Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Divisional Court

Court File No. 379/99

Date: 2000-07-10

McRae, Pardu and Sedgwick JJ.

Counsel:

Neil Finkelstein and Matthew P. Gottlieb, for applicant.

Anthony Griffin and Cathryn Pike, for respondent.

[1] McRae J. (Sedgwick J. concurring):—The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario applies for judicial review of a decision under s. 34 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 (the "Code"), on April 12, 1999, by the Ontario Human Rights Commission ("Commission"), to proceed with the complaint of Henry Freitag regarding the reading at the Lord's Prayer as part of the daily proceedings at the Assembly.

[2] The relief sought includes:

(a) a declaration that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to inquire into, investigate, take steps to initiate the holding of a hearing or take any other steps in connection with the prayers read at the Legislative Assembly of Ontario;

(b) an Order in the nature of certiorari setting aside the decision.

The Facts

[3] The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly is elected by the other members of the Assembly as the first item of business after each election. It is his or her duty to oversee the proceedings in the Assembly and to be guardian of the rights and privileges of the Assembly and the members thereof.

[4] Since at least 1792, the meetings of the Assembly have opened with a prayer.

[5] On May 26, 1969, a new short form of prayer was adopted.

[6] Standing Order of the House 8(c) enacted July 25, 1989, requires:

(c) The Speaker shall take the chair at the time appointed on every day fixed for the meeting of the House and shall read the Prayers. [Emphasis added.]

[7] The current prayer read by the Speaker before the House joins the Speaker in the Lord's Prayer is:

Oh God, our Heavenly Father we come before you this day, asking Your blessing upon Her Gracious Majesty Queen Elizabeth and upon Her representative in this Province.

Give to each Member of this Legislature a strong and abiding sense of the great responsibility laid upon us. Guide us here in our deliberations. Give us a deep and thorough understanding of the needs of the people we serve. Help us to use power wisely and well. Inspire us to decisions which establish and maintain a land of prosperity and righteousness where freedom prevails and where justice rules. Amen.

[8] On April 8, 1996, Henry W. Freitag, a resident of Penetanguishene Ontario, complained to the Commission that as a "non-Christian" person his right to equal treatment with respect to services, without discrimination because of creed, has been infringed.

[9] As result of this complaint the Commission wrote to the then Speaker by letter dated May 29, 1996, advising that it had "initiated the complaint". It asked that a questionnaire be completed and returned with any documentation by July 2, 1996.

[10] Counsel for the Speaker replied to the Commission by letter dated July 2, 1996, asserting, in detail, a claim for immunity because of parliamentary privilege and requesting the Commission to decline jurisdiction pursuant to s. 34(1) of the Code.

[11] Nearly two years later on June 22, 1998, the Commission by letter elected to proceed with the investigation of the complaint stating: "Since the matter is arguable the Commission should not exercise its discretion not to deal with the complaint on grounds of parliamentary privilege."

[12] The Commission thereby decided that Mr. Freitag's complaint should proceed through the normal course.

[13] By application dated June 7, 1999, the Speaker applied for judicial review of the decision of the Commission to pursue the complaint.

[14] On March 29, 2000, the Commission, having investigated the complaint and having attempted unsuccessfully to conciliate between the parties, decided not to refer the complaint to a board of inquiry for hearing because (1) there is insufficient evidence to indicate that the complainant has been subjected to unequal treatment in the provision of goods, services or facilities because of his creed; (2) the issues raised in the present complaint should be determined under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and accordingly, referral to a board of inquiry under s. 36 would not be appropriate. This decision was made pursuant to s. 36(2) of the Code.

Mootness

[15] Despite the fact that the Commission, having assumed jurisdiction, later made a decision not to refer the complaint to a hearing pursuant to s. 36(2) of the Code the issue is not moot. There remains a genuine lis between the parties.

[16] The Commission by its action assumed jurisdiction over the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly. The Speaker representing the interests of the Legislature is entitled to litigate its claim of parliamentary privilege.

