ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
COURT FILE NO.: 751/02
DATE: 20031002
B E T W E E N:
NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, TRANSPORTATION AND GENERAL WORKERS UNION OF CANADA (CAW-CANADA) AND ITS LOCAL 385 Applicant
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COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 175, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 393W, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION AND ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD Responding Parties
BEFORE: MCRAE, DUNNET AND JENNINGS JJ.
COUNSEL: L. A. Richmond, for the Applicant James T. Beamish, for Coca-Cola Bottling Company Douglas J. Wray, for United Food and Commercial Workers International Union and United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 175 Voy Stelmaszynski, for the Ontario Labour Relations Board
HEARD: October 2, 2003
ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCRAE J.: (Orally)
[1] This case involved several applications by the applicant, CAW, in relation to proposed certification as the bargaining agent for a new facility operated by the respondent Coca-Cola Bottling Company in Brampton, Ontario. In addition to its application for certification, CAW filed an application pursuant to s.66 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 to terminate the purported bargaining rights of UFCW Local 175 at the Brampton facility and also an application alleging that Coca-Cola and UFCW had engaged in unfair labour practices by entering into an agreement allowing the UFCW to represent employees at the new facility.
[2] The Board dismissed all of CAW’s applications. The Ontario Labour Relations Board takes no position on the disposition of this application.
[3] CAW submits that the Board failed to provide compelling reasons for its determination that the preconditions to the application of s. 66 of the Act did not apply to the particular circumstances of this case and consequently, s. 66 of the Act did not apply.
[4] The interpretation of whether the two preconditions to the section had been satisfied is a question of fact and law which came within the ambit of the expertise of the Board. The Board held first, that this was not a situation where an employer entered into a collective agreement with a trade union that had not been certified. UFCW Local 175 was certified as the bargaining agent for two bargaining units of employees of Coca-Cola, both of which collective agreements contain provisions whereby bargaining rights would be extended to the Brampton facility. Second, an agreement to expand pre-existing bargaining rights was found not the same as a recognition agreement where bargaining rights are given where none existed before. Again, this finding was within the expertise of the Board. We were unable to say that the Board’s decision in this respect was patently unreasonable.
[5] The Board held, in the alternative, that even if s. 66 of the Act did apply, UFCW Local 175 had majority support at the time the collective agreement was entered into. Further, each of the subsisting collective agreements between Coca-Cola and UFCW and between Coca-Cola and CAW contained a provision which, in effect, would grant bargaining rights to whichever union represented a majority of employees at the new Brampton facility. There is no issue that a clear majority of the employees at the new Brampton facility were members of UFCW.
[6] The applicant states that the Board failed to take into account the representation vote ordered by the Board, which was overwhelmingly in favour of CAW. We note that the vote was held before the Board made any determination of the legal effect, if any, of the results of the vote. In addition, in ordering the vote the position of the Board was that it would have no “impact on the parties’ rights to pursue their positions in the pending application”.
[7] CAW also submits that the Board erred when it rejected CAW’s argument that Coke had provided “other support” within the meaning of s. 53 of the Act.
[8] We are satisfied that the agreement was reached because all parties, including the applicant, recognized that it would be preferable to have an agreement in place when the new facility opened.
[9] UFCW made an agreement with the Brampton facility a key issue in its negotiations with Coca-Cola for the Guelph, Hamilton and Downsview facilities whose collective agreements expired before that of the Thorncliffe operation.
[10] We agree with the Board’s findings that CAW has not met the significant evidentiary burden required under s. 53 of the statute. The determination of competing representation and bargaining rights between trade unions falls squarely within the specialized jurisdiction, expertise and experience of the Board. We are unable to find that the decision of the Board was patently unreasonable. For those reasons the application is dismissed.
[11] The application record will read: “For oral reasons the application is dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000 to UFCW.”
MCRAE J.
DUNNET J.
JENNINGS J.
Date of Reasons for Judgment: October 2, 2003 Date of Release: October 10, 2003
COURT FILE NO.: 751/02 DATE: 20031002
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT MCRAE, DUNNET AND JENNINGS JJ.
B E T W E E N:
NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, TRANSPORTATION AND GENERAL WORKERS UNION OF CANADA (CAW-CANADA) AND ITS LOCAL 385 Applicant
- and -
COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 175, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 393W, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION AND ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD Responding Parties
ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT MCRAE J.
Date of Reasons for Judgment: October 2, 2003 Date of Release: October 10, 2003