurisdiction with respect to each named defendant.

Relevant provisions of the Copyright Act

[43] The Copyright Act creates statutory causes of action for copyright infringement.

[44] As set out in the statement of claim, Mr. Pourshian’s claim is brought under sections 3 and 27 of the Copyright Act.

[45] Section 3(1) of the Act establishes that the owner of a copyright has the sole right to do various things with a work to which copyright applies, including the right to produce and reproduce the work and to authorize its production and reproduction:

3 (1) For the purposes of this Act, copyright, in relation to a work, means the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever, to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in public or, if the work is unpublished, to publish the work or any substantial part thereof…

and to authorize any such acts. [Empashis added.]

[46] Section 27 provides that it is a copyright infringement to do a number of specified things without the consent of the copyright owner:

27 (1) It is an infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has the right to do.

(2) It is an infringement of copyright for any person to

(a) sell or rent out,

(b) distribute to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright,

(c) by way of trade distribute, expose or offer for sale or rental, or exhibit in public,

(d) possess for the purpose of doing anything referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c), or

(e) import into Canada for the purpose of doing anything referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c),

a copy of a work, sound recording or fixation of a performer’s performance or of a communication signal that the person knows or should have known infringes copyright or would infringe copyright if it had been made in Canada by the person who made it.

Pleading defects identified by the defendants

[47] To a large extent, the defendants’ arguments against jurisdiction focus on alleged defects in the statement of claim. First, they argue that the plaintiffs’ arguments that the Ontario court has jurisdiction relies on allegations that the defendants “authorized” copyright infringement and that authorization is not properly pleaded in the statement of claim. Second, they argue that, even if such allegations were properly pleaded, they are impermissible at law because the Copyright Act does not allow for claims based on authorization of a secondary infringement. Third, they argue that the plaintiff relies on activities of some of the defendants in relation to merchandise and products with INSIDE OUT branding, whereas the statement of claim only alleges copyright infringement based on the production and distribution of the film INSIDE OUT, not branded merchandise. Finally, the defendants point out that, in many instances, the statement of claim does not set out the accurate name of the corporate defendants.

[48] In my view, these are pleading issues that are not properly addressed on a jurisdiction motion. As held by the Court of Appeal in Rothmans, at para. 106, “the motion judge is not required to subject the pleadings to the scrutiny applicable on a rule 21 motion”. In this case, the plaintiff makes a claim against the defendants for copyright infringement. It is not the proper role of the court in the context of a jurisdiction motion to analyze the finer points of the pleading to determine whether it discloses a cause of action for copyright infringement or whether the claim meets all necessary pleading requirements for a claim for copyright infringement. Rather, as held in Rothmans, again at para. 106, “[s]o long as a statement of claim advances the core elements of a cause of action known to law and appears capable of being amended to cure any pleadings deficiencies such that the claim will have at least some prospect of success, the issue for the motion judge is whether the claimant has established a good arguable case that the cause of action is sufficiently connected to Ontario to permit an Ontario court to assume jurisdiction”. Accordingly, the task in this context is to assess the connection between the claim against the defendants and Ontario not the sufficiency of the pleading. If the court has jurisdiction over the claim, the defendants may have good arguments on a motion to strike parts of the claim on the grounds identified above (in which case the court would also consider whether amendments should be permitted). The defendants may also have good defences to the plaintiff’s claim. However, a jurisdiction motion is not the context in which to address these issues. At this point, the focus of the court is on the key threshold issue of whether the claim against the defendants is sufficiently connected to Ontario to warrant taking jurisdiction.

[49] I now turn to a general discussion of each of the presumptive connecting factors the plaintiff relies on.

Copyright infringement in Ontario

[50] The plaintiff argues that Van Breda is of limited assistance in determining whether there is a real and substantial connection in this case because it dealt with tort claims. Instead, given that this claim is brought under the Copyright Act, the proper analysis arises from the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in SOCAN, where the Court held that the countries where a transmission originated and where it was received may have jurisdiction. The plaintiff argues that, given that INSIDE OUT was received in Canada, the courts here have jurisdiction over the defendants. Mr. Pourshian argues that, while he relied on SOCAN at the hearing below, the Master failed to consider its application in his analysis.