[17] The Supreme Court in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989 123 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342 at 353, 57 D.L.R. (4th) 231, set this analysis:

The approach in recent cases involves a two-step analysis. First it is necessary to determine whether the required tangible and concrete dispute has disappeared and the issues have become academic. Second, if the response to the first question is affirmative, it is necessary to decide if the court should exercise its discretion to hear the case.

[18] The dispute here remains. The court should hear and decide this issue.

[19] Even if there was no live controversy — as there clearly is — this is an important public policy issue which undoubtedly will arise again. It is also a discrete issue which can be resolved without investing further judicial resources.

Parliamentary Privilege

[20] Parliamentary privilege is an ancient concept in English law extending back to the original Bill of Rights in 1689. It refers to those rights and immunities enjoyed by legislative bodies and their members which are recognized as being necessary to ensure that the legislature is independent and able to carry out its functions. It has been recognized, protected and enforced in the common law of England and Canada over the years. In New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), 1993 153 (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319, 100 D.L.R. (4th) 212, Madam Justice McLachlin referred to this privilege:

I turn first to the historical tradition of parliamentary privileges. "Privilege" in this context denotes the legal exemption from some duty, burden, attendance or liability to which others are subject. It has long been accepted that in order to perform their functions, legislative bodies require certain privileges relating to the conduct of their business. It has also long been accepted that these privileges must be held absolutely and constitutionally if they are to be effective; the legislative branch of our government must enjoy a certain autonomy which even the Crown and the courts cannot touch. [At pp. 378-79.]

The test of necessity is not applied as a standard for judging the content of a claimed privilege, but for the purpose of determining the necessary sphere of exclusive or absolute "parliamentary" or "legislative" jurisdiction. If a matter falls within this necessary sphere of matters without which the dignity and efficiency of the House cannot be upheld, courts will not inquire into questions concerning such privilege. All such questions will instead fall to the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislative body. [At p. 383.]

In summary, it seems clear that, from a historical perspective, Canadian legislative bodies possess such inherent privileges as may be necessary to their proper functioning. These privileges are part of the fundamental law of our land, and hence are constitutional. [At p. 384.]

Our democratic government consists of several branches: the Crown, as represented by the Governor General and the provincial counterparts of that office; the legislative body; the executive; and the courts. It is fundamental to the working of government as a whole that all these parts play their proper role. It is equally fundamental that no one of them overstep its bounds, that each show proper deference for the legitimate sphere of activity of the other. [At p. 389.]

But, it is argued, it is not necessary that the right be absolute. The courts should be given the power to monitor the exercise of this power to ensure that only those strangers who are truly disruptive are excluded. In my view, a system of court review, quite apart from the constitutional question of what right the courts have to interfere in the internal process of another branch of government, would bring its own problems. The ruling of the Assembly would not be final. The Assembly would find itself caught up in legal proceedings and appeals about what is disruptive and not disruptive. This in itself might impair the proper functioning of the chamber. This lends support to the venerable and accepted proposition that it is necessary to the proper functioning of a legislative assembly modeled on the Parliamentary system of the United Kingdom that the Assembly possess the absolute right to exclude strangers from its proceedings, when it deems them to be disruptive of its efficacious operation. [At pp. 387-88.]

[21] Standing Order 8(c) which requires the Speaker to "read the Prayers" and which was made the subject of inquiry by the Commission is one of a large number of Standing Orders which have been passed for the purpose of the efficient operation of the Legislature. Standing Orders are necessary for the proper administration of and day-to-day operation of the house. The courts will not inquire into the impugned Standing Order nor should the Commission.

[22] The Commission, itself a creature of the Legislature, is given wide powers and duties to investigate complaints.

