Health Law - ONCJ

The defendant pleaded guilty to sexual interference against a nine-year-old girl.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of six to nine months, while the defence sought a 12-month conditional sentence order.

The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence with electronic supervision, followed by three years of probation.

The sentencing was guided by R. v. Friesen and the principle that sexual offences against children warrant denunciation and deterrence, but exceptional circumstances—including the defendant's unresolved mental health issues—justified a non-custodial sentence.

The defendant was also subject to ancillary orders including sex offender registry, DNA collection, weapons prohibition, and a 10-year section 161 order restricting contact with minors.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving arising from a head-on collision on Highway 17 near Walden in Greater Sudbury.

The accused deliberately drove his truck into oncoming traffic as a suicide attempt.

One victim (Dawn Ceasar) was killed, and two others (Hartley Ceasar and Jack Ceasar) suffered serious injuries.

The court imposed a 15-month custodial sentence followed by three years probation, rejecting both the Crown's request for 18 months incarceration and the defence request for an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court found that while the accused suffered from depression and demonstrated remorse and rehabilitation efforts, the gravity of the offence and harm to victims required a custodial sentence to satisfy principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

A child protection trial involving three children: JSP (8 years old), JS (4 years old), and RS (9 months old).

The Children's Aid Society sought orders placing JSP and JS in the final care and custody of their paternal grandparents and placing RS in extended society care.

The mother opposed these applications and sought placement of all children in her care or jointly with the maternal grandmother.

The court found that RS was a child in need of protection due to risk of physical harm arising from the mother's untreated mental health issues, substance abuse, volatile behaviour, lack of insight, and inability to work effectively with service providers.

The court found that intervention through court orders was necessary to protect all three children.

The court placed JSP and JS in the custody of the paternal grandparents and RS in extended society care, with carefully structured access orders balancing the children's need for connection with their mother against the risks posed by her conduct and mental health challenges.

The accused was charged with mischief endangering life after lighting a fire at a gas station, causing injury to himself and endangering others.

The Crown conceded that the accused was incapable of appreciating that his actions were wrong due to cannabis-induced psychosis, but argued that cannabis-induced psychosis does not constitute a mental disorder within the meaning of s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused suffered from an underlying propensity to psychosis triggered by prolonged cannabis use, distinguishing his case from simple drug intoxication.

Applying the internal cause and continuing danger factors from R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, the court found the accused not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The defendant was charged with Aggravated Sexual Assault and related offences.

He had been assessed for fitness to stand trial twice and found fit on both occasions (July 18 and September 27, 2019).

The defence brought an application to determine whether a "keep fit" order was necessary under section 672.29 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the defendant remained fit and that there was no evidence to displace the presumption of fitness.

The defendant's medical needs were being adequately met at the correctional facility, and he remained able to instruct counsel.

The court declined to issue a keep fit order and adjourned the matter to set trial dates.

An application under section 74 of the Firearms Act to review the Chief Firearms Officer's decision to revoke the applicant's firearms licence.

The applicant, a retired military officer with PTSD and a history of alcohol abuse, had his licence revoked following several incidents involving mental health crises and impaired driving between October 2017 and September 2018.

The applicant sought to overturn the revocation, presenting new medical evidence from specialized treatment providers indicating significant improvement in his condition, abstinence from alcohol, and minimal risk regarding firearm possession.

The court found the original decision reasonable but determined that the new medical evidence was substantial enough to undermine the factual assumptions underlying the revocation decision and granted the application.

The Children's Aid Society sought a secure treatment order for a 15-year-old child with Autism Spectrum Disorder, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.

The child had a history of aggressive behaviour and multiple failed placements.

The court found all six statutory criteria under section 164(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 were met and committed the child to a 180-day secure treatment program at Syl Apps Youth Centre.

The decision is notable for the court's serious concerns about the child's prior placement at Reflections, where the child was confined to a basement apartment for nearly three months without access to fresh air or outdoor activity.

This child protection trial concerns access between an eight-year-old child and her biological father.