[51] For their part, the defendants argue that, to the extent the Master relied on SOCAN, he did so correctly in finding that the case stands for the proposition that the Copyright Act has no extraterritorial application.

[52] In my view, SOCAN assists in the analysis in this case, but not in the ways suggested by the parties. It is a false dichotomy to say that Van Breda dealt with tort claims and SOCAN deals with claims for copyright infringement. Copyright infringement is essentially a statutory tort. One of the presumptive connecting factors established by Van Breda is whether the tort was committed in the jurisdiction where the action is brought. When dealing with a claim for copyright infringement, the analogous presumptive factor is whether the alleged copyright infringement occurred in the jurisdiction where the action was brought. In my view, SOCAN assists in this analysis.

[53] In SOCAN, the Supreme Court considered the issue of who should compensate composers for their Canadian copyright in music transmitted from a foreign country into Canada via the internet. The specific issue considered by the Court was whether internet service providers based in Canada should compensate composers for royalties. The Court found that internet service providers are not required to do so because of a specific exclusion in the Copyright Act. However, in the context of the decision, the Court discussed the issue of the jurisdiction of Canadian courts over the foreign entities that transmit the music. In that context, at paras. 56-57, the Court held that, while Canadian copyright law respects territorial distinctions, the applicability of the Copyright Act to foreign participants depends on whether “there is a sufficient connection between this country and the communication in question”. The Court went on to hold that the real and substantial connection test should apply to determining whether Canadian courts have jurisdiction over a breach of copyright claim. At para. 63, the Court stated that Canadian courts will generally have jurisdiction where Canada is the “country of transmission” or “the country of reception”. Based on SOCAN, the plaintiff argues that, as the jurisdiction of reception for INSIDE OUT, Ontario has jurisdiction over the claims against the defendants.

[54] The defendants correctly point out that SOCAN was decided before Van Breda. However, this does not make SOCAN irrelevant. In fact, in Davydiuk v. Internet Archive Canada, 2014 FC 944, at paras. 29-30, which was decided after Van Breda, the Federal Court explicitly held that when dealing with allegations of copyright infringement involving the internet, SOCAN can be helpful in understanding the factors giving rise to a real and substantial connection. In that case, the Court accepted that allegations that a foreign defendant “reached into” Canada over the internet were sufficient to find a real and substantial connection.

[55] In my view, the distinction the plaintiff draws between SOCAN and Van Breda is not particularly helpful. The significance of SOCAN was its discussion about internet copyright infringement, not that it dealt with copyright infringement rather than a tort claim. Copyright infringement is essentially a statutory tort. In applying Van Breda to this claim, one of the potential connecting factors is the location where the copyright infringement occurred. A tort can occur in more than one jurisdiction. As held by Perell J. in Beijing Hehe Fengye Investment Co. Limited v. Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP, 2020 ONSC 934, at para. 59, assessing where a tort occurred requires consideration of the jurisdiction substantially affected by the defendants’ activities and a tort can thereby occur in more than one jurisdiction:

A tort occurs in the jurisdiction substantially affected by the defendant’s activities or its consequences or where the important elements of the tort occurred. For example, the torts of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation occur where the misinformation is received or acted upon. In determining the situs of a tort for jurisdictional purposes, the Court adopts a flexible and pragmatic approach to consider whether the jurisdiction was substantially affected by the defendants’ activities, or its consequences or where the important elements of the alleged torts occurred. Whether all the elements required to complete the alleged tort occurred in the jurisdiction is not determinative.

[56] Similarly, in a copyright infringement case, as held by the Supreme Court in SOCAN, the infringement can occur where the communication was transmitted from and where it was received. Based on SOCAN and analogous analysis in the context of tort claims, if the communication or product originated in another jurisdiction but is ultimately made available in Ontario, Ontario is one of the places where copyright infringement occurred as it is one of the jurisdictions substantially affected by the copyright infringement.