[23] Section 33 of the Code authorizes a warrantless search of any place other than a dwelling, to request and remove documents and to question a person (subject to a right to counsel) on matters relevant to an inquiry:

33(3) A person authorized to investigate a complaint may,

(a) enter any place, other than a place that is being used as a dwelling, at any reasonable time, fur the purpose of investigating the complaint;

(b) request the production for inspection and examination of documents or things that are or may be relevant to the investigation;

(c) upon giving a receipt therefor, remove from a place documents produced in response to a request under clause (b) for the purpose of making copies thereof for extracts therefrom and shall promptly return them to the person who produced or furnished them; and

(d) question a person on matters that are or may be relevant to the complaint subject to the person's right to have counsel or a personal representative present during such questioning, and may exclude from the questioning any person who may be adverse in interest to the complainant.

[24] If the Commission requests, search warrants may be obtained, and at the request of the Commission the Minister shall appoint a board of inquiry. The Board is given wide powers of enforcement and punishment. Section 41(1) provides in part:

41(1) Where the board of inquiry, after a hearing, finds that a right of the complainant under Part I has been infringed and that the infringement is a contravention of section 9 by a party to the proceeding, the board may, by order,

(a) direct the party to do anything that, in the opinion of the board, the party ought to do to achieve compliance with this Act, both in respect of the complaint and in respect of future practices; and

(b) direct the party to make restitution, including monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the infringement, and, where the infringement has been engaged in wilfully or recklessly, monetary compensation may include an award, not exceeding $10,000, for mental anguish.

[25] Standing Orders including the impugned one are at the very heart of the day-to-day operation of the Legislature and an integral part of its proceedings. They fall within the scope of parliamentary privilege and they must be protected from outside attack from a body such as the Human Rights Commission to ensure that the Legislature is able to perform its duties and responsibilities without interference.

[26] The application for judicial review is therefore allowed — no costs.

[27] Pardu J. (dissenting):—Henry Freitag filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission alleging that the recital of the Lord's Prayer during the daily opening ceremony of the Legislative Assembly discriminated against him.

[28] The Speaker responded with a request that the Commission decide "not to deal with the complaint" pursuant to s. 34(1) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, on the ground that parliamentary privilege prohibited the Commission from investigating or taking any steps in relation to the internal affairs of the Legislative Assembly.

[29] The Commission refused to exercise its discretion to "not deal with the complaint" and the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly brings this application for judicial review by way of certiorari to quash the refusal to terminate the complaint proceedings and for a declaration that the Commission had no jurisdiction to deal with the complaint.

[30] Section 34(1) of the Human Rights Code provides:

34(1) Where it appears to the Commission that,

(a) the complaint is one that could or should be more appropriately dealt with under an Act other than this Act;

(b) the subject-matter of the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;

(c) the complaint is not within the jurisdiction of the Commission; or

(d) the facts upon which the complaint is based occurred more than six months before the complaint was filed, unless the Commission is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay,

the Commission may, in its discretion, decide to not deal with the complaint.

[31] This provides a means for summary termination of complaint proceedings. The Commission investigates and prosecutes complaints under the Human Rights Code. If proceedings continue, the ultimate decision as to whether there is jurisdiction to deal with the complaint, whether the Code was violated and the remedy are determined by an independent tribunal, a Board of Inquiry.

[32] Judicial review of decisions to "not deal with a complaint" will result in intervention where the decision is "patently unreasonable".[^1] Where the Commission allows proceedings to continue, the scope of review is more uncertain. In Re: Prudential Insurance Co. of America and Ontario (Human Rights Commission), November 15, 1999, the Divisional Court held that such a decision was not reviewable, essentially on the ground that nothing had been decided.

[33] In allowing proceedings to continue, the Commission does not make findings of fact or conclusive determinations as to jurisdiction. Its role is to screen complaints so as to eliminate those not worthy of pursuit. If the Commission is unsure about the accuracy of assertions of fact or law by one party or another, it may decline to end the complaint proceedings. The Commission does not hold hearings in making its decisions under s. 34(1) and there is no statutory mechanism for resolution of disputed issues of fact or law at this stage. The Commission does not duplicate the ultimate hearing procedure and decision-making process of a Board of Inquiry.

[34] Where proceedings are allowed to continue, there is, in effect, no decision resolving the complaint one way or another. This suggests that a very high degree of deference should be accorded to decisions under s. 34(1) not to screen out a complaint. There may be circumstances where the public interest favours a full hearing, despite uncertainty as to the law or the facts.

