Civil Litigation - Defendant - ONCJ

The respondent sought an order for the release of transcripts from ten past settlement and case conferences (2012-2020) and a waiver of associated fees, citing hearing difficulties and the need for appeals.

The applicant opposed, arguing the transcripts were irrelevant to the current appeals and that conference discussions are confidential.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no legitimate need for the transcripts that outweighed the confidentiality of settlement discussions, and affirmed it lacked jurisdiction to waive fees.

This is an appeal from a conviction for three counts of careless driving causing bodily harm and the dismissal of an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of a roadside statement, the trial judge's finding of guilt and sufficiency of reasons, and the ruling on unreasonable delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including a request to admit fresh evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in law, no unreasonable verdict, and no miscarriage of justice regarding the voluntariness of the statement, the conviction, or the 11(b) application.

This is a costs endorsement following the respondent's successful motion for summary judgment, which dismissed the applicant's claims in their entirety.

The respondent sought full recovery costs, arguing the applicant acted aggressively and in bad faith.

The court found the applicant's conduct, including baseless accusations and attacks on opposing counsel, constituted bad faith.

Consequently, costs were assessed on a full recovery basis, though the claimed amount was reduced, and the applicant was ordered to pay $13,560 immediately.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) brought an urgent motion to set aside a Summons to Witness served by Kina Gbezhgomi Child and Family Services (Kina) on the child A.L.P. in a Secure Treatment Application proceeding.

Kina sought to question the child, arguing it was permissible under the Family Law Rules.

The OCL argued that Secure Treatment Applications fall under Part VII of the CYFSA, not Part V (Child Protection), and therefore Rule 20(3) regarding questioning as a right does not apply.

The court agreed with the OCL, finding that Rule 20(3) does not apply to Secure Treatment Applications and that Kina should have brought a motion under Rule 20(5) for an order to question the child, which it failed to do.

The OCL's motion was granted, and the Summons to Witness was set aside.

This ruling provides the judge's full reasons for citing defence counsel, Ms. Eliany, in contempt.

The contempt arose from Ms. Eliany's refusal to provide a requested memorandum outlining her position on a s. 276 application during a judicial pre-trial conference.

The court affirmed its authority under s. 625 of the Criminal Code to order such a memo, emphasizing the importance of meaningful participation in pre-trials to promote fair and expeditious hearings and efficient case management.

The judge found that Ms. Eliany's refusal to comply with the order constituted a failure to effectively participate in the pre-trial process.

The court issued a costs endorsement following a four-day trial on parenting and support.

The mother (applicant) was largely successful on parenting and more successful on financial issues, including imputed income and spousal support.

The father (respondent) engaged in serious unreasonable behaviour by breaching court orders regarding the child's return to Canada.

However, the mother was found to have acted in bad faith by altering a text message.

The court awarded the mother $20,000 in costs, but ordered her to pay the father $5,000 due to her bad faith, resulting in a net costs award of $15,000 to the mother, payable in installments.

Claude Laporte appealed his conviction for failing to comply with an Order to Comply under the Building Code Act.

The appeal raised four grounds: misapprehension of evidence regarding his testimony, incorrect interpretation of "build" and "owner" under the Building Code Act, improper judicial interference by raising the principle of collateral attack, and an erroneous consideration of the defence of officially induced error.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, confirming the applicability of the collateral attack principle to administrative orders, and rejecting the officially induced error defence.

The applicant (mother) sought costs of $15,000 after a successful two-day trial concerning parenting and support arrangements.

The respondent (father) requested no costs or a fixed amount of $2,000.

The court found the mother to be the more successful party, despite some divided success on issues and her failure to make a parenting offer to settle.

The father's conduct was deemed unreasonable due to his failure to provide complete and timely financial disclosure, disregard of court orders, and attempts to intimidate the mother.

The court awarded the mother $11,521 in costs, payable by the father over three years, subject to his ongoing support and costs payments.

The court declined to order costs paid directly to Legal Aid Ontario, affirming that legally aided clients stand in the same position as other litigants regarding costs.

The accused brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 20.9 months (637 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court deducted 21 days for defence-caused delay but found no basis to deduct time for the COVID-19 pandemic without specific evidentiary foundation.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay or demonstrate that the case was particularly complex.

The court found a breach of the accused's s. 11(b) Charter right and entered a stay of proceedings.

The applicant, Alex Yizhak, sought to make inquiries of the presiding judge regarding her health-related leave, which had impacted the deliberative period of his criminal trial.

These inquiries were intended to support a s. 11(b) application for unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the request, finding that the information already provided was sufficient, the questions amounted to an improper cross-examination of the judge, probed into private health information, and resembled a public inquiry beyond the scope of a criminal trial.

This decision addresses costs arising from motions concerning the lifting of a stay order and the imposition of pre-conditions, including security for costs.

The court found divided success but determined the father (respondent) was more successful as meaningful pre-conditions were ordered for the mother (applicant) to lift the stay, particularly regarding her long-standing failure to provide financial disclosure.