[57] Besides SOCAN, the plaintiff relies on the decision in Robinson c. Films Cinar inc. (Q.C.C.S.), aff’d. 1997 10114 (QCCA) to suggest that the screening of INSIDE OUT in Ontario should inform the court’s analysis of whether it has jurisdiction over a claim for copyright infringement against the defendants. In Cinar, the Quebec court took jurisdiction over a claim against a German film maker for copyright infringement on the basis that its film was shown in Quebec and infringed the copyright of another work made in Quebec. While the defendants argue that Cinar predates Van Breda and that the Quebec court did not engage in a proper jurisdictional analysis, I have no doubt that the outcome would be the same if Van Breda was explicitly applied. As in this case, the plaintiff, who was based in Quebec, alleged that the defendant’s work infringed his copyright. The foreign defendant permitted the film to be broadcast in Quebec, and therefore the copyright infringement arguably took place in Quebec as found by the court at first instance (and upheld on appeal):

Sans aller dans tous les détails de la preuve qu’ils ont offerte, les demandeurs ont établi que les défendeurs requérants ont plagié et ont contrevenu au droit d’auteur du demandeur dans son œuvre intitulée « Robinson Curiosité ». Les demandeurs ont aussi prouvé à la satisfaction du Tribunal pour les fins de l’exception déclinatoire que leur faute a été commise au Québec en permettant qu’il soit diffusée une série d’émissions qui seraient en violation des droits d’auteur des demandeurs. Les demandeurs ont subi un préjudice qui pourrait justifier une partie des conclusions contre les requérants.

[58] The defendants argue that the Copyright Act has no extraterritorial reach and, therefore, Mr. Pourshian cannot make a claim for copyright infringement for activities that occurred outside Canada. However, this argument is an overly simplistic approach to the issue. Mr. Pourshian’s ability to recover damages for copyright infringement outside Canada, or even Ontario, may be limited, but he can certainly pursue a claim for copyright infringement in Ontario in relation to the communication of INSIDE OUT in this jurisdiction. Any activities the defendants engaged in outside Ontario that resulted in the communication of INSIDE OUT in Ontario are not protected simply because they took place outside Ontario. This is clear from SOCAN.

[59] Ultimately, the defendants’ real complaint is that they played no role in the distribution or dissemination of INSIDE OUT into Ontario. Their position is that, unless a defendant has directly participated in the sale or distribution of INSIDE OUT in Ontario, the Ontario court does not have jurisdiction. In my view, this misconceives the appropriate analysis in this case. While this analysis may support a finding that the defendants are not carrying on business in Ontario, it does not address the issue of whether there is a good arguable case that they have committed copyright infringement in Ontario. In my view, this has to be the core of the analysis. In this case, there is no dispute that INSIDE OUT was distributed, received and viewed in Ontario. The real issue in deciding whether the presumptive factor of copyright infringement in Ontario applies is whether the plaintiff’s claim and/or evidence establish a good arguable case that each individual defendant played a role in authorizing the “transmission” or distribution of INSIDE OUT into Ontario. This issue is addressed below in respect of each defendant.

Property in Ontario as a presumptive connecting factor

[60] Mr. Pourshian argues that, given that his copyright for Inside Out is in Ontario, his claim against the defendants is in respect of property in Ontario and that this should be accepted as a presumptive factor, giving the Ontario court jurisdiction over the claim against the defendants. The defendants argue that intangible property should not be treated in the same way as tangible property. Given that copyright infringement has no extraterritorial reach, Ontario courts cannot assume jurisdiction on the basis of this presumptive connecting factor.

[61] As reviewed above, while the Master accepted that the claim was in respect of property in Ontario, he did not engage in any analysis of the significance of this finding. He did not discuss to which defendants this finding might be relevant.

[62] In Van Breda, the Supreme Court did not explicitly list property in the jurisdiction as a presumptive connecting factor. However, in Knowles v. Lindstrom, 2014 ONCA 116, at para. 21, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recognized it as such:

The location of the property is, in my view, a presumptive connecting factor. If the subject of the claim is real property which is alleged to be the vehicle for the alleged unjust enrichment, I find it hard to think of any fact or factors that would provide a stronger presumptive connection than the location of the property within the jurisdiction. The analogy between the situs of the tort, a presumptive connecting factor in tort cases, Van Breda, at para. 88, and the location of the property in a property case is an apt one. Indeed, the argument in favour of the location of the property as a presumptive connecting factor is stronger than the argument in favour of the situs of the tort. While a tort may occur in more than one jurisdiction, real property is permanently located in only one jurisdiction. The location of the property clearly links any dispute over ownership to the courts of that jurisdiction.

