Human Rights - ONCJ

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 (impaired driving) following a traffic stop on November 14, 2015.

The defence raised two Charter violations: (1) that the police stop was racially motivated and unlawful under section 9, and (2) that the defendant was denied his right to counsel under section 10 by being denied access to his cell phone to contact a lawyer of choice.

This was the second trial following reversal of an acquittal on summary conviction appeal.

The court found no racial profiling but upheld the section 10 Charter violation regarding denial of access to counsel of choice.

The breath test evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and the charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with Impaired Operation or Care or Control of a Motor Vehicle and Over 80 following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown conceded Charter breaches relating to the delay in making an Approved Screening Device demand and the delay in reading rights to counsel after arrest.

The court applied the section 24(2) analysis and admitted the breath sample evidence, finding that admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was found guilty of both charges, with a conditional stay entered on the Impaired Operation conviction.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown alleged the accused was observed driving erratically at high speed, including driving through a red light.

The defence challenged the reasonable grounds for arrest and the approved instrument demand, and alleged arbitrary detention contrary to section 9 of the Charter.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds based on the totality of the driving observations and physical indicia.

The court rejected the arbitrary detention argument, finding the delay in release was reasonably explained by station circumstances.

The court convicted the accused on the impaired operation count and stayed the Over 80 count.

The accused was charged with driving while over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood and impaired driving following an incident at a fire station parking lot.

The Crown's case relied on observations by firefighters and police officers, as well as breath sample analysis.

The central issue was whether the Crown could prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt given the "bolus drinking" defence—the possibility that the accused consumed large quantities of alcohol while driving rather than before.

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest but acquitted the accused on both counts because the evidence established a reasonable inference of bolus drinking, which undermined a necessary precondition of the toxicology expert's opinion.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking in persons contrary to section 279.01 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought the mandatory minimum sentence of four years imprisonment.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it was grossly disproportionate to his circumstances.

The court found the mandatory minimum infringed section 12 and could not be justified under section 1.

The court determined an appropriate sentence of 21 months was warranted based on the circumstances of the offence and offender, and declared the mandatory minimum invalid in these proceedings.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mls of blood and having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The trial proceeded following a successful Charter application under s.10(b) that resulted in the exclusion of breath samples.

The accused also brought a s.11(b) Charter motion alleging unreasonable delay, which was dismissed.

On the merits, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in care or control of the motor vehicle.

The statutory presumption of care or control was rebutted by evidence that the accused occupied the driver's seat solely to smoke a cigarette in cold weather after arriving home.

The court also found no realistic risk of danger to ground a conviction based on de facto care or control.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with two offences: operating a motor vehicle with impaired ability due to alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and failing or refusing to provide breath samples for analysis in an approved screening device contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on an alleged delay between the officer's formation of reasonable suspicion and the demand for a breath sample.

The court rejected the Charter application and found the accused guilty on both counts based on evidence of impairment and failure to comply with the breath demand.

The applicant was charged with dangerous driving and impaired driving causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

Police seized blood samples drawn for medical purposes and sealed them without reasonable grounds to believe the samples would afford evidence of a criminal act.

Seven weeks later, police obtained a warrant and seized the blood, which was subsequently tested and revealed the presence of Xanax.

The applicant moved to exclude the evidence on the basis of an unreasonable seizure contrary to section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds at the time of sealing the blood samples and that the sealing constituted an unreasonable seizure and Charter violation.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of 80 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood.

The trial occurred after amendments to the Criminal Code regarding drinking and driving offences.

The court found the defendant not guilty of impaired driving due to insufficient evidence of impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, despite evidence of poor driving and a strong odour of alcohol.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of the over-80 charge, relying on the presumption of accuracy under the new legislation and determining that breath readings were admissible despite a Charter violation regarding the right to counsel.

The accused was charged with operation impaired and blow over 80 following a collision with a stationary vehicle.

The accused raised Charter challenges regarding alleged breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter, claiming infringement of his rights to counsel and arguing special circumstances warranting an interpreter.

The court found no breaches of s. 10(a) or (b), rejected the language/special circumstances argument, and found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The court also rejected the argument that the vehicle was inoperable and therefore the accused was not in care or control.

The accused was found guilty of operation impaired; the blow over 80 charge was stayed.

The applicant was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, two counts of assault resist arrest, and possession of cocaine following his arrest by Durham Regional Police Service officers.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging excessive use of force by police, including repeated tasering and punching to the face, claiming violations of sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court found no Charter breaches, rejected the applicant's evidence of punching as implausible and internally inconsistent, and found the use of tasers was proportional and justified.

The applicant was convicted on the two assault resist arrest counts but acquitted on the impaired care or control and possession charges due to insufficient evidence.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving on March 3, 2018, after police responded to a report of an unconscious driver on Spadina Avenue in Toronto.

