CITATION: Dell v. Zeifman Partners Inc., 2020 ONSC 3881
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 501/19 DATE: 20200623
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
Swinton, Backhouse and Kristjanson JJ.
BETWEEN:
JAMES DELL, SOPHIE DELL, RON QUEVILLON, CHARLENE QUEVILLON, DINO LAVALLE, MARY LAVALLE, DAN LAVALLE, LARRY BOURK, JOAN BOURK, RICHARD ZIRGER, JUDI ZIRGER, ROBERT ZIRGER, SHARON ZIRGER, GEORGE LEPP, CINDI LEPP, MARK LEPP, AND ERICA LEPP
Appellants
– and –
ZEIFMAN PARTNERS INC., as Operator of the waste disposal site at 2021 Four Mile Creek Road, Niagara-on-the-Lake
Respondent
Debra McAllister, Paul Marshall and Cassandra Kirewskie, for the Appellants
Stanley D. Berger, for the Respondent
HEARD at Toronto (by videoconference): June 11, 2020
Swinton and Backhouse JJ.
Overview
[1] The Appellants appeal from a decision of the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board (the “Board”) dated July 30, 2019 that denied their claim for costs related to a lengthy proceeding before the Board. For the reasons that follow, we would dismiss the appeal.
Background
[2] The Farming and Food Production Protection Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 1 (the “Act”) establishes a statutory scheme to shield farmers from liability in nuisance for disturbances caused by “normal farm practices”, a term defined by the Act. The Board adjudicates disputes under the Act, and, in particular, determines whether an agricultural operation meets the “normal farm practice” standard.
[3] At issue in the present proceeding before the Board was a greenhouse site that had been operated by Vandermeer Greenhouses (“Vandermeer”) in a rural area near Niagara-on-the-Lake. In 2009, Vandermeer installed an alternative energy system called an “anaerobic digester.” Biogas produced by the digester was used to run a large generator that heated water to heat the greenhouses. After the digester commenced operation, nearby residents reported disturbance from offensive odours and an extreme increase in the number of flies.
[4] Vandermeer entered into bankruptcy proceedings in early 2014. On February 21, 2014, Zeifman Partners, the respondent in this appeal, was appointed Receiver by court order. The order stayed and suspended all rights and remedies against the debtor and the Receiver or the property of the receivership except with the written consent of the Receiver or leave of the Court.
[5] The Appellants reside near the Vandermeer property. In May, 2014, they commenced an application under s. 5(1) of the Act, arguing that the waste disposal and alternative energy facility operated by the Receiver seriously disturbed their enjoyment of their properties and was not a normal farm practice.
[6] The Receiver responded to the application by noting that proceedings had been stayed against it due to the receivership order. The Board declined to proceed until the Receiver consented to the proceeding or the Appellants obtained an order to lift the stay. Initially, the Receiver did not consent to lift the stay. On April 23, 2015, the Superior Court made an order to lift the stay, the Receiver having consented to allowing the application to proceed on the day the motion to lift the stay was to be heard.
[7] In the following paragraphs, we describe some of what happened before the Board during the proceedings.
[8] There were extensive pre-hearing proceedings before the Board. In May 2015, the Appellants sent a letter raising the “perceived biases” of the Board after they discovered that a government employee, whom the Appellants believed would be called as a witness by the Receiver, had learned of the Appellants’ application.
[9] On July 13, 2015, the Board issued a pre-hearing order requiring “broad disclosure” of documentary evidence by the Receiver by a deadline of August 13, 2015. The July 13, 2015 order also provided for interrogatories by the Appellants.
[10] On October 9, 2015, the Board partially granted the Appellants’ motion for an order requiring the Receiver to comply with the July 13, 2015 disclosure order. However, the Board declined to add two Ontario government ministries as parties for disclosure purposes. On November 3, 2015, the Board partially granted a second motion brought by the Appellants. It ordered the Receiver to respond to interrogatories, but it denied the Appellants’ request for an order permitting them access to the property. It also permitted the Receiver to have a limited number of interrogatories.
[11] The evidentiary phase of the application was heard over 20 days between December 2015 and July 2016. The Board heard evidence from 23 witnesses for the Appellants and two witnesses for the Receiver. Disputes regarding disclosure and answers to interrogatories continued throughout the hearing.