The father was convicted of serious violent offences against the mother, including human trafficking, sexual assault, and assault causing bodily harm.

Following his release from prison, a Quebec Superior Court ordered supervised access.

However, the mother relocated to Ontario to avoid implementing that order.

The Society sought a finding that the child is in need of protection and a no-access order.

The father engaged in extensive online harassment of the mother and the child, posting videos, images, and commentary that violated non-publication provisions.

The mother suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression, and made statements about suicidal ideation if access was ordered.

The court found that access is not in the child's best interests at this time, but ordered comprehensive terms and conditions addressing the parents' online conduct and requiring expert assessment of the child's needs regarding her paternal identity.

The accused was charged with uttering a death threat under section 264.1(1) of the Criminal Code after disclosing to a crisis counsellor that he was having thoughts about stabbing his wife during a marital separation.

The Crown argued that because the words were meant to be taken seriously, the accused was guilty.

The court found that while the actus reus of the offence was established (the words objectively conveyed a threat to a reasonable person), the mens rea was not satisfied.

The accused intended his words to be taken seriously for the purpose of seeking help for his anxiety, not for the purpose of intimidating or instilling fear in his wife or any other person.

The accused was acquitted.

Application by a psychiatrist at McMaster Children's Hospital for an order committing a 16-year-old child with severe eating disorder and multiple mental health conditions to a secure treatment program at Syl Apps Youth Centre for 180 days.

The child opposed the application.

The court found that all six statutory criteria under section 164(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act were met: the child had a mental disorder; had caused serious bodily harm to herself within 45 days preceding the application; had threatened serious bodily harm within 12 months; the secure treatment program would be effective; appropriate treatment was available; and no less restrictive method was appropriate.

The court granted the application for a 180-day commitment.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement following an incident on December 6, 2018, in which he held a knife to his mother's body while confining her in her bedroom.

The accused testified that he was following God's instructions to kill his mother, whom he believed God assured would not be harmed.

A forensic psychiatrist diagnosed the accused with schizophrenia and opined that at the time of the offences, the accused was experiencing psychotic symptoms including command auditory hallucinations and delusions that rendered him incapable of rationally perceiving the nature and quality of his actions and unable to make a rational choice regarding his conduct.

The court found that the accused's religious delusions and hallucinations were symptoms of a major mental disorder and that the accused lacked the capacity to know his acts were morally wrong.

The court found the accused not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The Crown brought an application for forfeiture of firearms under section 117.05 of the Criminal Code.

The respondent was apprehended under the Mental Health Act following an apparent suicide attempt involving self-harm to his wrists.

Police seized four long guns, ammunition, and the respondent's Possession and Acquisition License (PAL) from his residence.

The respondent did not appear at the hearing despite being served with notice and having duty counsel confirm his availability.

The court proceeded ex parte and ordered forfeiture of the firearms and ammunition to the Crown, with a 90-day period allowing the respondent to sell or transfer the long guns to a licensed person, subject to police approval.

The court also imposed a five-year firearms prohibition.

The accused was charged with six offences arising from a home invasion, robbery, forcible confinement, and kidnapping for ransom.

The accused admitted committing the actus reus of all charges but raised a defence of not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

The accused claimed he suffered from delusional disorder and believed he was on a mission assigned by Chinese anti-corruption authorities to locate and apprehend corrupt Chinese officials in Canada.

The trial proceeded in two phases: the first addressing the Crown's case and the accused's testimony; the second addressing psychiatric evidence.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, rejecting the NCR defence after finding the accused's account of his motivations was not credible and that he had not proven on a balance of probabilities that his mental disorder deprived him of the capacity to know his actions were wrong according to Canadian societal standards.

The accused was found guilty of threatening death following a trial on November 3, 2017.

The incident occurred at Queen's Park when the accused left two duffle bags unattended in front of the Whitney Block west doors and made statements to security officers indicating a threat to the Legislature building.

The Crown sought to have the threat classified as an act of terrorism under section 83.01 of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the terrorism designation, finding that the accused's mental health issues, rather than any ideological, political, or religious purpose, motivated the conduct.