The mother's unreasonable conduct in failing to provide adequate financial disclosure led to additional costs.

The court awarded the father $3,600 in costs, payable monthly, with 50% ($1,800) designated as support and enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office.

The Child and Family Services of Grand Erie applied for a warrant under section 81(2) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act to apprehend four children from their mother, S.S. This was the second such application, the first having been denied.

The court denied the application again, finding that the Society failed to establish imminent risk, explore less restrictive alternatives, or provide full and fair disclosure of the previous denial and its reasons.

The court emphasized the parent's right to refuse ongoing services and cautioned against the Society's practice of re-litigating the same issue without substantially new evidence, bordering on res judicata.

The Respondent brought a motion seeking an order to compel an Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) clinician to attend for questioning and produce records related to an OCL report.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Respondent failed to satisfy the three-part test under Family Law Rule 20(5) for compelling a non-party's attendance.

Additionally, the Respondent had not filed a statement disputing the OCL report within the timelines required by Family Law Rule 21(e), rendering the report uncontested evidence.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a child protection application and a motion for temporary care and custody of three children, seeking a supervision order for the mother (K.M.).

The father (D.L.) did not appear.

The court addressed procedural fairness, noting the Society's failure to provide adequate notice for both the application (30 days required) and the motion (6 days required), as materials were filed and the first court date set only four days later.

The judge declined to abridge time, finding the Society's procedure unfair and tantamount to ex parte proceedings.

Despite the Society's request for a supervision order under s.94(2)(b) of the CYFSA, the court ordered temporary care and custody to the mother without supervision under s.94(2)(a), emphasizing fairness and the lack of pressing concerns for the children.

The applicant brought an urgent motion seeking the return of the child, Maddaline, to her primary care as per a separation agreement, after the respondent unilaterally withheld the child following a temporary COVID-19 arrangement.

The respondent sought to maintain primary care based on the child's stated preference.

The court found urgency due to the respondent's self-help actions in changing the long-standing status quo.

While acknowledging the child's views, the court determined that the views were potentially influenced by the circumstances created by the respondent and lacked sufficient consistency over time.

The court ordered the child's immediate return to the applicant's primary care and school in her catchment area, upholding the prior status quo.

Claims for temporary decision-making and a police assistance clause were dismissed without prejudice.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking an interim order to change the primary residence of the child, Jacob (age 8), from the mother in Ottawa back to him in Sudbury.

An earlier consent order allowed the mother to relocate to Ottawa for a 12-month clinical placement, with a review upon its completion or discontinuance.

The mother's university program was discontinued, but she remained in Ottawa without disclosing this to the father.

The court found sufficient material changes in circumstances to review or vary the previous order.

Based on the child's best interests, including the mother's difficulties managing the child's behaviour, her questionable judgments, and the father's stable environment and family support in Sudbury, the court ordered interim decision-making responsibility and primary residence to the father.

The father, Cletus Oppong Wiafe, sought costs after a two-week trial concerning parenting and child support.

The court found the father to be the more successful party at trial, particularly on the dominant issue of the child's primary residence.

The mother, Gifty Afoakwa-Yeboah, failed to make costs submissions and exhibited unreasonable litigation conduct throughout the case, including non-compliance with court orders, late filings, exceeding page limits, and making unsupported allegations.

Despite the mother's inability to pay, the court declined to discount the costs award due to her reckless and unreasonable conduct, emphasizing the need to uphold the integrity of the justice system.

The court awarded the father $3,000 for production motions and $72,000 for trial costs.

The applicant sought leave to amend his motion to change to include a request for custody of the child, with the respondent seeking to transfer the matter to Orillia and increase child support based on the applicant's higher disclosed income.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to amend, finding no material change in circumstances warranting a custody claim.

The court granted the respondent's motion to transfer the matter to Orillia as the more convenient forum.

The court also increased child support from $446.83 to $540.13 per month based on the applicant's 2017 disclosed income of $58,430.00, effective November 1, 2018.

This is a costs decision arising from a motion to change spousal support brought by the husband.

The husband sought to reduce spousal support from $2,300 per month to $530 per month, retroactive to June 1, 2016.

The wife responded to the motion and made counter-claims for security of spousal support through life insurance.

The husband withdrew his motion after the wife responded and did not attend any subsequent court dates.

The wife was successful in obtaining orders for life insurance security and other protections.

The court awarded costs to the wife on a substantial recovery basis, finding the husband's conduct unreasonable and his failure to respond to the costs claim unopposed.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that a newborn child (A.G.) was in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act and requesting an order for crown wardship with no access.

The respondent parents had executed a written custody agreement transferring sole custody of the child to a third party (A.G.1) on the day of the child's birth.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring trial on multiple grounds: (1) the identity of the person having charge of the child at the time of apprehension; (2) the validity and legal effect of the custody agreement; (3) whether A.G.1 qualifies as a statutory party to the proceeding; (4) whether the grounds for finding the child in need of protection (abandonment and risk of physical harm) were established; and (5) procedural and temporal issues arising from delays in the proceedings.