Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCJ

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement arising from a sexual encounter on March 1, 2024.

The complainant testified that she repeatedly communicated her lack of consent and that the defendant forced her to have intercourse despite her protests.

The defendant testified that the complainant communicated consent verbally and through conduct.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, noting that the defendant's text messages the following day constituted an adoptive admission that he engaged in sexual activity with her despite her having said no multiple times.

The court rejected the defendant's explanations for his text messages and found him guilty of sexual assault.

The forcible confinement charge was dismissed as the court was unable to rely on the complainant's description of the restraint incident.

The applicant was charged with drug and firearm offences following police searches of a residence and motor vehicles that yielded fentanyl, cocaine, a handgun, ammunition, and cash.

The applicant challenged the validity of the search warrants through a Garofoli review, arguing that the information to obtain (ITO) contained material omissions and misrepresentations that would have prevented the warrants from issuing.

The court conducted a detailed review of the ITO, made various corrections through excision and addition of information, and ultimately found that the corrected ITO provided a sufficient basis for the warrants to have issued.

The court found no deliberate misleading or recklessness by the affiant and upheld the warrants, making the evidence admissible at trial.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault against a refugee claimant with whom she was in an intimate relationship while both resided at a shelter in Toronto.

The Crown alleged two separate incidents of sexual assault in April 2022.

The accused denied the first incident and characterized the second as a consensual joke.

The court found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness, applying a trauma-informed approach to assess inconsistencies in their testimony.

The court rejected the accused's reliance on "implied consent" as a defence and found the touching to be sexual in nature.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

Robert Patterson was charged with assault causing bodily harm.

He claimed self-defence, arguing he was defending himself from the complainant who had entered his home.

The court found that while there was an "air of reality" to the self-defence claim, the defendant's subjective belief that force was being used or threatened was not credible, nor was it objectively reasonable.

Furthermore, his conduct was not for the purpose of self-defence and was unreasonable in the circumstances, particularly the continued stabbing after the complainant fell.

The defendant was found guilty.

R.R. was charged with sexual assault and voyeurism stemming from events where the complainant, T.L., became heavily intoxicated at R.R.'s dance studio.

T.L. testified that R.R. sexually assaulted her while she feigned sleep and later took a surreptitious photo of her breasts.

R.R. denied the allegations, offering alternative explanations for his actions and the social media messages exchanged.

The court found T.L.'s evidence credible and reliable, despite minor inconsistencies, and rejected R.R.'s testimony as implausible and contradictory.

R.R. was found guilty of both sexual assault and voyeurism, as the court concluded T.L. did not consent and R.R. acted with the requisite intent and in circumstances where T.L. had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The accused was charged with three counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking after surrendering drugs during a police parade following her arrest for a firearms offence.

The trial proceeded by way of a blended voir dire.

The court found that while the arrest was lawful, the police flagrantly violated the accused's Charter rights by failing to implement her right to counsel without delay for approximately four hours and by conducting an unjustified strip search without reasonable grounds specific to the accused's circumstances.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these violations and entered acquittals on all counts.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device following a traffic stop.

The officer had reasonable grounds to believe the accused had consumed alcohol and made a lawful demand for a roadside breath sample.

The accused refused the demand multiple times over approximately seven minutes, providing various reasons including frustration with the stop and claims of not having consumed alcohol.

The accused testified that he did not understand what was being asked of him and was anxious about being taken to a police station due to a prior traumatic experience with police.

The court found that the accused's refusals were unequivocal and that he understood what was being demanded of him, despite his testimony to the contrary.

The court rejected the accused's explanations and found him guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert witness to provide opinion evidence regarding factual characteristics indicative of cocaine trafficking.

The defence objected on the basis that the officer was not properly qualified under the fourth Mohan criterion.

The court found that the Crown had not established that the officer understood her primary duty to the court rather than to the Crown.

The application to present opinion evidence was dismissed.

The charge was subsequently resolved by guilty plea to simple possession of cocaine.

A sexual assault trial involving allegations of non-consensual sexual activity.

The Crown alleged that the accused engaged in sexual intercourse without the complainant's subjective consent.

The case hinged on whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity and, alternatively, whether the accused held an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The trial was divided into three phases: consensual foreplay on a couch, bedroom intercourse, and a second act of intercourse.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's lack of subjective consent and dismissed the charge.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual interference, three counts of incest, two counts of sexual assault, and one count of making child pornography.

The offences involved the systematic sexual abuse of the accused's three biological daughters over approximately ten years, beginning when each was approximately thirteen years old.

The abuse included multiple acts of sexual intercourse, forced masturbation, forced oral sex, and digital penetration.

The accused also took nude photographs of his youngest daughter.