[12] The Receiver was seeking a buyer for the property throughout the litigation. Unsuccessful negotiations with prospective purchasers occurred during the summer and fall of 2015 that ended in January 2016. An agreement of purchase and sale with the eventual purchaser occurred on February 8, 2016, although there were ongoing negotiations over the next few months. By this time, there had been 12 days of evidence in this proceeding.
[13] In June 2016, the Appellants learned that the digester had been shut down for some six months and that the property was soon going to be sold. They requested that the Board issue summons to two witnesses, Allan Rutman, the President of the Receiver, and Daryl Robinson, the operator of the digester and greenhouses, to give evidence regarding the pending sale. The Appellants also challenged the impartiality of the Receiver’s expert witness. The Board denied the Appellants’ request that these witnesses be summonsed and ordered that the Receiver’s expert be permitted to testify.
[14] On June 21, 2016, the Appellants requested a concession from the Receiver, or in the alternative, a ruling from the Board, that the Appellants had established certain preliminary issues, including that they had experienced disturbances caused by the digester. The Receiver declined to make this concession, and the Board declined to make a ruling before all the evidence had been heard.
[15] After the conclusion of the evidence in early July 2016, the Board ordered that the parties file written submissions within 30 days of being advised by the Board that it had received the transcripts of the hearing.
[16] Following the completion of the hearing, the Superior Court approved the sale of the property in late July 2016. In his endorsement, Pattillo J. denied the Appellants’ request for disclosure of the Receiver’s communications with the purchaser, commenting that this information was “none of [the Appellants’] business”. The sale ultimately closed in February 2017.
[17] On July 25, 2016, the Appellants brought a motion to the Board for an order to add the prospective purchaser as a party to their application and for information on the sale. The next day, the Board indicated by email that it viewed the Appellants’ notice of motion as a “nullity” because they had failed to comply with Board Rules of Practice and Procedure (the “Rules”). The Board wrote that the Appellants should re-serve their notice on the purchaser, and scheduled a motion hearing for August 9, 2016.
[18] In light of the Board’s communication, the Appellants took the position that their motion had been ruled a nullity and that the motion should therefore not proceed. After midnight on the morning of August 9, 2016, counsel for the Appellants wrote to the Board and the Receiver’s counsel that she would not be attending the hearing. Nonetheless, the Board convened for the hearing in accordance with an email that had been sent to the parties on August 2 saying that the Board planned to convene on August 9.
[19] In a subsequent decision, the Board acknowledged that there was no proper motion before it, but noted that the Appellants had not indicated in a timely manner that they would not be attending and had not requested that the Board cancel the hearing. On August 12, 2016, the Board ordered the Appellants to pay $2,500 in costs for failing to attend and prohibited them from bringing further motions without leave. Further, the Board held that it had no jurisdiction to add a party at that stage in the proceeding.
[20] The Appellants requested a review of this order by the Board’s Chair. On September 22, 2016, he upheld the order, noting that the Appellants could have addressed the scheduling of the hearing before it actually took place. He also held that it was appropriate for the Board to address its jurisdiction to add a party, noting that the Appellants’ motion had no reasonable prospect of success.
[21] On October 24, 2016, the Appellants brought an application for judicial review before the Divisional Court in respect of the Board’s August 12, 2016 order. On April 6, 2018, the application was dismissed in light of the appeal mechanism provided by s. 8(2) of the Act and on the basis of prematurity. Costs of $2,000 were ordered to the Receiver.
[22] During the period when the matter was before the Divisional Court, proceedings had continued before the Board. In June 2017, after the closing of the sale of the property, the Appellants brought a motion for leave to bring a new motion to add parties and file fresh evidence. On August 4, 2017, the Board denied leave and ordered the Appellants to pay $2,000 in costs for the motion. Further, the Board ordered that despite transcripts not having been received, the 30-day timeline for delivering final written submissions would begin to run, regardless of whether the transcripts had been delivered, on September 15, 2017. The Appellants requested a review of this order, but their request was dismissed by the Board’s Chair on September 21, 2017. Hard copies of the transcripts were finally delivered to the Board around his time.
