Human Rights - ONCJ

The defendant brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant executed on his home and personal computer, arguing that there were no reasonable grounds for the warrant's issuance and that the search violated his Charter rights under section 8.

The defendant raised three grounds: typographical errors in the Information to Obtain, staleness of information due to a two-month delay, and insufficient corroboration of the evidence.

The court found that the errors were inadvertent and correctable, that the delay was not fatal given the nature of digital evidence and forensic retrieval capabilities, and that sufficient corroboration existed.

The motion was dismissed and the warrant was upheld as valid.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application to exclude breath readings, alleging a breach of section 10(b) rights to counsel.

The officer delayed providing rights to counsel for approximately 3-4 minutes after arrest to secure the vehicle, conduct an inventory search, and address a passenger.

The court found a breach of section 10(b) but admitted the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the breach was cured by the subsequent provision of rights to counsel and access to duty counsel prior to the breath samples being obtained.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The accused brought a Charter application asserting breaches of sections 8 and 10(b), seeking exclusion of evidence.

The court found that the officer lacked objectively reasonable grounds for suspicion based on the totality of circumstances, that the demand for an approved screening device test was not made forthwith as required by statute, and that these breaches violated the accused's section 8 rights.

The court applied the three-part test under section 24(2) of the Charter and determined that exclusion of the breath sample evidence was appropriate to maintain the integrity of the justice system.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction, making the mandatory minimum sentence six months imprisonment.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found that while the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate for this particular offender, it would be grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonable hypotheticals involving minimal culpability.

The court declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional and imposed an intermittent sentence of 111 days (90 days to serve after pre-trial custody credit) with probation and ancillary orders.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a roadside stop.

He challenged his detention on Charter grounds, alleging violations of his section 9 rights (freedom from arbitrary detention) and section 12 rights (freedom from cruel and unusual treatment).

The defendant was held in a cold basement cell for three hours while inadequately clothed, with a blanket provided only in the final 45 minutes.

The court found no breach of either Charter right, holding that the police followed appropriate prisoner care policies and released the defendant as soon as practicable.

The court rejected the defendant's application for a stay of proceedings.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis that his right to be tried without unreasonable delay under section 11(b) had been infringed.

The raw delay from charge to trial date was 18 months and 22 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for Ontario Court of Justice cases.

The court found that the Crown failed to justify the delay under either the Jordan or Morin frameworks.

Critical issues included the Crown's handling of search warrants, delayed disclosure of surveillance footage, and the unjustified delay in obtaining a second warrant to search the applicant's laptop.

The court granted the stay and vacated the trial dates.

The accused was charged with simple possession of crack cocaine.

The sole issues at trial were Charter violations.

The defence alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the initial detention for investigative purposes regarding a robbery was lawful, the arrest for public intoxication lacked objective grounds.

The court also found violations of the right to counsel, as the accused was not advised of his right to counsel in relation to the drug charge until over an hour after the drugs were discovered, and was further delayed in implementing that right for over six hours due to his intoxication.

The court excluded the evidence of the crack cocaine as a remedy for the Charter breaches.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and "over 80" following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown withdrew the impaired driving charge during trial.

The defence raised Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, and 10(b).

The Crown conceded a section 8 breach regarding the timing of the approved screening device breath demand.

The court found that while a technical Charter breach occurred, the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) as the breach was minor, made in good faith, and had limited impact on the accused's rights.

The court also found the breath tests were conducted "as soon as practicable" within the statutory requirement.

The accused was convicted of the "over 80" offence.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a sample of breath into an approved screening device contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown established that a proper demand was made with reasonable grounds, that the accused intentionally refused to comply, and that no reasonable excuse existed.

The defence argued that incomplete information provided by the officer regarding the consequences of refusal affected the validity of the demand, vitiated proof of mens rea, provided a reasonable excuse, constituted officially induced error, and violated section 7 of the Charter.

The court rejected all defence arguments and entered a conviction.

The appellant was charged with unsafe lane change under the Highway Traffic Act.

On the trial date, a paralegal acting as his agent appeared and requested an adjournment based on incomplete disclosure.

The adjournment was denied.

The paralegal then withdrew from the proceedings, stating he was instructed to "walk away." The Justice of the Peace entered a conviction without a hearing pursuant to section 9.1(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: that the adjournment should have been granted, and that section 9.1(2) did not apply.

