ONSCDC 2020

The appellant tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board denying an adjournment of eviction proceedings pending the resolution of her Human Rights Tribunal application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant had already found new accommodation and vacated the premises.

The court noted this dismissal does not affect her ongoing human rights application regarding the cancellation of her rent-geared-to-income subsidy.

The self-represented applicant sought to have her application heard on an urgent basis but refused to attend a mandatory case management teleconference, insisting on a panel of three judges.

Due to her failure to attend the scheduled teleconference, the court stayed the application pending further order, with a warning that it may be dismissed if she does not arrange a fresh teleconference by a specified date.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitration award that reinstated an employee terminated for sexual harassment and dishonesty during the investigation.

The arbitrator had substituted the dismissal with a 30-day suspension and a condition that any future sexual harassment would result in automatic termination, binding any future arbitrator to only determine if harassment occurred.

The Divisional Court upheld the arbitrator's finding that termination was not the only appropriate penalty, as it was based on reasonable factual findings.

However, the Court found the penalty unreasonable because the arbitrator lacked statutory authority under the Labour Relations Act to bind future arbitrators.

The application was granted and the matter remitted to the arbitrator to determine the appropriate penalty.

The tenants, who owned permanent homes on a residential complex, had a lease with the landlord that restricted their occupancy during winter months.

The Landlord and Tenant Board found that the Residential Tenancies Act applied and that the lease provision restricting access was void because it substantially interfered with the tenants' reasonable enjoyment under s. 22 of the Act.

The landlord appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that s. 22 does not prohibit parties from mutually agreeing to limit occupancy during certain periods, and that such a voluntary agreement does not constitute substantial interference by the landlord.

The applicant appeared before the court for a show cause hearing regarding civil contempt.

The court accepted the applicant's apology for a prior outburst and declined to make a finding of contempt for his failure to appear.

For a prior finding of civil contempt, the court sentenced the applicant to time served, accounting for 8 days spent in custody on remand.

The applicant remains subject to an order requiring prior judicial permission to commence any proceedings in Ontario.

The tenant appealed an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board, which automatically stayed the eviction.

The court previously directed the tenant to pay $3,000 in rent by a specific date to maintain the stay.

The tenant failed to make the payment, alleging the landlord illegally redirected his mail and intercepted his social benefits.

The court rejected the tenant's unsubstantiated claim and lifted the stay of enforcement, directing the Sheriff to expedite the eviction due to the longstanding non-payment of rent.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering him to pay $25,000 to his former common-law partner for unpaid loans and living expenses.

He argued the trial judge failed to credit him for certain payments and that his debt should be reduced because the respondent had entered into a consumer proposal with her creditors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

The court also held that the respondent's consumer proposal did not reduce the value of the debt the appellant owed to her.

The moving party, who previously won a summary judgment for defamation against the respondent, brought a motion to quash the respondent's appeal or alternatively for security for costs.

The court declined to quash the appeal, noting that doing so would require a full review of the merits.

However, the court granted the motion for security for costs, finding that the appeal appeared frivolous and vexatious, the respondent had insufficient assets in Ontario, and the respondent was continuing to breach an existing injunction against publishing defamatory statements.

The respondent was ordered to post $20,000 as security for costs.

The moving party sought leave to adduce fresh evidence and leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions and awarded costs of $2,500 to the responding party.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a costs order.

The Divisional Court reviewed the moving party's materials and found that leave might be warranted on a single ground: whether the motion judge erred in awarding costs to the self-represented responding party without evidence that she forewent remunerative activity, contrary to Fong v. Chan.

The responding party was granted an opportunity to respond to this issue, while leave on all other grounds was denied.

The defendants moved for leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion for a stay on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, noting that an order dismissing a jurisdiction motion for a stay is a final order.

Final orders of the Superior Court of Justice must be appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, not the Divisional Court.

The moving parties, Project Spokane, LLC and Sean Walsh, brought a motion for leave to appeal an October 8, 2020 order of Conway J. in a bankruptcy proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The father moved for a stay pending appeal of an order requiring him to provide a notarized copy of his severely autistic child's passport and OHIP card to the mother.

The mother, a Ghanaian diplomat, required the documents to obtain a travel visa to return to Canada and resume equal parenting time.

The court admitted fresh evidence from an immigration lawyer but ultimately dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no irreparable harm to the father and that the balance of convenience and the child's best interests favoured the mother returning to Canada.

Following the dismissal of the moving party's motion for leave to appeal, the responding parties sought costs.

The court had initially ordered no costs because the respondents had not filed costs outlines.

The respondents subsequently contacted the court to request costs, arguing they had uploaded a bill of costs late or should be allowed to make submissions after the decision.

The Divisional Court declined to amend its order, noting that the scheduling direction clearly required all costs materials to be uploaded by a specific date, consistent with the court's practice direction.

No costs were awarded.

The moving party insurer brought a motion to dismiss the respondent's application for judicial review for delay.

The respondent had commenced the application over 30 months prior but took no steps to perfect it until the eve of the motion.

The court applied the test for dismissing an application for judicial review for delay, finding the 30-month delay excessive, the explanation for the delay unsatisfactory, and the delay long enough to presume prejudice.

The motion was granted and the application for judicial review was dismissed.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a decision by an insurance company denying his claim against a school board for failing to identify his learning disability.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure considering dismissal of the application.

The court found that judicial review is only available for decisions made by public bodies exercising state authority.

As the insurance company was not a public body, the application had no chance of success and was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Three appeals were scheduled to be heard regarding whether the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) has jurisdiction under s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act to extend the two-year limitation period for statutory accident benefits applications.

The LAT had previously made conflicting decisions on this issue and indicated it did not intend to appear.

The Divisional Court adjourned the appeals and ordered the LAT to intervene and file materials to assist the court in determining the jurisdictional issue.

The appellant sought leave under section 246 of the Business Corporations Act to commence a derivative action and file pleadings on behalf of a corporation in an ongoing shareholder dispute.

The application judge refused leave, finding that the proposed action would not benefit the corporation and that the appellant was not acting in good faith due to a conflict of interest.

On appeal, the Divisional Court applied the Housen standard of review and found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding that the respondent's transitional youth housing program was exempt from the Residential Tenancies Act under section 5(k).

The appellant argued that the introduction of section 5.1, which specifically regulates transitional housing, meant the respondent could no longer rely on section 5(k) without meeting section 5.1's prescriptive requirements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 5.1(5) explicitly preserves other exemptions, and the Board made no error of law in finding the respondent's program met the requirements for the section 5(k) exemption.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits until the insurer refused further benefits.

The appellant applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal to dispute the refusal, but the adjudicator dismissed the application as being outside the two-year limitation period.

On appeal, the appellant argued the refusal was invalid because the insurer failed to provide copies of independent assessment reports to her treating practitioner, as required by section 37(5) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while the insurer breached section 37(5), this omission did not invalidate the clear and unequivocal refusal of benefits, and the limitation period had expired.