[63] The issue in this case is whether copyright should be recognized as having the same status as real property for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction, and in particular whether the fact that Mr. Pourshian’s copyright is based in Ontario is sufficient to give the Ontario court jurisdiction over the claim. In Tucows.Com Co. v. Lojas Renner S.A., 2011 ONCA 548, the Court of Appeal recognized that intangible property is property for the purpose of Rule 17.06(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, the Court was dealing with a domain name. The Court found that the claim was in relation to property in Ontario because, in part, the holder of the domain name was based in Ontario. In this case, Mr. Pourshian lives in Ontario and he created Inside Out in Ontario. Therefore, I am satisfied that his claim is in respect of property in Ontario.

[64] However, as with the issue of whether the claim is in respect of copyright infringement in Ontario, this does not end the inquiry. It will be necessary to assess whether this presumptive connecting factor applies to each defendant, including whether the defendants’ evidence rebuts the presumption.

Carrying on Business as a presumptive connecting factor

[65] As reviewed above, in Van Breda, the Supreme Court stated that, in order to make a finding that a foreign defendant carries on business in a jurisdiction, the foreign entity must have an actual presence in the jurisdiction. The Master erred in finding that the production or distribution of INSIDE OUT, because the film was intended for distribution in Ontario, is sufficient for a finding that Pixar and Walt Disney Pictures Inc. are carrying on business in Ontario.

[66] In reviewing the claim against each defendant, it is necessary to assess whether, based on the pleaded facts or evidence, there is a good arguable case that any of the defendants, with the exception of Disney Shopping, Inc., has an actual presence in Ontario. The plaintiff has identified no such pleaded facts or evidence. Accordingly, my analysis below does not address this presumptive connecting factor as there would be no utility in going through this analysis for each defendant.

Whether the plaintiff has established a good arguable case for jurisdiction over each defendant

[67] Having reviewed the general principles above, it is now appropriate to review the claim against each defendant. I approach this task as follows. As discussed above, I am satisfied that, in a general sense, the presumptive connecting factors of copyright infringement in Ontario and property in Ontario provide a real and substantial connection between the plaintiff’s claim and Ontario. The core argument made by the defendants is that they played no direct role in distributing INSIDE OUT in Ontario. However, as reviewed above, I do not accept that this means that Ontario cannot have jurisdiction over the defendants.

[68] Therefore, the focus of the analysis in respect of each defendant is whether the allegations in the statement of claim and evidence support finding a good arguable case for assuming jurisdiction on the basis of copyright infringement in Ontario and/or property in Ontario, which includes an analysis of whether the defendant has rebutted the presumption because the connection to Ontario is too weak to justify assuming jurisdiction.

Walt Disney Company

[69] The Master stayed the claim against this defendant. In my view, the order staying the action should not be overturned.

[70] The allegation against the Walt Disney Company in the statement of claim is that it is the parent company of all the other defendants. There are no other allegations made against this defendant, and no specific allegations regarding its involvement in making or distributing INSIDE OUT in Ontario.

[71] In his affidavit, Mr. Salama states that the correct name of the company is The Walt Disney Corporation. He states that this defendant has never engaged in business in Canada. He also states that it is the ultimate parent of all the defendants and that it played no role in creating or distributing INSIDE OUT in Canada or elsewhere.

[72] In my view, Mr. Pourshian has not made out a good arguable case that Ontario has jurisdiction over the claim against The Walt Disney Corporation. Neither the statement of claim nor the evidence supports a finding that this defendant played any role in making INSIDE OUT or in distributing it in Ontario. Its role as ultimate parent is not sufficient to create such a connection. The plaintiff has not established a good arguable case that this defendant breached the copyright for Inside Out in Ontario. Even if the plaintiff’s claim is in relation to property in Ontario, this defendant has rebutted any connection between this defendant and the plaintiff’s claim by putting forward evidence that it played no role in the production or distribution of INSIDE OUT.

Walt Disney Pictures Inc.

[73] The Master did not stay the action against this defendant. While I arrive at the result differently, I agree that Ontario has jurisdiction over the claim against this defendant.

[74] The allegations against Walt Disney Pictures Inc. in the statement of claim are that it distributes films made by Pixar. The claim also specifically alleges that this defendant produced INSIDE OUT and released it widely in Canada.

