Civil Litigation - Defendant - ONCJ

The applicant, charged with an owner liability red-light camera offence under the Highway Traffic Act, brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of her s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The respondent argued that s. 11(b) did not apply to such offences or, alternatively, that the delay was reasonable.

The court found that s. 11(b) does apply to these quasi-criminal proceedings, as they possess the indicia of criminal prosecutions and the penalties are penal in nature.

However, upon calculating the delay, the court determined that the net delay, after accounting for defence delay, fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

Consequently, the applicant's motion was dismissed.

The mother (B.J.) brought a motion seeking an order for family reunification/reintegration therapy involving herself, the father (D.M.), and their child (S.M.).

The father and the Office of the Children's Lawyer opposed the motion, citing the child's strong and consistent views against contact with the mother.

The court found that the child's views were significantly influenced by the father, who displayed a lack of willingness to support the child's relationship with the mother and a disregard for judicial process.

Despite the child's stated reluctance, the court determined that reunification therapy was in the child's best interests, given the profound negative influence exerted by the father and the potential long-term negative effects on the child's emotional and psychological well-being.

The motion was granted, ordering all parties to attend and participate in the therapy, with costs to be shared equally.

The Respondent Mother brought a motion seeking police enforcement of a final order and supervised parenting time for the Applicant Father.

She alleged the Applicant Father overheld the child in Montreal, contrary to a previous order, and has a history of disobeying court orders, including a restraining order and prior parenting time orders that required police intervention.

The Applicant Father argued his actions were justified by concerns about the child being taken to Cambodia and that his past breaches were irrelevant or excusable.

The court found the Applicant Father's history of non-compliance and threatening behaviour constituted family violence, demonstrating a pattern of coercive and controlling conduct.

The motion was granted, ordering supervised in-person parenting time for the Applicant Father due to concerns about his trustworthiness, the child's emotional safety, and threats made.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion for final orders regarding the child E., including joint custody to the father and paternal grandmother, decision-making authority to the father, and discretionary supervised access for the mother.

The mother opposed, seeking joint custody and generous unsupervised access.

The court applied the Hryniak framework for summary judgment, with the caution required in child protection cases (Kawartha principles).

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother's untreated mental health issues, history of instability, and failure to engage with services.

The court granted the Society's requested orders, finding them to be in the child's best interests, and dismissed the mother's opposing requests.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a protection finding and an order for extended care for the child.

The parents opposed, arguing the Society's evidence was deficient.

The court found the Society's affidavits largely inadmissible hearsay and not specifically prepared for a summary judgment motion, failing to meet the evidentiary standard for disposition.

However, the court did make a protection finding under section 74(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act, based on the mother's admitted illegal drug use, which was undisputed.

The motion for summary judgment regarding disposition (placement and access) was dismissed, and the matter was adjourned for a trial management conference.

This is a costs endorsement following a trial on parenting and child support issues.

The applicant mother sought $4,000 in costs, while the respondent father requested no costs.

The court found the mother to be the successful party, particularly as her offer to settle was more favourable than the trial outcome on most issues, including child support, travel, and documentation.

The father's conduct was deemed unreasonable due to non-compliance with court orders and financial disclosure.

The court awarded the mother $4,000 in costs, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable within 30 days, and declared this award enforceable as a support order by the Family Responsibility Office.

The applicant, as litigation guardian for two minor children, sought disclosure of records held by the Crown and Ontario Provincial Police relating to the investigation and prosecution of a young person under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The applicant sought these records to support a civil negligence action against the Children's Aid Society.

The court granted partial access to records relating to charges to which the young person pleaded guilty and charges that were withdrawn, while denying access to records relating to allegations where no charges were laid.

The court applied the statutory tests under sections 119 and 123 of the YCJA, balancing the applicant's need for disclosure against the privacy protections afforded to young persons.

The Children's Aid Society of Peel brought a motion to have the respondent mother declared a special party under the Family Law Rules and to appoint the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee as her representative.

The Society argued that the mother's mental health issues, evidenced by concerning statements made to her daughter during supervised access visits and to Society workers, demonstrated incapacity to participate in the child protection proceedings.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the mother's statements and beliefs were unusual and potentially harmful to her case, they did not constitute compelling evidence of incapacity to understand and appreciate the risks and consequences of her decisions or to participate in the proceedings.

In a child protection status review application, the Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking custody of a child who had suffered serious unexplained injuries at two months of age.

The child had been in foster care and subsequently in the care of paternal grandparents under a supervision order.

The biological mother opposed the motion, arguing that counselling she had undertaken created a genuine issue for trial regarding her ability to care for the child.

The court found that the unexplained injuries, combined with the mother's lack of insight, ongoing lack of cooperation with the Society, and the conclusions of a parenting capacity assessment, established an ongoing need for protection.

The court granted summary judgment, placing the child in the custody of the paternal grandparents with supervised access for the mother.

A child protection motion for summary judgment on disposition following a finding that the child was in need of protection.