[23] Through to the early months of 2018, the Appellants continued to report problems in obtaining copies of the transcripts. They wrote to the Board Chair several times regarding the status of the transcripts. Among other things, the Appellants requested explanations from the Board as to the delays and the notes of Board members. They also asked that the Board reconvene so that the reporter could be examined in person. The Board’s Chair denied these requests.
[24] In January 2018, the Appellants wrote to the Board alleging that the Receiver was in possession of transcripts that had not yet been delivered to the Appellants. In this letter, the Appellants suggested that a reasonable person would perceive the Board was “shielding the court reporter from scrutiny” in order to maintain the Receiver’s advantage in possessing transcripts that the Appellants did not have. They further suggested that the Receiver was in violation of Rule 39(5) of the Board’s Rules, which requires a party who has ordered a transcript to provide copies to all other parties free of charge.
[25] The Board dismissed the Appellants’ concerns, and noted that the Board had previously told the parties that they were responsible for obtaining their own transcripts, thereby waiving compliance with Rule 39(5). Further, the Board found that the Appellants had made little effort to reach out to the court reporter during the fall of 2017 and winter of 2018, and so could not fault the Board for the fact that they did not have the transcripts they had requested. In light of these findings, the Board made an order on August 4, 2018 requiring the Appellants to pay $1,000 in costs and ordering that they make no further motions or requests for review without leave.
[26] The parties delivered their final submissions on the merits of the application in the spring of 2018, almost two years after the hearing had concluded.
The Board’s Decision on the Merits
[27] The Board issued its decision on the merits of the application on November 8, 2018, holding that several of the Appellants had been directly affected by the odour and extreme increase in fly population caused by the digester. Further, it held that the operation was not a normal farm practice given the severity of these disturbances, and its finding that the digester operation had changed the character of the neighbourhood “from a peaceful, rural environment… to one where [the Appellants] must shelter in their home to avoid the offensive odours and the numerous flies.” On this basis, the Board ordered that the digester be shut down and that all feedstock be removed from the premises.
The Costs Decision
[28] Following the release of the merits decision, both parties submitted requests for costs under s. 17.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (the “SPPA”) and the Board’s Rules.
[29] Subsections 17.1(1) and (2) of the SPPA provide that a tribunal may order a party to pay all or part of another party’s costs on two conditions: the tribunal has made rules respecting the award of costs, and the conduct or course of conduct of a party against whom costs are awarded has been “unreasonable, frivolous or vexatious or a party has acted in bad faith.”
[30] The Board has enacted rules respecting the award of costs in accordance with s. 17.1 of the SPPA. Subsection 66(1) of the Board’s Rules provides that a party may seek costs where it believes that another party “has acted clearly unreasonably, frivolously, in a vexatious manner, or in bad faith, considering all of the circumstances.” Subsection 66(8) sets out a non-exhaustive list of conduct that can be found to be “clearly unreasonable, frivolous, vexatious or bad faith”. According to s. 66(9) of the Rules, if the party requesting costs has also conducted itself in an unreasonable manner, the Board has discretion to deny costs or reduce the quantum of a costs award.
[31] The Appellants sought costs totaling $1,200,339.57, representing a claim for full indemnification in respect of:
The costs of a first application brought by Richard and Judi Zirger in 2012 totaling $46,134.53.
The costs incurred in the Superior Court of Justice to obtain leave to bring these proceedings totaling $341,471.57.
The costs of a motion heard October 6, 2015 brought by the Appellants to compel compliance with the July 13, 2015 disclosure order totaling $23,778.02.
The costs of the Appellants’ November 2, 2015 motion to compel further compliance with the July 13, 2015 order totaling $25,978.70.
The costs of responding to the Receiver’s allegedly frivolous and vexatious interrogatories totaling $6,118.95.
The costs of the Appellants’ testimony during the first seven days of hearing, including preparation and attendance, totaling $161,642.60.
The costs of challenging the impartiality of the Receiver’s expert witness totaling $31,238.85.
The costs of the entire hearing “thrown away” as a result of the Receiver’s failure to disclose the December 2015 shutdown of the digester and the February 2016 sale of the property, totaling $485,667.35.
The cost of the Appellants pursuing their right to have a copy of the transcript of the hearing by enforcing the Receiver’s compliance with Rule 39(5) totaling $78,309.00.
[32] In its costs decision of July 30, 2019, the Board determined that the Appellants had failed to make out their claims for the costs of all but one of these items. The Board declined to award costs for the 2012 application, as that application was between different parties, and it had been withdrawn.