The court sentenced the accused to six months time served and two years probation with various conditions, including mental health treatment and restrictions on attending Ontario Legislative buildings.

The appellant was convicted of selling tobacco to a person under 19 years old contrary to section 3(1) of the Smoke-Free Ontario Act.

The trial judge found the appellant credible but convicted him on the basis that he conducted a subjective analysis rather than an objective one, and should have requested identification.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the due diligence defence was available where he honestly and reasonably believed the buyer appeared to be 25 years or older based on his training, experience, and observation.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, finding that section 3(2) of the Act contemplates that sellers need not request identification in all cases, and that an honest mistake of fact constitutes a valid defence where the seller has diligently assessed the buyer's apparent age using their knowledge and experience.

The defendant was charged with two counts of mischief and two counts of failing to comply with a probation order prohibiting contact with her neighbours.

The Crown alleged the defendant threw eggs at the neighbours' window, made excessive noise, and engaged in direct contact in violation of the court order.

The court found the mischief charges were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as the egg-throwing did not cause sufficient damage to property and the noise did not substantially interfere with the neighbours' quiet enjoyment of their property.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of both counts of breaching the probation order, as her conduct on both dates constituted unacceptable conduct that violated public peace and good order, and she made direct contact with the neighbours in contravention of the order.

The Crown's application for a mental disorder assessment under section 672.12(3) of the Criminal Code was dismissed, as the Crown failed to establish reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant's criminal responsibility on account of mental disorder.

The defendant was charged with four Highway Traffic Act offences arising from an incident on March 21, 2011: speeding 105 km/h in a posted 60 km/h zone, failing to stop for a police officer and willfully continuing to avoid police during pursuit, failing to signal a lane change, and failing to surrender a vehicle permit.

The defendant raised a mental disorder defence based on a diagnosis of bipolar disorder.

The court found the defendant guilty of speeding, failing to stop for a police officer, and failing to surrender a permit.

The court acquitted the defendant of failing to signal a lane change due to insufficient evidence of the actus reus.

While the mental disorder defence was not established on a balance of probabilities, the court found reasonable doubt regarding whether the defendant willfully continued to avoid police, thereby excluding the enhanced penalty provisions under section 216(3).

The accused was charged with two counts of assault contrary to section 266 of the Criminal Code and one count of attempting to disarm a police officer contrary to section 270.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from an incident on December 15, 2010, at Joseph Brant Memorial Hospital in Burlington, where the accused, who was admitted under the Mental Health Act, became agitated when informed he would receive injectable medication.

The trial proceeded over several days spanning approximately 15 months.

The court found the accused not guilty on all counts, determining that the Crown failed to prove the essential elements of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judgment is highly critical of both hospital staff and police conduct, finding serious credibility issues with key witnesses and evidence of excessive use of force by police.

The Crown brought an application to have the accused found not criminally responsible (NCR) on the basis of mental disorder following her conviction for two counts of criminal harassment.

The accused had been found guilty of changing her surname to that of a man she had been obsessed with for approximately fourteen years.

Expert psychiatric evidence established that the accused suffered from Delusional Disorder, Erotomanic Type, a chronic psychotic disorder characterized by the false belief that another person is in love with the individual.

The court found that the accused's mental disorder rendered her incapable of knowing that her actions were morally wrong, despite her general understanding that the act was legally permissible.

An NCR verdict was recorded.

A default hearing brought by the Director, Family Responsibility Office against a support payor for arrears of child and spousal support totalling $68,335.56.

The payor had been in default since December 2008 following job loss and subsequent development of severe clinical depression and anxiety disorder.

The Director sought an order for incarceration.

The court found that the payor had discharged his burden of proof by demonstrating he was unable, for valid reasons, to pay the arrears or make subsequent payments.

The court dismissed the incarceration remedy and instead imposed reporting and disclosure obligations, including annual submission of tax returns, financial statements, and medical reports regarding the payor's employability.