Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCJ

The Ontario Court of Justice considered charges against Brian Cobb for breaching a release order by attending a place frequented by the complainant and for uttering a threat via email.

The Court analyzed the meaning of "frequented" in the context of a release order condition, rejecting an overly broad interpretation that would create impractical no-go zones.

The Court found no reasonable risk of contact at the church visit and acquitted Cobb on count 1.

On count 2, the Court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Cobb sent threatening emails, relying on circumstantial evidence linking the emails to Cobb’s prior meeting and statements.

Cobb was convicted of uttering a threat.

The defendant, charged under the Highway Traffic Act, brought a lost evidence application under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

He alleged that police improperly handled and stored his dashcam and memory card, leading to the loss of crucial video evidence that would have supported his defence.

The Crown argued that the defendant failed to prove a Charter breach, specifically that no evidence was lost or that police acted negligently.

The court dismissed the application, finding no violation of the defendant's Charter rights, as there was no evidence that footage existed or was lost due to police negligence.

The defendant, a caregiver, was charged with theft and forgery related to an elderly veteran's finances and a vehicle purchase.

The Crown alleged a pattern of ATM withdrawals from the complainant's account matching deposits into the defendant's, and a falsified vehicle purchase agreement.

The court found the defendant guilty of theft for a specific withdrawal made on the day the complainant died, as posthumous consent was impossible.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding consent for prior withdrawals.

For the forgery charge, the court found the incorrect address on the vehicle contract was not a "material particular" and that the Crown failed to prove intent to induce action, leading to an acquittal on that count.

The accused, Lajos Gabor Marosi, was charged with unlawful entry into a dwelling, assault, and failure to comply with a release order.

The charges stemmed from an incident where Marosi, separated from his wife Renata Galamb and subject to a no-contact order, forcefully entered her residence to retrieve their child against her wishes.

During the incident, he struggled with Renata and her mother, took Renata's phone to prevent her from calling the police, and physically assaulted Renata.

The court found Marosi guilty on all counts, determining that he entered the dwelling without lawful excuse and with the requisite intent, that he knowingly or recklessly breached his no-contact order, and that the assault was not consensual nor justified by self-defence.

The defendant, S.K., was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada, involving non-consensual vaginal intercourse with the complainant, J.F., who was 15 years old at the time.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and reliable, establishing the actus reus of sexual assault.

Regarding mens rea, the court determined that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that S.K. did not take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and knew of, was wilfully blind to, or was reckless about the absence of consent.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused, Hanzen Goodfellow, was charged with aggravated assault on Asaf Moonah following a road rage incident.

The defence argued self-defence, claiming the complainant initiated the altercation by spitting and hurling racial epithets.

The court assessed the credibility of all witnesses, including the accused's son, and applied the three-part test for self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the complainant initiated the incident and that the accused's response was proportionate and motivated by parental instinct.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to disprove self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the acquittal of the accused.

The accused was found unconscious in a running vehicle on a snowbank, exhibiting signs of severe intoxication.

Charged with impaired operation and operating over 80 mg%, the defence argued a Charter s. 10(b) breach, claiming the accused's waiver of the right to counsel was not informed or unequivocal due to his condition, and challenged the impairment evidence.

The court found the accused's testimony lacked credibility and reliability.

It held that the police fulfilled their duty to inform the accused of his right to counsel, and his repeated declinations were unambiguous, not triggering a further duty to inquire despite his intoxication.

The court concluded that the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, finding the accused's physical and mental faculties were completely impaired by alcohol.

The Charter application was dismissed, and findings of guilt were entered for both counts, with the over 80 mg% count stayed under the rule against multiple convictions.

The accused, Wendel Attard, was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a collision.

The Crown alleged that Attard's vehicle, travelling at an excessive speed (112-117 km/hr in an 80 km/hr zone), collided with another vehicle making a left turn, demonstrating dangerous driving.

The defence argued that while the driving might have been dangerous, it did not constitute a "marked departure" from the standard of care required for a criminal conviction, noting that other vehicles were also exceeding the speed limit.

The court found Attard's driving objectively dangerous due to speed and inattention, but ultimately concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct amounted to a "marked departure" from the standard of care of a reasonable and prudent person.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty.

The accused, an inmate and server in a detention facility, distributed a fentanyl/carfentanil mixture to other inmates, leading to the fatal overdose of one inmate and overdoses in others.

The accused was charged with trafficking and unlawful act manslaughter.

The defence argued that the accused acted as an 'agent for the purchaser' or 'co-purchaser' and that his actions were induced by duress from the inmate hierarchy.

For the manslaughter charge, the defence claimed a lack of factual or legal causation due to alleged intervening acts (suicide, correctional authorities' failure, additional drug intake, voluntary consumption).

The court found the accused guilty of trafficking, rejecting the 'agent for the purchaser' and duress defences, as his actions were voluntary and he had safe avenues of escape.

The court also found him guilty of unlawful act manslaughter, concluding his actions were a significant contributing cause of death, and rejected all alleged intervening acts.

The defendant was charged with operating a conveyance with an excess blood alcohol concentration following a collision.

The central issue was the admissibility of the defendant's admission to police that he was driving, which he argued was compelled by the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found that the defendant's statement identifying himself as the driver was a compelled utterance under the Highway Traffic Act, given his honest and reasonable belief in the statutory duty to report the accident.