[33] The Board declined to award costs for the proceedings before the Superior Court of Justice on the basis that this was separate litigation, and the Appellants could have sought costs from the Court.
[34] The Board rejected the Appellants’ argument that the Receiver should be rebuked for the positions taken in “this complex litigation.” The Board refused to order costs related to the motion of October 6, 2015, as the conduct did not meet the threshold for an award of costs – in other words, the Receiver had not acted unreasonably or in bad faith. Similarly, the Board refused to award costs for answering interrogatories.
[35] The Board declined to award costs for the Appellants’ challenge to the impartiality of the Receiver’s expert because the Appellants were unsuccessful in preventing the expert’s testimony. Lastly, the Board found that the Appellants were not entitled to their costs of obtaining transcripts, because the Receiver had complied with its Rule 39(5) obligations, or its non-compliance was insufficient to ground a costs award.
[36] However, the Board agreed with the Appellants that the Receiver had acted in bad faith by failing to disclose the pending sale of the property. It rejected the Appellants’ argument that the Receiver should have disclosed the shutdown of the digester around December 2015, since the digester could have been restarted at any time. However, the Board held that the Receiver should have disclosed the existence of an accepted offer to purchase the property in February 2016 in a timely manner, as “[t]he sale of the Vandermeer operation would render any decision of this Board moot as any order would only affect the current owner/operator”. Had the sale been disclosed in a timely manner, the Appellants could have adjourned the matter pending court approval of the sale and then considered whether to commence a fresh application against the new owner.
[37] Despite this finding, the Board declined to award costs to the Appellants because, through counsel, they had “conducted themselves in an unreasonable manner” throughout the proceedings, specifically
(a) by showing throughout the proceeding a lack of respect for the Board, the Ministry and opposing counsel;
(b) by failing on numerous occasions to comply with directions from the Board; and
(c) by prolonging the hearing with an unnecessary number of witnesses, an unnecessary number of motions and lengthy and repetitive questioning of witnesses.
[38] The Board then considered the Receiver’s request for costs, in which the Receiver pointed to specific allegations of unreasonable conduct on the part of the Appellants. The Board indicated that it had reviewed these instances and stated that “[f]or the most part they are supported by the facts.” However, the Board declined to decide whether any conduct of the Appellants was serious enough to warrant an award of costs because the Receiver’s failure to disclose the pending sale disqualified it from any costs.
[39] In concluding that no costs should be awarded, the Board commented that neither party was blameless in their conduct; counsel for both parties lacked civility with each other; and neither party had clean hands.
The Appeal
[40] Pursuant to s. 8(2) of the Act, an appeal lies to the Divisional Court on a question of fact, law or jurisdiction.
The Standard of Review
[41] Appellate standards of review apply in this appeal, given the holding in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (at para. 37). As confirmed in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 questions of law and questions of mixed fact and law involving extricable legal errors are reviewable on a standard of correctness, while questions of fact and other questions of mixed fact and law are to be reviewed for palpable and overriding error (at paras. 8, 10, 19, and 26-37).
[42] However, it is important to remember that the present appeal is from a costs award. An award of costs is in the discretion of the judge or the administrative tribunal that makes the award. Appellate courts do not interfere with orders of costs made by a judge unless there has been an error of principle, or the award of costs is plainly wrong (Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9 at para. 27). A similar approach should be taken in an appeal from a costs decision of an administrative tribunal.
The Appellants’ Arguments
[43] In their factum, the Appellants argued that the Board erred in law in refusing to award costs to them because of the finding that their counsel had acted unreasonably in the proceeding. In oral argument, they did not pursue this, instead focusing on the conduct of the Receiver. They also argued that the Board made palpable and overriding errors with respect to finding unreasonable conduct on their part and submitted that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for that finding.
