Administrative Law - ONCJ

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion seeking a non-removal order to prevent the deportation of a mother and one of her two children to St. Lucia, where a removal order had been issued by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

The mother and one child lacked legal residency status in Canada, while the other child was a Canadian citizen.

The society had commenced child protection proceedings in 2013 and obtained multiple supervision orders based on ongoing protection concerns.

The court found that a genuine lis existed in the child protection proceeding, that the supervision order would be directly contravened by enforcement of the removal order, and that the Minister had been given full opportunity to make submissions.

The court granted the non-removal order, finding that the supervision order acts as an automatic stay of the removal order under paragraph 50(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The defendant, a member of the Royal Canadian Legion, organized and promoted two vacation packages without being registered as a travel agent under the Travel Industry Act.

The Bahamas cruise package resulted in $25,089.91 in losses to 104 victims, and the Hawaii vacation package resulted in $45,500.00 in losses with no value delivered.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of acting as a travel agent without registration.

At sentencing, the court found aggravated moral wrongdoing, including misappropriation of funds, continued promotion of trips while unable to deliver, and deliberate deception of victims.

The court imposed intermittent jail sentences totaling 75 days on the primary count and 45 days concurrent on the secondary count, rejecting arguments for a non-custodial sentence despite the defendant's lack of prior record and extensive volunteer history.

An application under section 74 of the Firearms Act to review the Chief Firearms Officer's decision to revoke the applicant's firearms licence.

The applicant, a retired military officer with PTSD and a history of alcohol abuse, had his licence revoked following several incidents involving mental health crises and impaired driving between October 2017 and September 2018.

The applicant sought to overturn the revocation, presenting new medical evidence from specialized treatment providers indicating significant improvement in his condition, abstinence from alcohol, and minimal risk regarding firearm possession.

The court found the original decision reasonable but determined that the new medical evidence was substantial enough to undermine the factual assumptions underlying the revocation decision and granted the application.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed by a Justice of the Peace after the respondent pleaded guilty to leaving the roadway not in safety contrary to section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The respondent had originally been charged with careless driving but agreed to plead guilty to the reduced charge.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a $500 fine with 180 days to pay.

The Justice of the Peace imposed a $350 fine instead, undercutting the joint submission.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to invite further submissions before rejecting the joint submission and by failing to make a finding that the submission was contrary to the public interest.

The court also criticized the trial judge's comments regarding the victim fine surcharge and its comparison to Criminal Code provisions.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with a Property Standards Order issued by the City of Pickering under the Building Code Act, 1992.

The order required the defendant to remedy violations on his residential property, including removing inoperative vehicles, garbage, and debris from the yard by May 17, 2018.

When the defendant failed to comply, the municipality attended the property with contractors and removed items from the yard.

The defendant challenged the conviction on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court rejected both Charter applications and convicted the defendant.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection on grounds of risk of physical harm and risk of emotional harm, a disposition order of deemed sole custody to the mother, and an order for supervised access to the father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society had not established a genuine issue requiring trial on either ground for finding.

The court noted that while the father exhibited difficult behaviour, there was no credible evidence of a mental health disorder causally connected to risk of physical harm, and no evidence of emotional harm to the children.

The court also expressed concerns about the disposition sought and the practical feasibility of the proposed access arrangement.

The Regional Municipality of York appealed acquittals on six Building Code Act charges arising from Orders to Comply issued in 2013 for unauthorized construction at a marina property.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent on the basis that the 2013 Orders were identical to Orders issued in 1996, and that the respondent had complied with the earlier Orders.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by permitting a collateral attack on the 2013 Orders, which had not been appealed to the Superior Court as required by statute.

The court also rejected defences of due diligence, estoppel, laches, and officially induced error.

The acquittals were overturned and convictions were entered on all counts, with fines of $100 per count totalling $600.

The Crown brought an application to vacate the preliminary inquiry date and remand the accused to Superior Court following amendments to the Criminal Code effective September 19, 2019, which restricted preliminary inquiries to offences carrying a maximum sentence of fourteen years or more.

The accused had elected for trial by judge and jury with a preliminary inquiry prior to the amendments coming into force.

The court considered whether the amendments applied retrospectively to cases already in the system.

The court found that a Superior Court decision on a prerogative writ application (R. v. R.S., 2019 ONSC 5497) was binding authority establishing that the amendments applied retrospectively as procedural changes affecting court jurisdiction.

The Crown's application was allowed, the preliminary inquiry was vacated, and the accused was given the opportunity to re-elect pursuant to section 536(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown brought applications to quash preliminary inquiry requests made by defendants before new provisions limiting preliminary inquiries came into effect on September 19, 2019.

The new provisions restrict preliminary inquiries to cases where the maximum penalty is at least 14 years imprisonment.

The defendants faced indictable offences with maximum penalties less than 14 years.

The court considered whether the new section 535 of the Criminal Code applied retrospectively to eliminate jurisdiction over previously valid preliminary inquiry requests.

The Crown argued the amendments were purely procedural and applied retrospectively.

The defence argued the court retained jurisdiction over validly requested inquiries.

The court found itself bound by a Superior Court decision granting the Crown's certiorari application in a related case and allowed the Crown's applications, finding the defendants' preliminary inquiry requests to be of no force and effect.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in a prosecution under the Smoke Free Ontario Act for selling tobacco to a minor.