The defendant was found asleep at the wheel in a live lane of traffic with the engine running.

Police observed signs consistent with impairment including the smell of alcohol and bloodshot eyes.

The defendant was arrested and advised of his rights to counsel.

The Crown did not rely on breath sample results due to an error in the demand read by police.

The trial focused on whether the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest and no Charter breaches regarding arrest or rights to counsel.

However, on the merits of the impairment charge, the court found a reasonable doubt existed and acquitted the defendant.

The accused was charged with being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder, obstructing justice, and breaching a recognizance.

The Crown's case relied heavily on statements made by the accused to Detective Constable Pyke immediately following his arrest.

The trial judge found that the accused's Charter rights under s. 10(b) were violated when the officer elicited statements from him after he had invoked his right to counsel but before he had an opportunity to speak with counsel.

The statements were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Additionally, the trial judge found insufficient evidence of the accused's knowledge of the specific offence for which the other person was wanted.

On the breach of recognizance charge, the trial judge found that the pellet gun found in the accused's residence did not meet the definition of a firearm or weapon as defined in the Criminal Code, and therefore did not constitute a breach of the recognizance as worded.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on an alleged infringement of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The information was sworn on August 16, 2017, and the trial was scheduled to conclude on June 20, 2019, totaling 673 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and R. v. Cody to determine whether the delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court identified two key issues: whether delay in retaining counsel constituted defence delay, and whether delays caused by three audits of interpreter translations constituted exceptional circumstances.

The court found that 89 days of defence delay should be deducted for the period when the accused switched between Legal Aid and private counsel retention.

The court also found that all delays caused by the three interpreter audits (totaling 99 days) constituted discrete exceptional events that could not be reasonably mitigated by the Crown or justice system.

After deducting 188 days total, the net delay fell below 18 months, and the application was dismissed.

The defendant challenged the validity of a second information alleging impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing it was a nullity and constituted an abuse of process in violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown had requested that police lay an additional impaired driving charge alongside the original over-80 charge.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the second information was valid, that the procedure followed by Peel Regional Police and the Crown Attorney's Office complied with the Criminal Code, and that no abuse of process occurred.

The court upheld the practical arrangement between police and Crown as a reasonable response to high case volumes while maintaining statutory compliance.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit following a traffic stop.

The defence raised multiple Charter breaches including: failure to make an ASD demand "forthwith," failure to administer the ASD test before the accused could obtain legal advice, lack of reasonable grounds for the approved instrument demand due to failure to note the ASD calibration date, privacy breach through cell video surveillance, overholding after testing, and inadequate right to counsel advice.

The court rejected all alleged breaches and found the Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams in 100 milliliters of blood.

Police observed erratic driving, arrested the accused, and obtained breath samples showing readings of 140 mg/100 ml and 130 mg/100 ml.

The trial judge dismissed the impaired driving charge, finding that while the accused likely had consumed alcohol, his driving and behaviour could reasonably be explained by reckless driving and a quick temper rather than impairment.

However, the trial judge found the accused guilty of the over 80 offence, rejecting arguments that the accused's Charter rights under section 10(b) had been breached and that the breath results should be excluded.

The applicant brought a directed verdict motion on two grounds: first, challenging the applicability of the prior section 258 presumption of identity (the Shaikh argument), and second, challenging whether the new section 320.31 presumption of accuracy could apply to the facts (the Flores-Vigil argument).

The court dismissed the application in whole.

The court found that there was sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could apply the new presumption of accuracy under section 320.31, as the breath technician was trained and qualified, the alcohol standard was certified by an analyst as suitable for use, and the technician's knowledge of the target value was part of her training.

The court reserved written reasons on the Shaikh point.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Two issues were raised at trial: (1) whether the defendant's Charter rights to counsel under section 10(b) were violated by police conduct, and if so, whether excluding breath test results was an appropriate remedy; and (2) whether the prosecution could rely on the presumption of identity under the now-repealed section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, or whether expert evidence of retrograde extrapolation was required.

The court found no breach of the defendant's right to counsel and held that the old presumption of identity continues to apply to outstanding Over 80 charges commenced after the new law came into force on December 18, 2018.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused was placed on probation with a condition to attend and complete the P.A.R.S. (Perpetrators of Abuse Rehabilitation Services) program.

He was rejected from the program because he refused to acknowledge his guilt for the underlying domestic violence offence.

The Crown charged him with breach of probation.

The court found the accused not guilty, holding that it is inappropriate for the state to force an individual to admit guilt, as this would violate Charter protections of freedom of thought and expression.

The court reasoned that programs designed to assist abusers must be able to accept those who deny the abuse, as these individuals may be those most in need of assistance.