Human Rights - ONCJ

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, refusing to provide a breath sample, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and failing to appear in court.

The Crown's case on identity was circumstantial.

The defendant claimed he was a passenger and that another occupant, Jesse Abroquah, was driving.

The court found the defendant was the driver based on eyewitness evidence from a passing motorist who observed the vehicle's trajectory and the occupants' emergence from the vehicle.

The defendant's roadside statement that Abroquah was driving was rejected as a deliberate lie.

The court found the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, his driving constituted dangerous operation, he intentionally refused the breath demand, and he knowingly failed to appear in court.

The defendant's Charter application regarding alleged failure to provide a change of clothing was dismissed.

The defendant was found guilty on all four counts.

The defendant brought a motion for a ruling on standing to challenge the search of a safe found in a vehicle following an altercation at a bar.

The defendant sought to challenge both the search warrant for the safe and alleged violations of the vehicle owner's rights during her arrest and vehicle search.

The court found that the defendant had standing to challenge the search warrant based on the Crown's theory that items in the safe were in the defendant's possession, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in R v Jones.

However, the court found the defendant lacked standing to challenge alleged violations of the vehicle owner's rights, as the defendant had no privacy or property interest in the vehicle.

The accused was charged with Operation Impaired and Exceed 80 following a roadside stop for a Highway Traffic Act infraction.

The trial proceeded as a blended hearing on consent due to Charter issues.

The court found that the accused's s. 10(b) rights were breached when the breathalyzer technician failed to offer a further opportunity for legal consultation despite objective indicators that the accused was confused about his rights and obligations.

The breath readings were excluded under s. 24(2) as their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

However, the court found the accused guilty of Operation Impaired based on observations of impairment preceding the Charter breach.

The court also addressed the retrospective application of the presumption of identity in transition cases under Bill C-46.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and causing bodily harm, contrary to section 255(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was acquitted on two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The defendant challenged the constitutionality of section 255(2.1), arguing it lacks sufficient fault requirement and is overbroad.

The court upheld the constitutionality of the section, finding it contains adequate fault requirements and is not saved by section 1 of the Charter, as it pursues the important objective of deterring drinking and driving and employs proportionate means.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging that a police officer violated his section 8 rights (freedom from unreasonable search and seizure) by attending at his front door and entering his home foyer without a warrant, and his section 9 rights (freedom from arbitrary detention) by demanding his driver's licence, vehicle registration, and insurance while inside the home.

The court found that the officer's attendance at the door for the purpose of gathering evidence exceeded the implied invitation doctrine, and that the officer's entry into the foyer was unlawful.

However, the court admitted the evidence obtained during the breach under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would not be necessary to preserve the repute of the administration of justice.

The accused was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol level equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The accused raised four Charter challenges: (1) the objective reasonableness of the approved screening device failure; (2) the arbitrariness of detention in cells pending release; (3) a violation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure due to videotaping while using the washroom; and (4) a violation of the right to counsel due to being directed to duty counsel.

The court rejected all four challenges and found the accused guilty.

The court found the ASD failure was objectively reasonable, the detention was not arbitrary as it was incident to a valid arrest and necessary for supervision and paperwork completion, the videotaping with privacy blanket protections did not violate privacy rights, and there was no improper funnelling to duty counsel.

The accused operated an escort service employing adult women and were charged with receiving material benefits from sexual services, procuring, and advertising sexual services.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of Criminal Code sections 286.2, 286.3, and 286.4 under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that all three provisions violated the Charter and were not justified under section 1.

The court determined that the provisions were arbitrary, overbroad, and grossly disproportionate in their effects on the liberty and security of the person, particularly as they prevented sex workers from accessing safety-enhancing measures and third-party support services.

The accused was arrested outside a target apartment building on suspicion of possession for the purpose of trafficking crystal methamphetamine and GHB.

The court found that the arrest was unlawful, lacking reasonable and probable grounds.

The detectives relied on mere suspicion based on the accused's presence outside the building and a "hard stare," without evidence connecting him to the target unit or any drug activity.

The court found multiple Charter breaches including violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b), stemming from an unlawful arrest effected through excessive force, an unlawful search, and a three-and-a-half-hour delay in providing access to counsel.

The court excluded the evidence and dismissed all charges.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was approximately 25.75 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

However, after deducting defence-caused delay (12.1 months) and exceptional circumstances related to a Rowbotham application (5.75 months), the resulting delay was 7.9 months, falling well below the ceiling.

The court found no violation of the accused's section 11(b) Charter right and dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed her conviction for failing to stop for an amber light contrary to s. 144(15) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The central issue was whether the Justice of the Peace erred in refusing an adjournment and proceeding with trial where the appellant received disclosure on the trial date.

