Human Rights - ONCJ

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit (over 80 mgs) and distracted driving contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The central issue was whether the police violated the accused's Charter section 10(b) rights regarding the right to counsel.

The court found that the police failed to comply with their informational and implementational obligations under section 10(b) by misleading the accused about his right to choose counsel and failing to provide access to a telephone and telephone book.

The court excluded the breath test evidence as a remedy under section 24(2), finding the violation was serious and had significant impact on the accused's Charter rights.

The over 80 charge was dismissed.

The accused was found guilty of the distracted driving charge.

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle while impaired by alcohol and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate her vehicle was impaired by alcohol consumption based on credible evidence from police officers and an independent witness.

However, the Crown failed to prove the refusal charge.

The court found that given the extent of the accused's intoxication and resulting mental confusion and disorientation at the time of the breath demand, a reasonable doubt existed regarding the mental element of the refusal offence.

The accused was found guilty of impaired driving but acquitted of the refusal charge.

The accused was charged with robbery, break and enter with intent to commit robbery, and breach of probation following a home invasion robbery.

The Crown's case depended heavily on evidence obtained from the accused's Blackberry Playbook tablet.

The defence brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the search and seizure of the tablet and the admissibility of evidence derived therefrom.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: an unlawful warrantless search of the tablet incident to arrest, a violation of the right to counsel when the accused was questioned about the robbery without being re-advised of his rights, and deliberate omissions and misleading statements in the Information to Obtain a search warrant.

The court excluded the evidence obtained from the tablet searches, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

Following a trial, the court dismissed Charter applications regarding the right to counsel and the lawfulness of the screening test process.

The accused was found guilty of driving with an illegal blood alcohol concentration of 130 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, which was 50 milligrams over the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of a $1,200 fine plus a $360 victim surcharge (total $1,560) payable within one year, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The court noted the accused's youth, education, lack of criminal record, and strong family support as mitigating factors, but emphasized the seriousness of the offense and the high blood alcohol reading.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration following a minor motor vehicle collision in Toronto.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples taken at roadside via an approved screening device and subsequent Intoxilyzer readings at the police station, supported by toxicology evidence.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of all BAC evidence on Charter grounds, arguing that the officer failed to comply with the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code by delaying approximately 10 minutes between forming reasonable suspicion and making the formal ASD demand.

The court found a breach of the "forthwith" requirement and, applying the three-part test under section 24(2) of the Charter, excluded the BAC evidence as the admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was convicted of defrauding the Ontario government social assistance plan of $18,636.00 over three years and pleaded guilty to defrauding a Visa cardholder of $7,944.75 while awaiting trial on the first offence.

The defendant challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-10) that removed the conditional sentence option for offences with a maximum term of 14 years or life imprisonment.

The defendant argued this violated sections 12 and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding that the removal of the conditional sentence option does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and does not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence, alleging that his right to counsel in private was breached when he spoke to duty counsel from a holding cell at the police detachment.

The accused claimed he could hear voices outside the cell and was concerned his conversation could be overheard.

The court found that the accused was in fact afforded privacy, was the only person in the cell block and booking area, and was monitored only by video with no audio recording.

The court rejected the accused's after-the-fact assertion that he reasonably believed his conversation could be overheard, finding his testimony lacked reliability and he took no steps at the time to indicate concern.

The Charter application was dismissed and the accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol content exceeded 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mls of blood contrary to s.253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused's vehicle had run out of gas on the roadway, and he was found seated in the driver's seat waiting for a tow truck to bring him fuel.

Police conducted a roadside investigation, obtained a failed approved screening device test, and subsequently obtained two breath samples exceeding the legal limit.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the investigation and arrest on Charter grounds and argued that the Crown had failed to prove care and control.

The court rejected all Charter challenges and found that the Crown had proven de facto care and control beyond a reasonable doubt, alternatively relying on the presumption in s.258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with assault, assault causing bodily harm, impaired driving, and driving with excess alcohol arising from events on May 7, 2013.

The accused brought a Charter section 11(b) motion alleging his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The trial commenced on March 9, 2015, and the accused renewed the 11(b) motion at the conclusion of trial on January 18, 2016.

The court found total delay of approximately 32 months from charge to trial completion, with 15 to 16 months of institutional delay.

Despite the seriousness of the charges and the substantial delay, the court initially dismissed the motion at the outset of trial.

Upon renewal, the court found the delay constituted a breach of section 11(b) rights and stayed all charges.

The applicant was charged with Care and Control over 80 mg and Impaired Care and Control following observations of her sitting in the driver's seat of a running vehicle in live traffic on Bayview Avenue.

The applicant brought a Charter application seeking to stay proceedings or exclude evidence including breath samples, statements, and observations based on alleged violations of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest existed, but determined that no valid breath demand was made because the officer making the demand did not receive information regarding the grounds for arrest.

