Human Rights - ONCJ

The accused was charged with impaired driving and having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The court conducted a blended voir dire to determine whether the accused's Charter rights were violated and whether evidence should be excluded.

The court found a breach of the accused's section 10(b) right to counsel of choice when police failed to wait a reasonable period for the accused's preferred counsel to return a call before offering duty counsel.

However, the court found the accused was in care and control of the vehicle and was impaired by alcohol.

The breath sample evidence was excluded due to the Charter violation, resulting in dismissal of the "over 80" charge but conviction on the impaired driving charge.

During a preliminary hearing, the court determined the voluntariness of two statements made by the defendant to police.

The first statement involved providing name and address during a search warrant execution.

The second statement was a videotaped interview at the police station following arrest and exercise of rights to counsel.

The defendant alleged she was distraught, lacked an operating mind, and was induced by promises that she could go home and rejoin her children if she provided information about drugs and a gun.

The court found both statements were made voluntarily and with an operating mind, rejecting the defendant's credibility and accepting the officer's evidence that no inducements were offered.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 on March 19, 2016.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings on the third trial date, alleging unreasonable delay.

The first trial date did not proceed due to lack of judicial resources (no per diem judge available).

The second trial date was adjourned because a Crown witness was unavailable due to a booked vacation.

The court calculated the net delay at 17 months and 8 days, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the accused failed to demonstrate sustained efforts to expedite proceedings and that the case did not take markedly longer than reasonably expected.

The section 11(b) application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with having care and control of a vehicle with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg/100 mL).

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results on two grounds: first, that a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter (right to counsel) warranted exclusion of evidence under section 24(2); and second, that the Crown failed to prove the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable as required by section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while a section 10(b) breach occurred (a nine-minute delay in informing the defendant of his right to counsel), the breach was not serious enough to warrant exclusion under the Grant test.

The court also found that the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable within the statutory two-hour window.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and with failing to stop and provide his name and address at the scene of an accident contrary to section 252 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown called evidence from a civilian witness, three police officers, and an expert toxicologist.

The accused testified and raised Charter violations.

The court found no Charter breaches, rejected the accused's evidence regarding post-accident drinking as fabricated, and found the Crown proved the over 80 charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court acquitted on the section 252 charge, finding the accused provided his cell phone number and did not intend to escape liability.

Defendants charged with offences under the Occupational Health and Safety Act brought applications alleging violations of their Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, determining that while the net delay of approximately 44 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice trials, the Crown established exceptional circumstances justifying the delay.

The court found the case was particularly complex due to the nature of the evidence and issues involved, and that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied to cases in the system when Jordan was released.

The applications were dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol after being stopped leaving a licensed establishment in Markham in the early morning hours of October 23, 2014.

The accused failed a roadside screening device test and subsequently provided breath samples at the police station showing readings of 153 and 139 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on Charter grounds, arguing breaches of section 10(b) (right to counsel) and section 9 (protection against arbitrary detention).

The court rejected both Charter applications and found the accused guilty of the offence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving by one or more drugs contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code following a single motor vehicle accident.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, having failed to investigate alternative explanations for the accused's physical condition such as head injury or fatigue.

The court further found that a subsequent demand for standardized field sobriety tests was unlawful as it was made after arrest without proper authority.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of the Charter violations, rendering the Crown's case untenable.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and sexual touching of a person under 16 years contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code, alleged to have occurred in January 2013.

The trial proceeded over multiple court appearances spanning 17 months.

The accused was found not guilty on both counts.

The court further found that the accused's rights under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were violated due to abuse of process resulting from the Crown's breach of undertakings given at the judicial pre-trial and the failures of Legal Aid Ontario.

The court also found a violation of section 11(b) Charter rights due to unreasonable delay caused by the actions of the prosecuting Crown and Legal Aid Ontario.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused applied to exclude the results of a breath analysis on Charter grounds.

The court found violations of section 10(b) of the Charter in two respects: (1) the arresting officer failed to advise the accused of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, instead delaying seven minutes to conduct other investigative steps; and (2) the breath technician failed to provide the accused with a second opportunity to consult counsel after the accused expressed mistrust of the duty counsel he had consulted.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing systemic problems within the Peel Regional Police regarding compliance with the immediacy requirement of section 10(b).

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The court found that the accused's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated due to special circumstances arising from his limited English proficiency and the police's failure to secure an interpreter.

The evidence of the refusal was excluded and that charge was dismissed.

However, the court found the accused guilty of impaired care or control based on evidence that he occupied the driver's seat, attempted to move the vehicle, and displayed signs of impairment.