All three victims have intellectual disabilities.

The court imposed an 11-year penitentiary sentence, with ancillary orders including a lifetime SOIRA registration, DNA order, and lifetime Section 161 order.

The defendants brought a preliminary motion seeking to excise from an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant references to the unlawful search of a third party's vehicle in which cocaine was found.

The search had been previously determined to be unlawful by another justice.

The Crown opposed the excision, arguing the defendants lacked standing to challenge a third party's search.

The court held that while the defendants could not challenge the lawfulness of the third party search itself, they could seek excision of evidence obtained through a judicially determined Charter breach to prevent the state from benefiting from illegal police conduct.

The court granted the motion and excised all references to the stop, arrest, and seizure from the third party's vehicle.

The accused was charged with three offences arising from incidents on September 7, 2015: fraudulently obtaining beverages at a bar, threatening bodily harm to a patron, and assaulting another individual.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused fraudulently obtained beverages by ordering drinks, offering insufficient payment, and leaving without paying.

The accused was found guilty of threatening serious bodily harm after losing his temper and threatening to hit the patron with a chair and kick him in the ribs.

However, the assault charge was dismissed due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the accused's assault on the victim's companion was committed as part of a common purpose to assault the victim or was an independent act of malice.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

He challenged the admissibility of breath test results, claiming violations of his Charter rights under sections 8 and 10(b).

The defendant argued that he was not adequately informed of his right to free legal advice at the roadside before providing samples to the approved screening device.

The court found that the police fully complied with the informational requirements of section 10(b) and that any confusion on the defendant's part was not apparent to the officers.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown's case relied on observations from truck stop employees who reported a suspected impaired driver, police observations of the accused's vehicle and physical condition, and breath analysis results.

The defence challenged the reliability of the approved screening device test on Charter grounds, arguing the officer failed to consider the possibility of mouth alcohol contamination.

The court found no Charter breach, as the officer reasonably concluded no evidence suggested recent alcohol consumption within 15 minutes of the test.

The court convicted the accused on both counts based on the totality of evidence demonstrating impairment.

A young person (C.L.), age 14 at the time of the alleged offences, was charged with sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault against a younger complainant (J.P.), age 9 at the time.

The complainant alleged that C.L. forced him to perform oral sex on multiple occasions between November and December 2014.

The defence denied all allegations.

The case turned primarily on credibility assessment.

The court found that while the complainant was an impressive witness for his age, significant discrepancies existed regarding how the allegations were initially disclosed.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault by wounding and uttering a threat to cause death following an incident in which she stabbed the complainant twice.

The Crown's case relied on the evidence of the complainant and a witness.

The defendant testified that she acted in self-defence after being thrown to the ground and pinned down by the complainant, who was about to punch her.

The trial judge found credibility issues with all three witnesses but determined that the defendant's evidence, while not fully believed, left reasonable doubt regarding the circumstances of the incident and the availability of self-defence.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with uttering threats to cause death, assault with a weapon (hammer), and simple assault against his spouse.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the testimony of the complainant, while the defence called the accused and a police officer.

The trial involved a credibility assessment of conflicting accounts regarding three alleged incidents: a threat to kill and bury the complainant, an attack with a hammer at a trailer, and a kitchen assault.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding a statement made on the eve of trial that appeared to conflate separate incidents.

Despite finding the complainant largely credible, the court determined that reasonable doubt existed on all charges due to unexplained inconsistencies, the erratic nature of the complainant's testimony, and ambiguities in the medical evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and "over 80" following a traffic stop in the early morning hours.

The court found that while the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the impaired driving arrest, the breathalyzer evidence was admissible under the Charter s. 24(2) test.

The court also found breaches of the accused's s. 9 rights due to arbitrary detention both at the point of arrest and through "overholding" in police custody, but declined to grant a stay of proceedings.

The accused was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of "over 80."

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit (over 80) following a traffic stop in downtown Toronto.

The defendant conceded all factual elements of the Crown's case but challenged whether police complied with the Charter right to counsel of choice under section 10(b).

The defendant indicated a desire to speak with a friend he believed to be a lawyer, but police did not adequately facilitate this request before offering duty counsel.

The court found a breach of the defendant's section 10(b) rights and excluded the breath test evidence as the appropriate remedy under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal on the over 80 charge.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision where the trial judge rejected a joint submission for 30 days imprisonment on two counts of driving while suspended contrary to section 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, instead imposing 18 months probation.

The appellate court found that the trial judge applied an incorrect standard by finding the proposed sentence "excessive" rather than determining whether it was contrary to the public interest and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court held that the 30-day sentence was within the reasonable range and that the trial judge erred in undercutting the joint submission.

The appeals were dismissed as the accused had completed the probation period.