[44] The Appellants submit that the Receiver acted in bad faith not only in failing to disclose the sale of the property but also throughout the proceeding, and that the Board erred in not awarding them full indemnity costs of the entire proceeding. They submit that the Receiver was not an ordinary litigant, and had a fiduciary obligation to all stakeholders to act in a neutral and objective way. They submit that the Receiver acted in bad faith:
i) in failing to disclose that the waste disposal operation was shut down around December 2015;
ii) in unreasonably refusing to consent to the stay of the proceedings being lifted and then ultimately consenting in chambers on the day of the motion;
iii) in failing to act cooperatively at the pre-hearing disclosure stage and in failing to make timely disclosure;
iv) in going on a “fishing expedition” in its interrogatories, looking for some other explanation for the source of the disturbance;
v) in failing to make reasonable concessions during the proceeding by admitting that the property was the source of the disturbance and that in any event arguing that it was de minimis; and
vi) in failing to comply with the Rule regarding providing transcripts to all parties.
[45] The Appellants submit that the Receiver breached his fiduciary obligations, and it was a palpable and overriding error for the Board not to hold the Receiver to account and award the Appellants their costs. Finally, the Appellants argue that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Board.
Analysis
[46] As a starting point, it is important to emphasize that an award of costs is discretionary. Moreover, this Board has a limited authority to award costs. In order to make a costs award, it must find that the party against whom costs are sought has acted in a manner that is unreasonable, frivolous, or vexatious or the party has acted in bad faith. Even then, the Board can deny costs or reduce the quantum of costs to a party who has acted unreasonably. As the Board noted in its costs decision, its jurisprudence has established that no party has a right to costs, and costs awards are rare (Dubois v. Burkhardt (No.1), 2010 ONNFPPB 55).
[47] The Appellants’ main argument is that the Receiver acted improperly throughout the proceedings. In support they rely on Bennett on Receivership, 3rd Edition, at p. 68 for the proposition that the court-appointed Receiver acts in a fiduciary capacity to all stakeholders, must be neutral and objective, and must act with meticulous correctness.
[48] However, the Appellants were unable to provide any authority for their assertion that the Receiver was not entitled to act like an ordinary litigant in the proceeding before the Board. The Appellants are not creditors of the estate, and it is questionable whether the standard of “meticulous correctness” owed by a receiver to all those interested in the estate is the same as that owed by a receiver when defending a claim that its operation is not a normal farm practice under the Act. See, as well, Toronto Dominion Bank v. Usarco Ltd. 1997 12417 (Ont. S.C.) at paras. 31-32, referencing the statement of Wilson J. in Fotti v. 777 Management Inc., 1981 3423 (MB QB), 2 P.P.S.A.C. 32 at p. 37, [1981] 5 W.W.R. 488, 9 Man. R. (2d) 142 (Q.B.) In Fotti, Wilson J. observed that the receiver was not “the mere agent of the debenture holder, but … trustee for all parties interested in the fund of which he stands possessed” (emphasis added). This is also consistent with what Myers J. stated in Zirger v. The Normal Farm Practices and Protection Board, 2018 ONSC 2236 (Div. Ct.) at para. 19:
The role of the receiver is to steward the assets of the debtor and administer the liquidation of the assets as a fiduciary for all of those who are lawfully entitled to share in the proceeds of liquidation. Its role is to investigate and welcome those who properly ought to share in the debtor’s estate. As a party to litigation where a creditor’s claim needs proof, the receiver’s role is usually just to ensure that the facts and relevant law are all fairly presented to the decision-maker. (emphasis added)
[49] We find no palpable and overriding error in the Board’s finding that the Receiver should be granted as broad a discretion as the Appellants in regard to interrogatories.
[50] The Board gave logical reasons for denying costs in relation to each of the claims of unreasonable conduct alleged against the Receiver. Except for the finding of bad faith for failing to disclose the pending sale of the property, the Board found that the conduct of the Receiver did not meet the threshold of clearly unreasonable conduct or bad faith. The Board found the Receiver’s failure to disclose the accepted agreement of purchase of sale amounted to bad faith because, had the Appellants known, they could have chosen to adjourn or withdraw their application. While the Receiver does not challenge the finding of bad faith, counsel points out that in weighing the severity of the misconduct, the Board found that the Appellants would have known that the property would be sold and chose to continue with the application after they were apprised of the accepted agreement of purchase and sale.
[51] The Board found that the failure to disclose the shutdown in December 20105 was not relevant, as the digester could have been restarted and continued operations. The Board did not find that there was anything unreasonable because the Receiver did not consent to lift the stay and then did so in chambers after the filing of the Appellants’ material supporting the claim. While not directly relevant to our view of this matter, we note in passing that the amount of costs claimed under this heading of $341,471.57 is completely disproportionate. In any event, the costs of the leave proceeding should have been sought before the Superior Court. The Board had no authority to award costs for that proceeding.