[35] As noted in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at 853, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [para. 53]:

A general doctrine of "unreasonableness" has also sometimes been applied to discretionary decisions: Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation ... In my opinion, these doctrines incorporate two central ideas — that discretionary decisions, like all other administrative decisions, must be made within the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute, but that considerable deference will be given to decision-makers by courts in reviewing the exercise of that discretion and determining the scope of the decision-maker's jurisdiction. These doctrines recognize that it is the intention of a legislature, when using statutory language that confers broad choices on administrative agencies, that courts should not lightly interfere with such decisions, and should give considerable respect to decision-makers when reviewing the manner in which discretion was exercised. However, discretion must still be exercised in a manner that is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law ... in line with general principles of administrative law governing the exercise of discretion, and consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . . . [Citations omitted.]

[36] There may be cases which are obviously outside the jurisdiction of the Commission, i.e. a complaint that a foreign government engaged in discriminatory practices outside Ontario. In my view, judicial review should be available to challenge a refusal to end complaint proceedings where the absence of jurisdiction is obvious.[^2] Injustice may result where a respondent is required to continue to participate in the complaint process where it is apparent that there is no jurisdiction to deal with the complaint. In those circumstances, it would be "patently unreasonable" for the Commission to permit proceedings to continue. Where the issue is less clear, a Commission would be justified in leaving the ultimate decision to a Board of Inquiry. I conclude that the refusal to "decide to not deal with the complaint" is not reviewable on the basis of correctness, but only if "patently unreasonable", because of the discretionary nature of the powers granted and because of the preliminary screening nature of the decision.

[37] In my view, the decision by the Commission to allow proceedings to continue was not patently unreasonable. The conduct complained of likely violated the complainant's rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town) (1999), 1999 3786 (ON CA), 47 O.R. (3d) 301, 179 D.L.R. (4th) 150 (C.A.)). A conflict between Charter rights and parliamentary privilege is fundamentally different from a contest between parliamentary privilege and issues which do not have constitutional status, such as the regulation of sales of liquor, or the supervision of the formation of a union or collective bargaining.[^3]

[38] In Canada, the absolute nature of parliamentary privilege has been tempered by the doctrine of necessity and by the Charter. As noted by McLachlin J. in New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly) (1993), 1993 153 (SCC), 100 D.L.R (4th) 212 (S.C.C.) at 266:

The privileges attaching to colonial legislatures arose from common law. Modelled on the British Parliament, they were deemed to possess such powers and authority as are necessarily incidental to their proper functioning. These privileges were governed by the principle of necessity rather than by historical privileges found in the United Kingdom.

and at pp. 268-69:

The test of necessity is not applied as a standard for judging the content of a claimed privilege, but for the purpose of determining the necessary sphere of exclusive or absolute "parliamentary" or "legislative" jurisdiction. If a matter falls within this necessary sphere of matters without which the dignity and efficiency of House cannot be upheld, courts will not inquire into questions concerning such privilege. All such questions will instead fall to the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislative body.

and at pp. 269-70:

So defined, the principle of necessity will encompass not only certain claimed privileges, but also the power to determine, adjudicate upon and apply those privileges. Were the courts to examine the content of particular exercises of valid privilege, and hold some of these exercises invalid, they would trump the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislative body, after having admitted that the privilege in issue falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislative body. The only area for court review is at the initial jurisdictional level: is the privilege claimed one of those privileges necessary to the capacity of the legislature to function? A particular exercise of a necessary privilege cannot then be reviewed, unless the deference and the conclusion reached at the initial stage be rendered nugatory.

