ONSCDC 2019

The appellant corporation appealed a judgment fixing the fair value of its shares at 30.4 cents per share under s. 185 of the Business Corporations Act.

The appellant argued the application judge erred by valuing the corporation on a going concern basis rather than a liquidation basis, by adjusting the cash flow forecast based on a three-month delay for alternative refinancing, and by failing to account for dilution from convertible debt.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge's valuation involved fact-specific judgment calls that were entitled to deference and revealed no errors of law.

The appellants appealed an order granting the plaintiff leave to amend her Statement of Claim to add the TTC Insurance Company Limited as a defendant.

The appellants argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that the limitation period for an indemnification claim does not begin to run until a demand is made and the insurer fails to satisfy it, following the Markel line of authorities.

The Employer applied for judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision certifying the Union as the bargaining agent for heavy equipment operators.

The Employer argued it was denied procedural fairness when the Board found its pleadings deficient regarding the status of 18 employees and refused to allow amendments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness as the Board applied established pleading standards for construction industry status disputes.

The Court also held the Board's refusal to allow amendments was reasonable due to the prejudice the delay would cause the Union.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order setting aside a default judgment and awarding partial indemnity costs to the respondents.

The underlying action involved a nuisance claim regarding property interference.

The Divisional Court reviewed the motion judge's application of the five-part test for setting aside default judgments and found no error in principle or palpable and overriding error in her discretionary decision.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Superior Court judge's decision regarding the form of an order in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court considered whether to dismiss the application under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the application, noting that judicial review is not available to review decisions of Superior Court judges and that the applicant's proper recourse was an application for leave to appeal, which had already been dismissed.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of an arbitration award that upheld a union grievance regarding a teacher laid off out of seniority order.

The board argued it retained a junior teacher because she possessed specific skills (ASL and PECS) necessary for a special education course, fulfilling its statutory duty to provide the 'best possible program.' The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's conclusion reasonable that the collective agreement's seniority provisions and the statutory requirements were complementary, and that the junior teacher did not possess recognized qualifications superior to the senior teachers.

The Child and Family Services Review Board brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review commenced by the Toronto District School Board regarding a student's suspension and expulsion.

The motion was brought on the grounds of mootness and undue delay.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the school board's 23-month delay in commencing and perfecting the application was excessive, unexplained, and prejudicial to the tribunal.

Furthermore, the court held that the underlying dispute had been settled, rendering the application moot, and declined to exercise its discretion to hear the case.

The respondent Registrar successfully resisted an application for judicial review regarding the cannabis retail lottery and sought costs.

The applicants argued that costs should not be awarded to a decision-maker that successfully resists judicial review, relying on an alleged overriding principle.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, noting that in Ontario, costs are awarded to administrative tribunals acting in an adversarial role to defend their decisions.

The court awarded the Registrar costs of the stay motion and the application, fixing the quantum at $40,000.

The moving party Justice of the Peace brought a motion to quash the responding party's Notice of Application for Judicial Review.

The responding party sought an order in the nature of mandamus to compel the Justice of the Peace to lay an information against a municipal prosecutor under the Provincial Offences Act.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that it lacked jurisdiction.

Under s. 142(4) of the Provincial Offences Act, the Judicial Review Procedure Act does not apply, and s. 140(1) provides that such relief must be sought in the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant general contractor appealed a motion judge's refusal to discharge a second construction lien registered by the respondent subcontractor.

The respondent had registered a first lien, discharged it due to an error in the dates of service, and registered a second lien for the same amount.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that under s. 48 of the Construction Lien Act, the discharge of a lien is irrevocable and the lien cannot be revived.

The motion judge erred in finding the first lien a nullity without giving the parties an opportunity to make submissions, and in failing to consider the curative provision in s. 6 of the Act.

The second lien was ordered discharged.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board denying OHIP funding for out-of-country residential psychiatric treatment at the Austen Riggs Centre.

The Board found that the appellant failed to establish that the required services were not available at an OHIP preferred provider facility.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's decision as reasonable, noting that while the chosen facility may have been preferred by the appellant's expert, the evidence did not show that the preferred providers could not provide the necessary care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant property manager appealed an interlocutory order dismissing its motion to strike a third party claim brought by the respondent developers.

The respondents sought contribution and indemnity from the appellant for alleged construction deficiencies and maintenance failures at a condominium.

The appellant argued the third party claim should be struck because the respondents did not assert an independent cause of action against it.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a defendant does not need an independent cause of action against a third party to bring a claim under the Negligence Act, provided the defendant is exposed to joint and several liability for damages caused to the plaintiff.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) upholding the Toronto Police Services Board's refusal to disclose certain records related to her 2007 arrest.

The IPC found the withheld records contained third-party personal information exempt from disclosure under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's decision reasonable.

The court also rejected the applicant's arguments that the IPC failed to properly consider her Charter rights and the public interest override, noting that the Act is not a mechanism for criminal disclosure and the public interest exemption did not apply.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal refusing to reopen his appeal after his ODSP application was initially closed as incomplete.

The Disability Adjudication Unit subsequently accepted the application as complete but denied benefits on the merits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal properly refused to reopen the appeal as it was moot.

The Court also held it lacked jurisdiction to determine the appellant's eligibility for benefits, as there was no Tribunal decision on entitlement before it.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles determining the easterly and westerly boundary lines of his property and dismissing his request for costs.

The appellant argued the Deputy Director erred by rejecting surveyor evidence that a cedar hedge and a frame structure established the boundaries through possession.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found the Deputy Director reasonably concluded there was insufficient evidence to relate the physical occupation back to the original survey.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs to one of the respondents.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to review an order refusing to extend the time to review a registrar's dismissal of his appeal for delay.

The underlying appeal related to an arbitrator's denial of attendant care and housekeeping benefits.

The court found the motion had no chance of success, as previous judges had already determined the appeal lacked legal merit.

The court dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also ordered that the appellant may not bring any further motions in the appeal proceeding without prior leave.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision which found that no settlement agreement existed between the parties.

The appellant argued the motion judge provided insufficient reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the correct legal test, adequately summarized the viva voce evidence, and reasonably concluded there was no meeting of the minds.

The moving party, a class member in a train derailment class action, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's Order dismissing his appeal for delay and sought an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The court applied the test for setting aside a dismissal order, noting the moving party had an intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay related to obtaining issued and entered orders, and demonstrated an arguable case on the merits.

The court found that truncating the appeal based on a procedural irregularity would be contrary to the interests of justice.

The motion was granted, the dismissal order was set aside, and an extension of time was granted.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order for non-payment of rent.

The tenant had not paid rent in over a year and owed more than $15,000.

On appeal, the tenant raised new factual allegations, including claims of being drugged and tortured by CSIS agents, which were not raised before the Board.

The Divisional Court held that appeals from the Board are restricted to questions of law.

Because the tenant only raised new factual issues, the appeal was manifestly devoid of merit.

The motion was granted, the appeal was quashed, and the eviction order was directed to be enforced.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Fire Safety Commission confirming an inspection order that required the appellant to remedy fire alarm audibility levels in its residential building.

The appellant argued the Fire Marshal lacked jurisdiction to issue the technical guideline used by the inspector and that the inspector fettered his discretion.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding the Fire Marshal had statutory authority to issue the guideline, the guideline was discretionary rather than mandatory, and the Commission reasonably concluded the inspection order was necessary to ensure fire safety.