Family and Matrimonial Law - ONCJ

This decision addresses a motion concerning medical decision-making authority, specifically the authority to consent to vaccinations for children placed in the care of their Paternal Aunt under a temporary order pursuant to the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA).

The court confirms that while the Paternal Aunt has temporary care and custody, a specific order permitting her to make medical decisions including vaccinations is appropriate and necessary to satisfy medical providers.

The court emphasizes the remedial purpose of the CYFSA and judicial notice of vaccine safety and efficacy, placing the onus on the objecting party to justify refusal of vaccination.

The Father’s request for adjournment was denied due to lack of evidence, and the Paternal Aunt was granted authority to consent to vaccinations in accordance with medical advice.

This decision addresses the issue of costs between parents in a child protection proceeding under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The father, J.N., sought partial indemnity costs from the mother, J.M., arguing that he was successful and that J.M. acted unreasonably and prolonged the matter.

The court reviewed the high threshold required for awarding costs between parents in protection cases, emphasizing that costs should only be awarded for extreme unreasonable conduct or bad faith.

The court found that although J.M. initially resisted conceding primary residence, she acted reasonably in later efforts to resolve the matter, and no findings of fact or breach of court orders were made against her.

The protection application was withdrawn on consent, and the court declined to order costs, highlighting the importance of good faith and proportionality in such proceedings.

The Ontario Court of Justice granted summary judgment in favour of the Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Peel, placing three children in extended society care due to chronic and long-standing child protection concerns including domestic violence, parental substance abuse, and mental health issues.

The court emphasized the children’s expressed wishes not to return to parental care, the lack of meaningful progress despite years of intervention, and the need for permanency and closure.

The decision carefully applied the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin regarding summary judgment, underscoring the cautious approach required in child protection cases.

This decision addresses a high-conflict parenting dispute involving Mischa Aaron Ettinger and Amilynn Bresseau concerning parenting time, communication, and child support issues for their child, Ozwald Edwin Mischa Ettinger.

The court found that both parents are capable and loving but unable to communicate effectively, with the father identified as the major contributor to ongoing conflict due to his inability to accept refusals for additional parenting time.

The judgment enforces a strict parenting schedule with minimal contact between parents, detailed provisions for exchanges, and clear guidelines for child support and Section 7 expenses.

The court also resolves a claim of overpayment by the father towards Section 7 expenses, ordering a net payment to the mother.

This decision addresses the retroactive child support obligations of Robert Sousa for his 7-year-old son with Tiffany Maggio and O. Benjamin Vincents.

The court applied the framework from Colucci v. Colucci to determine the presumptive start date for child support, ultimately ordering support retroactive to August 1, 2019, despite the presumptive date being September 18, 2020.

The father was found to have engaged in blameworthy conduct by underreporting income, failing to provide full financial disclosure, and misrepresenting his financial situation.

The court imputed income to the father based on a detailed analysis of his business revenues and expenses, including a gross-up to account for underreported income.

The father’s arrears were fixed at $37,006, with a payment plan ordered.

The court also ordered the father to pay 74% of the child’s special expenses related to tutoring, reflecting the child’s special needs.

This Ontario Court of Justice decision addresses a contested relocation and parenting dispute involving an 8-year-old child.

The mother sought sole decision-making responsibility and permission to relocate with the child to Wisconsin, while the father opposed the move and sought joint or parallel decision-making responsibility.

The court carefully analyzed the best interests of the child under the Children’s Law Reform Act, including family violence considerations, the parties’ parenting abilities, and the impact of relocation.

The court found the mother to be the primary caregiver and granted her sole decision-making responsibility, permitting relocation with a detailed parenting time plan for the father.

The father’s income was imputed at $88,800 for child support purposes due to under-employment and lack of financial disclosure.

The mother’s spousal support claim was withdrawn if relocation was permitted.

This decision addresses the imputation of income for child support purposes where the father ceased working due to claimed mental health issues but failed to provide sufficient medical evidence or comply with court orders.

The court found the father deliberately under-employed without a valid medical excuse, imputed an annual income of $70,000 based on his prior earnings, and ordered child support accordingly.

The father’s failure to participate fully in the trial and produce medical witnesses led to adverse inferences and a costs award in favor of the mother.

This trial concerned parenting and child support arrangements for the parties' four-year-old child.

The mother sought primary residence and sole decision-making, and child support.

The father sought primary residence and sole decision-making, and no child support.

The court found it in the child's best interests to be in the primary care of the father with sole decision-making responsibility, citing the mother's emotional fragility, contempt for the father, unwillingness to cooperate, and attempts to alienate the child from the father.

The court also imputed income to the father for retroactive child support from the date of separation but terminated ongoing child support due to the father having primary residence and not seeking support from the mother.

The respondent father sought an adjournment of his child support trial, arguing inability to work due to severe anxiety and depression, and his psychiatrist's unavailability for cross-examination.

The applicant mother opposed.

The court, balancing the need for finality in family proceedings with the father's diligent efforts and the psychiatrist's health issues, granted one final adjournment.

The order set strict conditions for the father to obtain and produce medical evidence, including potentially a new psychiatrist, and made the next trial date peremptory.

The trial addressed parenting and child support arrangements for the parties' six-year-old son.

The mother sought recognition of a Syrian custody order, or alternatively, primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility, supervised parenting time for the father, and child support.

The father sought primary residence and decision-making in Germany, or joint decision-making, and opposed retroactive child support.

The court dismissed the father's claims for primary residence and joint decision-making, refused to recognize the Syrian order due to lack of notice and opportunity to be heard, and granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence.