In summary, it seems clear that, from an historical perspective, Canadian legislative bodies possess such inherent privileges as may be necessary to their proper functioning. These privileges are part of the fundamental law of our land, and hence are constitutional. The courts may determine if the privilege claimed is necessary to the capacity of the legislature to function, but have no power to review the lightness or wrongness of a particular decision made pursuant to the privilege.

and in Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General) (1996), 1996 163 (SCC), 137 D.L.R. (4th) 142 (S.C.C.) at p. 172 [para. 72]:

The necessity inquiry does not ask whether the particular action at issue was necessary, and hence does not involve substantive judicial review. Rather, it asks whether the dignity, integrity and efficiency of the legislative body could be maintained if it were not permitted to carry out the type of action sought to be done.

[39] The interplay between the Charter and parliamentary privilege was discussed in Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra, at p. 170:

Because parliamentary privilege enjoys constitutional status, it is not "subject to" the Charter, as are ordinary laws. Both parliamentary privilege and the Charter constitute essential parts of the Constitution of Canada. Neither prevails over the other. While parliamentary privilege and immunity from improper judicial interference in parliamentary processes must be maintained, so must the fundamental democratic guarantees of the Charter. Where apparent conflicts between different constitutional principles arise, the proper approach is not to resolve the conflict by subordinating one principle to the other, but rather to attempt to reconcile them.

The necessary reconciliation of parliamentary privilege and s. 3 of the Charter is achieved by interpreting the democratic guarantees of s. 3 in a purposive way. The purpose of the democratic guarantees in the Charter must be taken to be the preservation of democratic values inherent in the existing Canadian Constitution, including the fundamental constitutional right of Parliament and the legislatures to regulate their own proceedings. Express words would be required to overthrow such an important constitutional principle as parliamentary privilege. It follows that s. 3 of the Charter must be read as being consistent with parliamentary privilege. However, this does not leave s. 3 without meaning. Expulsions and disqualification from office may, if found to fall within the scope of parliamentary privilege, be beyond the purview of s. 3. But s. 3 still operates to prevent citizens from being disqualified from holding office on grounds which fall outside the rules by which Parliament and the legislatures conduct their business; race and gender would be examples of grounds falling into this category. Viewed from this perspective, s. 3 may be seen as reflecting, in the democratic context, the values enshrined in the equality guarantee of s. 15 of the Charter. This approach gives full value to the purpose, the content and the place of s. 3 in the context not only of the Charter, but the Constitution as a whole.

and at p. 172:

This, in broad outline, suggests how the constitutional principle of parliamentary privilege may be reconciled with the democratic guarantees of the Charter. Section 3 of the Charter guarantees that candidates will not be denied electoral office by reason of discrimination on the basis of such grounds as race, class or gender. It does not however, oust the historic privilege of the legislature to deny membership to those who disqualify themselves by crime, corruption or other misconduct. The courts may review an act or ruling of the legislature to determine whether it properly falls within the domain of parliamentary privilege. If it does, they may proceed with Charter review. If it does, they must leave the matter to the legislature. This approach preserves parliamentary privilege and the principle of the separation of powers, while at the same time assuring the protection of the right under s. 3 of the Charter not to be excluded from public office on grounds unrelated to the need of the legislature to maintain order and the integrity of its processes.

[40] If, as suggested by McLachlin J. the parliamentary privilege to exclude strangers could not be used to exclude persons because of race, class or gender, it is difficult to see how the parliamentary privilege allowing it to regulate its own procedures could violate the Charter right to be free from religious domination by government.

[41] In New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia and Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra, Lamer J. expressly left open the issue of whether the non-statutory privileges of provincial Houses of Assembly have "constitutional status which would make them immune to Charter review" (New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia, supra, pp. 233- 234; see also Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra, p. 146).

[42] In New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia, supra, Cory J. said at p. 251:

... it is clear that the exercise of the constitutional power of privilege is not entrenched in the Constitution of Canada and the Charter must apply to the exercise of that parliamentary privilege.

[43] In Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra, the majority did not find it necessary to decide that issue, as the privilege was embodied in legislation, and therefore subject to the Charter.

[44] In New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia, supra, Sopinka J. (concurring) held that the Charter does apply to members of the House of Assembly when exercising their privileges as members (p. 246).

