Human Rights - ONCJ

The defendant was charged with Operation Impaired and Blow Over 80 following a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant applied to exclude breath test results based on alleged Charter breaches, including violations of section 8 (search and seizure), section 10(b) (right to counsel), and section 9 (arbitrary detention) rights.

The court found that the officer breached the defendant's section 10(b) rights by failing to inform him immediately of his right to counsel and by facilitating access to a paralegal rather than a lawyer, without explaining the distinction.

The court excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also found a reasonable doubt regarding care or control of the vehicle and impairment without the breath readings.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a lawful R.I.D.E. stop, the officer detected the odor of alcohol on the accused's breath and administered a roadside screening device, which produced a "fail" result.

The accused was arrested and transported to a police detachment where breath samples were obtained.

The defence challenged the legality of the stop, the placement of the accused in the police vehicle for the screening device test, and alleged violations of the right to counsel.

The court found no Charter violations and convicted the accused.

The defendant was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer tests taken more than two hours after the defendant was stopped, requiring expert toxicology evidence to establish the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The Crown's expert opined the defendant's BAC was 95 to 140 mg/100ml at the time of driving, based on an assumption of no "bolus drinking." The defendant challenged the admissibility of his weight statement on Charter grounds and argued the Crown failed to prove the absence of bolus drinking.

The court rejected the Charter challenges, admitted the defendant's weight statement, and found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not consume two standard drinks within 20 minutes before driving.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with "Young Driver – Blood Alcohol Above Zero" contrary to section 44.1(5) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant brought a Charter motion alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant's right to be advised of her right to retain and instruct counsel was infringed under section 10(b).

Applying the R. v. Grant analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

With the breath sample evidence excluded and no other admissible evidence of blood alcohol concentration, the court dismissed the charge, finding the prosecution failed to prove an essential element of the offence.

A young person brought an application to stay charges pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for breach of section 11(b) rights (right to be tried within a reasonable time).

The applicant faced charges on two informations arising from offences alleged to have occurred on October 25, 2015.

The application was heard following the recusal of the original trial judge.

The court considered the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, and applied it contextually to a case involving a young person and proceedings that commenced before the Jordan decision was released.

The court found that the Crown established exceptional circumstances justifying the delay and that the defence failed to demonstrate a violation of section 11(b) rights.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle over the legal limit contrary to the Criminal Code of Canada.

The Crown proved the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defence raised three Charter-based issues: two alleged breaches of section 9 (arbitrary detention) relating to placement in the police cruiser and overholding at the station, and one alleged breach of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) relating to a pat-down search.

The court found that placing the accused in the cruiser was reasonable and necessary for administering the ASD test.

The pat-down search was found to be unlawful and a breach of section 8, but evidence was not excluded under section 24(2) as the breach was not serious enough.

The court assumed a breach of section 9 regarding overholding for approximately three hours but declined to grant a stay of proceedings.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and refusal to take a breathalyzer test following a traffic stop.

The Crown withdrew the dangerous driving charge at trial.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant for impaired driving and make a breath demand.

The officer's evidence contained significant discrepancies when compared to video evidence from the police cruiser, including mischaracterizations of the defendant's driving, minimization of the force used during the stop, and failure to account for the defendant's obvious language difficulties.

The court acquitted the defendant of the refusal charge, finding the breath demand was invalid.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

A Charter application was brought alleging a breach of the accused's section 10(b) rights (right to counsel).

The accused clearly and unequivocally requested to speak to his lawyer of choice but needed to contact his wife to obtain the lawyer's name and phone number.

The police failed to facilitate this contact and did not adequately explain the role of duty counsel.

The court found a serious breach of the right to counsel and excluded the breath samples pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood following a traffic stop on Highway 401.

The defence challenged the reasonableness of the officer's grounds for demanding breath samples, the admissibility of observations made during the roadside investigation, and whether the breath tests were conducted as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of circumstances including poor driving, inability to focus, slow movements, and admission of alcohol consumption.

The court rejected the Charter violation argument, found the roadside observations admissible for proving impairment, and determined the tests were conducted as soon as practicable.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 following a traffic stop on March 4, 2014.

While the defendant's impairment was not disputed, the case was defended on Charter grounds and the contention that the "as soon as practicable" requirement had not been met.

The court found that police violated the defendant's Charter section 7 rights by failing to provide access to toilet facilities, a change of wet clothing, adequate warmth, and food during approximately 12 hours of custody.

The court determined that the totality of this neglect amounted to a violation of the defendant's right to fair, humane, and dignified treatment.

A stay of proceedings was granted as the appropriate remedy.

The applicant was charged with luring a child by means of a computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police obtaining his cell phone subscriber information from a telecommunications provider without a warrant.