The court excluded the breath samples and readings but declined to stay proceedings.

The applicant's detention at the police division after medical clearance was found to be arbitrary, though the duration was not sufficiently egregious to warrant a stay.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol in the blood following a roadside stop.

The court conducted a Charter voir dire to determine whether breath sample evidence should be excluded.

The court found that the police failed to make a proper and timely demand for an approved screening device sample at the roadside, violating sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

Additionally, the police failed to provide the accused with a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel of choice, instead putting him on the phone to duty counsel after only 13 minutes and then dismissing his subsequent request for further assistance.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol in her system and impaired driving following a motor vehicle collision on the Don Valley Parkway on February 20, 2013.

The trial raised significant Charter issues regarding the accused's right to counsel.

The court found that the accused did not receive a reasonable opportunity to consult with duty counsel due to the duty counsel's unprofessional and rude conduct, combined with the police's failure to provide a Prosper warning or explore alternative options for legal consultation.

The court excluded the breath readings as evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Without the breath readings, the Crown could not prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police entry onto her property.

The officer attended at the accused's residence in response to a dispatch report of a possible impaired driver.

The property was secured by a motorized metal gate at the end of a 200-metre driveway, with intercom and security camera systems.

The officer entered the property by following a security guard through the gate without explicit permission.

The court found two Charter breaches: an unlawful entry onto the property in violation of section 8 rights, and an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds.

The court excluded all evidence obtained after the officer passed through the gate, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

This is a Dawson Motion brought by multiple defendants in a drug and firearm investigation known as Project Wheeler.

The defendants sought leave to cross-examine the affiant who deposed to the affidavit in support of a wiretap authorization granted by a Superior Court judge.

The defendants challenged two areas: claims about possession of firearms and statements that observations about meetings were indicative of drug trafficking.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendants failed to demonstrate how cross-examination would undermine the preconditions for the wiretap authorization and that the allegations of sweeping generalizations and circular reasoning were not relevant to an attack on facial validity in the circumstances presented.

The offender pleaded guilty to one count of gross indecency and one count of indecent assault involving two young male victims in the early 1980s.

The offences involved sexual exploitation of children aged 10 and 13 years old, including oral sex, anal intercourse, coercion, blackmail, and the provision of alcohol.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months' imprisonment concurrent on both counts, rejecting the defence submission for a conditional sentence despite the offender's exemplary life over the intervening 30 years.

The court found that denunciation and general deterrence required incarceration in a traditional setting.

A DNA order, SOIRA compliance order, and 5-year weapons prohibition were imposed.

A section 161 order was refused on Charter grounds.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial proceeded as a blended trial and Charter voir dire.

The Crown called two witnesses: the arresting officer and a qualified breath technician.

The defence challenged whether the roadside screening device demand was made "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, and whether breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c) to preserve the statutory presumptions.

The court found no breach regarding the "forthwith" requirement but concluded that multiple unexplained delays in the custody process violated the "as soon as practicable" requirement, resulting in acquittal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The Crown withdrew the impaired charge at trial.

The central issue was whether the Crown established that the arresting officer gave a demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code at the roadside.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that such a demand was made.

Without proof of the demand, the Crown could not rely on the statutory presumption in section 258(1)(c) to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant was charged with unlawful production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

He brought an application under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) had been infringed.

The court found that the applicant had suffered Crown delay of approximately two months, institutional delay of approximately 14 months and 13 days, and actual prejudice to both his liberty and security interests.

The operative delay of 16 months and 13 days exceeded the Morin guidelines by approximately six and a half months.

Balancing all factors, including the seriousness of the offences against the applicant's prejudice and the institutional failures to expedite the proceedings, the court granted the application and stayed the charges.

The defendant was charged with operating a motorcycle with handlebars exceeding the maximum height of 380 millimetres as prescribed by Ontario Regulation 596, section 10(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the regulation on grounds of vagueness and anachronism, arguing violations of sections 7, 9, and 26 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found the regulation was not vague, not anachronistic, and did not violate the defendant's Charter rights.

The defendant was convicted after the prosecution proved the handlebars measured 830 millimetres above the seat.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop at an intersection.

The Crown's evidence established that the accused was found slumped over the steering wheel of a running vehicle at a red light, displaying signs of impairment including red glassy eyes, slurred speech, and an odour of alcohol.

The accused was arrested and subjected to breathalyzer testing, which yielded readings of 160 and 180 mgs of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breathalyzer evidence on Charter grounds, alleging that he was not properly informed of his right to counsel due to language comprehension difficulties.

The court found that the accused's Charter rights under section 10(b) were infringed and excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the court found the accused guilty of impaired driving based on the officers' observations at the roadside, and not guilty of driving with excess alcohol due to the exclusion of the breathalyzer results.