The appellant had delayed requesting disclosure until five weeks before trial, despite receiving clear instructions in the Notice of Trial and online guide.

The court held down the matter twice on the trial date to allow the appellant to review the disclosure, including officer's notes and in-car camera video.

The appellant agreed to proceed with trial after reviewing the materials.

The court found no error in proceeding and dismissed the appeal.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control.

The Crown's case relied on blood test results obtained at a hospital without the accused's consent.

The defence sought to exclude the blood results based on alleged Charter breaches, including unlawful detention, delayed right to counsel, and failure to facilitate the accused's request to contact counsel.

The court found that while the initial order to exit the vehicle was lawful under the Waterfield test (justified to protect life), there were Charter breaches regarding the right to counsel.

The court excluded the blood evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was significant, particularly given the accused's vulnerability and explicit request for counsel that was not facilitated.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

Following a blended voir dire and trial, the court found that the officer administering the approved screening device (ASD) did not have objectively reasonable grounds to believe the device was in proper working order, as he failed to check the calibration and accuracy check dates despite knowing their importance.

This constituted a violation of the accused's section 8 Charter rights.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood following a high-speed pursuit on Highway 410.

The Crown relied on officer observations of excessive speed, odour of alcohol, and bloodshot eyes.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and breath demand, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found the arrest for dangerous driving was lawful based on excessive speed alone, but the breath demand lacked reasonable and probable grounds for impaired driving.

Despite Charter breaches, the breath evidence was admitted under section 24(2).

The accused was convicted of the over 80 charge but acquitted of both dangerous driving and impaired driving charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a single-vehicle rollover on Highway 427.

The Crown proceeded on both counts.

The defence challenged the arrest on reasonable and probable grounds and brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7 and 8 regarding video surveillance of the accused urinating in a police cell.

The trial judge found the arrest was lawful and dismissed the Charter applications, finding that although a privacy breach occurred, the police had provided adequate notice and privacy protection measures.

The accused was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of the over-80 offence.

The defendants brought applications under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to challenge the lawfulness of search warrants executed on three apartment units.

Thanh Nguyen lacked standing to challenge the search of the Sherway location as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a unit he was merely permitted to use as a guest.

Catherine Vu and Kevin Tran challenged the search of the Lakeshore location where Vu was the tenant.

The court found the warrant for the Lakeshore location was issued without reasonable grounds to believe evidence would be found there, as the connection between Tran and the residence was insufficient to establish more than occasional guest status.

The search violated section 8 rights.

However, under the R. v. Grant analysis, the evidence was admitted as the police acted in good faith, the state conduct was not improper, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits outweighed the privacy breach.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case rested entirely on breath test results obtained following the accused's arrest.

The defence raised three Charter applications: (1) a section 8 breach based on the arresting officer's chemically impossible articulation of the legal BAC limit; (2) a section 8 breach for failure to "transfer grounds" to the breath technician; and (3) a section 10(b) breach regarding the implementation of the right to counsel of choice.

The court found a section 10(b) breach but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach fell on the lower end of the seriousness spectrum despite its significant impact on the accused's protected interests.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with assault on May 6, 2017.

Following a judicial pre-trial in October 2017, a trial date was set for May 2018, but the case was not reached due to insufficient court resources.

A second trial date was set for January 2019.

After the trial concluded on January 8, 2019, the defence filed a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the net delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R v. Jordan, and that the defence had not demonstrated meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The defence's late filing of the application and failure to comply with court rules were significant factors in the dismissal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a RIDE program stop, the accused provided breath samples indicating a BAC of 100 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on the grounds that police breached his Charter right to counsel by failing to inform him of available resources to contact counsel of choice, thereby unconstitutionally channeling him to duty counsel.

The court found a serious Charter breach and excluded the evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following a single motor vehicle accident.

The accused challenged the grounds for her arrest under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol based on her observable signs of impairment at the roadside, including unsteadiness, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and incoherent responses.

The court also found that a formal breath demand was made at the detachment, and the accused's refusal to comply constituted the offence of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but abandoned the sections 8 and 9 arguments before trial.

The court found no breach of the accused's section 10(b) right to counsel, rejecting arguments that police "funnelled" the accused to duty counsel or that the telephone consultation lacked privacy.

On the trial proper, the accused testified he consumed two double vodka drinks in the 10 minutes before leaving the restaurant, raising a bolus drinking defence.

The court rejected this evidence as incredible and unreliable, finding it inconsistent with the bartender's testimony and contrary to common sense.

The court convicted the accused based on the toxicology evidence and the common sense inference that people do not normally consume large quantities of alcohol immediately before driving.