The applicant argued that the disclosure of cell phone subscriber information was analogous to internet subscriber information and should require judicial authorization under the principles established in R v. Spencer.

The court rejected this argument, finding that cell phone subscriber information does not attract the same reasonable expectation of privacy as internet subscriber information, and therefore no breach of section 8 Charter rights occurred.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and "Over 80".

He brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the police officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to stop the vehicle and arrest the accused.

The officer's observations of driving behaviour were unreliable, his inference regarding the accused's direction of travel was unsupportable, and he failed to use available investigative tools such as an Approved Screening Device.

The court found breaches of both sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under section 24(2), resulting in acquittals on both charges.

Following a 19-day trial, the accused was convicted of 60 firearms and weapons offences, including possession of prohibited and restricted firearms with readily accessible ammunition, breach of prohibition orders, unsafe storage of firearms, and possession of firearms with removed serial numbers.

The accused, a former RCMP officer and convicted gun trafficker on federal parole, was arrested after police executed a high-risk search warrant and seized 67 firearms, prohibited devices, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and explosives from his residence.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years 9 months (resulting in 6 years after pre-trial custody credit), with consecutive sentences for breach of prohibition orders.

The court also granted a 3-month sentencing remission as a remedy for the accused's unlawful detention for 15 days without being brought before a judicial officer, which constituted an abuse of process and breach of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80mg of alcohol in 100ml of blood following a motor vehicle collision on April 28, 2013.

This was the second section 11(b) Charter application challenging the delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The trial commenced on June 16, 2014 (approximately 14 months after arrest) but did not conclude, requiring a continuation date of October 3, 2014 (an additional 109 days of delay).

The court found total state-caused delay of 11.5 months, exceeding the Morin guidelines by six weeks.

The defendant suffered actual prejudice including stress, anxiety, sleep disturbance requiring medication, and loss of a job opportunity.

Balancing the defendant's prejudice against the serious nature of the offence and strong societal interest in trial on merits, the court found the delay constitutionally intolerable and granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused was found guilty of operation impaired following a motor vehicle collision.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including violations of ss. 9, 10(a), 10(b), and critically, s. 7 security rights.

The accused was left in a urine-soaked state for approximately 10 hours in custody without being offered a change of clothing, blanket, or early release.

Police officers made demeaning remarks about his condition.

The court determined that the accused's dignity and composure during the breathalyzer process were fundamentally compromised by the wilful indifference of persons in authority.

Applying the test from R. v. Babos, the court found that the egregious Charter violation reflected an endemic institutional attitude toward detainees that could not be adequately remedied by alternative sanctions, particularly given mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.

The court concluded that a stay of proceedings was warranted to maintain the integrity of the justice system.

The accused was charged with possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown conceded that a warrantless search of the residence constituted a breach of the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.

The court found that while a breach occurred, the police acted in good faith based on legitimate public safety concerns arising from a volatile domestic dispute involving references to a firearm.

Applying the section 24(2) Charter exclusion analysis from R v. Grant, the court balanced the seriousness of the police conduct, the impact on the accused's privacy interests, and society's interest in adjudicating the case.

The court concluded that admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and admitted the evidence.

The accused brought an application for a judicial stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The information was sworn on April 25, 2012, and the application was heard on October 7, 2013, approximately 20 months later.

The court found an unacceptable delay of approximately 19 months, with significant portions attributable to the Crown and judicial officers.

The court also found moderate actual prejudice to the accused flowing from the delay.

Balancing the competing interests and applying the framework from R. v. Morin, the court granted the application and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on a breathalyzer test result of 150 milligrams.

The defence challenged the validity of the approved roadside screening device (ASD) demand on grounds of breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the officer detected an odour of alcohol at the initial contact but unreasonably delayed making the ASD demand to conduct routine license inquiries.

The court further found that the total delay of 21 minutes from the formation of reasonable suspicion to the point the officer was ready to require a breath sample provided a realistic opportunity for the accused to consult with counsel, which was not afforded.

The court concluded that section 8 rights were breached and excluded the evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of section 8 rights (unreasonable search and seizure) arising from a police officer's entry into a detached garage to locate the accused following a report of an impaired driver leaving a bar.

The officer opened an unlocked garage door and briefly entered to order the accused out.

The court found no breach of section 8 rights, determining that the search was reasonable given the circumstances, including the minimal intrusion, the detached nature of the garage, the accused's apparent attempt to evade police, and the reduced expectation of privacy in the garage.

The court also found that even if a breach had occurred, evidence would not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused's section 8 and 9 rights were violated when he was handcuffed in the parking lot before the roadside screening test was administered.

The court excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court also found a section 10(a) breach but noted it would not have excluded evidence on that basis alone.