[75] Mr. Salama’s evidence is that the correct name for this defendant is Walt Disney Pictures. In his affidavit, he states that this company is not engaged in any business in Ontario and that it has “not reproduced, sold, offered for sale, rented, distributed, exposed or exhibited INSIDE OUT or related merchandise in Canada”.

[76] Mr. Salama did not rebut or contest the plaintiff’s allegations in the statement of claim that Walt Disney Pictures produced INSIDE OUT or that it was responsible for its distribution in Canada. Rather, the defendants argue that the Ontario court does not have jurisdiction over the claim against this defendant because it did not directly distribute INSIDE OUT in Ontario. In my view, the uncontested allegations that Walt Disney Pictures produced INSIDE OUT and was responsible for its distribution are sufficient for finding a good arguable case for the Ontario court to take jurisdiction over this defendant on the basis of the presumptive factors of copyright infringement in Ontario and property in Ontario. Walt Disney Pictures has not put forward any evidence to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction by showing that the connection between the claim against this defendant and Ontario is weak.

Pixar Animation Studios

[77] The Master did not stay the action against this defendant. Again, while I arrive at the result differently, I agree that Ontario has jurisdiction over the action against this defendant.

[78] The allegation in the statement of claim is that Pixar was responsible for filming and producing INSIDE OUT.

[79] Mr. Salama’s evidence is that the correct legal name for this company is Pixar and not Pixar Animation Studios. Mr. Salama states that Pixar is not engaged in any business in Ontario. He states that, while Pixar is the registered owner of INSIDE OUT in Canada, it has not reproduced, sold, offered for sale, rented, distributed, exposed or exhibited INSIDE OUT in Canada.

[80] Mr. Salama did not dispute or rebut the allegation that Pixar was responsible for filming or producing INSIDE OUT. In my view, the uncontested allegation that Pixar filmed and produced INSIDE OUT, along with the evidence that Pixar is the registered owner of INSIDE OUT in Canada, are sufficient for the Ontario court to take jurisdiction over the claim against this defendant. With respect to the presumptive factor of copyright infringement in Ontario, Pixar filmed and produced INSIDE OUT, which was ultimately distributed in Ontario. Again, it was part of the chain of production and distribution that led to INSIDE OUT being available in Ontario. With respect to the presumptive factor of property in Ontario, Pixar made the film which is alleged to infringe the copyright to Inside Out. It is also the registered owner of INSIDE OUT in Canada. The claim also alleges that Pixar had agents in Ontario who may have viewed Inside Out and that it hired former students from Sheridan College who would have viewed Inside Out and who then worked on INSIDE OUT. These are not weak connections between the claim against Pixar and Ontario, and Pixar has not rebutted the presumption of jurisdiction.

Disney Enterprises Inc.

[81] The Master stayed the action against Disney Enterprises Inc. In my view, this was an error.

[82] The allegation in the statement of claim is that this defendant is the registered owner of the copyright for INSIDE OUT and that it owns various trademark registrations in Canada.

[83] Mr. Salama’s evidence in his affidavit is that the correct legal name for this defendant is Disney Enterprises, Inc. and that it has not engaged in any business in Ontario. Mr. Salama confirms that this defendant is the registered owner of the copyright for INSIDE OUT in Canada and that it is the owner of two trademark registrations for INSIDE OUT in Canada. Mr. Salama states that the company has not reproduced, sold, offered for sale, rented, distributed, exposed or exhibited INSIDE OUT or related merchandise in Canada.

[84] During cross-examination, Mr. Salama confirmed that Disney Enterprises, Inc. entered into a Master Licence Agreement with The Walt Disney Company (Canada) Ltd. (which is a Canadian company and not a defendant in the action) authorizing the use and further licensing of INSIDE OUT merchandise.

[85] In my view, Disney Enterprises, Inc.’s ownership of the copyright and trademark for INSIDE OUT in Canada, and its agreement with a third party in Canada authorizing the use and further licensing of the INSIDE OUT trademark are sufficient to give rise to a good arguable case for the Ontario court to take jurisdiction over this defendant.