The court ordered supervised in-person and virtual parenting time for the father, and ordered him to pay retroactive and ongoing child support, including a share of special expenses, based on his actual income, dismissing his undue hardship claim.

A no-contact and communication order was issued against the father.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to add a maternal aunt as a party to a child protection proceeding, arguing that a Court of Appeal decision made it mandatory.

The child had been placed in the maternal aunt's temporary care.

The child's mother opposed the motion, expressing concerns about family division.

The maternal aunt tearfully withdrew her consent, stating she had not received independent legal advice and felt pressured by the Society.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society's application of the cited case could have constitutional implications and that the process for adding parties must ensure procedural fairness, including proper notice, opportunity to respond, and independent legal advice for the proposed party.

The court also rejected the Society's argument that the temporary order should be deemed "with prejudice" due to the passage of time.

In a status review application, the Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought extended society care for a child (N.G.-L.), while the father (W.L.), supported by the mother (N.G.), sought custody with a supervision order.

The court found intervention necessary due to the mother's long-standing substance abuse issues, the parents' past dishonesty, and minimization of risks.

However, considering the child's best interests, the father's commitment, his capacity to parent with support, and the positive influence of a friend (T.G.), the court determined that a supervision order placing the child in the father's care, following a six-week interim society care transition, was the least disruptive and most appropriate alternative.

The order included strict supervision terms for the father and clear boundaries for the mother's access, which is to be supervised solely by the society.

The respondent brought a motion to change a 2007 child support order, seeking to terminate support for his 30-year-old intellectually disabled son and rescind all arrears.

The applicant opposed, seeking ongoing support and fixed arrears.

The court found the son was unable to withdraw from parental charge due to disability, entitling him to ongoing support under the amended Family Law Act.

The court determined the son's monthly needs, ordering the parents to contribute equally.

Arrears were significantly reduced due to Family Responsibility Office (FRO) inaccuracies and the applicant's delay in seeking Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) benefits, but not fully rescinded.

A Form 14b motion brought by the respondent seeking summary judgment on custody, access, and child support matters.

The applicant, who was self-represented, had effectively abandoned the proceedings and had not seen the child for over a year.

The court found that the applicant had abdicated his parental responsibilities and granted the respondent sole custody of the child.

Access was granted at the sole discretion of the respondent.

Child support was ordered retroactively from June 1, 2019, based on an imputed income of $35,500 per annum.

The respondent was permitted to travel outside Ontario and move residence without the applicant's consent.

Issues regarding First Nations status and costs were reserved for a future return date.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a Form 14B motion seeking an order requiring respondent parents to file Answers and Plans of Care by October 5, 2020, with a conditional order noting them in default if they failed to comply.

The motion arose from COVID-19 pandemic-related suspension of time limits under Ontario Regulation 73/20.

The court found that the parents had not engaged with the process, had not participated in services, and had not attended hearings.

The children, ages 16 and 12, had resided with their maternal uncle for eight months and expressed a clear wish to remain with him.

The court exercised its discretion to lift the presumptive suspension of the parents' time to file pleadings, finding it was in the best interests of the children to bring the litigation to conclusion.

The parents were noted in default, and a final order was made placing the children in the custody of the maternal uncle with access to the parents.

Motion review of an emergency restraining order granted without notice on April 2, 2020.

The applicant sought to restrain the respondent from direct or indirect contact with her and their infant daughter, and from approaching their residence or workplace.

The respondent contested the order, denying allegations of abuse and arguing he had voluntarily left the home.

The court found evidence of emotional and aggressive behaviour, including the respondent's admission to breaking down a locked door.

The court granted a modified restraining order prohibiting direct contact and requiring communication through counsel, while establishing supervised access to the child through a third party facilitator.

The court also established a temporary parenting schedule pending a case conference.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and seeking a disposition order placing them in kin care with supervision.

The respondent parents opposed the motion, arguing genuine issues required a trial.

The court found that the children were at risk of physical and emotional harm due to exposure to domestic violence, the father's unaddressed drug use and mental health issues, and the parents' failure to adequately address these concerns.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring trial, and ordered the children to remain in their current kin placements with supervised access at the Society's discretion.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of a child protection proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The child subject to the proceeding (H.S.) was identified as non-status and not an Indian or native child under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Nogdawindamin CAS lacked jurisdiction under its ministerial designation to provide services in this case.

The court held that jurisdictional compliance with the Minister's designation cannot be overridden by efficiency or duplication of services arguments, and that the court has authority to determine whether a society has jurisdiction to be the applicant in a child protection proceeding.

A child protection society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that a child was in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act on grounds of risk of physical harm.

The child had been in the father's sole custody and care for approximately four months before the application was commenced.

The mother had a history of substance abuse, medical issues, and domestic violence incidents.

The court found that while the mother presented a significant risk of harm, the statutory language of section 37(2)(b)(i) requires that the risk be caused by or result from the acts or omissions of "the person having charge of the child." The court determined that the father, as the sole custodian, was the person having charge, and that the mother's supervised access did not constitute having charge.

The court found some evidence of the father's failure to protect the child from domestic violence exposure and confusion regarding access restrictions, sufficient to support a finding under section 37(2)(b)(i).

The court granted a section 57.1 sole custody order to the father with supervised maternal access.

The applicant mother sought costs following a successful motion to change a separation agreement regarding child support and parenting arrangements.

The respondent father failed to accept two settlement offers made by the applicant and the matter proceeded to hearing.

The court awarded partial costs to the applicant, considering the settlement offers, the respondent's financial circumstances, and the need to balance the costs award with the respondent's obligations to support the children.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $2,500 in costs at $50 per month, enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office.