The court found the refusal of the adjournment was within the Justice of the Peace's discretion but held that section 9.1(2) could not be applied because the appellant had appeared through an agent and therefore had not "failed to appear" at trial.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence sought to exclude breathalyzer evidence on grounds of Charter violations under sections 10(b) and 24(2), arguing that the accused was denied a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel at the roadside during a 19-minute delay while awaiting a tow truck.

The court found a section 10(b) violation but ultimately admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding that the circumstances favoured inclusion despite the breach.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol or drugs contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that on May 9, 2014, the accused drove while impaired.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the investigation, alleging Charter breaches under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make a breathalyzer demand, that the drug evaluation demand was made as soon as practicable, and that the accused's Charter rights were not infringed.

The court found the accused guilty based on evidence of impairment by both alcohol and drugs.

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit ("Over 80") after failing a roadside screening device test.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results from an approved instrument to establish the accused's blood alcohol level.

The defence brought a motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the Crown failed to prove the breath demand was made "as soon as practicable" as required by section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, thereby depriving the Crown of the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c).

The court dismissed the motion, holding that while the demand was delayed, the failure to comply with the timing requirement in section 254(3) does not render the breath test evidence inadmissible or deprive the Crown of the section 258 presumptions in the absence of a Charter application.

The accused was stopped for erratic driving and subsequently subjected to an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand for suspected impaired driving.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches: failure to inform the accused of the reason for detention (s. 10(a)), failure to provide the ASD demand "forthwith" (s. 254(2)(b)), resulting in failure to advise of the right to counsel without delay (s. 10(b) informational breach), unlawful detention and search (s. 8 and 9), and failure to facilitate a realistic opportunity to consult counsel before the ASD test (s. 10(b) implementational breach).

The trial judge excluded the breath sample evidence and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, dangerous driving, and refusing to provide a breath sample following a serious driving incident on July 18, 2012.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence based on alleged violations of sections 7, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found breaches of the Charter regarding the timing of the breath demand and the provision of rights to counsel, but declined to exclude any evidence.

The court found that the accused's extreme intoxication rendered any Charter breaches of negligible effect on his actual interests, and that the police acted in good faith throughout.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was arrested on December 16, 2012 for impaired driving and care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content over 80 mg/100 mL.

The trial was scheduled for March 13-14, 2014, approximately 15 months after the incident.

The court found that the Crown's disclosure was incomplete and late, with essential police notes not provided until after the second court appearance.

The court calculated state-attributable delay as 1 month and 4 days for late disclosure and 10 months and 3 days for institutional delay, totaling approximately 11¼ months.

The court found this exceeded the Morin guidelines of 8-10 months and that the accused suffered real prejudice.

The motion was granted and the charges were stayed.

The defendant brought a Charter section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay in trial.

The defendant was arrested on December 2, 2011, for mischief to property, causing a disturbance, and assault causing bodily harm arising from an incident at a Toronto bus station.

The trial was scheduled for July 2-3, 2013, approximately 19 months after the Information was sworn.

The court found that the Crown and police were responsible for approximately 14 months of delay through incomplete disclosure, failure to respond to defence counsel communications, Crown non-attendance at scheduled proceedings, and inconsistent positions on procedural requirements.

The court granted the stay, finding a violation of the defendant's right to trial within a reasonable time.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm-related offences following a search of his apartment.

The defence challenged the validity of the search warrant, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was insufficient to justify issuance.

The Crown conceded that the redacted ITO did not disclose reasonable and probable grounds but argued the warrant was valid based on unredacted information protected to preserve confidential informant identity.

The court applied the Garofoli Step 6 procedure, excised erroneous information from the ITO regarding the accused's alleged involvement in drug trafficking, and determined that the remaining information—comprising credible and detailed information from a reliable confidential informant—provided sufficient grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The Charter motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown alleged the accused drove while impaired after consuming alcohol and subsequently crashed her vehicle into a ditch.

The defence raised Charter violations regarding the right to counsel, arguing the accused did not understand her rights and that the police failed to adequately explain them or inform her of duty counsel availability.

The court found a breach of section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and excluded the breath test evidence.

On the impairment charge, the court found the Crown had not proven impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the accused's cognitive disability from a prior head injury and alternative explanations for observed symptoms.

The Crown brought a motion seeking a ruling permitting cross-examination of a police sergeant on his prior testimony given at a separate trial where he testified as a Crown witness.

The sergeant was subsequently charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was whether the sergeant's prior testimony was compelled and therefore protected by section 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court held that the testimony was compelled both because the sergeant was a compellable witness called by the Crown and because he was statutorily compelled to attend court under the Police Services Act and police policy.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that section 13 rights are diminished for police officers and dismissed the Crown's application.