The applicant brought a motion under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that her right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

She was charged with impaired operation and refusing to provide intoxilyzer breath samples arising from events on August 3, 2014.

The information was sworn on August 12, 2014, and trial was scheduled for November 5-6, 2015.

The court found that the total delay was at minimum 11.5 months, comprising 2 months of Crown delay due to incomplete vetting of disclosure and 9 months and 14 days of institutional delay due to lack of court resources in Halton Region.

The court also found that the trial time estimate of 2 days was unrealistic and that a proper estimate of 4 consecutive days would have pushed the trial date further out.

The applicant demonstrated real prejudice due to pre-existing mental health issues exacerbated by the delay.

The court concluded that the applicant's section 11(b) rights had been infringed and granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused brought a Charter application under s. 8 and s. 24(2) to exclude all evidence obtained from two search warrants executed on May 7, 2014.

The accused was charged with uttering threats to cause death, possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and possession of prohibited weapons.

The court found that police officers conducting the search exceeded the scope of the warrant by searching in containers too small to hold a shotgun while looking for gun parts, thereby violating the accused's s. 8 rights.

The court also found that the officers improperly seized cell phones and medical information without reasonable grounds, and that misleading reports were filed with the justice.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court excluded all evidence obtained from the searches due to the serious and deliberate nature of the Charter breaches and the importance of maintaining judicial oversight through accurate reporting.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a motor vehicle collision on February 8, 2012.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The trial involved Charter voir dire issues regarding the lawfulness of the breath demand and the accused's right to counsel.

The court found violations of the accused's rights under sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and excluded the breath sample evidence.

On the merits, the court acquitted the accused of impaired driving but convicted him of dangerous driving based on evidence of cell phone use while driving.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

Approximately 25 months elapsed between arrest and the second trial date.

The defence brought a motion to stay proceedings alleging a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown failed to provide disclosure of a booking video despite repeated requests over many months.

The court found the delay constitutionally intolerable and granted the stay of proceedings.

The applicant sought to exclude all evidence obtained during a DUI investigation, including breath sample results, on the basis that his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the applicant for impaired operation based on observed erratic driving and indicia of impairment.

However, the court found a significant breach of the applicant's section 10(b) right to counsel by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact his counsel of choice before requiring breath samples.

The court excluded the breath test evidence and subsequent statements under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with mischief, assault on police, obstruction of police, and assault with intent to resist arrest arising from his conduct during a protest at Toronto City Hall against budget cuts.

The Crown called seven police officers; the defence called the accused and two witnesses.

The court found the accused guilty of assault on police (pushing PC Hopkinson) and obstruction of police, but acquitted him of mischief and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The court also dismissed Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, finding no unlawful detention, no unreasonable search, and no lost evidence constituting a Charter breach.

The respondent, an Aboriginal person, entered guilty pleas to Operation Impaired and Refuse Breath Sample.

She challenged the Crown's request for a bifurcated sentencing process, arguing that Ontario's failure to proclaim the curative discharge provision in the Criminal Code discriminates against Aboriginal persons and violates their Charter equality rights.

The Crown sought to first determine an appropriate sentence before addressing the constitutional question.

The court rejected the bifurcated approach, finding that a full sentencing analysis considering Aboriginal circumstances and the Charter challenge must proceed together to ensure fairness and a complete record for appeal.

The accused was charged with Over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code arising from an incident on March 30, 2012.

The Crown conceded a section 10(b) Charter violation regarding the accused's right to counsel.

The sole issue was whether breath test evidence should be excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter and the Grant test.

The court found that the police officer demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward the accused's right to counsel despite being aware of his obligations under R. v. Prosper.

The officer failed to explain the accused's rights or ascertain whether the accused understood what he was giving up when waiving counsel.

Applying the three-part Grant analysis, the court found the violation serious, the impact on Charter-protected interests significant, and excluded the breath test evidence.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm and drug offences following his arrest while driving with a loaded prohibited firearm and marijuana.

At a bail hearing, the justice of the peace endorsed the information under s. 515(9.1) of the Criminal Code based on the accused's prior criminal record, restricting pre-sentence custody credit to 1:1.

Following conviction on all counts, the accused challenged the constitutionality of s. 719(3.1), which removes sentencing discretion regarding enhanced pre-sentence custody credit when a bail justice has made a s. 515(9.1) endorsement.

The court found the impugned provision violated s. 7 of the Charter and declared it of no force and effect.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6 years imprisonment with 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.