The respondent corporation operated a truck stop convenience store where a 17-year-old purchased cigarettes without being asked for identification.

The Crown alleged the trial justice erred in finding the respondent established the due diligence defence.

The appeal court upheld the acquittal, finding the respondent had implemented comprehensive training, supervision, and compliance measures that resulted in three years of successful compliance checks following prior enforcement notices.

A child protection agency brought an application seeking temporary care and custody of two children.

The respondent mother challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the agency failed to comply with statutory timelines for bringing the matter before the court.

The central issue was whether a customary care agreement was validly executed and, if not, whether the agency's failure to commence proceedings within five days of removing the children from the mother's care resulted in a loss of jurisdiction.

The court found that the consent to the customary care agreement was invalid due to lack of voluntariness and absence of independent legal advice, and that the mother's subsequent revocation of consent was clear and unequivocal.

The court concluded that the agency's failure to bring the matter before the court within the statutory five-day period resulted in a loss of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving a commercial motor vehicle with a major defect, contrary to section 107 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defects included inoperative brakes on a trailer and a crack in a wheel rim, discovered during an MTO inspection on June 18, 2017.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: lack of evidence of proper service of summons, improper application of credibility assessment principles, and failure to consider the due diligence defence.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, finding that the summons was properly served, the trial judge correctly applied the W.D. analysis, and the trial judge properly assessed whether the appellant met the due diligence standard for a strict liability offence.

The appellant, a company convicted of breaching a municipal zoning bylaw by stacking shipping containers to a height exceeding the maximum permitted height of 5 metres, appealed the conviction and sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The fresh evidence consisted of internet-sourced information regarding standard shipping container sizes.

The court dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding that the evidence was available and discoverable at trial, the issue of container height was clearly foreseeable, and the appellant's legal counsel had been aware of and addressed this issue during trial.

The appellant's decision not to call evidence at trial was an informed tactical decision by counsel, and the appellant could not now introduce such evidence on appeal.

The Electrical Safety Authority sought a pre-sentencing order compelling the defendant to produce personal and business financial documents to assist in determining an appropriate fine.

The defendant had been convicted of operating an electrical contracting business without a valid license under the Electricity Act, 1998.

The court held that while a sentencing court has implied jurisdiction under s. 57(3) of the Provincial Offences Act to compel production of financial documents in exceptional circumstances, the prosecution failed to establish such exceptional circumstances in this case.

The application was dismissed as premature.

The defendant was convicted of twenty-two offences under the Ontario Fire Code for failing to maintain fire safety standards in a multi-unit residential building.

The offences included creating hazards not allowed in the original building design, failing to maintain interconnected smoke alarms, and failing to maintain fire separations and closures.

The defendant had a significant history of prior convictions for similar regulatory offences across multiple properties.

The court imposed a sentence of twenty-one days incarceration and fines totalling $34,000, balancing the goals of general and specific deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation against the principle of proportionality.

Three separate speeding prosecutions were consolidated to address a recurring legal issue regarding sentencing discretion in the early resolution process.

The defendants were charged with speeding offences under section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Following early resolution meetings, the prosecution and defence jointly proposed fines significantly exceeding the applicable set fines and fixed fines.

The court held that it lacked authority to impose fines beyond those prescribed by statute, and that the early resolution process under the Provincial Offences Act limits judicial discretion to either the applicable set fine or the fixed fine specified in section 128(14) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The court rejected the joint submissions as unlawful.

The applicant appealed an order under the Dog Owner's Liability Act requiring that his dog be destroyed.

A stay of the destruction order was granted pending the appeal.

The applicant then applied for the dog to be returned to his custody pending the hearing of the appeal, subject to conditions ensuring the dog remained on his property.

The court dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant such an order.

While the court recognized it had ancillary jurisdiction to stay the destruction order itself (to prevent frustration of the appeal), it held that returning the dog to the applicant's custody was not necessary to prevent frustration of the appeal and therefore fell outside the court's jurisdiction.

The applicant sought a refraining order to prevent the Director of the Family Responsibility Office from directing the suspension of his driver's licence pursuant to a Final Notice dated November 1, 2018.

The applicant had previously obtained a refraining order in August 2017 on terms requiring him to bring a motion to change the underlying support order and make specified monthly payments.

The applicant failed to comply with these terms, causing the refraining order to terminate automatically.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction to grant a refraining order in response to a Final Notice, as the statutory framework under Part V of the Family Arrears and Support Enforcement Act permits refraining orders only in response to a First Notice.

The motion was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Crown appealed a conviction entered against the respondent for failing to signal a lane change under the Highway Traffic Act.

The respondent appeared twice requesting adjournments but failed to appear when the trial was called.

The Justice of the Peace entered a conviction pursuant to section 9.1(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding that section 9.1(1) applied when the respondent failed to appear at the time and place appointed for trial, and that the respondent's conduct demonstrated he wished to defer the outcome rather than have his day in court.

The appellant appealed his conviction for disobeying a stop sign contrary to section 136 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal raised four grounds: improper denial of an adjournment application, failure to afford meaningful opportunity to review disclosure, conviction by section 54 rather than section 9.1 of the Provincial Offences Act, and insufficient evidence of identification.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the adjournment was properly denied, the brief hold-down for disclosure review was reasonable, section 54 was the appropriate procedure, and identification evidence was sufficient.