Family and Matrimonial Law - ONCJ

This trial concerned decision-making responsibility and parenting time for the parties' 10-year-old daughter.

The Applicant mother sought sole decision-making and supervised parenting time for the Respondent father, transitioning to unsupervised upon completion of programs.

The father sought joint decision-making and immediate unsupervised parenting time, plus reimbursement for supervised access costs.

The court found the father engaged in extensive family violence against both the mother (abusive communication, controlling behavior) and the child (corporal punishment), and demonstrated a lack of credibility and accountability.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility and ordered unsupervised parenting time for the father on alternating weekends, contingent on his cessation of corporal punishment.

The father's claim for reimbursement was dismissed, and the court determined further programs for the father were unlikely to be effective given his lack of insight.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) brought an urgent motion to set aside a Summons to Witness served by Kina Gbezhgomi Child and Family Services (Kina) on the child A.L.P. in a Secure Treatment Application proceeding.

Kina sought to question the child, arguing it was permissible under the Family Law Rules.

The OCL argued that Secure Treatment Applications fall under Part VII of the CYFSA, not Part V (Child Protection), and therefore Rule 20(3) regarding questioning as a right does not apply.

The court agreed with the OCL, finding that Rule 20(3) does not apply to Secure Treatment Applications and that Kina should have brought a motion under Rule 20(5) for an order to question the child, which it failed to do.

The OCL's motion was granted, and the Summons to Witness was set aside.

The applicant (mother) sought costs of $15,000 after a successful two-day trial concerning parenting and support arrangements.

The respondent (father) requested no costs or a fixed amount of $2,000.

The court found the mother to be the more successful party, despite some divided success on issues and her failure to make a parenting offer to settle.

The father's conduct was deemed unreasonable due to his failure to provide complete and timely financial disclosure, disregard of court orders, and attempts to intimidate the mother.

The court awarded the mother $11,521 in costs, payable by the father over three years, subject to his ongoing support and costs payments.

The court declined to order costs paid directly to Legal Aid Ontario, affirming that legally aided clients stand in the same position as other litigants regarding costs.

The Child and Family Services of Grand Erie applied for a warrant under section 81(2) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act to apprehend four children from their mother, S.S. This was the second such application, the first having been denied.

The court denied the application again, finding that the Society failed to establish imminent risk, explore less restrictive alternatives, or provide full and fair disclosure of the previous denial and its reasons.

The court emphasized the parent's right to refuse ongoing services and cautioned against the Society's practice of re-litigating the same issue without substantially new evidence, bordering on res judicata.

This is a costs endorsement following motions for temporary parenting and support (brought by the father) and contempt (brought by the mother).

The father sought $5,000 in costs, while the mother requested no costs.

The court found the father to be more successful overall, particularly on the dominant issues of child residency (for one child) and child support.

The mother's motion for contempt was dismissed as ill-advised, and her conduct regarding it and her refusal to pay child support for one child was deemed unreasonable.

Applying the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, and considering the factors under the Family Law Rules, the court ordered the mother to pay the father $3,500 in costs.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a child protection application and a motion for temporary care and custody of three children, seeking a supervision order for the mother (K.M.).

The father (D.L.) did not appear.

The court addressed procedural fairness, noting the Society's failure to provide adequate notice for both the application (30 days required) and the motion (6 days required), as materials were filed and the first court date set only four days later.

The judge declined to abridge time, finding the Society's procedure unfair and tantamount to ex parte proceedings.

Despite the Society's request for a supervision order under s.94(2)(b) of the CYFSA, the court ordered temporary care and custody to the mother without supervision under s.94(2)(a), emphasizing fairness and the lack of pressing concerns for the children.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that Adam T. was a child in need of protection and an order for extended Society care.

The respondent mother, A.T.T., and respondent father, T.M., sought alternative dispositions, including the child's return to their care.

The court found Adam to be in need of protection due to the mother's chronic substance abuse, unstable lifestyle, and lack of candor, and the father's disengagement.

The court granted the Society's request for extended Society care, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial for a different disposition, and dismissed the parents' plans for care and access, except for supervised access for the maternal grandmother.

The applicant brought an urgent motion seeking the return of the child, Maddaline, to her primary care as per a separation agreement, after the respondent unilaterally withheld the child following a temporary COVID-19 arrangement.

The respondent sought to maintain primary care based on the child's stated preference.

The court found urgency due to the respondent's self-help actions in changing the long-standing status quo.

While acknowledging the child's views, the court determined that the views were potentially influenced by the circumstances created by the respondent and lacked sufficient consistency over time.

The court ordered the child's immediate return to the applicant's primary care and school in her catchment area, upholding the prior status quo.

Claims for temporary decision-making and a police assistance clause were dismissed without prejudice.

This ruling addresses a status review proceeding by summary judgment motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court assessed whether the child, "G", remained in need of protection due to emotional harm stemming from past domestic violence involving the parents and the father's ongoing actions.

While the mother had made significant progress in her ability to protect the child, "G" continued to exhibit aggressive behaviors and fear related to the father.

The court denied the Society's request for a deemed custody order, opting instead for a protection order.

This order placed the child in the mother's care subject to nine months of Society supervision, with no access for the incarcerated father until he brings a new application and demonstrates reduced risk.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking an interim order to change the primary residence of the child, Jacob (age 8), from the mother in Ottawa back to him in Sudbury.

An earlier consent order allowed the mother to relocate to Ottawa for a 12-month clinical placement, with a review upon its completion or discontinuance.

The mother's university program was discontinued, but she remained in Ottawa without disclosing this to the father.

The court found sufficient material changes in circumstances to review or vary the previous order.