[86] As reviewed above, I have found that the plaintiff’s claim is in relation to property in Ontario. Therefore, in order to rebut this presumptive factor, this defendant would have to demonstrate that this presumptive connecting factor “does not point to any real relationship between the subject matter of the litigation and the forum or points only to a weak relationship between them”. Disney Enterprises, Inc.’s ownership of the copyright and trademark for INSIDE OUT in Canada and its Master Licence Agreement with a Canadian company do not suggest that there is only a weak connection between Ontario and the claim against this defendant. It may turn out that this defendant has a good defence against the claim, but that is not the same as establishing a weak connection to Ontario.

[87] Given my finding that the presumptive factor of property in Ontario applies to this defendant, it is not necessary for me to also consider whether the claim against this defendant arises from copyright infringement in Ontario. However, arguably, this company has committed copyright infringement in Ontario by authorizing The Walt Disney Company (Canada) Ltd. to use its trademark in relation to INSIDE OUT in Ontario.

Walt Disney Studios Home Entertainment

[88] The Master stayed the action against Walt Disney Studios Home Entertainment. In my view, this was an error.

[89] The allegation in the statement of claim is that this defendant is responsible for home video distribution.

[90] Mr. Salama’s evidence is that there is no such corporation, and that it is the trade name for Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. In his affidavit, Mr. Salama states that Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. is registered to do business in Saskatchewan but he says that it does not carry on business in Ontario or elsewhere in Canada.

[91] In his cross-examination, Mr. Salama stated that a Canadian company, Buena Vista Home Entertainment, would have been responsible for securing duplicated copies of DVDs and Blu-ray discs for distribution in Canada.

[92] In my view, the allegations in the statement of claim and the evidence are sufficient to find a good arguable case for taking jurisdiction over this defendant both on the basis of the presumptive factors of property in Ontario and copyright infringement in Ontario. With respect to property in Ontario, this defendant has not rebutted the presumption by showing a weak connection between the claim against it and Ontario. On the contrary, the evidence shows that this defendant played a role in distributing copies of INSIDE OUT in Ontario. This also supports finding a good arguable case that this defendant committed copyright infringement in Ontario by authorizing the sale of INSIDE OUT DVDs in Ontario.

[93] With respect to the misnomer of this defendant, the statement of claim may need to be amended, but assuming the amendment is permitted, for the reasons above, I am satisfied that the Ontario court has jurisdiction over a claim against Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., who’s trade name is Walt Disney Studios Home Entertainment.

Disney Consumer Products and Interactive Media

[94] The action against this defendant was stayed. In my view, this was an error.

[95] The allegation in the statement of claim is that this company is responsible for the merchandising and development of the parent company’s physical products and digital experiences, including those associated with the animated films.

[96] Mr. Salama’s evidence is that the correct name is Disney Consumer Products, Inc. and that it only licenses intellectual property to manufacturers but that it does not manufacture anything itself. He states that Disney Consumer Products, Inc. does not engage in business in Ontario and that it has not sold INSIDE OUT in Ontario.

[97] The evidence also includes a licence agreement between Disney Consumer Products, Inc. and a company called Funko LLC, that authorizes the sale of branded INSIDE OUT merchandise in Canada.

[98] In my view, the allegations in the statement of claim and the evidence are sufficient to find a good arguable case for taking jurisdiction over this defendant both on the basis of the presumptive factors of property in Ontario and copyright infringement in Ontario. With respect to property in Ontario, this defendant has not rebutted the presumption by showing a weak connection between the claim against it and Ontario. On the contrary, the evidence shows that this defendant played a role in making available INSIDE OUT branded merchandise in Ontario. This also supports finding a good arguable case that this defendant committed copyright infringement in Ontario by authorizing the sale of INSIDE OUT merchandise in Ontario.

Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures

[99] The Master stayed the claim against this defendant. In my view, this was an error.

[100] The allegation in the statement of claim is that this defendant is responsible for the distribution, marketing and promotion of films released by Pixar and Disney affiliates.

[101] Mr. Salama’s evidence in his affidavit is that this is not a corporation, but a division of ABC, Inc., which is a New York corporation. He says that it is primarily a service provider to other Disney companies and that it owns and operates television stations in Los Angeles, Fresno, Raleigh-Durham and Philadelphia. He also states that ABC, Inc. has not engaged in any business in Ontario and that it has not sold or distributed INSIDE OUT in Ontario.