[45] None of the judgments delivered in Harvey v. New Brunswick, supra, and New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia, supra, suggests that parliamentary privilege immunizes a legislative assembly from Charter scrutiny of a violation of the constitutional guarantees provided by s. 15 to be free of "discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability". All of the jurists who wrote on this issue expressed a contrary view. Where two constitutional rights conflict, they must be reconciled, and one does not trump the other.

[46] If the policy had been adopted by legislation rather than Standing Order, there is no doubt that the measure would have been subjected to scrutiny under the Charter. In principle, there seems little reason to treat a Standing Order differently.

[47] The Legislative Assembly has the undoubted right to implement opening ceremonies. The particular choice of the Lord's Prayer may not be reviewable on the ground that a court cannot inquire into the lightness or wrongness of a particular exercise of the privilege, but a court might inquire, on a more general level, whether adoption of religious practices, or whether adoption of only Christian religious practices was necessary to the "dignity, integrity and efficiency" of the legislative body. It is unlikely that discrimination based on race, gender or religious beliefs, for example, would be found necessary to the "dignity, integrity and efficiency" of a Legislative Assembly.

[48] The scope of the necessity inquiry will be informed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Proceedings of the Canadian Parliament are opened with a non-denominational prayer. Such evidence may be relevant to the issue of necessity.

[49] The issue of whether the Standing Order incorporating the Lord's Prayer is immune from review on the ground of necessity and pursuant to the Charter is far from clear

[50] I conclude that the Commission did not act in a "patently unreasonable" way when it refused to exercise its discretion to end the complaint proceedings.

[51] It is also argued that by deciding to "continue the investigation", the Commission violated the parliamentary privileges of the Legislative Assembly. In my view, this level of generality is too broad a course of conduct to examine in determining whether there has been an infringement of parliamentary privilege.

[52] The particular actions of the Commission must be reviewed. What the Commission did was reflect upon the complaint. It made no demands of the Legislative Assembly, nor did it assert any investigative powers. It thought about the complaint and ultimately decided not to refer the matter to a Board of Inquiry, under s. 36(1) of the Human Rights Code, which provides:

36(1) Where the Commission does not effect a settlement of the complaint and it appears to the Commission that the procedure is appropriate and the evidence warrants an inquiry, the Commission may refer the subject-matter of the complaint to the board of inquiry.

[53] The Commission did not undertake any step which interfered with any exercise of parliamentary privilege, in contrast, for example, to the obstruction of access to the Legislative Precinct referred to in Ontario (Speaker of the Legislative Assembly) v. Casselman (Winkler J., March 18, 1996) [available at [1996] O.J. No. 5343 (QL)].

[54] Even if the Legislative Assembly was subject to review of the decision to adopt the Lord's Prayer, it may still be able to assert parliamentary privilege to resist a particular investigative step, akin to the assertion of solicitor-and-client privilege in the face of a search warrant.

[55] The granting of a remedy on judicial review is discretionary. I would dismiss the application in any event on the grounds that there was no actual interference with parliamentary privilege nor is such interference anticipated. The proceedings are now over and there is no longer any dispute between the Legislative Assembly and the Commission.

[56] I would accordingly dismiss the application.

[57] Application granted.

[^1]: See for example Enoch v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), Divisional Court, November 7, 1997 [reported 98 C.L.L.C. 1230-003]; Devlen v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), Divisional Court, January 9, 1998 [reported 98 C.L.L.C. 1230-008]; Brome v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1999), 1999 15060 (ON SC), 171 D.L.R (4th) 538 (Ont. Div. Ct.).

[^2]: Nishimura v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1989), 1989 4317 (ON SC), 11 C.H.R.R. D/246, 62 D.L.R. (4th) 552 (Ont. Div. Ct.).

[^3]: R. v. Graham-Campbell (Sir R.F.); Ex parte Herbert, [1935] 1 K.B. 594 (Div. Ct.); C.U.P.E., Local 3441 v. New Democratic Members of the Legislative Assembly, [1992] Alta. L.R.B.R. 523 (QL).