The applicant sought an order for extended society care without access.

The parents consented to the finding of need for protection but failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment on disposition.

The court granted the motion, ordering extended society care without access to the respondent parents, finding that the child remained at risk of exposure to domestic violence and parental instability, and that the parents had failed to demonstrate capacity for meaningful engagement with access.

The accused was charged with breaching a restraining order under section 127 of the Criminal Code by communicating indirectly with the protected person through a third party.

The accused sent text messages to an intermediary stating "you should tell Beverly that I pose no threat to her" in the context of arranging access to his children.

The court found that while the communication technically violated the order, the de minimis principle applied, as the conduct was so trivial and trifling as to raise no abiding concern to public or community interest.

The charge was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion to terminate a supervision order granted on May 31, 2016, which had placed a child in the care of the father.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the return of the child to her care.

The father and the child's counsel supported the Society's request.

The court found that the child had transitioned well into the father's care, the home was stable, there were no ongoing protection concerns, and the child did not wish to meet with child protection workers or counsel.

The court granted the Society's motion and terminated the supervision order, finding no genuine issue for trial and that termination was in the child's best interests.

A child protection motion for summary judgment brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking a finding that a child is in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act, an order for crown wardship, and an order for no maternal access.

The child was apprehended at birth and had been in foster care for approximately two years with only supervised access to the mother.

The court found that the mother's severe intellectual limitations, history of unsuccessful parenting with three prior children, personality difficulties, and inability to comply with supervision orders created a risk of physical harm.

The court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring trial on the grounds for protection, disposition, or access.

A summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto seeking findings that two young children (T.D. born in 2015 and A.D.-W. born in 2016) be found in need of protection and made Crown wards without access for the purpose of adoption.

The respondent mother consented to the orders sought.

The respondent father of A.D.-W. opposed the motion, arguing there were triable issues regarding the finding of need of protection and the disposition.

The court granted the society's motion, finding both children were in need of protection due to the mother's significant cognitive and mental health limitations, history of domestic violence, and lack of engagement with services.

The father's plan involving placement with the paternal grandmother was rejected due to the grandmother's extensive child welfare history and the unsuitability of the home environment.

Both children were made Crown wards without access.

The respondent brought a motion to file an amended answer over three-and-a-half years after filing the original answer, seeking to change final orders that had been in place for nearly three years.

The respondent sought joint custody with shared residency, substantially increased access, termination of child support obligations, and dismissal of the applicant's spousal support claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that an amended answer should not be accepted in proceedings to amend final orders, and that accepting it would disadvantage the applicant and restart the entire litigation.

The court held that the proper forum for such requests is a motion to change, not an amended answer under the Family Law Rules.

The Mississaugas of the New Credit Band Council brought a motion for release of records held by Waterloo and Brant Family and Children Services relating to the current caregiver and potential alternative caregivers in a child protection proceeding.

The motion arose in the context of an upcoming trial involving competing plans for the child's placement.

The court established a two-stage test for disclosure of kin records, requiring the moving party to first demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the records are likely relevant, followed by judicial review to weigh probative value against privacy interests and public policy considerations.

Parents in a child protection proceeding brought a motion to remove the child's legal representative, Ms. Samira Ahmed of Justice for Children and Youth.

The child, nearly sixteen years old and in the care of the child protection society since February 2013, opposed the motion.

The parents argued the child lacked capacity to instruct counsel, that the representative exceeded her role, that a litigation guardian should be appointed, and that the representative had misused confidential information.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the child had clearly expressed views separate from both parents and the society, that legal representation was desirable, and that the representative had properly discharged her duties in advocating for the child's interests.

An interjurisdictional support order application brought by a father residing in Winnipeg, Manitoba against a mother residing in Sault Ste.

Marie, Ontario.

The father sought child support from the mother for their biological child and a child to whom he stood in loco parentis, and sought to vary or terminate existing support orders from British Columbia, Ontario, and Manitoba courts.

The application was converted to a case conference due to both parties' absence.

The court identified significant procedural deficiencies in the applicant's application and the respondent's failure to file required documentation, and adjourned the matter to allow both parties to cure these deficiencies.

A summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking a finding that two young children were in need of protection and an order making them Crown wards without access for the purpose of adoption.

The mother opposed the finding but agreed to Crown wardship with access.

The court found that the children were in need of protection due to exposure to domestic violence and parental substance abuse.

The court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The children were made Crown wards without access, as the mother failed to meet the statutory test for access to Crown wards under section 59(2.1) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The applicant mother sought temporary custody of the child with supervised access to the father, while the respondent father sought temporary custody with weekend access for the mother.

The father also brought a motion to transfer the case from Toronto to Peel.

The court found that the child had thrived in the father's primary care for several years and that the mother's allegations of abuse were not proven on a balance of probabilities.

The court granted temporary custody to the father, imposed strict conditions on the mother's access, and transferred the case to Peel where the child ordinarily resides.