[102] During his cross-examination, Mr. Salama testified that Buena Vista Pictures distribution, which is a division of ABC Inc., is the licensor of rights to Buena Vista Pictures Canada Inc., which in turn is licensed for the theatrical distribution of INSIDE OUT in Canada. Accordingly, through Buena Vista Pictures Distribution Inc., ABC Inc. authorized and participated in the theatrical distribution of INSIDE OUT in Canada, including Ontario.

[103] While the plaintiff misnamed this defendant as Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures, the defendants were able to identify the correct legal entity as ABC, Inc. and to provide evidence on its behalf. This is a defect that could be cured by amendment.

[104] In my view, assuming that ABC, Inc. was the named defendant, the allegations in the statement of claim and Mr. Salama’s evidence are sufficient to find a good arguable case for taking jurisdiction over this defendant both on the basis of the presumptive factors of property in Ontario and copyright infringement in Ontario. With respect to property in Ontario, this defendant has not rebutted the presumption by showing a weak connection between the claim against it and Ontario. On the contrary, the evidence shows that this defendant played a role in making available INSIDE OUT for distribution in theaters in Ontario. This also supports finding a good arguable case that this defendant committed copyright infringement in Ontario by authorizing the distribution and showing of INSIDE OUT in theaters in Ontario through its license agreement with Buena Vista Pictures Canada Inc..

American Broadcasting Company Inc.

[105] The action against this defendant was stayed. I agree that it should remain stayed.

[106] The allegation in the statement of claim is that this defendant is responsible for the television distribution of films distributed by Pixar and that it reproduced INSIDE OUT through online streaming.

[107] Mr. Salama’s evidence is that the correct name for the company is American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. He states that the company provides a feed to affiliate televisions stations, which includes a station in Buffalo, New York. He states that the company does not engage in business in Ontario. The feed provided to affiliate stations has included INSIDE OUT and may have been viewed in Ontario through “spillover broadcasting”.

[108] In my view, the “spillover” by an affiliate station into Ontario is not sufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff has made out a good arguable case that American Broadcasting Company Inc. breached copyright infringement in Ontario. The company provides the feed for broadcasting in New York state. It does not broadcast from New York state itself, and the spillover is incidental to the intended audience.

[109] With respect to the factor of property in Ontario, given that the feed included INSIDE OUT, I accept that this presumptive factor applied. However, I am satisfied that this defendant has rebutted this presumptive connecting factor given the weakness of the connection between the claim against this defendant and Ontario identified above. This company is not part of the direct chain of production and distribution that led to the sale and showing of INSIDE OUT in Ontario.

Costs

[110] Following the hearing, counsel for the parties advised the Court that they had reached an agreement on costs. If one side was entirely successful on the appeal and cross-appeal, that side would be entitled to $30,000. Otherwise, the Court should determine the costs payable having regard to this amount. Mr. Pourshian has been substantially successful on the appeal and cross-appeal. In the circumstances, in my view, $25,000 in costs for Mr. Pourshian is a fair amount.

Conclusion

[111] For the reasons above, Mr. Pourshian’s appeal is granted in part and the appeal by Walt Disney Pictures Inc. and Pixar Animation Studios is dismissed. The action in Ontario can proceed against all defendants, except for the claims against Walt Disney Company and American Broadcasting Company Inc. which remain stayed.

[112] Costs are awarded to Mr. Pourshian in the amount of $25,000 payable within 30 days.

___________________________ Favreau J.

Released: July 12, 2021

CITATION: Pourshian v. Walt Disney Company, 2021 ONSC 4840

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 629/19 and 632/16 DATE: 20210712

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

BETWEEN:

DAMON POURSHIAN

Appellant/Respondent by Cross-Appeal

– and –

WALT DISNEY COMPANY, WALT DISNEY PICTURES INC., PIXAR ANIMATION STUDIOS, DISNEY ENTERPRISES INC., DISNEY SHOPPING, INC., WALT DISNEY STUDIOS HOME ENTERTAINEMENT, DISNEY CONSUMER PRODUCTS AND INTERACTIVE MEDIA, WALT DISNEY STUDIOS MOTION PICTURES and AMERICAN BROADCAST COMPANY, INC.

Respondents/Appellants by Cross-Appeal

REASONS FOR DECISION

FAVREAU J.

Released: July 12, 2021