[52] Similarly, the Board did not find that it was unreasonable for the Receiver to defend the application, and there is no finding by the Board that the Receiver’s defence was frivolous. The Board properly found that the prior application in 2012 had different parties, and that to order costs of a withdrawn application was not appropriate.
[53] There was no finding by the Board that the Receiver, who had ordered a partial transcript, had failed to comply with the Rule requiring that it provide transcripts to the Appellants. We find no palpable and overriding error here.
[54] The Board properly considered the unreasonable conduct of Appellants’ counsel, as counsel acted as the agent for the Appellants, and there was no basis to find that he acted without instructions from his clients.
[55] We reject the Appellants’ submissions that the Board had no authority to find that neither party had clean hands. This comment was another way of saying that their conduct was unreasonable, and is what the Board is directed to consider under its costs rules.
[56] With respect to the Board’s findings regarding the Appellants’ unreasonable conduct, the Appellants have demonstrated no palpable and overriding error. In support of its claim for costs of the proceeding, the Receiver set out detailed allegations of the Appellants’ alleged misconduct in written submissions to the Board. The Board held:
The Board has reviewed the instances to support each of the above-noted circumstances but does not intend to review each circumstance separately in these reasons. For the most part they are supported by the facts.
[57] The reviewing court must read the decision maker’s reasons in light of the history and context of the proceedings in which they were rendered (Vavilov, supra at para. 94). The Board ordered costs against the Appellants three times during the course of the proceeding, giving detailed reasons for doing so. The Receiver’s written costs submissions before the Board and the Board’s reasons for ordering costs during the proceeding are properly before us and help explain the Board’s reasoning process that may not be fully apparent from the costs reasons themselves. The Board’s reasons were sufficient to support its decision, when read in light of the history and context of the proceeding, and we find no failure of justification, intelligibility or transparency.
[58] The Appellants have failed to show that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias by the Board. The Appellants succeeded on the merits before the Board. The Appellants’ submissions that the Board favored the Receiver or that the way it conducted the hearing rebutted the presumption of impartiality have no merit. With respect to the costs proceeding, the Appellants have not shown that a reasonable person, properly informed, would consider the Board to have approached the determination of costs with a closed mind.
[59] The Board applied the proper test for awarding costs in accordance with its rules. It was in the best position to determine whether the parties had acted in bad faith or unreasonably. It determined that both parties had acted unreasonably, and that there should be no award of costs. The Appellants have not demonstrated any error in principle by the Board, nor have they shown that the decision to refuse to order costs was plainly wrong. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
[60] The Appellants claimed costs of the appeal, if successful, on an all inclusive full indemnity basis of $363,741.92. The Receiver seeks costs of the appeal on an all inclusive substantial indemnity basis of $65,000 or partial indemnity basis of $39,866. We see no basis for awarding full or substantial indemnity costs, and the amount sought by the Receiver is not fair and reasonable for an appeal of this complexity. Accordingly, the Receiver shall be entitled to costs of this appeal, fixed in the all inclusive amount of $20,000, payable by the Appellants jointly and severally.
Swinton J.
Backhouse J.
I agree _______________________________
Kristjanson J.
Date of Release: June 23, 2020
CITATION: Dell v. Zeifman Partners Inc., 2020 ONSC 3881
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 501/19 DATE: 20200623
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
Swinton, Backhouse and Kristjanson JJ.
BETWEEN:
JAMES DELL, SOPHIE DELL, RON QUEVILLON, CHARLENE QUEVILLON, DINO LAVALLE, MARY LAVALLE, DAN LAVALLE, LARRY BOURK, JOAN BOURK, RICHARD ZIRGER, JUDI ZIRGER, ROBERT ZIRGER, SHARON ZIRGER, GEORGE LEPP, CINDI LEPP, MARK LEPP, AND ERICA LEPP
Appellants
– and –
ZEIFMAN PARTNERS INC., as Operator of the waste disposal site at 2021 Four Mile Creek Road, Niagara-on-the-Lake
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Swinton and Backhouse JJ.
Date of Release: June 23, 2020