Applying the principles of the Charter, specifically section 7 (right against self-incrimination) and section 24(1) (exclusion of evidence rendering trial unfair), the court ruled that the compelled statement was inadmissible to prove the identity of the driver.

As there was no other evidence to establish identity, the defendant was found not guilty.

The court also addressed, but did not rely on, concerns regarding the ASD testing procedure, reaffirming that the lawfulness of a demand does not affect the admissibility of a breathalyzer certificate if the demand was acceded to.

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm and mischief to property following a physical altercation with his common-law partner.

The court heard conflicting evidence from the complainant and the defendant.

Applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.) regarding credibility assessment and reasonable doubt, the judge found the complainant's testimony lacked specific details regarding the mechanics of the alleged assault and phone damage.

Conversely, the defendant's version of events was deemed credible and plausible, indicating he acted in self-defence and that any injuries or property damage were unintentional.

The court concluded that the prosecution had not proven the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the defendant's acquittal on all charges.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of sexual assault against Mohamed Ali, who was accused of non-consensual vaginal intercourse with the complainant, LSM.

The accused denied vaginal intercourse, claiming other sexual touching was consensual.

The court applied the principles of R. v. W.(D) to assess the conflicting evidence.

The accused's testimony was found to be inconsistent and not credible, particularly regarding his statements about ejaculation and his responses to the complainant's accusations.

The complainant's evidence was deemed credible and corroborated by forensic evidence (presence of the accused's semen in her vagina) and the accused's post-incident text messages.

The court rejected defence arguments based on "rape myths" concerning the complainant's behaviour and found that a breach of the Browne v. Dunn rule by defence counsel did not affect the outcome.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The defendant, H.K., was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of a person under 16.

The defence argued that a second alleged meeting between the defendant and the complainant, during which the assault purportedly occurred, did not happen.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding the second meeting inconsistent and unreliable, particularly concerning the absence of corroborating text messages she claimed existed.

Due to these significant discrepancies, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant of all charges.

The accused, Justin Thombs, brought a mid-trial Charter application under s. 8, alleging an unreasonable search and seizure of his vehicle.

The defence argued that new information regarding the grounds for the search emerged during the arresting officer's testimony, which was not disclosed pre-trial.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing it was untimely and lacked merit.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was not brought in a timely fashion and that the police had lawful grounds for the search incident to arrest, and that any potential breach regarding specific items would likely not warrant exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with Impaired Operation or Care or Control of a Motor Vehicle and Over 80 following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown conceded Charter breaches relating to the delay in making an Approved Screening Device demand and the delay in reading rights to counsel after arrest.

The court applied the section 24(2) analysis and admitted the breath sample evidence, finding that admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was found guilty of both charges, with a conditional stay entered on the Impaired Operation conviction.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of breach of probation orders prohibiting internet access and communication with minors, and with luring a person under 16 years old.

The accused brought a Charter section 8 application to exclude evidence obtained from a seized smartphone on the grounds of unreasonable search and seizure.

The court considered four alleged breaches: observation of a password gesture in public, seizure and search of cellular phones from the residence without a specific warrant, the particularity of the warrant for the target smartphone, and whether the search was overly broad.

The court found one breach regarding the warrantless search of cellular phones seized from the residence but declined to exclude the evidence from the target smartphone under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision on January 15, 2015.

The trial involved a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and the admissibility of breath sample evidence.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for arrest, having only reasonable suspicion, and that the officer's credibility and reliability were seriously compromised by inadequate notes, failure to use required recording equipment, and evasive testimony.

The court concluded that the defendant's s. 9 Charter rights against arbitrary detention were violated.

Under s. 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence obtained after the arrest, finding that the seriousness of the state misconduct outweighed other considerations.

The Crown sought to detain an Indigenous accused facing serious charges of gang sexual assault pending trial.

The accused had spent months in pretrial custody and had no surety available due to his difficult personal history, including childhood in state care and lack of family connections.

His co-accused, facing similar charges with comparable evidence, had been released on bail with family support.

The court released the accused on his own recognizance with Toronto Bail Program supervision and conditions, finding that detention was not necessary for public safety or confidence in the administration of justice.

The decision emphasizes the disproportionate incarceration of Indigenous persons and the importance of considering systemic factors and unique circumstances in bail determinations for Indigenous accused.

A youth pleaded guilty to theft of a motor vehicle, possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and failing to stop for police.

The Crown sought six months secure custody followed by probation, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence with probation and community service.

The court determined that the flight from police constituted a violent offence under section 39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, making custody an available option.

However, the court found this was not an exceptional case under section 39(1)(d).

Considering the youth's first-time offender status, guilty pleas, pre-trial custody served, positive pre-sentence report, remorse, and return to stable home environment, the court imposed an 18-month probation with 100 hours of community service instead of custody.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and while having an excessive blood alcohol concentration after being found asleep behind the wheel of his parked car in an underground garage at the Rogers Centre.

The Crown conceded that the statutory presumption of care or control was rebutted.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual care or control of the vehicle.

The court applied the analytical framework from R. v. Boudreault and found that while certain factors favored the Crown, the totality of circumstances—including that the vehicle was parked as the defendant's intended destination for sleeping, was not running, was in a fully reclined position, and the defendant had no reason to drive until after completing his next work shift—did not establish a realistic risk of danger.

The defendant was acquitted.