Based on the child's best interests, including the mother's difficulties managing the child's behaviour, her questionable judgments, and the father's stable environment and family support in Sudbury, the court ordered interim decision-making responsibility and primary residence to the father.

The father, Cletus Oppong Wiafe, sought costs after a two-week trial concerning parenting and child support.

The court found the father to be the more successful party at trial, particularly on the dominant issue of the child's primary residence.

The mother, Gifty Afoakwa-Yeboah, failed to make costs submissions and exhibited unreasonable litigation conduct throughout the case, including non-compliance with court orders, late filings, exceeding page limits, and making unsupported allegations.

Despite the mother's inability to pay, the court declined to discount the costs award due to her reckless and unreasonable conduct, emphasizing the need to uphold the integrity of the justice system.

The court awarded the father $3,000 for production motions and $72,000 for trial costs.

The respondent father brought an emergency motion without notice seeking sole custody and suspension of the applicant mother's access to their son, alleging the child was at risk due to violence by an individual associated with the applicant.

The court reviewed the emergency order and found that while the respondent's concerns about the applicant's judgment had some basis, there was no real threat to the child at that time.

The court vacated the emergency order and restored the joint custody and access arrangement established by the parties' consent order dated January 23, 2019, effective December 14, 2020.

The matter was adjourned for a case conference to proceed through the motion to change process.

The applicant sought leave to amend his motion to change to include a request for custody of the child, with the respondent seeking to transfer the matter to Orillia and increase child support based on the applicant's higher disclosed income.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to amend, finding no material change in circumstances warranting a custody claim.

The court granted the respondent's motion to transfer the matter to Orillia as the more convenient forum.

The court also increased child support from $446.83 to $540.13 per month based on the applicant's 2017 disclosed income of $58,430.00, effective November 1, 2018.

The applicant (mother) sought costs following a successful interim motion heard on September 10, 2018.

The respondent (father) was found to have deliberately underpaid child support, failed to comply with disclosure obligations, and lacked reasonable grounds for his allegations regarding the applicant's fitness as a parent.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, finding the respondent's litigation conduct unreasonable and his defenses unsupported by the evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of assault against her minor daughter.

The assaults occurred over a two-year period from May 2014 to February 2016, involving repeated beatings with household objects including a toilet plunger handle, rolling pin, and broom handle.

The final assault in March 2016 resulted in visible bruising and abrasions.

The court imposed a sentence of 135 days imprisonment (90 days on count 1, 45 days consecutive on count 2) followed by 18 months probation, a weapons prohibition under Section 110, and a DNA order.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as primary sentencing objectives while considering the accused's remorse, guilty plea, lack of prior record, and the risk of deportation as a permanent resident.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, failure to provide a breath sample, criminal harassment, breach of undertaking, and assault.

The accused pleaded guilty to failure to provide a breath sample and breach of undertaking.

The Crown withdrew the impaired driving charge.

At trial, the court found the accused guilty of assault but acquitted on the criminal harassment charge.

The court found that while the accused threw a water bottle at the complainant during a custody dispute, the subsequent confrontation at a hotel parking lot did not constitute criminal harassment directed at the complainant, as the actions were directed at third parties and the complainant had no direct knowledge of the confrontation.

The applicant father brought motions for contempt and access against the respondent mother who had willfully breached access orders made on consent by Justice Katarynych on July 16, 2015 and September 2, 2015.

The mother failed to attend nine court proceedings, including the contempt hearing and sentencing hearing.

The court found the mother in contempt of the July 16, 2015 order and imposed a $500 fine.

The court modified the access arrangement to allow the father direct pickup and return of the child from the mother's residence on a weekly basis, commencing February 27, 2016.

The mother was given an opportunity to purge her contempt by complying with the new access order.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that a newborn child (A.G.) was in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act and requesting an order for crown wardship with no access.

The respondent parents had executed a written custody agreement transferring sole custody of the child to a third party (A.G.1) on the day of the child's birth.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring trial on multiple grounds: (1) the identity of the person having charge of the child at the time of apprehension; (2) the validity and legal effect of the custody agreement; (3) whether A.G.1 qualifies as a statutory party to the proceeding; (4) whether the grounds for finding the child in need of protection (abandonment and risk of physical harm) were established; and (5) procedural and temporal issues arising from delays in the proceedings.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a prior consent order concerning custody and access to the parties' child.

The mother sought to increase her access time, restrict the father's exclusive decision-making authority over extracurricular activities, obtain "make-up access" when activities conflicted with her parenting time, and require the father to provide financial and other information.

The court found that the mother failed to establish a material change in circumstances affecting the child's best interests as required by the Children's Law Reform Act.

The child was thriving academically, physically, and socially under the existing arrangement.

The court granted some of the mother's requests on a consensual basis but denied the contested claims, including the additional mid-week access, make-up access provisions, and restrictions on the father's extracurricular decision-making authority.

The court clarified that as a joint custodial parent, the mother has the right to make decisions about the child's participation in extracurricular activities during her parenting time.

This is a child protection trial under the Child and Family Services Act involving an amended protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto regarding a child (A.L.) born in 2010.

The child was apprehended on December 17, 2010, due to the mother's mental health crisis, suicidal ideation, domestic conflict within the parental relationship, and concerns about parental capacity.

The Society sought a Crown wardship order with no access to facilitate adoption.

The parents opposed the application and sought the child's return to their care.

The court found the child was in need of protection but determined that return to the parents with a supervision order was in the child's best interests, rejecting the Society's adoption plan.

The court applied section 70(4) of the CFSA to extend the time for Society wardship to facilitate a gradual transition home over four months.